[Editor’s Note: This Blast from the Past article was originally published in Army Logistician (the former title of Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin) in the January-February 1989 issue, pages 12–15, which can be found here: https://www.dvidshub.net/unit/Army-SustainmentBulletin.]
One of the most critical and difficult tasks confronting Army logisticians is that of determining the number and types of combat service support (CSS) units needed to sustain the combat forces in performing their warfighting missions. The function that logisticians perform in making those determinations and allocating CSS forces is called force structuring. Combat forces must, obviously, be structured also, but that is not the province of the logistician; the logistician accepts the combat force structure as a given and develops the CSS force structure to meet the requirements of the combat forces.
CSS force structuring takes the major Army combat forces and, based on a particular scenario, develops the combat service support and general support forces needed to sustain them. This is accomplished using a process called Total Army Analysis (TAA).
TAA is a partly quantitative, partly qualitative analytical process involving virtually every level in the Army hierarchy from the unit level to the Army Chief of Staff. TAA results in a description of the program force for a given year. This description includes the number and types of units, as well as each unit’s organization level and component category. Unit types are designated by the standard requirement code (SRC), which is virtually equivalent to a table of organization and equipment (TOE) number.
The most current fully analyzed TAA cycle is for analytical year 1993. In the past, the process has been annual, but it is changing to a quadrennial cycle, with warfighting simulations conducted in primary years and sensitivity and excursion analyses conducted during intermediate years. TAA 93 is already being carried forward, virtually unchanged, to TAA 96.
The first phase in the TAA process is the preparation phase [see chart in the original publication on page 14]. During this phase, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), U.S. Forces Command, TRADOC integrating centers and service schools, and other major Army Command’s (MACOM’s) review the Defense and Army force sizing guidance that is contained in a classified document called the Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions (AFPDA), discussed in detail in the article “Help for Army Force Planners” by Dianna Woody (Army Logistician, JAN-FEB 1989 [starting on page 16 in the original publication]). The AFPDA — which is updated and published annually — is one of the most important source documents used in the TAA process.
The product of the first phase is a set of allocation rules, which are constrained by the AFPDA assumptions; these rules drive the rest of the force structuring process. There are two types of allocation rules. The first type consists of workload rules, which state TOE capabilities in quantifiable terms that are understandable to computer simulation models. For example, a warfighting requirement to move a quantity of Class I supplies will generate a requirement for a portion of a motor transport company. The second type consists of existence rules, which add force structure for reasons not directly related to workload. For example, the accumulation of a specified number of motor transport companies (workload requirements) will generate an existence requirement for a motor transport battalion. Some existence rules are even farther removed from any workload requirement. For example, the existence of a theater automatically generates a requirement for a theater movement control center. Existence rules are always controversial and intensely debated. These allocation rule proposals and debates are conducted during a Department of the Army-chaired force structure conference (FSC I), and the results are presented to a general officer steering committee (GOSC I) for approval.
The second phase of the TAA is the quantitative analysis phase (see chart in the original publication on page 14). It is conducted by the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA). Using a variety of computer models, CAA performs wargame simulations to determine the requirements for supporting the warfighting forces. These requirements then become input for a model known as the force analysis simulation of theater administrative and logistics support (FASTALS).
FASTALS computes the time-phased support force requirements for the CS and CSS forces needed to support the warfighting forces. The output of the FASTALS process is the minimum number of units required to provide doctrinal support to the deployed combat forces. The overall results of these analyses are called the design case.
The design case is only as accurate and realistic as the simulation models can make it. Though the models are highly sophisticated and have been refined over several years, they can cope with only a few of the thousands of variables and with none of the numerous nonquantifiable intangibles that define day-to-day reality. The quantitative results of the models, therefore, must also be qualitatively analyzed.
Qualitative analysis (see chart below [page 15 in the original publication]) begins by accepting that the support forces included in the design care are doctrinally sound but unconstrained. There are always more requirements for support forces than there are resources to meet them. The design case must therefore be modified to fit within constraints, the most significant of which are congressional budget and manpower limitations.
Although the requirements change with each TAA cycle in response to changes in operations plans, warfighting scenarios, allocation rules, or the dozens of other variables that enter the analysis, there are always more requirements than resources. The shortages must be allocated to produce the least risk. MACOMs are particularly important in determining “acceptable risk.” A MACOM commander might, for example, determine that, given the current scenario, he needs one more Transportation Corps truck company and is willing to give up a Quartermaster Corps petroleum, oils, and lubricants pipeline company to get it.
