Introduction
During National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 25-03, Task Force (TF) Danger successfully conducted sustainment operations across an area that would doctrinally be assigned to a corps. Flexible resupply options, secure logistics nodes, maintenance, and operational pace and tempo were crucial as the division operated across a 50 x 70 km area of operations. The enemy’s ability to disrupt logistics posed a significant threat to the division’s effectiveness, highlighting the need for an innovative and adaptive sustainment approach.
To address this challenge, TF Danger adopted a dynamic sustainment posture that leveraged a two-division support area (DSA) concept, forward logistics elements (FLEs), and integration with protection assets. By operating from two geographically separated DSAs, the division created a resilient logistics network that was difficult for the enemy to disrupt. The deployment of FLEs to maneuver elements provided additional supply, recovery, and maintenance capabilities, enabling the division to sustain the close fight and generate combat power.
Furthermore, integrating protection into sustainment planning ensured the security of logistics nodes and maintained the pace and tempo of sustainment operations. By prioritizing the close fight, maintaining a high level of responsiveness, and providing the right support at the right time, TF Danger achieved an operational advantage in a complex environment and operated effectively despite a proactive enemy.
Operating From Two DSAs
Sustainment nodes are high-priority targets in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). To mitigate this risk, TF Danger created two geographically separated division sustainment areas to remain responsive while increasing survivability and sustainment mobility. In this case, the DSAs established by the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) extended from the corps rear area to the division close. By placing a sustainment node forward with the capacity and capability to support multiple brigades simultaneously, TF Danger remained responsive to planning cycles, expected and unexpected expenditures, and changes in the rhythm of the battle. This forward sustainment concept shortened the ground lines of communication when compared to the concept of a single DSA in the division rear area.
During planning, 1ID staff recognized the importance of placing sustainment nodes in the right place on the battlefield to create responsiveness. Durable North, DSA Brooks, and FLEs proved pivotal to ensuring responsive sustainment. Durable North, the forward DSA node, created the ability to rapidly resupply commodities, move casualties, regenerate combat power forward, and maintain sustainment in stride.
Two division sustainment support areas created options for commanders on the ground. A second DSA node allowed for resupply from multiple echelons simultaneously, throughput from corps, and resupply from the more distant DSA. It also allowed for the splintering of sustainment assets to maneuver elements to increase stockage capabilities while maintaining sustainment forward. TF Danger used this fragmentation effect in the form of FLEs across the battlefield.
Use of FLEs
To remain responsive and anticipate requirements, TF Danger needed a task-organized, multi-functional logistics asset designed to support a fast-moving operation, an FLE. TF Danger provided FLEs with a tactical control command relationship to maneuver forces forward on the battlefield.
The warfighter on the forward line of own troops (FLOT) held the first stock of any sustainment commodity, including Classes I, III, and V. Trailing behind the warfighter was the forward support company (FSC), which had enough stockage for its battalion, and further back was the brigade support battalion, which held enough for its brigade. An FLE created an additional layer of sustainment support embedded within or alongside that FSC to increase days of supply or combat loads for classes of supply.
Aligning the FLE to the FSC of a battalion increased capacity, capability, and responsiveness, enabled integration with the maneuver force, and decreased potential for culmination. The FLE carried more than just stockage of supplies; it provided additional capabilities such as troop lift, vehicle recovery support, maintenance support, and casualty evacuation when properly configured. FLEs are tailorable mission packages that provide options to both the sustainment and ground force commander to achieve the end state. Along with FLEs, maintenance support teams (MSTs) provide further options to commanders in the dynamic LSCO environment.
MSTs drastically increased combat power regeneration through maintenance in-stride operations. MSTs, as part of an FLE, or constituting an FLE unto themselves, created an additional node of battle damage assessment and repair, recovery capabilities, and maintenance capabilities, which ensured rapid regeneration of combat power in addition to echeloned maintenance support. With the maintenance-forward mindset and MSTs pushed forward in the division close, units waited less time for vehicle repairs and replacements. A centralized collection point for the TF with MST support allowed units to conduct maintenance on equipment they could fix themselves and move any equipment beyond their organic capability. With the MST pushed forward, the rearward movement of maintenance does not inhibit the maneuver force from conducting vehicle recovery from the FLOT to the DSA. Expeditious regeneration during operations can create decisive opportunities for units and allow commanders more decision space.
