"If you want to break a country, and you want to change the course of history, then you send a heavy division."(1)
The changing character of warfare necessitates a reevaluation of the armored brigade combat team (ABCT). Recent conflicts in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Israel demonstrate the rapid evolution of combat characterized by technological advancements, increased lethality of precision-guided munitions, and the prolific use of unmanned systems and cyber capabilities. These conflicts raise concerns about the dominance of heavy armor in environments where mobility, adaptability, and integration of advanced technologies are paramount. To maintain battlefield relevance, the ABCT must adapt and undergo structural alterations, which enhance its agility, endurance, and depth in multi-domain operations. Among the most urgent alterations are strengthening maneuver capabilities, increasing organic indirect firepower, thoroughly integrating autonomous systems, and creating a durable communications network.
Strong Maneuver Capabilities Facilitate Endurance
The strength of the ABCT depends on the strength of the armored cavalry squadron (ACS). The ACS currently consists of three cavalry troops and one armor company. The armor company can function as an independent formation but is often task organized by platoon to the cavalry troops. Organizing the armor with the cavalry troops enable a hunter/killer configuration. The use of the armor in this formation facilitates effective execution of the commander’s engagement criteria without immediately unmasking the scouts. However, this configuration creates command and control issues, because these teams are rarely tested during training, leading to mission command and sustainment issues. Additionally, a consequence of this configuration is that the armor company commander (in the ACS) loses all combat power, becoming a hollow company. Subsequently, cavalry troops should be assigned one armor platoon permanently. Two scout platoons and one armor platoon per cavalry troop places firepower where it is needed and facilitates effective training and team building prior to execution. Unlike the original organization of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in which a Mobile Gun System (MGS) platoon, led by an armor lieutenant, was assigned to an infantry company, the cavalry troop commander can properly train and develop the armor platoon leader as a future armor or cavalry officer.
Prudent commanders maintain a tactical reserve to reinforce; to add depth; to block penetrations; to counterattack; and to seize and exploit the initiative. Currently, ABCT commanders must subtract combat power from one of the combined arms battalions to source a reserve company ‘out of hide’. Subtracting this company from a combined arms battalion disrupts teams who have trained to fight together and lessens the combat power required to accomplish the battalion mission. Additionally, whatever company is selected to be the BCT reserve is rarely trained to be a reserve, is likely unaware of the planning considerations, and forced to coordinate support outside its parent battalion. Unlike in counterinsurgency operations, the reserve is more likely to be used to exploit an advantage or defeat a penetration, postured in a position of advantage. To remedy this, the ABCT should have an additional armor company added to the BCT by way of the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). This armor company should primarily consist of fourteen tanks and have very few enablers allowing it to maneuver rapidly and decisively. This company should consist of the best and most experienced tankers in the BCT and be led by a second-time company commander who can operate audaciously and independently.
In 2014, when BCTs received a third maneuver battalion, combined arms battalions (CAB) lost a company.(2) They became either CAB-As (Armor), which consist of two armor companies and one mechanized infantry company, or CAB-Is (Infantry), which consist of two mechanized infantry companies and one armor company. This off-balanced and fragile organization hindered the CAB from moving with the speed and lethality for which it was intended. Furthermore, at its core, the current formation works against three of the four tenets of multidomain operations.(3) Combined arms battalion commanders cannot fully task-organize into company teams and must reduce their favorable force ratios to constitute a reserve at the battalion level, which is nearly always required by both doctrine and the environment. This organization imposes a dilemma on the commander by forcing them to make task organization choices they would not have had to make in the former organization of two armor companies and two mechanized infantry companies. Finally, infantry squads in the ABCT enable the speed and lethality of the ABCT by providing security to the main body, defeating threats in restricted terrain, and assaulting trenches and small urban areas which are inevitable in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). To increase lethality, we must restructure the ACS and return to the previous CAB task organization. In doing so, the ABCT will possess the ability to endure and overwhelmingly defeat the enemy.
"As the ranges of our artillery systems increase and the battlefield becomes deeper, the tank-infantry team in that last mile of combat and in the final hundred yards will be more dependent, not less. on mortars for their indirect fire support."(4)
Close Fight Agility Through Indirect Firepower
In ABCTs, there is a gap between the effects placed by a company and those placed by the brigade and the division. This is due, in part, to the division becoming the primary tactical warfighting headquarters and recent changes arising from the Army Structure (ARSTRUC)(5). Subsequently, the artillery battalion, which previously belonged to the BCT commander, will more than likely support the division artillery’s mission to prosecute targets directed by the commanding general, leaving the ABCT without organically controlled artillery. This means ABCTs do not have the weaponry required to prosecute targets greater than a battalion’s 120mm mortar systems and less than the artillery supporting the division’s targeting, which creates a gap between echelons.
