Maximizing Combat Power: Lessons Learned from WFX 25-01

This article presents the lessons learned by the 1st Armored Division (1AD) — America’s Tank Division — on understanding, preserving, regenerating, and maximizing combat power during Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 25-01. The division staff worked through this problem set for many iterations before the exercise during their command post exercises (CPXs). After solidifying lessons learned from CPX 3, America’s Tank Division employed them to determine their utility and success during complex operations.

There are four viewpoints that enable the successful management of combat power. The first is how 1AD illustrates the dynamics of combat power to facilitate decision making. The second analyzes how reconstitution operations are used and when regeneration efforts shift from incremental to sub-unit regeneration. The third introduces the initial reasoning, objective, and employment of Iron Forge. The fourth discusses lessons learned from WFX 25-01 and how they will drive future operations.

Understanding Combat Power

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defines combat power as the ability to fight. It is the decisive blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, defines combat power as the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. Regardless of how you define combat power, every fighting formation knows it is one of the most essential elements to achieving victory during multidomain operations.

There are five essential dynamics to combat power: leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and survivability. Each dynamic is imperative, requiring all warfighting functions (WfFs) to generate and apply combat power. 1AD wrestled with how to illustrate combat power and experimented with many graphic representations. In many cases, maintenance was the primary factor for a drop in combat power. However, bulk fuel and high-priority ammunition were also areas of concern. The sustainment senior mentor advised that the leadership aspect was missing. This advice aligns with FM 3-0, which states, “C2 (command and control) enables leadership, the most important qualitative aspect of combat power.” It was acknowledged that leadership capability is difficult to determine during a simulated training exercise but could easily be calculated during actual combat operations.

Unit liaison personnel in the division main command post updated the combat power chart with oversight from division staff members in the division rear command post (RCP). This allowed for near-real-time data to be available to commanders at any point when a determination of combat power was needed. In conjunction with the division sustainment brigade expertise, RCP staff estimates provided projected combat power for future operations. These processes and controls enabled an understanding of current and future combat power while confirming the appropriate correlation of forces for combat formations.

Incremental vs. Sub-Unit Regeneration

Reconstitution is the process used to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. The unit commander’s assessment drives reconstitution. Once the initial assessment is complete, internal reorganization occurs to create initial combat power. This action does not require higher echelon resources but must incorporate the mission task. If the unit cannot meet mission objectives due to decreased combat power, the regeneration process begins.

Regeneration is the rebuilding of combat power for a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Additionally, it is designed to reestablish essential leadership roles and ensure the unit has the required C2 elements. This task is daunting and requires the assistance of two levels higher than the unit getting regenerated. Often, a unit must be removed from combat to receive additional support from strategic assets. Regeneration is conducted both incrementally and by replacing sub-unit formations.

During most warfighter exercises, corps and division staff focus on incremental replacements and concentrate on the returns of personnel and equipment. This action does not consider the status of leadership capability and crew certification. On average, training forces lose substantial combat power and must be rebuilt using sub-unit regeneration. This requires personnel and equipment to be prepared in the rear before their integration into the battle. Replacements come in the form of platoons, companies, and, in some cases, battalion-sized elements. 1AD saw this when its cavalry met heavy resistance and enemy fires, causing their combat power to plummet below 20%, leaving them combat ineffective. The division deputy commanding general for sustainment determined that this unit was a candidate for reconstitution and removed them from combat to begin the process.

Iron Forge

The action above forced 1AD to run its reconstitution battle drill, and the division staff immediately opened communication with the unit commander. He assessed that the unit needed approximately 65% combat power to continue the mission. The G-2 geospatial team worked with both fires and protection to determine the best location to conduct reconstitution efforts. Simultaneously, the sustainment fusion cell began working on the requests for replacements of personnel and equipment. III Armored Corps did not have Class VII equipment available in the requested quantities, so 1AD looked to other options to rebuild combat platforms.

Iron Forge was the name given to this reconstitution operation. Iron Forge later became the name used to identify the process for reconstitution efforts across the division, which included retrograding all battle loss equipment from the brigades to a single location in the rear area. Iron Forge became an entity that existed solely to manufacture combat power incrementally and in sub-units. In less than 48 hours, the 1AD cavalry unit was above 65% combat power and returned to complete its new mission task. Iron Forge was successful, and the division staff realized it could generate considerable results if adequately resourced.

Iron Forge not only remained operational, but it became a requirement. Military doctrine claims that inoperable equipment must be repaired as far forward as possible to enable combat actions. Forward maintenance collection points were forced to conduct survivability moves and displace to maintain shorter distances to unit formations. This made conducting repairs forward of the rear area problematic. Repairs that could not be done in 24 hours became candidates for evacuation. Army Techniques Publication 4-33, Maintenance Operations, states that division staff must identify requirements, understand available resources, and manage those capabilities for maximum returns. This, coupled with a clearer understanding of the environment and enemy situation, set conditions for Iron Forge.

