Combined Arms in Urban Operations: Insights into ATP 3-06.11

While serving as a platoon leader in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), I taught a class on strong points in an urban defense. As a Blackhorse trooper with 11 ACR, my primary re­sponsibility was to lead an opposing force (OPFOR) platoon in ten rotations a year against rotational training unit (RTU) at Ft. Irwin, CA. After executing 20 rotations, I developed experience with military operations in urban ter­rain (MOUT), training at some of the US Army’s premiere urban training fa­cilities, such as Razish.

The class I taught was in support of the second ever Urban Operation Planners Course (UOPC), organized and hosted by the 40th Infantry Division. It was a valuable experience, where I had the opportunity to meet senior officers from US Army units and allied nations all attending as students. While lead­ing this class, I worked with personnel from the National Training Center Op­erations Group (Ops Group).

Two years later, I had the opportunity to revisit NTC again, this time as a stu­dent of UOPC. The curriculum of the UOPC, combined with the practical ex­perience I gained as OPFOR, validated the perspective I had gained about combined arms in urban terrain.

From both experiences, I realized that there is a knowledge and training gap within brigade combat teams for how to conduct combined arms urban op­erations. The Army has made recent headway with the publication of army training publication (ATP) 3-06.11, Bri­gade Combat Team Urban Operations. This publication supersedes ATP 3-06.11 published in 2011.(1) The earlier publication opened with the statement that urban operations are “infantry centric.” While relevant to the counter­insurgency era in which the doctrine was published, this statement reinforc­es the need for updated urban opera­tion doctrine.

While attending UOPC, a common trend conveyed by the observer con­troller/trainers (OC/Ts) at Fort Irwin was that RTU struggled to employ com­bined arms in urban terrain. This infor­mation reinforces that RTU is not in­corporating training at the home sta­tion that prepares them to win in the urban environment. On the other hand, units that would use armor and engineers with infantry have experi­enced success attacking Razish.

The Ukrainian War and the Israel-Hamas War demonstrate that simply bypassing a city is not always feasible or desirable. On the operational and strategic level, urban centers often consist of the “heart and guts” as de­scribed by sixteenth- century French commander Marshal de Tavannes.(2) His­tory has shown that a Nation’s capital may be a center of economic, political, and cultural gravity and that control­ling that capital is vital to controlling the nation or population.

On the tactical level terrain, lines of communication (LOCs), population control, and actor attitude all play a role in whether fighting should occur in a city. What’s more, the tactical unit will fight in a varied range of cities that range in urbanization complexity.3

Bottom line, the urban environment, with its various zone complexity bleed into today’s battlefields. In this paper, I will provide insight into the newly published ATP 3-06.11 and how the principles shared in this publication are relevant to how we equip and train our armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) at the tactical level. In this en­deavor, I also draw upon case studies from the current conflict in Ukraine, lessons shared from UOPC, and practi­cal experience I gained while assigned to 11ACR.

Doctrinal Overview

The newly published ATP 3-06.11 builds upon the foundational urban doctrine of ATP 3-06. Yet, this most re­cent doctrinal publication narrows the scope of urban operations as it applies to today’s brigade combat teams (BCTs). A quality publication, this doc­trine starts with a broad overview of the urban environment and then tran­sitions to operational approaches for the offense, defense, stability, and en­abling operations in the urban environ­ment.

Figure 1. Combined Arms Task Force (U.S. Army Graphic)

One of the unique additions into this publication is the presentation of fun­damentals for urban operations:(4)

1. Employ forces as combined arms teams.
2. Control the essential and leverage urban systems.
3. Manage the population.
4. Isolate threats.
5. Reduce collateral damage and maintain the integrity of urban systems.
6. Create a collaborative environ­ment.

While all these fundamentals apply to today’s ABCT, analyzing all these fun­damentals are well beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, the following pro­vides a discussion for three of the six fundamentals: employ forces as com­bined arms teams, manage the popu­lation, and isolate threats. I have cho­sen these three principles from the others, as these principles can more easily transfer from the higher head­quarters of a brigade down to the com­pany and platoon level of combined arms teams. Additionally, these funda­mentals can be resourced at most home station military operations in ur­ban terrain (MOUT) sites.

Figure 2. This graphic illustrates the sequence of events necessary to attack and occupy a prepared defense in an Urban environment. (Photo by CPT Evan M. Cain, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment).