During the rotation, 1ID task organized an FLE to support two battalions with division tasks. These were 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (5-4 CAV), conducting a division-level guard forward of the FLOT, and for 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment (2-70 AR), as a division reserve. The second DSA, Durable North, provided reactive logistics. The generic FLEs for 5-4 CAV and 2-70 AR consisted of 30,000 gallons of fuel, 2,000 gallons of water, three light medium tactical vehicles for casualty evacuation, three systems of Class V, one heavy equipment transporter, and one wrecker for recovery support. While adaptation with organic equipment and task organization provides for prolonged endurance, these capabilities are invalid without enhanced protection.
Integration with Protection
Sustainment depends on protection for route clearance, convoy protection, and protection of the sustainment node, while protection relies on sustainment to move and distribute protection Class IV and Class V. Divisions cannot sustain what they cannot protect. Logistics elements protected themselves through the use of multiple routes, variable timing, switching nodes, and movement of nodes. It required the assignment of protection warfighting function planners and capabilities to all sustainment nodes.
Large, long-term nodes required multiple layers of protection due to enemy intelligence collection capabilities. Each DSA node required air defense protection measures, ground obstacles, and perimeters like berms and triple-strand concertina wire. Berms were critical for the forward DSA, which was much closer to all forms of enemy contact and more likely to engage bypassed enemy formations or special purpose forces.
Threat force commanders frequently sought to disrupt sustainment through contamination, deterioration, and degradation of movement assets and movement routes. Integrating protection assets during mobile operations like logistics package movements became key to the survivability of forward sustainment formations. Route clearance and status verification were factors in any sustainment operation, including air and ground routes. Without air defense, route clearance ahead of convoys, and protection from the rear area forward, sustainment assets on the air and ground were at increased risk. Sustainment nodes are ineffective without robust protection planning and task-organized capabilities.
Conclusion
TF Danger implemented new and unique sustainment techniques during the NTC Rotation 25-03. While applying principles of sustainment, namely anticipation, integration, and responsiveness, the division sustainment enterprise transformed in contact. These adaptations centered around a two-DSA concept, the placement of FLEs with division main efforts, and the forward placement of MSTs. Collectively, these adaptations with 1ID’s organic task organization allowed for a higher rate of responsiveness to changes on the battlefield. Lastly, the deeper integration of sustainment with the protection warfighting function ensured the survivability of its dispersed logistics nodes. While no concept of sustainment is perfect, TF Danger provided multiple sustainment dilemmas for the enemy and increased the operational reach of the formation.
--------------------
LTC Christian Gatbonton is currently attending the U.S. Army War College. He earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Maryland in 2003 and received his commission through Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning as an Infantry officer. He later transitioned to the Logistics branch. He previously served as: G-4, 1st Infantry Division; commander, 541st Division Sustainment Support Battalion; deputy commander, 23rd Quartermaster Brigade; executive officer to the 31st Chief of Transportation; and secretary of the general staff, 4th Infantry Division.
MAJ Russell Vickers serves as the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) G-4 at Fort Riley, Kansas. He recently served as the 601st Aviation Support Battalion support operations (SPO) officer and 1ID Sustainment Brigade executive officer. He previously served as 8th Army G-4 at Camp Humphreys, South Korea; senior logistics observer controller/trainer for Task Force Fires at Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and company commander for E Company, 16th Ordnance Battalion, Fort Lee, Virginia. He commissioned as a Transportation officer from Georgia Southern University. He is a graduate of resident Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, SPO Phase II, Airborne, and Theater Sustainment Planner’s Course. He has a master’s degree in logistics management from Florida Tech and a master’s degree in military operational studies from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
--------------------
This article was published in conjunction with the fall 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.
RELATED LINKS
The Current issue of Army Sustainment in pdf format
Current Army Sustainment Online Articles
Connect with Army Sustainment on LinkedIn
Connect with Army Sustainment on Facebook
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Sharing