[Editor’s Note: This Blast from the Past article was initially published in Army Logistician (the former title of Army Sustainment) in the July-August 1983 issue.]
The Logistics Center’s historian speculates on combat service support of the future.
While you were filling out a supply request, loading authorized stockage list items for movement, or treating wounded soldiers on the battlefield, did you ever wonder, “How will my job be done in the 21st century?” Although no doctrinal developer could provide definitive answers to all our questions about logistics methods of the future, one thing is certain: Army doctrine will differ, and consequently so will the day-to-day activities of the Army logistician who supports the future battle.
Even though the tactics and logistics of the future battle will differ from those of the past, certain factors will not change. As always, the logistician’s goal will be to furnish everything needed to produce maximum combat power. To effect this, the logistician must be able to transport massively equipped armies to any part of the globe and to supply and sustain them as long as they are there. Supporting the Army’s combat readiness will continue to be rooted in effective planning and outstanding leadership. And, since many aspects of the future battle are like those of the past, we can continue to turn to history for lessons, both of what to do and of what not to do. But change and new methods are inevitable. Our improved weapon systems, new force organizations, and the resulting increased support requirements will also necessitate many changes for Army logisticians.
Future battles will be fought with weapons capable of killing before visual contact is made. Since nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are likely to be used, units will have to be widely dispersed yet capable of quickly reassembling. These mobile troops will be expected to go into action from the line of march with little or no time between movement and combat. The dispersed and therefore isolated units will need reliable communications with adequate backup systems.
Future battles may extend over great distances and last an indeterminable time. Consequently, the traditional concept of a “battlefield” is perhaps too restrictive because it implies confinement in space and time and is associated with a conventional process of attaining victory by visible destruction. Such will probably not hold true in the future battle. A more likely scenario, known as the “air-land battle,” will be characterized by mobile units operating in an integrated battle area — combining nuclear, chemical, and electronic with conventional means — unencumbered by excessive supplies, thus enabling their commanders to rapidly adapt to changing situations.
Integral to the future battle is a combination of static strong points and battle positions from which attacks will be launched. From these same positions the Army must meet the enemy's offensive threat. Gaining and maintaining the initiative through offensive action will be a key to success. Fighting often will change in direction and intensity, making offense and defense unrecognizable at battalion level. The battle will place heavy demands on leaders as well as individual soldiers. Leaders will need to seize every opportunity for decisive action. Often it will be difficult to know which side is winning.
At the squad or individual level, there will be little difference between the future battle and the battles of the past. Combat will require well-trained, well-equipped, highly motivated, and physically fit soldiers who are also mentally prepared for war. The individual soldier usually sees war as a localized, personal affair. The noise, loneliness, and fear bombarding his senses become his primary concern. The battle raging inside the soldier will be won due to his training, morale, steadfastness of purpose, knowledge of the situation, and ability to handle pressures. The battle going on outside will be won due to the creativeness and intelligence of leaders who recognize what to do and when to do it. Since combat in the future battle will be characterized by periods of intense action separated by lulls, soldiers must be able to shift emotionally from a safe situation to a dangerous one instantaneously and continue to perform effectively.
In the future battle, as always, the logistician’s role will be to furnish everything the Army needs to produce maximum combat power. That will not change, but what will change is the superfluidity of supply and maintenance that has characterized many American military operations of the past. One time, when asked about supplying the Army, General Creighton Abrams replied, “The trouble with logisticians is they always give me what I want, not what I need.”
When riflemen crossed the beaches in World War Il, they carried 80 rounds of M1 ammunition, grenades, and food for 3 days. Surveys showed that 75 percent of this materiel was unnecessary and never used. When the 31st Infantry was overrun near the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War, it lost 15 truckloads of clothing, none of which it should have kept in this combat situation. In Vietnam, oversupply was most evident during the initial stages of buildup, even though 40 percent of all requisitions were lost.
