Infantry Doctrine Proposal: UAS Sections that Mirror Mortar Sections

In his 2006 book, Passion of Command: The Moral Imperative for Leadership, U.S. Marine Corps Col B.P. McCoy states that “to take and conquer land, you must give brave men rifles and hand grenades.”(1) Although many modern technological advancements induced significant change in both the military and civilian landscapes since the writing of his book, the requirement of the Infantry to close with and destroy the enemy in close combat remains a universal constant of ground combat. With the current proliferation of low-cost and highly lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS), we believe that these machines are positioned to provide a significant increase of infantry company lethality when used to support the company’s essential role of closing with the enemy.

The introduction to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3.21.10, Infantry Rifle Company, explains that the Army’s vision of a rifle company’s primary mission is “to close with the enemy employing fire and movement in order to; destroy, capture, or to repel his assault through fire, close combat, and counterattack.”(2) In this capacity, we believe that small UAS (sUAS) can be integrated into maneuver formations as an evolution of available assets as they apply to the battle drills and patrolling listed within ATP 3.21-8, Infantry Platoon and Squad, and the Ranger Handbook.(3) UAS integration should be viewed as a complementary asset to the current rifle company without competing to replace any current weapon systems. As such, we believe it is prudent for the Army to include a UAS section within its infantry companies similar to that of a mortar section.

The personnel and sustainment considerations for UAS integration should follow the example of mortar sections as demonstrated in ATP 3.21.10.(4) Larger UAS integration should also follow this precedent but at higher echelons such as the battalion.(5) Figure 1 contains the infantry company-level formation recommendation and highlights our proposed modification.

The most important capability gained from UAS integration is that it introduces a targeting asset that is an immediately available, maneuverable kinetic munition. This integration, even at the current stage of drone development, enables the characteristics of the offense and the defense through enabling significant augmentations to disruption, tempo, and surprise.(6) Furthermore, as the technology to coordinate one-too-many human-drone implementations matures, this integration will only increase in value through the ability to be a force multiplier to concentration and mass.

Since we believe the kinetic aspect of a UAS is its most important capability in support of a rifle company’s core mission, our recommendations make this capability the center of gravity of any integration effort. To that extent, the rifle company’s maneuver Soldiers must be able to seamlessly call upon kinetic UAS to destroy, disrupt, or disable the enemy while engaging in close combat. This type of close support integration can already be found in the rifle company’s mortar section. The benefits of closely integrated mortar sections are illustrated in ATP 3-21.8 (Appendix D and Chapter 1).(7) This integration will enable the maneuver commander to assign a task and purpose to the UAS section in accordance with the Ranger Handbook and Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Field Artillery and Fire Support Operations.(8) Furthermore, the desired effect for the UAS section should come from Appendix C of FM 3-60, Army Targeting.(9)

As stated in doctrine, the purpose of mortars is to provide the maneuver commander with immediately available, responsive, mobile, lethal, and non-lethal fires.(10) Mortars are universally beloved because of their seamless, intuitive, effective integration. The integration of UAS must follow this example.

A starting point for “UAS section” integration would be performance while in the support element of a combat patrol or how well the section performs Battle Drill 5 (Knock out a bunker). The purpose of the former would require no change to doctrine: “The support element suppresses the enemy on the objective using direct and indirect fires.”(11) The purpose of the latter would be employing an M67 fragmentation grenade from a UAS.(12) Either of these purposes mirror what mortars are currently used for: suppressing enemy positions. The feasibility of a 60mm mortar “direct lay” technique is comparable to the speed and integration of one-way attack (OWA) UAS.(13)

Current maneuver doctrine not only employs mortars as unique modular components but also employs machine-gun and anti-tank teams as disparate sections. Both of these are organic to infantry platoons.(14) The unique battlefield effects of machine guns or anti-tank weapon systems warrant special consideration in planning, and UAS sections should be treated no differently. Infantry formations should incorporate UAS sections that mirror mortar sections to maximize the mobility of a maneuverable kinetic munition, reduce the latency of employed effects on targets, and leverage the initiative.