For the ABCT of the future, the 120mm mortar is increasingly important. Future 120mm mortar carriers must be enclosed to provide protection to the crew and be capable of firing on the move. The enemy will focus fires on mortar systems in the close fight and evidence from the current conflict in Ukraine suggests artillery fragments are the predominant cause of casualties.(6) There are large caliber mortar systems currently available which meet these criteria, including an Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) variant with the Patria NEMO (from “NEw MOrtar”) remote-controlled turret. This system enables simultaneous, multi-round, fire missions in less than four seconds while the vehicle is stationary or on the move. Future mortar systems must work in conjunction with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for targeting. Direct coordination between UAS and mortars provides greater options to the command by reducing fire response times and increasing accuracy.
Indeed, future mortar platoons must also have Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance (LASSO) - which is a man-portable, tube launched, lethal payload munition, UAS - or for ease of discussion, a loitering munition. The 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 demonstrated the devastating effect of loitering munitions by destroying heavy ground units, including T-72 tanks and advanced S-300 air defenses.(7)
Figure 1. A M2 Bradley and M1A2 Abrams from B Troop 3-116 Cavalry Brigade Combat Team during JRTC rotation 24-09 at Fort Polk, LA. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by MAJ Gregory Walsh)
LASSO should be organic to each mortar section within the brigade. Co-locating LASSO with mortar platoons allows for command and control of the munitions through the mortar section sergeant and integrates them into the battalion fire support plan. In the ACS, the LASSO can be integrated to provide depth for security operations by identifying and destroying armored threats beyond direct fire distances or screening the flanks of the squadron. Additionally, placing LASSO within CABs will provide a tremendous advantage in engagement area development, allowing the battalion to destroy armor threats before unmasking and revealing its battle positions.
"Integrated formations will bring robotic systems into units alongside humans, with the goal of always having robots, not soldiers, make first contact with the enemy."(9)
The ABCT requires rapid and overwhelming lethality in the close fight. As artillery, rockets, and attack aviation shape the division’s deep fight, commanders in the close fight require a platform that can integrate with UAS to defeat high payoff targets. A multi-mission launcher (MML) section carries fifteen Hellfire (or future equivalent) missiles. Using laser designators or drones, Soldiers can identify and destroy targets well beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).(8) This capability would enable the ABCT commander to impose his will in the close fight. The MML would also reduce the strain on attack aviation by minimizing the need for commanders to request their effects in the close fight, thus allowing the attack aviation to place greater effects in the deep area.
Figure 2. The Multi-mission launcher meets major milestones with tests in 2017.
Echelonment of Unmanned Reconnaissance
The Robotics Autonomous Systems (RAS) Platoon will achieve the Secretary of the Army’s intent. To best ensure that robots make first contact and provide early warning, the ABCT should contain at minimum three RAS platoons. RAS platoons should be assigned to each cavalry troop. Conceptually, the armored cavalry troop will consist of one RAS platoon, two scout platoons, one tank platoon, a mortar section, and a headquarters section. The inclusion of this capability will enable the ACS to conduct a guard against an armored adversary.
The Medium Range Reconnaissance (MRR) (Group 2 UAS) drones of the RAS are vitally important to ABCT’s success. The MRR will identify targets and relay the target location to mortars, cannon artillery, and rockets. Additionally, the MRR must be fitted with laser designators for Hellfire remote missions to the MML. As the enemy approaches the FEBA, first contact robots and drones will gain and maintain initial contact with the enemy and provide firing solutions to an array of capabilities available to the commander. The idea being that enemy attrition is achieved by robots before they reach friendly battle positions, allowing for a desirable force ratio.
To complement the MRR, the ABCT also requires a long-range reconnaissance (LRR) platoon. The LRR platoon will be used to map the area ahead of the brigade, identifying suspected enemy positions using multispectral technology. Multispectral imaging shows greater promise in detecting camouflaged positions than rudimentary visual or thermal imaging.(10) Anything with a spectral signature that appears anomalous with respect to their current context, i.e. a camo net or camouflaged vehicle tucked into natural vegetation, will stick out. Detection results should be available almost immediately, allowing an intel analyst to define enemy positions. The BCT’s drones, loitering munitions, mortars, and MML can target these positions to set conditions for the brigade transition into the offense.
