Data Overload in an Age of Transformation: Mastering the Basics

As one of the battle captains assigned to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), I was first struck by the amount of chat rooms, message boxes, spreadsheets, and email functions I had to manage. It was strange that with the technology available to battle staff, we found ourselves locked onto headsets and laptops, as if we were no better than pro-gamers trying to coordinate the actions of an entire division. As the Army’s premier light infantry unit specializing in long-range air assault missions, the 101st will continue to master the fundamentals of air assault planning and execution as it approaches its new 2030 framework, which will include deep alterations to its existing brigade combat team structure, like many other units throughout the Army. With the division now as the primary unit of action in a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) environment, it is crucial that staff sections at the division headquarters make commensurate changes to their standard operating procedures and force structure as well. One of these changes must be the way division staff sections manage data overload on the current operations and integration cell (COIC) floor.

This “blended” approach is an easily understood and practical framework utilizing time-tested mechanisms that provide robust analysis to commanders in the field. The danger of an unrefined, data-centric approach, relying predominantly on chat rooms and digital common operating picture (COP) technology, is its inability to reflect information that belies quantitative measurement. It cannot recommend contingencies, provide accurate analysis, nor offer actionable courses of action to the commander. Whereas refined COP tools included in Maven software, for example, can amalgamate vast amounts of information and present it neatly, this tool can easily succumb to data overload without analysis and established guardrails. In order to make effective decisions in a time-constrained environment, commanders require both quantitative and qualitative data sets (data plus analysis). This approach will not only allow staff sections to collaborate more effectively in the COIC but also redirect planners and decision-makers back to established objectives, guidance, and intended outcomes. It will help immunize staff from overreliance on chat rooms and COP tools which, although helpful, have a tendency to produce extraneous data, pull key leaders from their established responsibilities, and provide commanders with inapplicable information.

Data Management and Chat Rooms

“Data management” has become a buzzword for the immense possibilities provided by the Army’s new digital software tools and technologies. Whereas in the past commanders relied on sophisticated map overlays and analog products, divisions can now employ sophisticated digital frameworks, relying on instant messaging and display tools that can collect and portray vast amounts of information. These digital platforms are certainly helpful and can allow commanders to visualize the battlespace more effectively. It is important to remember, however, that the data pathways from the point of origin to the COIC floor are rarely clearcut but messy and chaotic, and it can be difficult even for experienced operations officers to keep pace with the flow of information the battlespace provides.

Big data — “data that contains greater variety, arriving in increasing volumes and with more velocity” — is becoming common as staffs work to employ upgraded digital systems for battle-staffing purposes.(1) Whether during a warfighter exercise, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation, or even real-world operation such as Hurricane Helene response efforts, for example, it was easy for essential information such as key weapon systems, casualty figures, logistics, etc., to become jumbled up and lost by the flow of other information such as enemy activities, target numbers, and other statistics of friendly information. More crucially, it was difficult to conduct effective cross-talk between sections on these chat platforms since doing so required an endless back-and-forth flow of question and rebuttal. Without writing full-length paragraphs for each entry, it was difficult to capture the significance of certain observations and events via chat functions, and precious time was lost attempting to issue guidance via text messages, hoping recipients were acting upon the latest information. The end result in some circumstances was that each functional cell essentially fought its own version of the fight, detached from the views or considerations of other sections where cross-talk and collaboration were necessary.

With all planners locked onto their laptop with headset, it took the G-33 current operations cell (CUOPs) function to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate the combined efforts of each section in accordance with the commander’s intent. As was the experience of myself and others in most recent division-level training exercises, however, we too often found ourselves mired in innumerable chat rooms, message boxes, and COP layers as well. We received reports in one chat and disseminated guidance in another, all while inputting information for briefing purposes in an entirely different slide deck, spreadsheet, or COP tool. Because of the plenitude of data-management tools, many staff sections did not know which “chat” to input their information, submit basic requests for information (RFIs), or report combat power slants and other pertinent information, resulting in chat rooms with excessive and irrelevant information. Furthermore, the COP operated by Maven became saturated with graphics, layers, and folders of each respective functional cell, making it difficult to navigate and revise. It quickly became apparent that everyone could not work on the same digital map at the same time.