Whereas soldiers fighting in previous battles were provided with the luxury items considered as “necessities” by most Americans, such will not hold true for future battles. There must be one standard of living for all the Services, and this standard must be characterized by austerity and the efficient handling of resources. Commanders should not want, and will not get, any more than is necessary to win the battle.
Since the combat commander of future battle operations will be in a highly fluid situation, he will not be able to haul surplus supplies, for these would hinder his movement and ability to fight. Because of the change in the “battlefield,” the commander will not want extra items, which would only take up valuable space and tie up vital transportation assets. A commander’s demand for support must be honest, not inflated to build up supplies for his unit. The logistician must have accurate information so there can be a close estimate of the quantity and type of support needed. Supply must match the combat unit’s need. For example, if urban fighting is anticipated, logisticians must supply units less fuel and barrier materials than usual.
Once supply needs have been adjusted based on actual combat consumption rates, bulk items such as fuel, food, and ammunition will be pushed forward daily without special requests. It is anticipated that 80 percent of a unit’s needs will be supplied in this manner. Because most of a unit’s needs will slide through the system without undue daily management, logisticians will be able to react quickly to a unique request. Such requests will be managed more effectively since they can move through a system uncluttered by excess requests for bulk items. Automated systems that control the flow of supplies from a central location will be capable of finding assets worldwide.
By supplying bulk commodities on an increasingly predictable basis, much of the supply process will become automatic from the user’s standpoint. The purpose of the scheduled resupply concept is not to see how close the user can come to depleting a commodity before receiving resupply but rather to keep him adequately supplied yet free from excess stocks that would impede his rapid movement. However, the “automatic” system never will be so rigid that changes cannot be made; instead, it will be the basic supply model to which logisticians make needed changes.
In the future battle, there can be little waste of supplies, action, or manpower at any level of command. Because we will be fighting away from continental United States supply sources, we must make the most of salvage, cannibalization, and host nation support. We must know about the enemy’s supplies and equipment so we can use them when captured.
We must not leave equipment behind, however. In past wars, equipment we left behind often was used against us. Food, more than any other item, should not be allowed to fall into enemy hands as it is readily usable without modification. Since Soviet and other enemy soldiers probably will be fed poorly in comparison with U.S. troops, large quantities of captured food would be of immediate use to them. If the enemy cannot live off the land or captured food, he will use his supply lines to obtain food to the detriment of other items. No modern army has been able to live off the land for any significant lime. For example, although Gettysburg was the richest part of agricultural America in 1863, General Robert E. Lee could not sustain his army of 75,000 and had to offer battle or retreat since the land could not support them.
Captured supplies other than food sometimes can sustain an invading army for a time. Many successful campaigns were conceived, planned, and conducted which made initial use of local supplies. The German blitzkrieg of France during World War Il, for example, which suffered the predicted 50 percent vehicle loss, used captured enemy and civilian vehicles as well as fuel to sustain the drive.
In their efforts to make the best use of available resources in the future battle, logisticians would do well to study the successful methods of the Medical Corps. The Medical Corps has made tremendous strides in maintaining our human resources through effective treatment of casualties. In triage, medical personnel tend to wounded, depending on the situation, either at the front, in a rear area, or by evacuation. The same should be true of equipment.
Inoperative equipment items can be divided into three groups: those that by virtue of small cost or extended use are not worth fixing and should be destroyed; those that should be repaired at a rear facility; and those that because of their size or location must be fixed where they stand. The logistician’s job is to oversee effective equipment management.
The future logistician also must plan multiple uses for equipment and be resourceful in making the most of what is on hand. A generator used to run a single piece of equipment is a thing of the past. Just a few years ago there were 145 different makes and models of generators in the 1.5- to 100-kilowatt range! This created a nightmare for those supplying replacement parts as well as for those servicing the generators.
