Sustaining Distributed Command and Control: Tactical Lessons from JMRC 26-07

During a recent rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, identified systemic friction points while executing distributed command and control (C2) in a contested large-scale combat operations (LSCO) environment. Operating across dispersed nodes with constrained network transport degraded the sustainment enterprise’s ability to maintain a common operational picture (COP) and conduct synchronization.

The rotation highlighted command post cognitive paralysis and the breakdown of staff standard operating procedures under pressure. Surviving in a contested environment requires tactical solutions to bridge these organizational gaps. This article outlines five actionable lessons learned during the rotation: bridging the digital divide, transitioning sustainment rehearsals into tactical wargames, enforcing a single authoritative COP, mandating capability-based briefings, and formalizing the relationship between the brigade (BDE) S-4 and the brigade support battalion (BSB) support operations (SPO) officer.

1. Bridging the Digital Divide: Transport Infrastructure and Low-Bandwidth C2

Enterprise-level collaboration platforms require network bandwidth that tactical command posts often lack. Operating dispersed nodes requires a transport-agnostic approach — processes that must function regardless of the digital medium or network available.

During distributed operations, the BDE attempted to host digital rehearsals by presenting the MAVEN COP over Microsoft Teams. Subordinate nodes, particularly at the company level, lacked the Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) hardware or bandwidth to participate effectively.

To bridge this digital divide, the BDE pushed the WickrGov app down to tactical-level operators via cell phones. However, the local cellular infrastructure was easily overwhelmed by user load, leading to connection drops. Furthermore, this highlighted a mismatch in software capabilities: WickrGov’s design strength is text-based chat, whereas Microsoft Teams is built to support voice/video map synchronization. Requiring users to manipulate unit icons in MAVEN during a live Microsoft Teams meeting proved too cumbersome due to the degraded network.

Recommendations:

• Proliferate Tactical Networks: Proliferate tactical networks using commercial satellite-based internet to extend Secret Internet Protocol Router Network and NIPR access to the tactical edge. Issue tactical devices to company-level leaders for enterprise C2 access. 
• Maintain Low-Bandwidth Fallbacks: Ensure the rehearsal process can function over any digital medium. Designate a staff officer to prepare and distribute rehearsal phase snippets — static map images — in advance. If high-bandwidth platforms like Microsoft Teams fail, units must be able to execute the rehearsal using these static images briefed over standard frequency modulation voice nets, rather than relying on tactical data networks that may be degraded. 

2. Wargaming the Logistics Plan: Integrating Enemy Injects and Casualty Estimates

After addressing connectivity and communication hurdles, effective distributed command requires the staff to elevate the quality and realism of sustainment rehearsals. This next lesson explains how to instill tactical rigor and enemy focus into the planning process.

Even when connectivity is established, sustainment rehearsals frequently devolve into administrative updates rather than tactical war games against a thinking threat.

Sustainment rehearsals often fail to simulate the friction of a contested rear area. At the training center, observer-coaches noted that briefers frequently failed to adhere to established scripts, prolonging the synchronization meeting by listing available raw quantities rather than discussing operational capabilities, phase transitions, and tactical tasks. Instead of a wargame, the event became a current-operations update.

Furthermore, rehearsal transcripts reveal a lack of enemy play. The S-2 threat brief and casualty estimates were omitted. Because the rehearsal did not force the enemy into the plan, the staff could not identify logistical culmination points.

Recommendations:

• Mandate Enemy Integration: Require the S-4 to brief enemy injects and require the S-2 to present the enemy’s most likely actions against sustainment during rehearsals. 
• Wargame Casualty and Loss Estimates: Require each battalion representative to brief projected casualties and equipment losses for each phase. Instruct the BDE medical operations officer and the S-1 to rehearse mass-casualty triggers, taskforce truck activation, and personnel replacement flow to spot logistical culmination points. 

3. Protecting the Distributed COP: The One BDE Overlay Rule

When network degradation occurred, staff frequently set up competing digital tracking systems. Failing to consolidate subordinate data into a single BDE-level overlay fractures the COP.

The training center’s executive summary highlighted two sustainment overlays being maintained, one by the BDE S-4 and one by the BSB.

This friction stems from differing command requirements. The BSB commander requires a granular, execution-focused COP to manage logistics forces, such as individual convoy locations and node security. The BDE commander requires a capability-focused COP to understand operational reach, including days of supply and culminating points. Critical information from the BSB is not integrated into the BDE’s primary overlay, thereby reducing shared understanding of the operational battlefield.