Iron Forge used operation contracting support to facilitate base life support to prepare unit equipment. Additionally, it added materials handling equipment (MHE), cranes, and hazardous material (HAZMAT) services. The division logistics support element from the Army field support battalion (AFSBn) positioned its logistics assistance representatives (LARs) at this location to assist in the repair process. The call-forward team from the forward repair activity in Poland was also flown into this area to increase wrench time and provide additional expertise. These actions increased the throughput at Iron Forge, allowing it to return over a brigade’s worth of equipment into the fight. Iron Forge was successful by consolidating battle loss equipment at a single location and applying battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR), controlled substitution, and cannibalization.

Lessons Learned

Below are the lessons learned from the employment of Iron Forge during 1AD’s WFX 25-01. These lessons are to be used for educational purposes and do not supersede any guidelines found in Army regulation or doctrine.

Iron Forge Successes:

• Enabled the division to regenerate an entire armored brigade’s worth of critical equipment.
• Increased the maintenance expertise and man-hours available with the division heavy and Stryker maintenance surge teams and the AFSBn LARs.
• Repaired and resourced battle loss equipment with a trained crew and combat load.
• Housed 200 Soldiers and 250 trucks with access to several road networks and proximity to air and rail capabilities.
• Used contracts to bolster its capability by adding base life support for 200 Soldiers, power generation with light sets, MHE, crane capability, and HAZMAT removal services.
• Increased cannibalization power by adding new platforms as candidates for repairable items.
• Created a Class IX repository for items unavailable in the theater as equipment was stripped of its critical line replaceable units before evacuation to III Armored Corps.
• Created a single evacuation point for all Class VII items deemed unrepairable by the division.
• Established base security from enemy forces with crews awaiting integration into their units. Tank and Bradley crews can employ serviceable platforms to reinforce the security posture.

Iron Forge Areas in Need of Improvement:

• Iron Forge was not part of the original concept of support. The analytics provided enough justification to determine a possible reconstitution site based on the scheme of maneuver.
• Operational contracts took considerable time to get employed due to unanticipated requirements.
• Protection measures must be planned before employment to ensure the reconstitution site is protected against aerial attacks and is beyond rocket range.
• Distance to forward formations grew exponentially as the fight continued. This left Iron Forge in the rear area on the far side of the river.
• Iron Forge did not coordinate with III Armored Corps to ensure the site was feasible as a future location for the AFSBn forward repair activity. The area selected was too far west, and Iron Forge was shut down instead of being absorbed.
• Maintenance surge teams were unavailable to be used as a push-package forward due to the amount of maintenance conducted at Iron Forge.
• Iron Forge did not include additional capabilities such as additive manufacturing, host nation maintenance support, or local procurement of Class IX items.
• Iron Forge was exposed to enemy observation. Units must determine locations that blend into the environment, such as abandoned warehouses or car dealerships.

Conclusion

Multidomain operations will force units to react to an ever-changing enemy and environment and to make rapid decisions to enable friendly forces to complete their missions. Army forces must maintain agility and move formations more rapidly than our enemy to seize key terrain while giving friendly troops a tactical advantage. This requires the division sustainment WfF to anticipate requirements, produce an economy of sustainment force, and generate options for the commander. Sustainment precision synchronized with the other Army WfFs enables the rapid employment of combat power.

Commanders and their staff must comprehend the total means of destructive and disruptive power a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy in time and space. Maximizing supply and maintenance capability and synchronizing it with strategic partners can quickly generate combat power capability. 1AD achieved maximum combat power when the commander’s assessments were interpreted and combined with rapid evacuation and application of BDAR at a location capable of receiving new Soldiers and equipment and with access to sustainment resources. Iron Forge, first formed out of necessity, quickly became a tactic, technique, and procedure for future operations. It incorporated the rapid recovery and consolidation of non-mission-capable equipment, allowing for the overwhelming success of hand receipt, supply, and maintenance operations and the realization that this introduced a new means to achieve agility forward while maximizing returns in the rear.

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CW5 David Marriott serves as the senior ordnance logistics officer in the 1st Armored Division G-4. He previously served as the senior maintenance warrant officer observer, coach, and trainer at the Mission Command Training Program. He became an automotive warrant officer in July 2007. He is a graduate of the Warrant Officer Senior Service Education Course and a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. His training includes the Joint Logistics Course, the Support Operations Course, the Middle Managers Course, and the Contract Representatives Course. He is a graduate of the Industry of Business Defense in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and is recognized as a Demonstrated Master Logistician from the International Society of Logistics. He earned a master’s degree in military arts and science from the Command and General Staff College.

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This article was published in the spring 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.

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