Introducing the Army's First Transformed Light Support Battalion

The Army’s transition to a division-focused structure as the unit of action has introduced a new paradigm in logistics and sustainment. Departing from modular logistics and units, the Army will test new technologies and organizational changes with transformation in contact (TiC). The 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division; 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division; and 2nd BCT, 25th Infantry Division (ID) were selected as pilot brigades for this initiative. Supporting 2/25 BCT, the 225th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) transformed into the first light support battalion (LSB) using the original U.S. Army Combined Support Command (CASCOM) force design update (FDU), emphasizing increased efficiency, flexibility, and readiness.

CASCOM developed the foundational FDU, which was provided to the 25th ID upon notification of the TiC initiative in February 2024. This design echoed principles from the past Army of Excellence structure with support platoons historically organic to maneuver formations. CASCOM later introduced an alternate design, which redesignated forward support companies (FSCs) as combat logistics companies while retaining company-level leadership. The 225th LSB adopted the original FDU, conducting in-depth analysis to tailor the organization to its operational requirements. The transformation was executed on April 2, 2024, and rigorously tested during the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) 25-01 exercise. Notably, the 225th LSB is the only battalion to validate the original FDU model, while the two other brigades implemented the proposed alternate design.

Transitioning from the brigade as the unit of action to the division as the focal point requires a philosophical shift in sustainment operations. The return to an Army of Excellence model supports large-scale combat operations (LSCO) while moving away from modular designs optimized for counterinsurgency. Consolidated logistics elements improve efficiency, enhance military occupational specialty (MOS) training proficiency, and ensure flexible mission adaptation. The consolidation requires that higher echelons assume increased sustainment responsibilities, aligning forces with projected requirements. Comprehensive logistics planning becomes paramount, requiring additional analysis and more refined forecasts.

Key structural changes included the deactivation of FSCs supporting two infantry battalions and the cavalry squadron. Maintenance Soldiers were centralized under the field maintenance company and assigned to one of three combat repair teams (CRTs) aligned with the maneuver battalions. Distribution, fuel, and water specialists were reassigned to the general support company (GSC), organized into combat logistics platoons (CLPs) aligned with maneuver battalions. Field feeding capabilities were integrated into the GSC. The support operations (SPO) section’s role expanded to plan and forecast sustainment activities, creating task-organized CLPs tailored for each mission requirement. The LSB commander, as chief of sustainment, directed sustainment priorities in alignment with the brigade’s operational priorities.

The 225th LSB implemented several critical adjustments to the original CASCOM FDU. Leadership was assigned over the three CRTs in the form of a platoon leader and platoon sergeant due to the lack of direct oversight in garrison. The automotive platoon could not absorb additional personnel due to that hefty responsibility. Specific personnel positions, such as S-1 staff and low-density MOS enlisted Soldiers, that were templated to be eliminated were retained based on operational requirements. Maintenance personnel were redistributed to technical sections from the proposed CRTs, enabling sections to balance their workload and increase training proficiency. For example, wheeled mechanics joined the automotive section, while armament specialists and computer/detection systems repairers joined the armament and electronics communication maintenance shops. Field feeding personnel and equipment from across the brigade were centralized under the GSC commander, an overdue consolidation that the brigade was planning before TiC.

Army Techniques Publication 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, states that FSCs “may be attached to or under operational control (OPCON) to the supported battalion for a limited duration; a mission or phase of an operation.” However, FSCs across the Army have operated as permanently attached units to their supported battalions for decades. While BSB commanders retain the authority to influence sustainment concepts across the brigade, the control of sustainment operations for maneuver forces has largely rested with maneuver battalion commanders and their assigned FSC commander. Factors such as rating chains, routine work locations, and daily support requirements have effectively overridden the doctrinal intent that such attachments be temporary.

The original CASCOM LSB design restores the intent of this doctrine by reintroducing temporary command relationships. It also ensures maneuver commanders retain the ability to direct sustainment elements supporting their forces, particularly for planning and operational integration. Implementing an OPCON relationship shortly before training or deployment provides the benefits of a consolidated sustainment force while allowing the CLP to deploy forward to critical points of need. This flexible framework enables adjustments during operational phases or in response to enemy threats and environmental conditions. It also allows the LSB commander, through the SPO section, to reallocate resources and personnel in real time, maximizing the brigade’s operational effectiveness and eliminating redundancies or underemployed forces.