Support forces are allocated by component (Compo). The components are —
- Compo 1, Active Army.
- Compo 2, Army National Guard.
- Compo 3, Army Reserve.
- Compo 4, Unmanned and unequipped requirements.
- Compo 7, Direct host nation support (HNS) offsets, HNS reserve units that will activate as required to support U.S. forces.
- Compo 8, Indirect HHS offsets, HNS commercial assets that have been designated for support of U.S. forces.
- Compo 9, Logistics civil augmentation program offsets, HNS commercial assets contractually obligated to support U.S. forces.
The TAA process affects all components. A change in any unit-Compo combination must have an offsetting change in some other unit-Compo combination. The maximum allowable total of all unit or Compo combinations is the constraint imposed by Congress plus the total host nation support unit equivalents available.
One of the most visible and attention-getting components in the TAA process is Compo 4, the unresourced requirements. In general terms, Compo 4 represents the difference between requirements and resources. Compo 4 is the shortfall, a measurement of what needs to be done but cannot be done with available resources; it is expressed in terms of U.S. unit equivalents to reflect the quantity of mission capability shortfall.
The most critical point regarding Compo 4 “units” is that they do not exist. There are no designated flagpoles around which otherwise-inactive forces will rally in the event of a call to arms. Compo 4 is simply an accounting mechanism to describe the force shortage in terms of unit mission capability.
After CAA has finished the modeling process and developed the design, a second force structure conference (FSC II) convenes to review the design and to recommend a force for the program objective memorandum (POM). All interested parties (MACOMs, Service schools, etc.) attend and, as before, their debate can be (and usually is) intense. The objective of the second force structure conference is to allocate resources.
Allocating resources to meet requirements is the most dramatic aspect of the TAA and force structuring process. Although TAA is concerned with the total Army, theater and limited war concerns are never overlooked. This is the most qualitative portion of the analytical process. All Compos are involved.
Compos 1, 2, and 3 are evaluated concurrently and allocated Army-wide. Debate is intense, and controversial decisions have to be made regarding the distribution of type units (by SRC) within the Army. Compos 7, 8, and 9 are allocated only within the theaters in which they are available; however, the availability of a Compo 7 truck unit equivalent in one theater frees up a Compo 1, 2, or 3 truck company for allocation to another theater. Allocation of a Compo 7, 8, or 9 unit can only be made against a like Compo 1, 2, or 3 unit.
The second force structure conference must always deal with the existence of Compo 4 and will make every effort to reduce or eliminate it; because of the systemic constraints, however, this is usually not possible. The focus of the effort therefore becomes one of minimizing the impact of the Compo 4. The conference prepares recommendations for forwarding to the general officer steering committee (GOSC).
The recommendations of the second force structure conference are briefed to the second GOSC. This steering committee attempts to resolve any issues remaining and, along with participants of the second force structure conference, conducts a force program review for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, acting for the Army Chief of Staff.
The Vice Chief is normally the final authority for resolving any issues the steering committee is unable to resolve. Alternatively, the Vice Chief may provide additional guidance and reconvene the steering committee to address unresolved issues.
Once the Vice Chief accepts the steering committee’s recommendations, the results are presented to the Army Chief of Staff in a decision brief, and this completes the basic force structuring process for a POM year has been completed. The process then starts again the next TAA cycle.
All force structuring efforts are oriented toward the future — usually 6 to 8 years into the future. Although there is continuity of process and many parameters do not vary significantly from one cycle to the next, each TAA cycle is independent of previous TAA cycles. A change in a major parameter (such as a major change in an operations plan) or the accumulation of numerous small changes (such as progressive improvements in technology) can significantly change requirements for a type of unit from one TAA cycle to the next. Changes in requirements necessarily subtend changes in force structure allocations.
The final product of the TAA and force structuring process is a POM force for a given year. That force, being virtually fixed, becomes a baseline for force development planning. This includes planning for unit activations, deactivations, or conversions. For this reason, once a POM force is defined, no changes are permitted until the next TAA cycle. The net effect of this is that a POM force, even though it is planned for approximately six years into the future, is history once the planning cycle is complete.
In summary, the TAA process provides a fixed-time, phased-changed management tool that permits force developers at every level in the Army to plan for changes in the future force. One of its greatest strengths is that it accommodates changing circumstances incrementally and those increments are focused several years into the future. This minimizes turmoil in the planning efforts for the Army of the future yet permits enough flexibility to accommodate anticipated changes.
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Joe A. Fortner was a logistics management specialist in the Directorate of Combat Developments, Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
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This article was published in the summer 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.
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