Convergence Requires Communication
Communicating on the modern battlefield presents significant challenges. The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as cyber warfare, electronic jamming, and the widespread use of unmanned systems complicates traditional communication methods. Recent conflicts in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Israel continue to highlight the vulnerability of communication networks to disruption, interception, and manipulation, underscoring the critical need for resilient, adaptable, and secure communication systems. As adversaries become more adept at targeting communication networks, the ability to maintain command and control, situational awareness, and cohesive operations is at risk, demanding innovative solutions that can withstand the threats of future warfare.
ABCTs must be able to communicate beyond line-of-sight without emitting noticeable electromagnetic signatures or being jammed. Current FM communications produce large electromagnetic emissions when used improperly and often require large antennas that are detectable and slow to displace. Satellite communications like tactical satellite (TACSAT), Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBCP), and Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) are all vulnerable to jamming. Both forms of communication share a common vulnerability in that they use centralized hubs.
ABCTs should immediately integrate all communications into a mesh network. Mesh networks solve the issue because they do not require a central communications hub. Wireless radio devices, housed in any asset whether it be a Soldier, vehicle, or drone, automatically locate one another and establish a data network. Data transmissions hop from one unit to another, maintaining signal strength. Line of sight is not required, so even if nodes are located behind a hill or within a building, units can still receive signals that have been relayed through other wireless nodes. Distribution of the communications load across multiple nodes reduces the need for high power transmissions from a single point, therefore minimizing the overall electromagnetic footprint. Integrating mesh networks enables the ABCT to facilitate convergence at the decisive point and dominate the close fight.
In conclusion, we must transform the ABCT to the leviathan it was intended to be. To ensure the ABCT can dominate the close fight, it must be able to identify and prosecute its own targets, gain and maintain contact with autonomous systems, and communicate in a manner that produces a low signature. To do this, the ABCT’s maneuver forces must be strengthened to ensure it overwhelms enemy forces with unmatched speed, lethality, and flexibility. The ABCT must also be equipped and thoroughly integrated with autonomous systems, sensors, and strike capabilities allowing it to detect and deliver lethal effects in the close area and up to the division’s deep area. Additionally, the ABCT must increase its organic indirect firepower and create a durable communications network that enables it to move at the lethal speed as it was intended. To their benefit in future conflicts, our enemies are currently discovering their innovation imperatives through many successes and failures. While we remain largely unengaged, we must likewise learn from their successes and failures. It is extremely important and existentially necessary that we transform the ABCT whilst we remain unengaged in large-scale ground combat operations.
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Hanes currently commands 1-31st Field Artillery Battalion in Fort Sill, OK. LTC Hanes’s previous assignments include tactics instructor at the Command and General Staff College, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1/25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and 1st Infantry Division. LTC Hanes is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies’ Advanced Military Studies Program.
Lieutenant Colonel Larry Kay currently commands 2nd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment in Fort Benning, GA. Before command, LTC Kay was the Assistant Chief of Staff – G5, Chief of Plans of 3rd Infantry Division. LTC Kay was also the Deputy Chief of Staff of 4th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, and 3rd Infantry Division. LTC Kay is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies’ Advanced Military Studies Program. LTC Kay authored numerous articles including, “Lessons from LSCO, parts 1-3,” which can be found in From The Green Notebook & “Putting the Enemy Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Multidomain Operations in Practice,” with the Modern War Institute.
Notes
1 Major General Charles Norrie, attributed to the hammer of the 18th Airborne Corps, the 3d Infantry Division.
2 U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, “Armored Brigade Combat Team,” MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90 Force Structure Reference Data, Fort Benning, GA, October 2016, https://www.radionerds.com/images/d/d6/216978118-MCoE-SM-3-90-Sep2013.pdf.
3 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Washington, DC, October 2022, 3-2.
4 Jeff Schogol, “Why Mortars Are Increasingly Important on the Modern Battlefield,” Task & Purpose, March 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-mortars-battlefield/.
5 Congressional Research Service (CRS), “The 2024 Army Force Structure Transformation Initiative,” CRS Report R47985, Washington, DC, August 21, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47985.
6 John Antal, NEXT WAR (Havertown: Casemate, 2023), 174.
7 John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting (Havertown: Casemate, 2022), 24.
8 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1, definition of “FEBA” (Forward Edge of the Battle Area), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018).
9 Laura Heckman, “Army Lays Out Plans for Robotic Combat Vehicles,” National Defense, December 2023, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/12/12/army-lays-out-plans-for-robotic-combat-vehicles.
10 Tobias Hupel and Peter Stütz, “Adopting Hyperspectral Anomaly Detection for Near Real-Time Camouflage Detection in Multispectral Imagery,” Remote Sensing 14, no. 15 (2022): 3755, https://doi.org/10.3390/rs14153755.
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