The elimination of FSCs and the introduction of CLPs were met with understandable skepticism, especially given the historical success of FSCs in providing direct support to maneuver battalions. These doubts mirror those raised during the creation of FSCs themselves, a move that initially faced resistance from leaders accustomed to legacy sustainment structures. However, 225th LSB demonstrated that a smaller, more agile sustainment force is not only feasible but advantageous in modern combat scenarios. The reduced signature and logistical footprint of the CLPs allowed for greater operational flexibility, decreasing the vulnerability of sustainment operations to enemy targeting while maintaining their responsiveness to the needs of maneuver units.

Despite skepticism about the removal of FSCs, JPMRC 25-01 validated the transformed LSB design. The reduced sustainment footprint and tailored support packages significantly improved operational efficiency. Maneuver battalion commanders’ assessments confirmed that the transformed LSB met all sustainment needs during the rigorous 14-day rotation in Hawaii’s jungle environment, and they had no concerns with sustainment during the exercise. This success underscores the adaptability of the new model and its potential for implementation across other Army units. The ability to rapidly create and deploy task-organized logistics elements proved invaluable in responding to the unique challenges posed by Hawaii’s dense, unforgiving terrain.

JPMRC 25-01 revealed the importance of robust leadership and planning in the success of the transformed LSB. The expanded role of the SPO section was instrumental in overcoming challenges associated with the new structure. By taking on the responsibility of sustainment planning and task organization, the SPO section ensured that resources were allocated effectively and in alignment with the brigade’s priorities. This level of centralized planning and decentralized execution represents a significant departure from previous sustainment models. The new model places greater emphasis on operational oversight, ensuring that sustainment plans are fully integrated into the brigade’s overall operational concept.

While the transformed LSB demonstrated success, challenges remain. The field maintenance company’s single maintenance control officer must oversee brigade-wide maintenance, a demanding responsibility for a relatively inexperienced lieutenant. This issue highlights the need for additional support at higher echelons to ensure that maintenance operations can be conducted effectively without overburdening key individuals. Furthermore, the consolidation of sustainment personnel and assets introduces a gap between support elements and the units they serve. This separation could lead to delays or misalignments in sustainment operations if not carefully managed through deliberate planning and communication.

The proposed integration of LSBs under division support brigades raises concerns about bureaucratic complexity. This alignment offers opportunities for greater coordination and resource sharing, but it also requires deliberate effort to prevent priority misalignment and to ensure that sustainment operations remain responsive to the needs of maneuver units. The success of the transformed LSB depends on the ability of leaders to navigate these challenges and maintain the focus on providing timely, effective support to the warfighter.

The LSB stands at the forefront of the Army’s transformation efforts. By embracing innovative organizational models and doctrinal shifts, the 225th LSB has redefined the sustainment landscape, paving the way for the Army’s refocus on LSCO. This fundamental evolution underscores the importance of adapting sustainment practices to meet the challenges of modern warfare.

Looking ahead, the lessons learned from the 225th LSB’s experience will be critical in shaping the future of Army sustainment. The success of the transformed LSB highlights the potential for similar models to be implemented across other units. It also emphasizes the need for continued innovation and adaptation. As the Army continues to evolve in response to emerging threats and operational requirements, the sustainment community must remain agile, forward thinking, and committed to excellence. The transformed LSB represents a bold step forward in this journey, providing a blueprint for the future of Army sustainment.

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LTC Jason Kappes serves as the commander of the 225th Light Support Battalion supporting the 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype) in the 25th Infantry Division (ID), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He previously served as a professor of military science for the University of Puerto Rico-Mayaguez, as the chief of staff for the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force in Sicily, and as the group S-4 for the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He previously commanded the field maintenance company in the 703rd Brigade Support Battalion in 3rd ID. He has a Master of Business Administration degree in information sciences from American Military University.

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This article was published in the spring 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.

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