In order to cut through the confusion and friction inevitably produced by the battlespace, the answer was often to make even more chat rooms with varying participants. Whether it was specifically for unit S-3s (operations), S-4s (logistics), commanders, pilots, or battle captains, the general tendency to create a myriad of additional chat rooms arose within the first hours of an exercise, all of which contained key information the other chat lacked — the radio-telephone operator for one recent exercise had to monitor the outputs of 20-plus chat rooms. This tendency had the pernicious effect of removing key players from pre-established lines of effort at the subordinate units. Instead of planning for the next 24 hours, for example, S-3s found themselves bogged down by messages and other requests in real time. Battle captains at subordinate units were belabored by continuous RFIs from higher echelons, making it hard to manage efforts at their own level as well. Open message and audio links with unit S-3s and commanders in the field became the norm, as well as staff members simply adding themselves onto the different chat rooms maintained by subordinate units. This was done under the assumption that having accurate, real-time information would better enable the higher formation to provide the commanding general a description of the battlespace. Unfortunately, the result of our efforts was that we were saddled with another imperfect information flow that removed the ability of subordinate units to apply their own analysis and manage efforts at their level accordingly. In our burning desire to acquire accurate, real-time information, we actually impeded our own understanding of the battlespace.

This data overload in both chat rooms and the COP resulted in confusion on the COIC floor. Staff sections spent more time chasing ephemeral data emanating from the battlespace, sometimes losing sight of the key tasks and objectives of the operational plan. Unsurprisingly, commanders sometimes did not know what to do with the information we provided to them during the battle and commander’s update briefs. “Staffs often present raw, unrefined data without analysis and are unable to provide the knowledge commanders need to make decisions,” as another expert at the Center for Army Lessons Learned observed.(2) The COP presented at these meetings could not display the required info without clicking on a succession of layers and icons and often lacked key info that commanders in the field reported. It took many painful iterations of this pattern to reach a level of proficiency but only through extemporaneous means that were not codified. The question remains: How can we bring economy of force back into the COIC floor?

The Way Forward

It should be noted that problems related to data overload are not a new phenomenon. During the height of the global war on terrorism, Army and Air Force intelligence officials repeatedly warned about the dangers of too much information — that Soldiers and airmen, especially drone pilots, were inundated with too much data that negatively impacted their ability to see the battlespace clearly.(3) Whereas this may have been confined to higher echelons with specific military occupational and functional specialties then, this dangerous tendency can percolate down to lower echelons as divisions and brigades employ state-of-the-art digital platforms. What commanders often request is information that “blends” the activities of multiple sections, particularly in combat power slants, for example.

There are many things that go into the calculation of combat power, of course, but no planner would seriously suggest that this is solely built on personnel or equipment exclusively. Personnel and equipment cannot be utilized effectively without the other. The result of our recent efforts was “G-14” as we termed it, where both G-1 (personnel) and G-4 (logistics) were able to calculate, predict, and brief accurate COMBAT power slants, including both personnel requirements and equipment quantities that directly influenced decision-making for conducting subsequent operations. The G-14 function then took the result of their combined data pool to offer robust analysis. This group was able to answer the question: With the personnel and equipment on hand, does a unit still have the capability necessary to achieve the task and purpose it has been allocated? Although the data was imperfect and drawn from varying sources, these planners could still intuit patterns and decision points that commanders could anticipate and act upon (Class V rate of expenditure, container delivery system bundles, reinforcement requests, fuel considerations, etc.).

The same could be said for other exigencies where close collaboration is necessary/requested. Cross-talk between G-2 (intelligence) and G-34 (fires) is vital when submitting and ascertaining targets sighted and destroyed (often with the invaluable help of special operations forces elements as well), producing concise and accurate battle-damage assessments that directly impact the commander’s understanding of the battle. G-32 (aviation), G-2, and air missile defense (AMD) can all provide a net assessment of enemy airspace, and G-2 and AMD work closely to counter enemy UAS. These functional cells coupled with the G-33 CUOPs can also integrate unit liaison officers into many of these blended functions so that units could directly report up the chain of command. Liaison duty is often undervalued by staff members, and it is not so presumptuous to suggest that it is sometimes an undesirable duty for those chosen to carry it out at the brigade or battalion level. This trend must be turned on its head. LSCO environments require the active participation of liaisons who not only possess a sophisticated operational understanding of what their units are doing, but who can also anticipate, alert, and analyze certain courses of action. Liaisons need to “look closely at specific requirements for critical events and phases and their inputs to the feasibility of actions during those phases/events.”(4)

