Top Left: A Humvee assigned to the 41st Field Artillery Regiment, drives through the wash rack at the agricultural wash station at Grafenwöhr Training Area, Germany, Oct. 24, 2024.

Bottom Left: SFC David Henderson and SFC Jed Hathaway, of the 2nd Mission Command Training Detachment, 1st Brigade, 91st Training Division, splash their Humvee through a creek while conducting an Observer Coach/Trainer mission at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, June 12, 2024.

Right: Soldiers assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Division Sustainment Troops Battalion, 3rd Division Sustainment Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, fire an M2 machine gun mounted on a Humvee during a live fire range in Swietoszow, Poland, Dec. 20, 2023.

In an era of high-cost tactical vehicle programs, the U.S. military is under increasing pressure to modernize cost-effectively. In 2023, the Army awarded AM General a $230.8 million dollar contract to produce the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) as a replacement for the Army’s aging High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle or Humvee. With a price tag of $300,000 to $400,000 per JLTV, it is expected to cost billions of dollars over the next decade to replace the Humvee. The Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV) and the Light Service Support Vehicle (LSSV) programs were cost-efficient, commercially derived vehicles that supported a wide range of non-combat military operations. The Army must reinstate a modernized CUCV/LSSV program to provide a low-cost, reliable, and logistically flexible vehicle fleet for non-combat roles, thereby freeing up advanced platforms like the JLTV for missions that truly require them.

The military has a long history of using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) acquisitions to meet its operational needs. In the 1970s, the military acquired some 40,000 militarized Dodge trucks to support units operating in noncombat operations. By the early 1980s, the CUCV replaced these initial COTS vehicles. General Motors (GM) delivered roughly 70,000 CUCVs to the military throughout the 1980s. The CUCV came in several variants and performed multiple roles, such as command post vehicles, troop transports, ambulances, and logistics. The truck was based on the GM Blazer chassis and has retained some of its aftermarket value with civilian customers due to its offroad capability and utility. In the early 2000s, GM updated its vehicle design offered to the military to be based on the Silverado, Tahoe, and Suburban. The vehicle was redesigned as the LSSV. While it is rare to see a CUCV or LSSV driving around base or the training area in the U.S., there are still several countries that actively employ the LSSV.

The two- and four-seat utility vehicles are ubiquitous across all Army organizations, from division band companies to light infantry companies. In all organizations, they perform similar supply, administrative, and command and control functions. To give some perspective on the costs associated with equipping our rear-echelon support units with the Army’s current utility vehicles, a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) for a medical command has over $3 million in Humvees, and an HHC for a theater engineer command has over $6 million in Humvees. Those costs will double because the Army plans to eventually replace all Humvees with JLTVs.

A new CUCV/LSSV could easily save the Army half or more of what it costs to procure our current up-armored Humvees. The savings go even further than just the initial procurement costs. Repair and replacement parts from commercially available vehicles will reduce the overall lifetime costs of maintaining a CUCV/LSSV fleet. A final financial bonus from adopting a CUCV/LSSV fleet is that when a vehicle meets the end of its military service life, the Army can recoup part of its investment by selling them as used vehicles to civilian outdoor enthusiasts, as was done with previous versions of CUCVs and LSSVs. Cutting costs by modernizing the utility vehicle fleet will allow the Army to better fund higher priority modernization efforts where viable COTS alternatives are not an option.

Many support roles (logistics, transport, training, administrative movement, etc.) do not need mine-resistant or JLTV-level protection. In large-scale combat operations, support troops will not be exposed to the same level of threats as they were during operations in the war on terrorism. Many units will operate in areas far beyond the reach of direct fire and artillery. Many also already depend on combat or combat-support units to provide security and force protection during movements outside a logistics support area or base. Modern COTS trucks are highly customizable and can be adapted for a wide range of tasks and threat levels.

COTS vehicles can be procured and fielded quickly. Having dual-utility vehicles for combat and support units would allow for overall quicker acquisition because vehicle manufacturing takes place at different facilities. Overall modernization would dramatically speed up. The Army could field combat and support units simultaneously instead of fielding them unit by unit. Additionally, a utility vehicle based on a civilian chassis would have parts already fully integrated into civilian supply chains, which would decrease wait times and back-order parts issues that plague specially designed military vehicles. Training for a vehicle based on a commonly driven civilian one would be easier.

Countries around the world actively use COTS utility vehicles in their militaries for everyday and tactical use. The Mercedes G Wagon has been used in over 60 countries worldwide in a variety of roles. The British use a militarized version of the Land Rover. These vehicles are standard issue and play pivotal roles in everyday training and operations in these countries. Although the U.S. divested its CUCV/LSSV programs decades ago, we continue to utilize COTS vehicles in an ad hoc and mission-specific manner. Soldiers use non-tactical vehicles while operating in the relative safety of Kuwait and South Korea or in the remote areas of Syria and Jordan. In 2020, the Army awarded a $66 million dollar contract to Africa Automotive Distribution Service Ltd. to provide J8 Jeep tactical vehicles, a militarized version of the Jeep Wrangler, for operations in South and Central Commands.

Reintroducing a modern CUCV/LSSV program would provide the Army with a practical, economical, and mission-fit alternative for non-combat operations. Giving the right unit the right type of vehicle improves readiness by speeding up modernization efforts and provides a vehicle that allows the unit to accomplish its mission. The Army must launch a pilot procurement program to assess the performance and value of COTS-based utility vehicles in current operational contexts and adopt a dual approach to replacing its fleet of utility vehicles.

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MAJ Scott Wolfe is currently the Assistant Professor of Military Science at California State University–Fresno. He has an undergraduate degree in exercise sport science from the University of Wisconsin–La Crosse and a Master of Arts in Teaching from Liberty University. He has completed the Support Operations and the Supply Chain Management courses in addition to the Maneuver Captains Career Course and Command and General Staff College–Common Core courses.

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This article was published in the winter 2026 issue of Army Sustainment.

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