Our contributions to infantry-UAS integration are the following:

• Proposing a weapon systems-focused doctrinal change for infantry formations

• Measuring the scope of integration through battle drills and patrolling

• Comparing kinetic feasibility of UAS to organic infantry weapon systems

• Proposing the integration as supplement to mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) limitations of current weapon systems

Infantry Formation Recommendations

Infantry Formation Weapon System Capabilities

Our recommendation for UAS sections warrants comparison to current infantry weapon systems. This comparison enables directly exploring capability gaps or synergies. Table 2 provides a standard weapon system comparison presented as a ratio of maximum effective ranges. The standard of comparison is deliberately withheld, and comparisons are confined to high explosive (HE) ammunition.

The range of the recommended UAS section should be comparable to that of a 60mm mortar; however, actual range of UAS vary by type and purpose.

UAS Section Formation Recommendation for Infantry Companies

The majority of maneuver graphics in Chapters 2 and 3 of ATP 3-21.8 include the organic light mortar section. These graphics include the entire symbol or the cannons separated into the squad-specific weapon symbols. The UAS section should be incorporated in an identical fashion.

The purpose of mortars might be best understood through military occupational specialties (MOS). The conventional Infantryman is an 11B and a mortarman is an 11C. Mortarmen are Infantry Soldiers who fight with indirect fire weapon systems. Mortar doctrine, training, and intent all harmonize to support maneuver elements in close combat with timely and accurate indirect fire.(15)

Appendix D of ATP 3-21.10 provides imperative for mortar employment: Mortar sections are mobile assets that provide immediate fire support through numerous means, to include cross-trained Infantrymen with the direct lay technique. UAS section Soldiers should be integrated in this same fashion.

The prominence of UAS — either intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); first-person view (FPV); or bombing — should follow the mortar precedent for forward line of own troops (FLOT) lethal mobility. Infantry companies should have UAS sections that operate as an immediate indirect fire asset.

The experience gained by the Experimental Force’s (EXFOR’s) Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) Platoon directly supports how to fight our UAS sections.(16) In their article “Human-Machine Integration: Tactical-Level Employment and the EXFOR RAS Platoon,” CPT Timothy Young and Mark Winstead mention establishing a forward line of sensors (FLOS) and launching UAS from protected positions.(17) This is identical to how Appendix D of ATP 3-21.10 conveys the tactical employment of a mortar section: behind the FLOT in a secure area to maximize effective indirect fires.

Measured Effects

We propose measuring the success of UAS integration through patrolling or battle drills. This approach aligns with FM 3-60, where the desired effects of a targeting process “should result in measurable and observable changes in the [operating environment] to enable or assess follow-on actions.”(18) This enables straightforward questions:

• Did the UAS section suppress the enemy as part of the support element?

• Did the UAS section kill or force a withdrawal from the bunker?

We recommend the metrics listed in ATP 3-21.10.

In accordance with Battle Drill 07-SQD-D9406, knocking out a bunker requires “killing, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy personnel” while retaining enough friendly personnel to perform follow-on operations. Our recommended metrics support the rhetorical question: What is the effective difference between an M67 hand grenade tossed into a bunker or flown into a bunker?

Hardware

Hardware must be officially separated from the task and purpose of the UAS:

FPV — Exclusively related to a “first-person view” fixed camera position at the “bow” of the UAV

Gimbal —The hardware that stabilizes the sensor while airborne so that the human operator receives clear, interpretable imagery

Sensor — The lens-aperture-pixel hardware and the inherent software driver that enables a UAV to observe the 3D world

Payload — Whatever the UAV carries during the sortie. This ranges from munitions to supplies to an advanced sensor-gimbal combination.

One aspect of hardware not yet discussed is the size of the UAS. There are three UAS sizes: short-range reconnaissance (SRR), medium-range reconnaissance (MRR), and long-range reconnaissance (LRR).(19) Generally speaking, the scales of complications are not linear. MRRs are much, much louder than SRRs; however, the logistics required to keep an MRR or larger UAS in a capable fighting posture becomes a full-time duty position.(20) These complications also do not involve de-bugging software should an issue arise.

