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Execution of a redundant three-cluster concept in lieu of a massed brigade support area (BSA) significantly increases survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness. A comprehensive training plan and a modernized signal infrastructure are required to successfully implement this concept, but this is possible for all future brigade support battalions (BSBs) as they transform.
On April 2, 2024, 225th BSB transformed in contact to a light support battalion (LSB). This new unit was tasked to support the 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (LBCT) (Prototype), a new construct that prioritizes mobility and lethality. The LSB’s new structure grew from four companies and 400 personnel to seven companies and over 800 personnel, all while maintaining its original allocation of staff.
This rapid and forceful transformation and the division’s culture of experimentation opened opportunities to rethink the structure of BSAs. How does the LSB transform to better face the pacing threat in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility? As it stood, the BSA was simply too large and centralized. It was a large target, not easily tailored for non-contiguous operations, and it did not fall in line with the essence of being light.
The answer is a redundant three-cluster support area coined as light logistics clusters distributed geographically in a light support area. After 28 days of training on cluster operations, the battalion was able to validate the cluster concept during the brigade’s capstone training, Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) 25-01.
The Benefits
Survivability — The pacing threat in theater can disable, if not destroy, a unit arrayed in a traditional BSA configuration. With its large, dense footprint, a BSA can be easily targeted. Splitting the BSA into three smaller, geographically distributed clusters reduces the enemy’s payoff and the friendly signature; it also increases the suitable land available to establish positions in favorable terrain features. Planners must no longer identify large swaths of land suitable for a BSA — something quite rare in the constricted jungle or island fight.
Furthermore, sustainment culmination in USINDOPACOM is a real concern. The tyranny of distance between sustainment nodes can be thousands of miles. Enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities may further degrade abilities to rapidly reinforce sustainment assets. This new structure must be survivable. Sustainment nodes in the future fight can easily be part of the enemy’s decision matrix to unmask our enemy fires if the ensuing payoff decimates the brigade’s sustainment capacity. It is too risky to array friendly sustainment assets in a BSA. Geographic distribution and signature reduction are a must to survive and support the light fighters.
Flexibility — The 225th LSB task-organized each cluster for survivability and redundancy. Each cluster must be able to individually command and control (C2) both the battalion fight and brigade sustainment. If one cluster is disabled or destroyed, sustainment will still continue.
The first cluster is designated as the slow cluster and is arrayed farther to the rear. This cluster has the majority of the supply support activity and maintenance assets. The battalion executive officer (XO) is the cluster officer in charge (OIC), responsible for overall C2, and the B Company (Co.) commander is the cluster commander, responsible for all cluster internal actions and security.
The second and third clusters have the Role 2 split, most of the distribution assets, and enablers as required. The support operations (SPO) OIC and S-3 OIC are the cluster OICs, with general support company (GSC) and headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) leadership as cluster commanders respectively. The battalion commander is free to occupy any cluster.
The cluster concept is inherently flexible because each cluster can displace, conduct C2, sustain higher echelons, and task-organize independently.
Operationalizing this concept results in the following sequence: The LSB first deploys and occupies the initial staging base in a geographic configuration like a BSA occupation. The area is occupied by a cluster and is divided into thirds on a clock face. At this point there is one battalion C2 element, and security is organized like a traditional BSA. Upon receipt of the first warning order and the initiation of the military decision-making process, the SPO team is tasked with refining cluster composition while the battalion staff identifies suitable jump locations for each of the clusters. Key assets are moved between clusters as the composition is finalized. At end state, there are three refined clusters task organized to suit the brigade’s mission.
As the brigade expands, and lines of communication are extended, each cluster jumps from the initial staging base and establishes itself as required. During this process there is at least one cluster in full operational condition and capable of supporting any sustainment contingencies.
As the fight progresses, the LSB can jump a single cluster each day as survivability moves or in response to changing battlefield conditions. Consequently, each cluster jumps every three days. This enhances survivability and balances support requirements. This concept also organically develops non-contiguous island capabilities by training three nodes that can operate in different locations.