Employ Forces as Combined Arms Teams

The first fundamental of urban opera­tions, employing forces as combined arms teams is essential for success in an ABCT. The urban environment plac­es more constraints on military units than any other operational environ­ment. In addition to the three-dimen­sional physical surfaces of the urban environment, population and infra­structure must also be considered when task organizing combined arms teams. Chapter 2 of ATP 3-06.11 pres­ents the following example of how a brigade combat team CAN be task or­ganized.5

In figure 1 note that in addition to in­tegration of armor and infantry; engi­neers, fires, explosive ordnance dispos­al (EOD), information operations, and civil affairs attached to the company and platoon level. While this graphic serves as an example for task organiza­tion, Chapter 2 continues to outline ways to task organize down to platoons and sections. Fundamentally, the ur­ban environment forces the brigade combat team to task organize differ­ently. The following vignette provides an example of how to complete this task organization.

Armor Integration

During Rotation 21-10, Easy Troop, 11 ACR was tasked to counterattack the RTU that previously seized Razish from defending forces in the city. The Troop’s primary avenue of approach was from the West moving through the well-known Peanut-Chod Hill gap.

During the planning and preparation phase, Easy Troop received one main battle tank (MBT) to cover the dis­mount and movement into the city. The size of the troop consisted of roughly 100 dismounted infantrymen, just short of a full infantry company.

Figure 3. Soldiers with the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, scan a simulated village with a Bradley Fighting Vehicle at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, July 21, 2024. (Photo by Spc. Rebeca Soria)

Shortly after departure, Easy Troop conducted battlefield hand off and dis­covered that RTU forces had emplaced two platoons of Abrams and Bradleys on the western portion of the city. This new information forced Easy Troop to dismount one kilometer west of the originally planned dismount point. To further complicate the troop’s attempt to reseize the city was the presence of a large-open danger area (ODA) be­tween the new dismount point and the first enemy battle position. To enable Easy Troop’s movement across this ODA, the unit emplaced their weapons squad with M240 and Javelin teams. After the weapon’s squad was em-placed, the troop commander called forward the attached MBT to suppress the enemy armor on the objective and facilitate movement across the ODA. While the use of machine gun and Jav­elin teams made a difference in their ability to gain a foothold in Razish, it was the presence of the MBT and the proficiency of the crew which made the biggest difference in Easy Troop’s survivability, allowing a successful counterattack of the city. The employ­ment of the MBT in this fashion show­cased one of the main employment roles of armor as described in ATP 3-06.11.

Easy Troop only requested one MBT in support of the dismount and seizure of Razish. Had the presence of enemy ar­mor on the objective been known sooner, Easy Troop could have request­ed a section or more of MBTs. ATP 3-06.11 describes the utility of armor to allow infantry to cross large open­ings within urban terrain and destroy enemy armor and strongpoints.6 This ad hoc task organization down to the section and platoon level is a major characteristic of urban combined arms task organization and should serve as an option in a commander’s tool kit.

While this vignette highlights the abil­ity that armor can enhance urban of­fensive operations, the same could be said for RTU in the defense who inte­grated armor into their defensive bat­tle positions. This integration success­fully thwarted Easy Troop’s ability to dismount on the objective by forcing them to dismount well before the de­sired position. Additionally, RTU suc­cessfully delayed Easy Troop’s ability to quickly seize a foothold in the city which cost precious time in their oper­ation.

Easy Troop employed similar tactics during rotation 22-02 in which they in­tegrated armored personnel carriers (APCs) and MBTs into the main city de­fense. This scenario forced Easy Troop to be more deliberate in the emplace­ment of armor within Razish by con­structing hide positions between build­ings and planning well-rehearsed bat­tle position occupations to prevent early detection of armor within the city. By integrating armor into their de­fense, Easy Troop was able to achieve greater stand-off, rate of fire, and mo­bile protection, allowing preservation of resources and infantry combat pow­er to concentrate as fighting moved further into the city.

Other Enablers

Alongside these examples, other en­ablers can and should be integrated within urban operations. Electronic warfare directional locating teams can be an effective attachment to the ma­neuver company by providing real time tactical information and refining ene­my locations in the urban space. Engi­neers are also essential in successful urban offensive and defensive opera­tions. The assistance of engineer bull­dozers and lift assets from forward support (FSC) companies are essential to build and establish a strong obstacle effort.

