Company-Level Lessons for NATO Multinational Operations

This article recommends best practices for multinational integration at the company level and below. Each section addresses one main lesson learned during a Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rotation fought under an Italian regiment and alongside nine other nations. Each section opens with a fact pattern and closes with recommendations.

The Army’s 2024 revision to Field Manual (FM) 3-16, The Army in Multinational Operations, identifies the tenets of multinational operations as rapport, respect, knowledge of partners, team building, patience, trust, and shared understanding. These instill “mutual confidence in multinational operations.” This article aims to help units develop that shared understanding and mutual confidence.

Background

Legion Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), was task-organized under the Italian Army’s 187th Parachute Regiment (Folgore) for the duration of Saber Junction 24, the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s biennial rotation. During the exercise, Folgore conducted a battalion-sized air assault with nine days of follow-on offensive and defensive operations as part of a brigade joint forcible entry (JFE). Folgore used a lead nation (LN) command structure, with Legion Company maintaining internal integrity.

Legion Company had relevant recent experience training as part of multinational operations. Successful integrations during the preceding year included battalion-sized airborne operations into Italy with a Hungarian squad and into Sweden with Hungarian, Spanish, and Italian paratroopers as part of Defender 24.

Integrate Planning and Rehearsals

The Folgore conducted planning at Camp Albertshof, Germany, with Legion Company in Italy. Folgore products were analog, handwritten, and closely held. For more than a week after the initial brigade order, no regimental orders reached Legion. When products arrived, they were often photographs of handwritten notes.

During that time, the brigade and Legion’s organic parent battalion produced several warning orders (WARNOs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). For almost a year, the brigade had instructed units to use all our technology in the fight, so Legion began planning tentative direct fire control measures (DFCMs) on Windows Tactical Assault Kits (WINTAKs) and chest-mounted displays. We packed screens, sensors, cables, antennas, chargers, and batteries.

Folgore conducted a highly deliberate military decision-making process (MDMP) with tightly controlled overlays. Even after platoon leaders arrived in Germany, they could neither inspect graphics nor attend planning meetings. As a result, parallel planning proceeded on divergent digital and analog graphics. Key terrain fell on different sides of phase lines and unit boundaries. Timelines varied between “H-hour,” “L-hour,” and “P-hour” due to multiple airborne, air assault, and ground assault convoys (GACs). Brigade tasked Folgore with defending no later than “H+66,” but synchronization proved difficult when timelines for insertion methods changed.

Lastly, Legion received uncertain tactical tasks. Some were unfamiliar, while others were familiar but used in unfamiliar ways. These included enabling “deception operations” and “engaging civilian leaders.”

Recommendations:

- Conduct at least one smaller training exercise for familiarization before a brigade-size assessment. Doing so builds confidence and identifies issues with lower stakes.

- Involve key leaders early in the foreign planning process and co-locate if possible. Doing so supports the production of timely orders, subordinate parallel planning, and one-third and two-thirds planning-to-preparation ratio. Set early expectations of junior officers, NCOs, liaison officers (LNOs), and staff involvement. Cultural differences may restrict attendance to officers.

- Use existing doctrinal resources as checklists. The Planning Considerations Checklist and FM 3-16’s command and control (C2) and MDMP considerations are especially useful.

- Schedule additional rehearsals among partners, describing actions across time and space, purpose, and end states. No planning cell can better confirm commander intent than a supervised rehearsal. Rehearsal-of-concept (ROC) drills identify ambiguities and misunderstandings.

- Nest company, regiment, and brigade expectations about technology and timelines. Future task organization and equipment should be harmonized. Companies can nest with similarly capable foreign units or leave unusable capabilities at home.

- Prepare compatible analog products, including for your higher regiment and adjacent companies. Bring maps, acetates, grid reference graphics (GRGs), and other office supplies and fighting products. These maintain a shared picture and allow for parallel planning. Ensure common scales and nomenclature. Budget time to produce and circulate multiple drafts of analog copies to all elements.

- Request a “wish list” of tactical tasks the foreign battalion expects from the company. Provide a “menu” of tasks the U.S. unit can execute. This supplements company standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment “smart cards” to speed integration (see next section).

- Consult international standardization agreements (ISAs) and multinational publications (MPs) in advance when possible. Solicit lessons learned and SOPs from the training center, the foreign partner, and your own brigade.