Similarly, the operations sync meeting is one of the most important tools of coordination and should not be relegated to a simple working group on a battle rhythm. Rather, it should be considered a continuous process of units feeding regular updates, alterations, and requests for support to higher levels in a way that is planned and predictable. With a pre-established reporting matrix and a well-defined operations overlay, staffs can anticipate the requirements of subordinate units, recommend contingencies, and identify points of friction between adjacent units. This will also allow subordinate units time to prepare their own assessments and adjust operations in accordance with the commander’s intent. Taking time and devoting resources to analyze information from the battlespace will not only result in better recommendations to the commander but also facilitate more effective guidance. Compiling inputs for nightly orders (fragmentary orders [FRAGOs]) is a routine but necessary process for nesting ongoing operations with approved plans and can be instrumental in conveying the outputs of key decisions. In formulating updated FRAGOs, the staff can take a clear look at how events in the battlespace conform to the operational plan and, if not, recommend contingencies and revised guidance to meet the commander’s intent. When published in an easily accessible location, subordinate units can receive updated guidance with properly aligned tasks and purposes. This will eliminate the excess of RFIs and friction points that inundate chat rooms and maintain an operational cognizance of what mission success looks like. Staffs engaged in managing chat rooms and COP adjustments have little time to collect and analyze FRAGO inputs, nor can they disseminate revised guidance adequately to a broad audience in a simple chat box.

Granted, many of the problems mentioned here may be the concomitant effects of annual staff transition windows and the growing pains of building effective battle staffs. Warfighter exercises and JRTC rotations are purposefully designed to test existing standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques and procedures so blaming the faulty use of digital tools for lack of battlefield success is not a veritable excuse. Through trial and error, staffs will steadily learn how to employ digital tools in ways that help commanders visualize the battlespace and make effective decisions. What this article has attempted to show is that this can only be done, however, through understanding the limitations of such technologies. According to Young Bang, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), “‘What we need is data processed to information, but more importantly, insights. Insights for the commander, insights for the Soldier. Not to tell them what to do, but insights so they take action...’”(5) Insights are provided by staffs aware of what operational success looks like, who can provide analytical expertise using information that is often incomplete, messy, and not easily quantifiable. Although we may strive to attain as much real-time data as possible, it takes time and brainpower to make this data flow intelligible at every echelon of command. This cannot take place if reporting via chat rooms without a defined reporting matrix becomes the primary means of sending and receiving information.

Conclusion

Some of these prescriptions to the increasing problem of data overload referenced here may seem simplistic. Things like a reporting matrix, operations sync, and nightly FRAGOs are not new procedures and should all be pre-established before executing any training exercise or operation. As the 101st Airborne Division and other units throughout the Army work to implement new command-and-control capabilities and digital software tools to streamline COIC functions, it is important to not lose sight of these time-tested mechanisms for alleviating the inevitable friction that arises from the battlespace.

It is important to remind ourselves that digital management tools are not a permanent solution to the perennial “fog of war” that can infect even competent staffs, and that these tools can actually produce friction if not properly maintained or nested with the traditional mechanisms of the battle staff. These new capabilities are not a substitute for the rigorous analysis staffs are required to conduct to make the battlefield comprehensible and retain the initiative in a large-scale fight. This analysis requires time, patience, and a keen awareness of what is important to commanders in the field in an environment that is constantly changing. It is doubtful whether any sophisticated digital tool or chat room can achieve this on its own.

This approach recognizes that information originates from a variety of sources and is messy, chaotic, and not easily quantifiable. Simply putting this information into one system (such as Maven) cannot ameliorate the negative impacts of data overload, nor is it a substitute for actual analysis.

Notes

1 Jon Delima and Matt Olrogg, “Bridging the Gap in Data Skills,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 24 July 2024, https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Military-Intelligence/MIPB-July-December/Bridging-the-Gap/.

2 James Villanueva, John Harrell, Peter Farese, Joseph Hammond, and Matthew Blome, “Staff Processes in LSCO Pt. 2: Running Estimates (Crawling When We Need to Run),” Call for Army Lessons Learned, 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/279458/staff_processes_in_lsco_pt_2_running_estimates_crawling_when_we_need_to_run.

3 Thom Shanker and Matt Richtell, “In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly (Published 2011),” The New York Times, 16 January 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html.

4 Villanueva et al., “Staff Processes in LSCO Pt. 2.”

5 Summer Myatt, “How U.S. Army Is Tackling ‘Data Overload,’” ExecutiveBiz, November 10, 2023, https://executivebiz.com/2023/11/how-us-army-is-tackling-data-overload/.

1LT William D. Pawlak served as a G-3 assistant in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, KY. 1LT Pawlak earned a bachelor’s degree in history from Norwich University and a master’s degree in political science from Columbia University. As the 101st Airborne Division’s battle captain, he participated in multiple division-level exercises and real-time operations from April 2024 to April 2025.

This article appears in the Winter 2025-2026 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.

As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of War or any element of it.