In the urban environment, the maneu­ver commander must deliberately con­sider all task organization options and tailor them to the mission. This vi­gnette also illustrates the possibility of pushing down assets held at the Bat­talion and Brigade level to company teams. The next example showcases the need to task organize other en­ablers not mentioned in this section, such as civil affairs, multi-function teams (MFT), and Psychological Opera­tions (PSYOP) teams.

Manage the Population

ATP 3-06.11 describes several threats and complications presented to the maneuver commander through the mismanagement of population.(7) Inter­nally displaced civilians (IDPs) can greatly outnumber military forces op­erating in the urban environment. The flow of IDPs out of contested zones may fall under the purview of Battal­ions and Brigades and failure to do so can wreak disastrous consequences to company level tactical units. Failing to direct IDPs can lead to looting, rioting, and other civil disturbances, which can impact military operations. Addition­ally, the proliferation of cellular devic­es and social media can place tactical actions on the world stage, forcing the need for brigades to also consider con­tinuous Information operations.

The doctrine later outlines how infor­mation collection teams, in the form of HUMINT, SIGINT and other teams should be incorporated in shaping the urban environment for decisive urban operations. Additionally, attaching mil­itary information support operation teams, in the form of PSYOPs and Civil Affairs can assist in communicating with the local population.(8) Use of loud­speakers, pamphlet drops, and civil re­connaissance can help with restricting inhabitants to home or central loca­tions, searches, and coordinating the movement of IDPs.

During NTC Rotation 22-02, higher headquarters directed Easy Troop to incorporate a large population of civil­ian role-players into the Razish defense to present a complex training scenario for RTU. To further complicate prepa­ration for this operation, HQ also di­rected Easy Troop to defend Razish for an uncommonly extended period. Act­ing as an indigenous fighting force, the troop commander factored in the time tasked to defend with the composition and the size of the objective. Consider­ing these operational constraints, Easy Troop chose to leverage the civilian role players by tasking them to lead a protest as RTU attempted the breach of the city.

What followed was a dramatic lesson of needing information collection teams and civil affairs integrated with ABCTs prior to conducting urban oper­ations. By sending several dozen civil­ian role players to disrupt RTU as they attempted to breach the city, Easy Troop dramatically enabled informa­tion operations and thwarted the abil­ity for the RTU to engage hostile forc­es. If the RTU properly conducted shaping information and civilian harm mitigation operations, maneuver units would have more freedom to operate unhindered.

Commanders should consider what ci­vilian harm mitigation strategies have already been taken prior to entering an urban area. This information can be es­sential when deciding what avenues of approach to direct military forces to use. Understanding shaping informa­tion operations can also help com­manders understand the attitudes and opinion of civilian populations. Control measures such as engagement criteria, weapon control status and posture can all be impacted through the manage­ment or mismanagement of popula­tion. Commanders should also inte­grate intelligence collection teams, along with Civil Affairs and PSYOP teams into planning efforts to better inform the commander of the risks in­herent with conducting urban opera­tions.

Isolate Threats

One of the four defeat mechanisms, isolation, is a tactical mission task that seeks to separate enemy forces from population, friendly units, and support capabilities. Isolation also extends to psychological and information opera­tions.(9) Physical isolation is a task in which an ABCT is particularly well de­signed. Circling back to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the battle of Mari­upol provides a good example of the need to achieve isolation for offensive forces and conversely to defeat isola­tion for defending forces.

The siege of Mariupol began on 24 February 2022 and ended on 20 May 2022.(10) Located in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, Mariupol is an urban littoral and port city whose seizure was vital to Russian forces having far side con­trol of the land bridge between Russia and Crimea. The location of Mariupol is such that for an attacking force to successfully seize the city, isolation was crucial.(11) Attacking forces consist­ed of elements from the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and the 150th Motor Rifle Division.(12&13) Russian naval, air, and special operations forces were also involved.