Early Exchange of Information on Equipment, Capabilities, and Procedures

Several times regimental elements moved into Legion’s positions. One night, an entire motorized company roared into our AO. We were tucked in patches of trees in a generally open area, ideal for concealing light infantry hunting armor but not for hiding vehicles. They had lost radio contact and were conducting a rearward passage of lines (RPOL) to the command post (CP) behind us. This rendezvous drew the attention of several hostile small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), which then approached us in a search pattern. Folgore opened fire and displaced, but our position was targeted by enemy scouts and waves of drones throughout the night.

We received a single challenge and password. Given frequent displacement, degraded situational awareness, and limited night-vision and radio capabilities, we used it often. However, vehicle noise and other factors meant parties would yell the challenge several times. The enemy eventually heard the challenge and began to use it to target friendly elements.

We also interacted with friendly foreign elements outside the regiment. One night, unfamiliar vehicles moved through our engagement area toward enemy lines. We assessed that a friendly foreign element must either be filling in a seam or setting a screen. The next morning, a Legion anti-armor team pursuing an armored target of opportunity found itself among friendly Montenegrin forces. After destroying the enemy vehicle, a quick exchange of information confirmed they were indeed there on brigade’s order. A nighttime encounter could have been fatal.

The next day, Legion conducted a deliberate linear danger area (LDA) crossing parallel to a Folgore company several kilometers to our north. Not a hundred meters past the road, our forward element made visual contact with a company of vehicles and dismounts. They recognized us as friendly, even though we did not initially recognize them. To reduce risk, we adopted an unthreatening posture, moving into a file and slinging weapons.

Once face to face, we learned they were Macedonian. While Legion continued crossing, a Macedonian dismount led me to his CP. There, in a mix of languages, they explained that Macedonian scouts had spotted enemy dismounts precisely where we were headed for linkup. We relayed the information and adjusted the link-up point.

Recommendations:

- Have LNOs arrange a “petting zoo” for all U.S. and partner vehicles, uniforms, and equipment. Test communications and night-vision devices for compatibility. Run the vehicle engines to allow for audial recognition, especially at night. Produce a “smart card” of each item’s capabilities. This enables rapid combat identification (CID) at the lowest level and also ensures commanders understand one another’s capabilities.

- Rehearse common scenarios for which foreign units may have diverging SOPs, including linkup and passage of lines. Review battle drills for direct fire contact, sUAS contact, and compromise of patrol base or defensive lines. Even if units do not share a unified approach, familiarity provides predictability.

- Confirm partner nations receive the same rules of engagement (ROE) brief, especially if under a common U.S. brigade, and then rehearse scenarios to confirm.

- Enforce signal operating instructions (SOI) with rotating challenge and password, even with foreign partners. Consider using two challenges and passwords, so that one side can issue a different challenge in return.

Fight Micro-Management

In contrast to U.S. planning, Folgore often viewed the plan as coextensive with the mission and made detailed plans touching the platoons and squads. When positioning companies for the defense, the Folgore gave multiple grids for each company to occupy as well as a task on that grid. These did not include company boundaries and were often too dispersed for tie-in with adjacent elements. At various times Legion provided detachments to secure the Folgore CP, overwatch key terrain, augment another company, and defend positions across multiple grid squares.

The specificity of the orders inhibited mission command or the exercise of disciplined initiative. In one instance, an order to displace with an imminent time hack precipitated a tense debate under a poncho among company and platoon leaders over whether to abandon a defensible position or disobey an impossible order.

On another night, following a difficult retrograde to a subsequent battle position, we saw an old message instructing Legion to split up and relocate across several kilometers. Given the message’s age and subsequent radio approval of our position, Legion’s commander requested clarification over both platforms. We gained approval to hold in place over the radio but then received orders to move at once through the mission partner network (MPN).

During another mission, Folgore ordered Legion to step off along a specific route through several kilometers of unsecured terrain to an objective. At that time, Legion was arrayed across urban defensive positions. The point man had been excluded from the planning, no route was provided, and no one had been briefed on the operation. Resisting pressure from above, Legion’s commander took several minutes to plan and prepare, making up time through an increased rate of march.

The frequency of urgent movements along unreconnoitered routes changed our formation order of movement (FOOM). Given the likelihood of frontal contact, the lead platoon’s first squad leader walked point, and the weapons squad leader pushed forward with one gun team to help control the lead squad. Given armored threats, the anti-tank gunners of the front and rear squads moved with their M136 AT4s in hand, rifles slung. On at least two occasions, this allowed for the destruction of high priority targets (HPTs) of opportunity while moving full speed along trails.