Responsiveness — A cluster is inherently more responsive than a BSA. Due to the smaller footprint, setup and teardown are much quicker and simpler. Displacement times are significantly reduced as well. It took 90 minutes to fully displace a trained cluster 2 kilometers in a survivability move compared to hours with a traditional BSA. Having redundant clusters arrayed on the battlefield enables the battalion commander to comfortably assume more risk and deploy clusters closer to the forward line of own troops, a concept like that of a forward logistics element. Consequently, ground lines of communication to the supported unit are further reduced.
Training
The battalion had six months to develop, test, and become trained on this concept before validating it at JPMRC 25-01. The battalion started off with a 14-day battalion field training exercise (FTX) crawl, followed by a 14-day walk for the brigade FTX. Tactical communication was the largest friction point because each cluster required a comprehensive amount of tactical communication equipment to function as three separate command posts. This friction point was alleviated by the new integrated tactical network equipment, multiple mobile broadband kits, Wi-Fi pucks, and the availability of a Starshield at each cluster for high-bandwidth communication.
The brigade’s mantra of being as light as possible also paid dividends to the sustainment enterprise. Tents other than individual tents and the Role 2 were barred. Sleeping in vehicles and cots was discouraged. Soldiers deployed to the field with a rucksack and an assault pack and were required to keep their gear always packed and ready to jump unless on a rest cycle. These policies effectively enabled the rapid displacement of formations while also forcing a lean and sensible approach to fieldcraft.
Staffs and commanders had a significant number of new concepts to learn and execute. Each cluster had to be trained as a separate command post. This consequently had the secondary effect of developing three times the teams capable of C2 than would have otherwise existed in a BSA construct.
While each cluster was a battalion C2 node, a company commander was assigned in each cluster to be the cluster commander. Typically, it was the HHC, B Co., and GSC commanders who were the cluster commanders. These cluster commanders were responsible for everything that occurred inside the cluster, such as security, accountability, and the base defense operations center. All other company elements reported to the cluster commander via a company representative. This freed up the A Co. command team to focus on distribution operations, and the C Co. command team to focus on medical operations. The GSC commander had all their distribution elements shift operational control to the maneuver task forces and therefore had the bandwidth to be a cluster commander.
The most challenging aspect of applying this new concept is training the formation in a wholly new way of organizing tactical formations in the field. First, the biggest question was how to identify these three clusters. Over many iterations Red, White, and Blue was identified as the most effective way to name each cluster. On the intra-battalion net, each cluster hailed as each color, including the subordinate commands. For example, the BN C2 node in the Red Cluster was Red Main, while the C2 node for our Alpha Company, Aztecs, in the red cluster was Aztec Red. Whichever cluster C2 node in the Dragon Battalion had the fight defaulted to Dragon Main, when reporting to the higher echelon and to subordinate clusters. Only the cluster with the fight reported to the brigade headquarters.
All three clusters fed a common operational picture (COP) synchronized via Microsoft Teams. Analog trackers that mirrored the digital COP were maintained and updated concurrently at each battalion C2 node. Each staff section was spread as evenly as possible across the clusters. Typically, Red Cluster defaulted to the main because the battalion S-3 assigned to it and the battalion commander typically co-located (although it was designed so that the battalion commander was free to occupy any cluster). White Cluster had the SPO OIC and the majority of the SPO team. The Blue Cluster had the battalion XO and a mix of primary and alternate staff.
Conclusion
A three-cluster configuration simply makes sense in the USINDOPACOM LBCT construct. The benefits of survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness are immense. These benefits can only be reaped with extensive training along with modernization of communication platforms. A one-size-fits-all concept across the sustainment enterprise simply will not suffice as new chapters of the sustainment handbook are written.
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CPT Kevin Adler is the operations officer (S-3) for 225th Light Support Battalion, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Prototype), 25th Infantry Division. He is a graduate of the Jungle Operations Course, Air Assault Course, and attended the Cavalry Leaders Course. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental policy analysis and planning from University of California-Davis.
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This article was published in the spring 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.
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