Having achieved the initiative, Russian forces encircled Mariupol and began assaulting the city in early March.(14) This event led to Russian forces achiev­ing large-scale isolation of the city of Mariupol. The situation mostly re­mained unchanged, with small gains until mid-March, when Russian forces began to achieve greater isolation, in­ternal to the city, separating northern Mariupol from the southern port.(15) Territorial gains were slow but continuous until early April.(16) At which point, early predictions were made that Mariupol would capitulate days afterwards. However, Ukrainian forces repelled waves of Russian advances, delaying the eventual seizure of the city. By mid- April, Russian forces cap­tured most of the city, including the port of Mariupol, but still faced an iso­lated pocket of Ukrainian fighters in the eastern part of the Azovstal facto­ry.(17) Notably, Ukrainian forces were able to repel Russian for another month until officially surrendering on 17 May.(18)

Several take aways from the Russian attack on Mariupol include the need for combined arms to achieve encircle­ment and breakthrough strong point defenses as the fight continues. Artil­lery bombardment was crucial in the opening days of the battle and use of armored vehicles and high explosive munitions helped address pockets of active Ukrainian resistance. Next is the need for speed and tempo to achieve encirclement. Russian forces were able to encircle the city in a matter of days. Thereby preventing additional rein­forcements or breakout. Finally, while Russian forces successfully isolated pockets of Ukrainian forces and steadi­ly made territorial gains. Russian forc­es were considerably delayed by the Azovstal strongpoint. The reason for this roadblock could be attributed to the air-bridge that enabled steady sup­plies and reinforcements to the facto­ry.(19) Russian fighters, while able to achieve physical isolation leading up to the Azovstal factory, were unable to achieve psychological isolation as the constant flow of reinforcements bol­stered the Ukrainian will to fight, pro­longing the battle for another month.

The ABCT is well suited to isolate threats in urban terrain. The speed, firepower, and psychological impact of the armored formation allows for a speedy isolation of the area and to sur­round a city, as the Russians demon­strated during the onset of the battle of Mariupol. At NTC, one of the most well-known operations is the seizure of the central corridor. Famous pieces of terrain like the racetrack, iron triangle, and moose gardens serve the specific purpose of allowing an attacking force to achieve isolation of the city of Ra­zish. From my observations and expe­rience, most ABCTs who cycle through NTC understand the need of this large-scale isolation of Razish and tend to fare well. On the other hand, as an op­eration progresses further in a city, ABCTs need to restructure based on operational needs.

To achieve or defeat isolation, com­manders should consider the use of the cavalry squadron and scout pla­toons. To achieve isolation, attacking forces must determine what LOCs to interdict and defending forces must know which LOCs to protect. Interdic­tion of critical LOCs in the urban area is a task in which the Armored Cavalry Squadron is well suited, as cavalry forc­es possess the speed, agility, firepow­er, and protection necessary to disrupt enemy outside the urban area during the offense. On the other hand, urban terrain can constrain the cavalry unit’s capabilities in the defense. Therefore, it is essential for cavalry forces be placed in the peripheries or outside of the urban area and use tasks such as a delay in a wider area defense.(20)

Tying it All Together

The common theme in all these exam­ples is that urban operations are a col­laborative affair, which includes the use of infantry, armor, engineers, civil affairs, and other enablers. For compa­nies and platoons to start thinking about how to fight in urban terrain, I offer the following recommendations:

1. Implement combined arms teams early and often in at training glidepath.

Drawing on the first fundamental of ur­ban operations, how a unit task orga­nizes for urban operations is crucial to success. When to implement this task organization is up to the commander. But units can start forming combined arms teams early in a unit’s training plan (UTP). Chapter 2 of ATP 3-06.11 shows that combined arms teams can be implemented to as low as the pla­toon level. This chapter also provides some scenarios in which a combined arms team with more infantry vs. ar­mor may be more appropriate and vice versa. Junior officers and NCOs should feel empowered to find creative solu­tions to the complex problem sets pre­sented to them from the urban envi­ronment.

Additionally, implementing less com­mon enablers such as multi-functional teams, civil affairs, and psychological operations would prove useful is rein­forcing the principles shared in ATP 3-06.11 that population and infrastruc­ture must be addressed in operational planning.

2. Incorporate urban training sites into all collective training exercise.

Battalions and Brigades can complete all UTPs without ever incorporating MOUT operations. While it is more common to see infantry companies and battalions incorporate aspects of urban operations into a UTP, there is a large absence of urban planning in ABCTs. Mission Essential Tasks (METs), and Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) are largely devoid of urban scenarios.