ISTAR

From a practical perspective, the most important characteristic of an ISTAR UAS is its ability to sortie for long durations and observe from large distances. Additionally, all ISTAR assets should be employed in accordance with FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations. From a technical perspective, the most important characteristic of an ISTAR UAS is access to the video-telemetry stream. This fused data stream is the critical requirement to employ targeting software like Shrike.(21)

One-Way Attack

These UAS should be used as the primary method of engagement in time-sensitive tactical situations. They can engage faster and have fewer complications with munition preparation. Maneuver Soldiers should aspire to expend these assets. The size of the platform depends on multiple variables such as necessary payload capacity, on-board compute requirements, range, flight time, etc. After testing at the Artificial Intelligence Integration Center (AI2C), we conclude that a 10-inch OWA drone with on-board computer (Raspberry Pi 5) and a payload capacity of 2 kilograms is ideal.

Droppers

These UAS should be used as the primary method in time-available tactical situations. They can be re-used to drop munitions on reinforced or inaccessible positions. Maneuver Soldiers should attempt to recover or preserve these assets.

Software

Shrike Targeting Software

The authors of this article either currently or formerly worked for AI2C. We do not wish to induce bias for UAS-focused software. Two of the authors are active or tangential developers for the Shrike targeting software.(22)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)

The general consensus for AI and ML integration should be acceptance — but with skepticism. For example, “automated” flights and decisions are not the same as autonomous flights and decisions. But most UAS include some “autonomous AI” features.

Some of the enterprise commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UAS contain AI, and to the best of our knowledge, these models and performances are not yet evaluated with an accepted performance standard. These metric-based standards are one component of our doctrine proposal. We wish to incorporate the AI/ML performance metrics into the UAS section training plan. An example of a basic metric in computer vision would be mean average precision (mAP), which can be understood as “how likely can the ML/AI detect every class of target.” However, mAP is only one metric that is often used in evaluation.

In these equations, n is the number of classes (i.e., tank, truck, car, person), TP is true positive, FP is false positive, FN is false negative, and δ implies the change in recall from class to class, otherwise interpreted as weighting the precision by the change in recall.(23)

However, a big context here is the lack of data engineering incorporating the ground-truth distance to the targets, thereby inhibiting the “range” of the model. This is an open-research problem that we are working to produce a solution. The solution will require significant data engineering, as the dataset is the “center of gravity” for an AI model.(24)

Integration in Mechanized Formations

Integration into mechanized formations is important, particularly with dismounted troops. However, consistent with the evolution theme of this article, the integration would be supplementary to the current weapon systems organic to the mechanized unit. According to ATP 3-21.71, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, the mechanized platoon fights with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). This weapon system is “an extremely powerful and robust weapon system that enables the mechanized Infantry to find and destroy the enemy at long ranges while the dismounted Infantry, supported by the BFV, can destroy the enemy in close combat.”(25) UAS integration should not distract from the primary line of effort for the mechanized platoon; it should be complementary.

Training Requirements

For UAS employment to succeed, the U.S. Army must prioritize training Soldiers and equipping maneuver formations with proven, tested solutions.

Training

In his recent article “Experimenting with Commercial Quadcopters for Jungle RSTA,” 1LT Alex Choy describes some successful tactics, techniques, and procedures.(26) His findings generally support those made by LTC Reed Markham, who discussed the difficulties associated with UAS integration in his article, “Integrating Drones Isn’t Intuitive: Practical Ways to Build This Critical Capability.”(27) Both leaders describe the importance of hands-on sorties and dispensing the online/classroom training.

Training to a standard of performance, using a plan resembling the one in Training Circular (TC) 3-20.33, Training Qualification and Mortars, requires dedicated, resourced training.(28) We recommend that performance-based training be measured through Battle Drill 5; this offers a concrete method of evaluating piloting and UAS mechanical functionality. The methods of training may vary, but a controlled training environment is essential to gaining the finesse needed for successful FPV sorties.

The learning curve for successful OWA FPV piloting is an arduous, detailed process. Achieving proficiency often requires many hours in simulation and training environments.

