Sustaining the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses land, air, and sea domains from the coast of California to the western borders of India. The Indo-Pacific is the most diverse geopolitical and socioeconomic region in the world. It contains 38 nations, houses 60% of the world’s population, and includes over 3,000 languages. This immense AOR also covers 52% of the world’s surface and is the DoD’s largest combatant command. The vastness of this theater and the distance between key areas of interest create a logistical problem set that the DoD has not had to deal with since World War II. Since the culmination of the island-hopping campaign in 1945, there has been a parabolic shift in technological advancements, which has had drastic implications for the conduct of warfare. These rapid changes have increased the lethality of long-range weapon systems, and exponential increases in computing power have brought artificial intelligence and electromagnetic sensing capabilities to the forefront of the operating environment.

The adversary’s weapon engagement zone (WEZ) has expanded well beyond the horizon. Not only will maneuver elements of the joint force be located inside the WEZ, but an extensive percentage of both the sustainment force and the command and control infrastructure will be forced to operate in an environment in which they will be both sensed and targeted.

Sustainment in the USINDOPACOM AOR largely depends on the DoD’s ability to close the distance and time between widely dispersed friendly units. To be successful, the joint force must establish forward-deployed supply repositories, leverage commercial logistics networks and open market contracts, and enhance the presence and mobility of our unmanned surface fleet.

Forward Deployed Supply Repositories

The DoD must leverage and expand allied partnerships in USINDOPACOM to establish supply repositories at key forward locations within the first and second island chains. Prepositioning key classes of supply such as food, water, fuel, and repair parts will drastically reduce the burden on the sustainment force and will limit the need for surface connectors in support of sustainment missions. A previous Army training circular (TC), TC 31-29/A, U.S. Army Special Forces Caching Techniques, describes caching as a solution to “help solve the supply problems of long-term operations conducted far from a secure base.” This tactic is used by Special Forces and can be extrapolated to help in sustaining the joint force at large. The first step in successfully establishing and managing these sites is through political agreements between countries, security cooperation exercises, and multilateral training between partner nations. By conducting routine exercises with allied countries such as the Philippines, Korea, and Japan, it appears the U.S. is maintaining the status quo with regularly scheduled training in the AOR. However, the joint force can covertly begin establishing these sites throughout the island chains in places like Pulau, Indonesia, and Micronesia. These cache sites will incur a sunken cost for all stored Class I, III, and IX. This cost is both variable and scalable, depending on the combatant commander’s guidance based on how many they would establish and the size of each. The force must accept this as a potential loss if the sites are discovered by an adversary or local civilians before maneuver elements use them, or if they are destroyed through hostile fire or prepping the battle space.

Leverage Commercial Logistics Networks

Sustaining the force efficiently and effectively is not something the DoD can do alone. It will be imperative to leverage and ease restrictions on the contracting process so the joint team can take full advantage of commercial logistics networks. This includes procurement of commercially available technology, contracted use of commercial supply lines, and host-nation service contracts.

Although the DoD has started the transition to using local assets and commercially available technology, barriers to entry remain, especially with contracting lead time. Government contracts frequently take anywhere from three to nine months or longer from the identification of a need to final procurement. In a rapidly changing battlefield, this timeline is not feasible. In the Marine Corps, the smallest tactical unit assigned contracting officers is a Marine logistics group, composed of approximately 10,000 Marines.

To effectively sustain the warfighter, the contracting process must be delegated to the small-unit level. This will allow maneuver units to use the local economy to aid in sustaining their unit. By having an individual at the company level who can write contracts as a collateral billet, there is no cost for increased manpower. Instead, the cost will be borne by additional training in the procurement process, thus easing the requirement at the group level when individuals are not co-located and do not have an accurate common operating picture of the situation on the ground.

Enhance Unmanned Surface Vehicle Fleet

The Navy’s current unmanned fleet is not adequate to sustain the joint force against a pacing threat in the Pacific. Additional resources must be allocated for military assets that cannot be stockpiled or commercially procured. These end items include munitions, vehicles, and communications equipment. To functionally sustain the force across the Indo-Pacific, the DoD must invest in enhancing its unmanned surface vessel (USV) fleet. The entire Navy currently has four USVs that, according to the Congressional Research Service, are “equipped with sensors, weapons, or other payloads, and can be operated remotely, semi-autonomously, or (with technological advancements) autonomously.” All four USVs remain in the experimentation phase of their employment.

The failure to incorporate sustainment into the mission set of the USV squadrons is a missed opportunity. Using USVs for sustainment allows the bulk of the naval fleet to focus on kinetic and strategic operations in the AOR. Small and maneuverable USVs eliminate the need to establish an iron mountain of supplies, an easy adversarial target. A fleet of sustainment USVs will lead to faster transit, more responsive sustainment, and a decreased risk the force. The Navy’s fiscal year 2025 budget requests an additional $338.4 million for research and development of four USV programs that vary in size and scale. The Navy will also bear an additional cost to train operators and mechanics and the maintenance costs associated with each USV.

Conclusion

To logistically support the joint force across the sheer vastness of the Indo-Pacific, the DoD must establish prepositioned cache sites through agreements with partner nations, decrease restrictions on the contracting process, expand commercial logistics networks, and enhance its commitment to the USV fleet. The USINDOPACOM AOR presents a myriad of challenges to the joint force. At the forefront of that problem set is how the DoD sustains the warfighter across 75 million nautical miles. The sheer distance to be covered is far too great for any one Service or any one country. Advancements in near-peer technology and capability sets expand the adversary’s WEZ and put the U.S. Armed Forces at a greater risk, at a far greater distance. The joint force faces profound provocation by a pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific, and the DoD must act now to effectively sustain the warfighter in future conflict.

[Editor's Note: The Captains Career Corner contains top written products from students and faculty in the Logistics Captains Career Course at Army Sustainment University. This is an opportunity for them to present solutions to current issues facing the Army and the sustainment community while also providing lessons learned from historical battles.]

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U.S. Marine Corps Capt. Tyler King is currently a student in the Logistics Captains Career Course at Army Sustainment University in Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia. He previously served as a platoon commander and operations officer with Truck Company, 1st Marine Division, and as the battalion S-4 at Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Logistics Officer Course and The Basic School. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering with a concentration in technology innovation. He is currently pursuing a master’s degree in business administration.

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This article was published in the winter 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.

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