A common tendency is to view urban operations with an all-or-nothing per­spective (i.e., rural vs. megacity). How­ever, urban operations incudes a spec­trum of terrain types from a couple of buildings to skyscrapers and from small villages to metroplexes. Units are sab­otaging lethality when conducting sit­uational training exercises and live-fire training exercises with the belief that urban operations are irrelevant.

A way to combat this complacency is to include urban training sites and ar­eas at home-stations into every train­ing exercise. Using MOUT sites like this will help planners and commanders start thinking about how to address the urban environment, even if it is not the primary focus of training. Used in this way, units can still achieve their METs. A unit can increase or decrease the focus of urban operations into a collective training based on the size of the training audience and the T&EO/ MET needing to be trained.

Conclusion

The publication of ATP 3-06.11 shows that efforts are being made to address the doctrinal void of combined arms in urban terrain. However, tactical units still lack the training proficiency to per­form operations. This is particularly true in ABCTs, which likely still hold to the belief that urban operations are “infantry-centric.” During my atten­dance at UOPC, I was surprised to see there were only two infantry officers in a class of fifty students. Branches ranged from armor to field artillery and from civil affairs to legal. The pri­mary theme in the above listed vi­gnettes is that urban operations are not owned by one combat arm. Urban operations are all encompassing. High intensity urban operations up the ante on munitions, logistics, personnel, and medical resources. Urban operations also change battlefield geometry, slows operational tempo, and place command and control in the hands of small unit leaders. Yet, many still strug­gle to correct the original issue posed by OC/Ts at Fort Irwin, that units strug­gle to combine arms in the city.

The need to address the urban issue is not unwarranted. The increase in ur­banization trends combined with cur­rent conflicts like Ukraine along with Gaza indicate an increasing need for units, specifically ABCTs, to think about the implications of operating in an ur­ban environment. My hope is that this paper served as a primer to help planners and commanders start think­ing how to fight and win in the urban environment. This endeavor will build more proficient, collaborative units who are comfortable combining arms in urban terrain.

Captain Logan S. Yates currently serves as the company commander for As­sault Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cav­alry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. Pri­or to this command, CPT Yates com­manded Headquarters and Headquar­ters Company. Previously, CPT Yates also served with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as an Executive Offi­cer for both Headquarters and Head­quarters Troop and Easy Troop, as well as a Platoon Leader for Easy Troop. CPT Yates’s military education includes completion of the Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, Basic Airborne Course, Cavalry Leader Course, and Maneuver Captains Career Course, and CPT Yates holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Exercise and Wellness from Brigham Young University.

NOTES

1 TRADOC. 2011. ATP 3-06.11. Army Pub­lishing Directorate.

2 Robertson, W. G., & Yates, L. (2012). Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Books Express Publishing.

3 Headquarters Department of the Army. 2024. Brigade Combat Team Urban Oper­ations. Washington D.C.: Army Publishing Directorate.

4 Ibid 5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid

9 Ibid

10 Institute for the Study of War. 2022. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2022. ISW Press. https://un­derstandingwar.org/backgrounder/rus­sian-offensive-campaign-assessment-feb­ruary-28-2022.

11 Ibid

12 Ibid

13 Kagan , Frederick A., George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko. 2022. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1. ISW Press. https://understandingwar. org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-cam­paign-assessment-march-1.

14 Clark, Mason, George Barros, and Kat­eryna Stepanenko. 2022. Russian Offen­sive Campaign Assessment, March 21. ISW Press. https://understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/russian-offensive-cam­paign-assessment-march-21.

15 Hird, Karolina, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros. 2022. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20. ISW Press. https://understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/russian-offensive-cam­paign-assessment-may-20.

16 Ibid

17 Clark, Mason, George Barros, and Kar­olina Hird. 2022. Russian Offensive Cam­paign Assessment, April 2. ISW Press. https://understandingwar.org/back­grounder/russian-offensive-campaign-as­sessment-april-2.

18 Clark, Mason, and George Barros. 2022. Russian Offensive Campaign, April

19 Ibid

20 Spencer, John, and Liam Collins. 2024. “The Untold Story of the Ukrainian Heli­copter Rescue Missions During the Mariu­pol Siege.” (TIME). https://time. com/6694858/ukrainian-helicopter-mis­sions-mariupol-siege/.

Click here to return to the table of contents:

https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2025/fall/