Certain U.S. Army units are already training OWA piloting techniques with select groups of military personnel leading the way.(29) It is imperative to implement current training procedures into formations. Current hardware/training resources include:

Liftoff — An FPV racing simulator and accessible on navigable platforms like Steam.(30) A large caveat is units having computers that can facilitate the FPV training.

FPV Goggles — These goggles are technically complex, and this obfuscates much of the radio-frequency complications.

FPV Controllers — These controllers are technically complex, and this obfuscates much of the radio-frequency complications.

Proficiency in FPV piloting for OWA requires dedicated time and incremental progression in degraded, adverse operating environments. This should be treated no differently than other weapon systems.

OWA Training

The primary complication in training is accessing National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)-compliant hardware, presuming financially procuring hardware is not an issue.(31) The current “work around” to this is piloting FPV under the guise of counter-UAS “Red Team” operations. NDAA compliance reduces acceptable hardware for U.S. military to almost only COTS and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) solutions, which are then further restricted by the “Blue List” from the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU).(32)

Provided these complications are reduced, training can begin with simulations and culminate in live sorties. Soldiers must refine their piloting talent and remain trained. FPV OWA piloting is comparable to other perishable skills in the U.S. Army. Piloting through a simulator such as Liftoff will keep Soldiers capable, but flying real sorties is the only method of flying in adverse weather, where adverse weather for a small UAS is often dismissed by ground troops. Our recommended FPV OWA training plan should result in a qualification rating similar to an weapons range: expert, marksman, qualified, unqualified (see Figure 4 for an example of measuring targeting accuracy).

Dropper Training

The training for droppers is intuitive and accompanied by lower piloting requirements. The limiting factor for droppers will be the UAS attachments to drop a payload. We expect the airborne infiltration and exfiltration from the drop point will be the most tactically challenging for operators.

ISTAR Training

This training is less intuitive to parameterize as ISTAR requirements vary. The best techniques would be to adhere to the principles of reconnaissance and enable maneuver commanders.(33)

Accuracy

One large consideration in training is the accuracy of the employed weapon system. TC 3-09.81, Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, covers many types of errors.(34) The accuracy of precision munitions is also covered in FM 3-09.(35) Perhaps the most intuitive type of error is the mean point of impact.(36) The basic theory is that variations in the mechanical system and atmosphere exist that induce “probable error” in the ballistic trajectory of munitions. Although OWA and dropper munitions are maneuverable and precise, the measured approach for error is still comparable. We recommend measuring the probability of these UAS with some standard munition to produce an effect on a target.

These types of accuracies can be represented by Figures 4 and 5. The distribution around the target reflects the accuracy of the pilot. Accuracy is also paramount for friendly unit protection. It is imperative to measure accuracy as well as to prevent any danger close and risk estimate distances (refer back to Figure 3).(37)

Additive Manufacturing

Consistent with the themes of this article, Soldiers must be prepared to conduct maintenance on these “weapon systems.” This will require any COTS/GOTS release of maintenance, which intuitively presents a large legal battle. The solutions then become additive manufacturing (3D printing). A UAS cannot be 100-percent printed; however, many parts that experience damage can be printed, repaired, and assembled in degraded environments. This is the direction needed for long-term UAS success.

Limitations

We believe UAS sections’ limitations stem from METT-TC. The book Ghost Mountain Boys by James Campbell provides a good example that is antagonistic to our thesis. In World War 2 during the New Guinea campaign, U.S. Soldiers had to crawl within hand-grenade range of Imperial Japanese Army machine-gun positions to successfully engage them.(38) The vegetation was too thick for conventional assault techniques; it obscured enemy positions too greatly, and suppression could not be employed prior to direct assaults. UAS would likely not have been useful in these situations.

