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The puzzle of nuclear deterrence is now further muddied by the emergence of cyber threats and their nebulous role in conflict escalation. As doctrine continues to be shaped, there is the ongoing risk that capable states will decide a cyber-attack warrants a nuclear response. As a result, states need to establish a clear framework on how they intend to use their cyber capabilities and integrate them into the modern schema of conflict and competition. With an argument grounded in political theory, cyber dominance proves to be an unavoidable yet necessary aspect of maintaining nuclear peace between two competing states.

Background

Nuclear deterrence, referring to a state’s threatened use of nuclear weapons as a response to political aggression, is particularly effective when both competing states are in possession of those weapons (Waltz, 1990). Coined by political scientists as “nuclear symmetry”, both states become gravely aware of how conflict could escalate into mutually assured destruction, thus drastically reducing the threat of nuclear war (Lerner, 1964). The concept of mutually assured destruction is fundamental to deterrence and would seem as if it discourages any kind of conflict completely due to its potential consequences. Despite this, states with nuclear symmetry experience an increased rate of conflict initiation, proxy wars, and crises that do not escalate into direct war. Known as the stability-instability paradox, these state actors are observed to consistently probe and instigate lesser conflicts that are unlikely to escalate while still fulfilling their strategic interests (Rauchhaus, 2009). Because actors in a state of competition are always looking to push boundaries and gain advantages over their adversaries, they are restricted to provocations falling short of direct war in fear of mutually assured destruction. Despite the risks, continued competition remains necessary, as nuclear symmetry and mutual distrust incentivize both sides to seek advantage rather than accept stalemate or risk falling behind. This dynamic necessitates a vigilant security posture and a persistent state of competition. For example, the Korean and Vietnam Wars served to advance the political and strategic interests of the Soviet Union and the United States at the expense of the involved smaller states (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1984, pp. 263-273). This demonstrates that both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were keen on disrupting each other’s foreign interests without engaging directly in war.

Another commonly accepted theory within the study of international relations is the concept that war is a result of bargaining failure. In particular, the lack of private information on a competitor may cause actors to create unreasonable or overconfident demands, eliciting conflict (Fearon, 1995). For example, an adversary miscalculating a nation’s strength may attempt to seize its resources and territory, only to encounter unexpected resistance. Despite that, actors still have incentives to misrepresent private information to win negotiations (Fearon, 1995, p. 382). Nations may employ strategies such as exaggerating their capabilities to avoid being intimidated and even initiate conflict to gather information on an adversary.

State actors should prioritize protecting their own private information while actively seeking to acquire that of their adversaries. This idea has driven the development of modern Operations in the Information Environment (OIE), particularly through cyber tools and Title 50 operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022). However, lines are still being drawn as to which cyber capabilities warrant a non-cyber response.

Analysis

Assuming all state actors act rationally and aim to avoid nuclear annihilation, the stability-instability paradox predicts “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons [to zero]” (Waltz, 1990, p. 740). This paradox provides an open seat for lower-level cyber threats to proliferate instead. An increase can already be observed within the United States military. While other disciplines dedicate their time to conflict readiness, cyber forces are constantly on mission within the cyberspace domain, conducting defensive and offensive cyberspace operations against the largest cyber threats—who mostly happen to possess nuclear weapons (Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2024).

Consequently, nuclear retaliation seems unlikely in dyads with nuclear symmetry, leading some to wonder how cyber warfare poses the risk of escalation in the same manner as conventional conflict. In the limited literature on the “cyber-nuclear nexus,” Andrew Futter places cyber threats into the escalating categories of hacking and hacktivism, denial of service, crime and espionage, sabotage and destruction, [and] strategic attacks and warfare (Futter, 2016, pp. 6-7). A cyber-attack shutting down key infrastructure may be just as devastating as if that infrastructure were bombed. Despite this, it seems that the likelihood of a cyber conflict shifting into the physical world is minimal, since initiating a cyber-attack with the potential for physical consequences requires the same caution that a kinetic attack would. Therefore, states are discouraged from performing these large-scale attacks, which explains why the majority of adversarial cyber activity occurs, and likely will continue to occur, below the threshold of armed conflict (Lin, 2012).

Solution

Through my analysis, I argue that the current state of cyberspace operations is generally unaffected by the delicacy surrounding nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the stability-instability paradox serves as a practical framework in its ability to justify and explain the need for small-scale conflict and competition between nuclear powers. This framework is bolstered by Fearon’s bargaining model of war and the modern understanding that a lack of private information is a key driver of conflict.

I propose that cyber warfare now occupies the niche previously held by minor physical conflict because of the stability-instability paradox. The continuous requirement for network defense, coupled with the rapid pace of cyber effects, mirrors the level of non-escalatory competition necessary for states operating under this dynamic. By redirecting such conflict to the cyberspace domain, loss of life is brought down to a minimum and competing states are still given the necessary space to engage each other in a dynamic environment. I predict cyber warfare will become the preferred medium of interstate conflict due to its aforementioned characteristics of accessibility, instantaneity, and low risk to human life.

Furthermore, I believe that an increased amount of cyber resources should be allocated toward information gathering and dominance. As modern societies converge towards Internet of Things, devices and networks become the most high-value targets. In limiting the amount of private information kept by adversaries, state actors can shape policies and demands in their favor. Ultimately, by fostering an outlet for low-level conflict and recovery of private information, cyber warfare provides conditions for nuclear and physical peace between nuclear-symmetric dyads by satisfying concerns of both nuclear escalation and bargaining failure.

Conclusion

The ramifications of this framework assume that both nations have access to nuclear weapons, making it relevant to U.S. competition with current near-peers and unknown future threats. Rooted in political theory, this framework invites the criticisms of academics and policymakers, thus increasing the engagement of the general population in complex cyber issues.

In conclusion, realizing strict cyber effects pose minimal risk of nuclear retaliation, states are incentivized to grow their cyber capabilities and redirect competition and information gathering to the cyberspace domain. Regardless of how these policies are implemented, this shift in strategy is a definitive indicator that the future of warfare will be remarkably different than that of the past.

References

Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. (1984). The Strategy of War by Proxy. Cooperation and Conflict, 19(4), 263–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/001083678401900405

Fearon, James D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300033324

Futter, Andrew. (2016). Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2022). Information in Joint Operations. JP 3-04. Washington, DC: Joint

Chiefs of Staff. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_04.pdf

Lerner, Abba P. (1964). Nuclear Symmetry as a Framework for Existence. Social Research 31(2), 141–54. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40969724

Lin, Herbert. (2012). Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law. International Review of the Red Cross 94(886), 515–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000811

Director of National Intelligence. (2024). Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Rauchhaus, Robert. (2009, January 27). Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(2), 258–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330387

Waltz, Kenneth N. Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. American Political Science Review 84(3), 730–45. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962764