Recommendations:

- Maintain one chain of command, even if using multiple communications channels or platforms. Ensure all orders include identification of the order’s source.

- Clearly identify the ground force commander and key leader location by phase. In the absence of engagement criteria, brief your own prior to movement.

- Seek higher command’s intent to maintain unity of effort. If higher remains grid- or task-centric, raise scenarios in which the narrow guidance would obviously fail to elicit further guidance.

- Plan explicitly for contingencies so that flexibility is planned rather than a departure from the plan. Update higher regularly on changing facts on the ground and provide recommendations.

- Communicate your timeline needs, especially for briefing and route planning. Force planning into the operational timeline. Buy time by sending a key leader to participate in higher’s planning and relay information as it emerges.

- Interpret higher’s guidance while being mindful of language and culture barriers. Exercise disciplined initiative within your formation and when interacting with other units. Push key leaders and assets forward, using aggression to make up for condensed planning timelines or limited coordination.

Battle Tracking

Due to terrain, equipment, and cultural factors, limited information reached our company. This limited our ability to battle track and maintain a common operational picture (COP). We had center-point grids for adjacent companies but no boundary lines or contact points, so tying in with adjacent companies risked inadvertent movement through their lines or engagement areas. Despite their advantages, Folgore’s analog products left units with maps of various scales, divergent operations graphics, and no interoperability of acetates for distribution.

In the early days of the exercise, our End User Devices allowed us to track key leaders across the brigade and to contact other battalions to maintain situational awareness. This became more difficult as elements fell back on different communications windows. We knew little about adjacent battalions, forward line of own troops (FLOT), or the changing enemy situation.

The lack of battle tracking led to chance contact with other American elements within days. Approaching planned defensive positions, we withheld preparatory fires to maintain surprise. Clearing through, we spotted a friendly gun truck in what would have been the impact area and learned that the brigade’s forward elements were several phase lines short of their templated positions. We shared our frequencies, distributed water and supplies, and tied them into our defensive plan.

The most memorable example took place the night before the culminating brigade assault. Legion was moving along a ridge to link up with Folgore scouts when we heard the scouts shout the challenge again and again. We realized they were challenging someone above us. Suddenly the high ground lit up with a company-plus of gunfire. Oddly, we saw no lasers pointing in our direction. It turned out another friendly company had changed its route and made contact with an enemy platoon. Neither us nor the scouts had known their position.

Recommendations:

- Bring, make, and circulate whatever materials and information are required to achieve shared “understanding of graphic control measures, especially changes, during execution.” (See earlier recommendation on shared maps and GRGs.)

- Attach capable personnel to the foreign partner’s headquarters to help maintain a single COP. This is especially important if using incompatible platforms or software.

- Task an operations officer (OPSO) or radio-telephone operator (RTO) with battle tracking for the company. Provide maps, acetates, and radio. Have the foreign LNO assist. If needed, the OPSO should link up with other units to pull the required information.

- Ask forward units for their rear trace and left and right limits, not just their FLOT. Share your location at every halt or communications window.

- Notify all nearby elements at all levels when conducting rearward or forward passage of lines with foreign units. Do not assume lower units are aware of your position just because you notified their higher command.

- Rapid attrition and frequent movement increase the chance of units crossing or mixing with one another. Exchange and test communications plans with planned and potential adjacent units. Record frequencies for their platoons to coordinate at the lowest level.

- Practice integrating foreign elements into your task organization, even temporarily. Paratroopers train to form “little groups of paratroopers” (LGOPs) on the drop zone. Adopt an “LGOP” mentality even deep into a ground fight. This may involve sharing frequencies to get others on your net or detaching a Soldier with a radio. Identify their resupply needs and capabilities. Report to both your higher element and theirs the change in task organization.

Deploy LNOs

Anticipating challenges, our organic brigade and battalion both sent LNOs to Folgore. One was the executive officer (XO) of our organic battalion’s heavy weapons company and the other a captain and full-time LNO. From Folgore, a chief warrant officer and 25-year veteran accompanied Legion.

Communications often bypassed the LNOs, denying them context and influence, and few spoke both fluent English and Italian. We lacked clear communication of the Italian plan, battle-tracking assistance, and one unified and consistent line of communication.

Additionally, when the American LNOs became planners, they began to have an “intent” which might not align with the Folgore commander’s. In one case, the regimental command team drove into our platoon position and told me to move the platoon, with no indication as to our purpose. One of the LNOs privately gave me his understanding of the broader intent, and we relayed this to Legion’s commander before once again displacing.