There is also precedent to integrate UAS similarly to the weapons squad. It already contains the Javelin Close Combat Missile System and M240B medium machine gun. However, this argument loses traction as the skill set required to employ various UAS scales much differently than that required to employ a machine gun or the Javelin. The latter does not scale while the former scales mostly with METT-TC considerations.(39) Integrating UAS sections similarly to a mortar section will enable scaling of skill sets to UAS of various types and sizes.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army’s focus on UAS is correct — we must not lose momentum to achieve tactically superior tactics, techniques, and procedures with emerging technology. We must determine a tactical integration path that mirrors current, successful infantry weapon systems. UAS integration should focus on targeting. UAS tactical applications should focus on known, rehearsed tactical tasks. Training to these standards might enable a direct alignment with combat employment. We should aspire to treat kinetic UAS operations akin to mortar sections. This process will enable a smooth integration of capabilities without disrupting maneuver capabilities nor the previously established weapon systems.

We recommend working with the Maneuver Future Capability Directorate (MFCD), EXFOR, and Army Transformation and Training Command to deliberately experiment placing UAS sections into maneuver formations with the explicit task of supporting maneuver units and purpose of effecting a target. We believe it is imperative to belay other RAS integrations in order decisively integrate a known, proven method of low latency, lethal targeting.

Acknowledging that the EXFOR and MFCD already contain certain GOTS and COTS ISTAR solutions, we recommend resourcing FPV goggles, controllers, and vehicles, and to begin training with EXFOR Soldiers. We also recommend the pursuit of AI and ML software integration but only after the primary engagement criteria of human-analog targeting is demonstrated.

Notes

1 Col B.P. McCoy, U.S. Marine Corps, Passion of Command: The Moral Imperative of Leadership (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 2006), 1.

2 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company, May 2018.

3 Stacie Pettyjohn, “Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine,” CNAS, 8 February 2024, https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/new-cnas-report-evolution-not-revolution-drone-warfare-in-russias-2022-invasion-of-ukraine; Stephen Biddle, “Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, 10 August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/back-trenches-technology-warfare; Antonio Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Raffaele Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini, “Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare,” International Security 46/4 (Spring 2022); Mariano Zafra, Max Hunder, Anurag Rao, and Sudev Kiyada, “How Drone Combat in Ukraine is Changing Warfare,” Reuters, 26 March 2024, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/; ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad, January 2024; Training Circular (TC) 3-21.76, Ranger Handbook, April 2017.

4 ATP 3-21.10, paragraph 1-77 and Appendix D.

5 CPT Timothy A. Young and Mark D. Winstead, “Human Machine Integration: Tactical-Level Employment and the EXFOR RAS Platoon, Infantry, Winter 2024-25, https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/Infantry-Archive/Winter-2024-2025/Human-Machine-Integration/; MAJ Anthony R. Padalino, “The Army Needs to Quickly Adapt to Tactical Drone Warfare, Infantry (Summer 2024), https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2024/Summer/pdf/10-Padalino_txt.pdf.

6 Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics, May 2023; Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, July 2019.

7 ATP 3-21.10, Appendix D and Chapter 1.

8 TC 3-21.76; FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations, August 2024.

9 FM 3-60, Army Targeting, August 2023.

10 ATP 3-21.10; ATP 3-21.90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, October 2019; TC 3-22.90, Mortars, March 2017.

11 ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad, January 2024.

12 TC 3-23.30. Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals, February 2023; ATP 3-21.90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, October 2019.

13 ATP 3-21.90.

14 ATP 3-21.8.

15 ATP 3-21.90; TC 3-22.90.

16 Young and Winstead, “Human Machine Integration.”

17 Ibid.

18 FM 3-60.

19 See Pettyjohn, “Evolution Not Revolution” for a comprehensive overview of the three UAS sizes.

20 CPT Charles J.O’Hagan, 1LT Parker Mitchell, 1LT Noah Paffenroth, and 1LT Adam Hendrick, “Tactical UAS: Three-Tiered UAS Manning for Increased Lethality and Situational Awareness,” Infantry (Winter 2024-25), https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2024/Winter/pdf/10_Ohagan-Mitchell.pdf.

21 Timothy Naudet, Jarek Ingros, John Roll, Thomas Canchol, Will Anderson, and Jeffrey Mattson, “Shrike: An AI-Enabled Forward Observer for the Army of 2030,” Military Sensing Symposia (MSS), Code PB2B01, 2025.