Shortages of equipment and supplies will occur in future battles. Occasionally, troops will go without materiel for short periods as enemy forces interdict supply lines. But logisticians who are able to think and react, as well as to plan and act, will be able to cope with unexpected problems. Part of the problem-solving exercise will involve a constant exchange of ideas between the users and combat service support personnel. When such an exchange is made, the tactician-logistician team will find a better way of doing most jobs. The addition of belly armor to armored personnel carriers in Vietnam and the rerouting of fuel lines, for example, are ideas that originated with users. Those ideas, when actualized, saved many lives.
In future wars, the large depot will be too vulnerable and cumbersome to be efficient. Instead of a network of large depots we need a responsive system able to speed up, slow down, or shift direction quickly. In the past, our well-stocked depots contributed to wastefulness and carelessness among commanders, who gained resupply with relative ease.
In the future, support units will be expected to carry greater loads, at greater speeds, over greater distances, and with greater frequency than ever before. The test of an effective logistics system will not be in amassing huge quantities of supplies but in matching the rapid fluidity of maneuvering units throughout the battle area with the certainty of an accurate and reliable system of delivery of supplies to where they are needed.
Early in the next battle, we must expand our use of computers that are able to “talk” to supply facilities in the United States; in this way, we will be able to tie the many aspects of logistics together and make the system operate in a timely fashion. Computers are especially useful in “stovepiping” items directly to the user. In Vietnam, for example, requests for repair parts from HAWK artillery units bypassed all echelons between the general support unit to the inventory control point in the United States. The requesting unit would receive a priority item in 8 days, other items in about 17 days. The HAWK units thus were able to maintain a 90-percent operational readiness level.
The storage container was widely used in Vietnam and there proved its worth. Containers were unloaded from ships up to 10 times faster than breakbulk items and with less manpower. When the user opened the containers, which were packed in the United States, he found there had been less damage in transit and less pilferage, and he had fewer problems in sorting the containers’ contents. Containerization continues to be improved and expanded.
Planners agree that on the next battleground transportation will have to use cross-country approaches since roads will be inadequate or will have been destroyed. Roads that have been targets for airstrikes are likely to be covered with rubble, which could cause excessive tire damage. Tire damage might mean diminished combat service support, as occurred during World War Il when many trucks sat idle because replacement tires were not available to replace those destroyed by road clutter.
Established routes should be used during attacks in future battles. Even then, we cannot expect smooth, quick, or certain resupply. In fact, history indicates that armies cannot travel long distances for sustained periods. In the 1967 Israeli-Egyptian war, for example, which was fought under ideal conditions with air superiority against a poorly prepared and ill-trained opponent and which was able to make use of the element of surprise, the Israeli Army could manage only about 60 miles a day. It should be obvious that supplying highly mobile troops with essential combat items will require thorough planning and even then present great challenges for innovative logistics planners.
We must not lose sight of the fact that what is speculated here about battles of the future is our present best estimate. On the hypothetical description we have superimposed theory — theory that should work but, we must remember, that has not been war-tested. Doctrine, concepts, and systems emerging from this theory, or any similar theories, will be at best only starting points.
The key ingredients for successful logistics are the ability and training of the leaders. It is clear that logisticians will be called upon to deal with situations and make decisions previously left to tacticians. Logisticians, then, must demonstrate more problem-solving skills than in the past.
Employment of combat forces must be matched by an effective logistics system able to sustain maximum effort until final victory. There is a growing awareness through historical study and estimates of the future that success in the battle area will require the best possible integration of logistics and tactics in both planning and execution. Future battles will be fluid and thereby subject to the direct influence of dynamic minds.
Intelligent and well-trained Army logisticians will be able to use their resources wisely to overcome the unexpected. That is how logisticians will make the best contribution to success in combat.
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Lynn Sims, Ph.D., was the command historian at the Army Logistics Center, Fort Lee, Virginia. He held a bachelor’s degree from Wheaton College and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in U.S. military history from New York University. He taught at the Army Command and General Staff College from 1974 through 1976.
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This article was published in the winter 2026 issue of Army Sustainment.
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