Recommendations:

- Identify LNOs early. Consider sending them TDY to meet their foreign counterparts. Invite partner nation LNOs to do the same. If travel is not possible or no specific foreign partner has been identified, have the officer serve in the LNO role during an ordinary training exercise.

- Wherever possible, ensure LNOs have suitable language skills. (See next section.)

- Involve LNOs in the planning process. This ensures the plan is compatible with U.S. capabilities, capacity, ROE, and risk to force.

- Send LNOs to brigade briefs, even if the foreign regiment has not begun its planning process or prefers not to have the LNO present. This is especially helpful if the brigade is also American. For the same reason, include foreign LNOs in all planning and briefings one level above or below the foreign nation.

Value Language Skills

Legion Company benefited from its home station in Vicenza, Italy. Legion’s first sergeant spoke passable Italian and was married to an Italian woman. My platoon’s first squad leader (and point man) spoke excellent Italian and likewise was married to an Italian. I learned Italian while in country, rating at a 2+ (limited working proficiency, plus) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). Given the relative density of Italian speakers in my platoon, Legion’s commander put us on company boundaries with Folgore and at the front of all movements.

During the several days of preparations at Camp Albertshof, we had only limited exposure to the Folgore. Beyond the large rehearsals and few meetings, leaders below the company level had almost no social or work contact with the Folgore prior to air assault. Several days later, while reconnoitering my platoon’s defensive engagement area, we encountered two Folgore scouts. (This was minutes after encountering the disabled cavalry truck.) They spoke little English so we spoke Italian. They were out of water and out of radio contact with their regiment. They relayed what information they had, which we relayed to the company, and shared their frequencies, which my RTO programmed into his radio. We shared our disposition with them, updated them on the regiment’s positions as best we could, and directed them to the disabled truck for water.

The next night, in a patrol base, our weapons squad leader sighted two dismounts and initiated the alert plan. After exchanging a tense challenge and password, we realized they were Folgore and called out in Italian that we were friendly. We brought them into the patrol base, woke the squad leader with the best Italian, and exchanged information.

Recommendations:

- Produce a smart card (like a pointee-talkee) with translations of key questions and answers. Distribute to your junior Soldiers most likely to make first contact. Examples could include:

• “Point to your friendly positions.”
• “Bring me to your commander.”
• “Do you need resupply?”
• “Where did you see enemy?”
• “Is this area secure?”

- Identify what all elements will be doing, even those templated in other AOs. Soldiers should at a minimum know which militaries and vehicles will be part of the broader campaign. Make initial contact with their leaders. Better an awkward first meeting during a busy planning week than in the dark or a firefight.

- Place leaders with relevant language or cultural skills at frictions points. This can be as an LNO, a participant in key meetings, or a leader of the element closest to foreign partners.

- Incentivize culture and language education among leaders and Soldiers. Protect time for attending on-base language classes. Integrate cultural and language exposure into fitness competitions, organizational days, Warrior Adventure Quest trips, or other unit off-sites. Schedule DLPT tests and reward Soldiers for high or improved results.

Rehearse Communications

Brigade, Folgore, and Legion had different primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plans and capabilities. During the initial GAC, Folgore did not have the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) for organic communications or reporting with brigade. Legion could see other companies and battalions in the brigade but not the Folgore CP or its companies. As part of the MPN, Folgore used a messaging device that reached the company but not the platoons. When enemy forces captured one of these devices, its usefulness vanished.

During the defense of an urban area, Folgore disseminated a reporting plan using Legion’s net, and reports initially went smoothly. When the traffic encryption key (TEK) expired midway through the night, Legion’s radios changed TEKs and Folgore went dark. When we could not raise the regiment, we moved to the Folgore CP to deconflict. Someone had switched to a different net to try and reach us, but the soldier manning the radio could not account for who had made the change, when, or why.

Recommendations:

- Avoid reliance on an app or phone. The chat function was the only expeditionary MPN available for creating the mission partner environment (MPE) but often seemed worse than nothing. It was a crutch early, caused confusion throughout, and became a liability once compromised.

- If there is an MPE platform assigned, request it early to test capabilities, procure enough units, develop SOPs, identify a PACE plan, and conduct rehearsals.

- Plan communications windows. Report your communications windows and record those of other units. Consider using those communications windows even during planning and preparation.