Recommendations:

• Enforce Consolidation: Direct the BDE operations officer to enforce the One BDE Overlay rule, ensuring all echelons submit final status updates to a single mission command system overlay for BDE visibility. Require the BSB to maintain internal tracking while ensuring their outputs feed the central overlay. 
• Role-Based Filtering: Direct staff to set mission command filters by role. For instance, have the BDE commander’s view exclude convoy graphics and display only days of supply per battalion, while the SPO officer’s view shows ammunition identification codes and active routes. 
• Forced Compliance: Instruct the staff to audit submissions for completeness within the authoritative digital system and direct units to correct any deficiencies. Discourage reliance on redundant analog trackers by establishing compliance checks. 

4. Capability-Based Briefing and the 96-Hour Planning Horizon

Under the stress of distributed operations, sustainment forecasting naturally degrades from long-range planning out to 96 hours down to immediate, reactive updates for the next 24 hours, resulting in false green reports that mask commodity shortfalls.

Because resupply cannot be guaranteed in a contested environment, predictive forecasting is required. To achieve this, the BDE’s sustainment architecture was explicitly designed to forecast requirements out to 96 hours. However, an analysis of the BDE’s logistics status reports during the rotation revealed a significant shortening of the planning horizon. While subordinate units reported their 24- and 48-hour requirements with high fidelity, the data fidelity for the 72- and 96-hour columns declined significantly.

Observer-coaches observed that briefers frequently discussed raw quantities, such as gallons or rounds, rather than capabilities measured in days of supply. The training center’s executive summary also noted a hyperfocus on liquid logistics at the expense of Class IV construction and Class V ammunition forecasting.

This was vividly demonstrated in the management of high-demand munitions. A maneuver battalion reported a green status for 120-millimeter mortars based on their current percentage of on-hand stock. Due to an inability to validate the required supply rate against the enemy threat during mission analysis, the staff was unable to anticipate that this green status would deplete to black within hours of engagement.

Recommendations:

• Military Decision-Making Process Integration: Task the S-4 and the SPO officer to determine supply rates using mission and course-of-action analysis for specified ammunition codes and the anticipated operational tempo. Require agreement and documentation of these rates before planning completion. 
• Reporting Standards: Require all briefers to convert on-hand supply percentages into operational reach estimates for the next 24, 48, and 72 hours. 

5. Formalizing the S-4/SPO Relationship in a Dispersed Environment

Collaborative planning between the BDE S-4 and the BSB SPO officer degrades when separated across hardened nodes and disrupted by enemy action.

The requirement for command post survivability eliminated the legacy C2 model of in-person touchpoints at the BDE support area. At the training center, the BCT’s alternate command post operated from a hardened facility, physically separated from the SPO officer at the BDE support area. Touchpoints were difficult to maintain due to conflicting battle rhythms and enemy indirect fire on logistics nodes. The training center’s executive summary noted this separation led to a reliance on short-suspense verbal orders rather than deliberate planning.

Recommendations:

• S-4/SPO Sync: Establish a dedicated S-4/SPO sync meeting, facilitated via secure voice or chat, on the operations calendar and maintained separately from the broader logistics synchronization meeting. Task the S-4 to chair and the SPO officer to co-chair this sync. 
• Battle Rhythm Alignment: Instruct the BSB staff to adjust their internal battle rhythm to align with the BDE’s schedule. Ensure the dedicated sync session is scheduled to anticipate operational disruptions and focuses on coordinating long-range transitions for the upcoming 72 to 96 hours. 

Conclusion

Executing distributed sustainment C2 in LSCO requires a shift in how staffs manage information over constrained networks. Units must enforce a single authoritative COP, ensure that rehearsals are transport-agnostic, and formalize the S-4/SPO relationship across distributed nodes. Enforcing strict reporting discipline ensures that sustainment formations maintain the synchronization required to extend operational reach while remaining survivable.

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MAJ Felix Woods is the brigade S-4 for the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. His previous assignments include serving as an observer-coach/trainer for First Army, a brigade support battalion S-3, a forward support company commander, and a combat sustainment support battalion plans officer. He holds a Master of Operational Studies degree from the Command and General Staff Officer Course.

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This article was published in the fall 2026 edition of Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin.

RELATED LINKS

Army Sustainment on army.mil

Army Sustainment on Line of Departure

Army Sustainment on DVIDS

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