22 Ibid.

23 Deval Shah, “Mean Average Precision (Map) Explained: Everything You Need to Know,” V7 Labs, 7 March 2022, https://www.v7labs.com/blog/mean-average-precision.

24 Timothy Naudet and Robert Skinker, “The Center of Gravity in Artificial Intelligence Ethics is the Dataset,” Military Review Online Exclusive, July 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Online-Exclusive/2024/AI-Ethics/AI-Ethics-UA.pdf.

25 ATP 3-21.71, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, October 2024.

26 1LT Alex Choy, “Experimenting with Commercial Quadcopters for Jungle RSTA,” Infantry (Spring 2024), https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2024/Spring/pdf/4_Choy_txt.pdf.

27 LTC Reed Markham, “Integrating Drones Isn’t Intuitive: Practical Ways to Build this Critical Capability,” Infantry (Fall 2024), https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2024/Fall/pdf/3_Markham_txt.pdf.

28 TC 3-20.33, Training Qualification and Mortars, August 2017.

29 Joseph Trevithick, “Green Beret A-Teams Training On FPV Drones Being Driven by War in Ukraine,” TWZ, 17 May 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/green-beret-a-teams-training-on-fpv-drones-being-driven-by-war-in-ukraine; Cpl. Joshua Barker, U.S. Marines Corps, “Marine Corps Launches Attack Drone Team,” USMC News Service, 31 March 2025, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/4139734/marine-corps-launches-attack-drone-team/.

30 Liftoff FPV Racing Simulator, https://store.steampowered.com/app/410340/Liftoff.

31 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/4638/text?s=1r=8q=10.

32 Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Blue List, https://www.diu.mil/blue-uas-cleared-list.

33 ATP 3-20.98, Scout Platoon, December 2019; FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, January 2023.

34 TC 3-09.81, Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, April 2016, Chapter 3.

35 FM 3-09, Chapter 4.

36 TC 3-09.81; TC 3-22.91.

37 Ibid.

38 James Campbell, The Ghost Mountain Boys: Their Epic March and the Terrifying Battle for New Guinea – The Forgotten War of the South Pacific (New York: Crown, 2007).

39 ATP 3-21.8, Appendix E.

CPT Timothy Naudet currently serves as a data scientist with the Artificial Intelligence Integration Center (AI2C) in Pittsburgh. His previous assignments include serving as a mechanized line platoon leader and mortar platoon leader in the 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. CPT Naudet earned a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, NY, and a Master of Information Systems Management-Business Intelligence and Data Analytics (MISM-BIDA) from Carnegie Mellon University.

CPT Thomas Canchola currently serves as a data scientist with AI2C. His previous assignments include serving a communications relay group platoon leader and battalion S-6 officer in charge in Okinawa, Japan. CPT Canchola earned a bachelor’s degree in mathematics from the University of California-Santa Barbara, a MISM-BIDA from Carnegie Mellon University, and a master’s degree in economics form Purdue University.

MAJ Ian Baird currently serves as the executive officer for the U.S. Space Command/J5 at Peterson Space Force Base, CO. He previously served as an AI cloud technician at AI2C. MAJ Baird earned a bachelor’s degree in physics from the University of South Carolina and a Master of Information Technology Strategy from Carnegie Mellon University.

CPT Avery A. Austin currently serves as the Peregrine lead at AI2C. His previous assignments include serving as an engineer platoon leader with the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, HI. CPT Austin earned a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from USMA and an MISM-BIDA from Carnegie Mellon University.

CPT Nathan Rosenberger currently serves as a data technician at AI2C. He previously served as a rifle company platoon leader with the 25th Infantry Division. CPT Rosenberger earned a bachelor’s degree in security and risk analysis from Pennsylvania State University.

Authors’ Note: We would like to acknowledge the cited authors and their contributions to this field as well as our offices, the AI2C, and U.S. Army Strategic Command. Our leadership affords us great trust in integrating technical, prototyped solutions into adverse, field environments.

This article appears in the Winter 2025-2026 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.

As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of War or any element of it.