- Nest PACE plans wherever possible. Report to higher if the PACE plan is unworkable or involves unusual risks. Consider using a runner or running yourself. Rehearse the full PACE plan before the operation.

- Determine which radios will be on which nets at which times. Identify changes to your radio organization in the event of a shortage.

- Have a compromise plan that can survive different comms platforms. Continue to push the pro-word for that change over the compromised net.

- Assign radios to LNOs. This allows them to interpret information and make recommendations in real time.

Scrutinize Logistics

Logistical challenges were acute. Folgore brought one support platoon. Without a forward support company or headquarters company, resupply was held at the regimental level, and their supply personnel worked nonstop with limited protection. Since theirs were among the only vehicles in our AO, they were often targeted. Manning and vehicle shortages also posed challenges for moving personnel and equipment to the rear.

Legion’s battery consumption was significantly higher than our counterparts. At one point, the Folgore supply officer simply rejected a resupply request, stating that they were out. Legion’s XO bartered chem lights for batteries from an adjacent Folgore company and then requested resupply directly from brigade’s support battalion.

Medical coverage posed a challenge both for cultural and practical reasons. Folgore casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) was coordinated over the MPN, preventing platoons from coordinating with Folgore when detached from the company. More importantly, the Folgore had few field litter ambulances (FLAs) and no escort vehicles available, so CASEVAC often required Legion gun trucks. This kept our paratroopers alive but took our most casualty-producing weapons out of the fight. We moved several casualties for kilometers by sled or litter, including out of the Folgore AO and over several hundred feet of elevation to reach our organic battalion’s medical assets.

Recommendations:

- When task organizing, ensure the foreign unit has the supplies needed to sustain the company. Share resupply needs, possibly through a “smart card” of equipment and consumption rates by class. If needed, request additional assets from the brigade to set conditions for the foreign unit’s resupply responsibilities.

- Rehearse resupply operations. Identify key personnel and develop SOPs based on observed friction points. Determine early whether the foreign unit requires additional assets to secure its communications lines, and from whom.

- Introduce foreign supply specialists to your brigade’s forward support companies and battalion support brigade. Ensure they understand resupply procedures. Likewise, meet their personnel and learn their procedures.

- Have a resupply PACE plan. Pack your vehicles and stage resupply caches to stretch how long your company can remain operational without higher support. Make a plan for direct brigade resupply in an emergency.

- As a forcing function, request the brigade establish a standard time for CASEVAC completion. Train with the foreign unit and request additional assets from brigade if standard is not met.

- Review the logistics and medical considerations of FM 3-16 and applicable checklists.-

Conclusion

The challenges we faced during our JMRC rotation were those we had expected, just more pronounced. To compensate, elements should remain organic where possible. When attached to a foreign partner, allow additional time for training, planning, preparation, and rehearsal. Place the right leaders at friction and decision points early. Socialize the different units with one another’s methods and equipment. Above all else, maintain unity of effort during the privilege that is fighting alongside our partners.

Strength and Honor! First Rock! Sky Soldiers!

Resources

Field Manual (FM) 3-16, The Army in Multinational Operations, July 2024

Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, June 2024

“Complex NATO Exercise for the Folgore, Saber Junction 2024 Concluded in Germany,” Brigato Folgore, 13 September 2024FM 3-90, Tactics, May 2023

“Press Release - Airborne Operations Kick Off Swift Response in Sweden,” U.S. Army Europe and Africa, 7 May 2024, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/3766889/press-release-airborne-operations-kick-off-swift-response-in-sweden

FM 3-90, Tactics, May 2023

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, January 2024,

150-LDR-5012, “Conduct Troop Leading Procedures,” Central Army Registry, 1 April 2024

1LT Nicholas B. Naquin, “Multinational Success Requires Multilingual Troops,” Army Magazine, April 2016, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Eisenhower/2016/3rd%20Naquin.pdf

Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 8110.01, Mission Partner Environment Information Sharing Capability Implementation for the DOD

ATP 6-02.61, Expeditionary Mission Partner Network Operations, December 2023

MAJ Michael S. Ryan, “A Short Note on PACE Plans,” Infantry, July 2013, https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2013/Jul-Sep/Ryan.html.

1LT Mikhael Smits is an Infantry officer in the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy. At the time of writing, he was a platoon leader in Bravo (Legion) Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne). He previously worked for the U.S. Army Infantry School's commandant and deputy commandant. 1LT Smits is on leave from Harvard Law School.

This article appears in the Summer 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.

As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.