Breaking Through: Combined Arms Maneuver Against Prepared Defenses

It has been more than 20 years since the United States Army has conducted combined arms maneuver at scale dur­ing combat. Over more than three years, however, the Russo-Ukraine War has offered an opportunity to study the effectiveness of maneuver. The re­sults, so far, are not promising. Both sides have seen major offensives stalled, making incremental gains after a significant commitment of time, re­sources, and personnel. It would be easy observing the challenges of offen­sive actions on both sides to see an era of defensive warfare arriving, however, defensive warfare will never suffice as a primary means for the US Army. The role of the Army since the Spanish-American War has been to fight for­ward and therefore nearly all goals re­quire a positive (offensive) action to achieve results. Therefore, like the Western Front in World War I, new tac­tics must emerge to enable combined arms maneuver.

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) conducts at least one brigade-level ma­neuver against a prepared defense ev­ery rotation for eight rotations per year. During that time, the Regiment has developed and refined a series of techniques to help break through an enemy in a prepared defense. These techniques and tactics do not eschew doctrine. For example, when breach­ing, the Regiment still plans for, re­hearses for, and employs the breaching fundamentals of Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, and Assault (SOSRA). However, the Regiment has experi­mented with a mix of doctrine and emerging techniques to enable it to break through a defense. There is no better example of this than Rotation 23-07 when the Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) attacking with two mechanized infantry battalions and a tank company reserve, infiltrated a division cavalry guard and then penetrated an armored brigade combat team defense.

What follows is a discussion of five te­nets originally developed by Major General Curtis Taylor, then commander of the National Training Center, and re­fined by 11 ACR (Blackhorse). The Reg­iment proffers these as a means of helping the Army prepare for its next large-scale combined arms maneuver.

Drive specific intel to the tactical edge. All the intelligence in the world doesn’t matter if the person needing it does not have it. Lower echelons have less means of processing and analyzing intelligence and data, so it is incum­bent on higher echelons to not provide data so much as answer priority intel­ligence requirements (PIR) and provide analysis. A tank platoon leader leading as the advance guard should know about the three main battle tanks dug in behind CHOD Hill just as much as the Division or Brigade Intelligence Officer. Higher echelons can err in determining what intelligence a lower echelon re­quires. Therefore, during planning and rehearsals, the Regiment focuses on learning the information requirements of subordinate units and arraying mul­tiple intel sources to answer these questions in time and space. This is necessary because at the BTG level, certain PIRs are not obvious. When looking at an operation at brigade scale, the BTG commander and staff likely would not task any element with determining individual tank fighting positions in a battle position. But, to a platoon leader heading into an engage­ment area, that information is critical.

Commanders provide PIRs to the S2, generally in a window of time follow­ing the initial orders brief and prior to the combined arms rehearsal. The BTG will accept Requests for Information (RFI) up to a predetermined cutoff point. This point ensures that all PIRs are duly investigated and prevents pa­ralysis by analysis. At some point, more information is unhelpful. To ensure proper arranging of assets, the BTG re­quires commanders to provide a latest time information of value (LTIOV) which ensures it answers the most im­portant questions first and gets the information to subordinate command­ers in a useful time frame. The BTG seeks to answer PIRs in order of useful­ness but also arrays assets under a con­cept of a probable time of contact (PTOC). The BTG commander is more likely to use intelligence and fires as­sets for shaping when there is a large gap from the present time to the PTOC, but as the PTOC grows near, he is more likely to push those assets to support the unit close to making contact. The position of a tank 48 hours from LD might be unhelpful, but the BSA or main CP is much less likely to move and may make sense to strike at that point versus closer to the contact when as­sets are needed against the enemy front.

The BTG also uses a final intelligence dump attempting to ensure that lower commands have the same picture as the BTG prior to the fight. Usually this occurs at 2 hours prior to LD to give commanders time to make any final ad­justments and not have information flowing in the last minute. Command­ers at echelon have access to intelli­gence chats and dumps from the Divi­sion Tactical Group to flatten the flow of information. The BTG still conducts analysis because the lower echelons have staff that are not mature or no staffs at all. But a commander at any echelon can pull data from higher.

It is critical that units instill map board discipline in their subordinates. All the work of developing intelligence for the tactical edge is for naught if the platoon leaders and company commanders on the march do not have that intelligence on their map board.

Conduct detailed reconnaissance to identify micro terrain. The old adage that “If I were given an hour in which to do a problem upon which my life de­pended, I would spend 40 minutes studying it, 15 minutes reviewing it, and 5 minutes solving it,” might better be said of the offense: “If I were given an hour in which to come up with a tac­tical solution, I would spend 40 minutes staring at the map, 15 minutes review­ing what I had seen, and 5 minutes ar­raying force.” Studying terrain enables the commander to know what is possi­ble, what is impossible, and what might be done. Commanders need to under­stand the terrain they will move through and fight on to determine speed, formation, and defilade as well as likely enemy positions. One of the advantages of Blackhorse ( is knowl­edge of terrain, which is not uncom­mon knowledge given how many peo­ple across the Army have fought on our home field. However, many across the Army believe Blackhorse fights from the same terrain each rotation. In real­ity, every rotation has a different design – and sometimes direction – and indi­vidual units rotate where they fight, so rarely would any leader spend two con­secutive fights in the same area. But due to experience, Blackhorse leaders begin to learn how to read and use ter­rain. Map reconnaissance is the first step.

Obviously, a smart commander will augment map reconnaissance with whatever means are at hand. Maps are imperfect and do not account for envi­ronmental effects. Hard rains in the desert can change the trafficability of routes or even wash some routes so well that they blend with the rest of the desert floor. Similarly, routes and areas that look like good ground for maneu­ver on the map can offer little but frustration for any attacking force. Therefore, while a map recon is some­times all that is available to a com­mander, commanders should fight for more information in forms such as sat­ellite imagery and reports from scouts. Overhead flights are not a bad way to recon a route, but this has limitations. First, anything in the air is subject to enemy direct fire and air defense mea­sures. Second, flight has a way of flat­tening terrain. It can be hard to see the microterrain from the air when flying at certain heights above ground level. There are areas of the National Train­ing Center “Box” that look far more in­viting from the air than they do while driving through.

Figure 1. Echelonment of the Offense. (Image by author)

Figure 2. A rotational training unit maneuvers through the box as several Observer Controller/Trainers (OC/Ts) look on. (Photo by author)

Therefore, ground route reconnais­sance, if possible, is an imperative. The Regiment has had success when units conduct route reconnaissance prior to attacks and go as far as the enemy will let them. Since the best avenue of ap­proach is a covered and concealed one unless speed is of the essence, con­ducting recon of little used routes or ones that have heavy crossing marks on the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) enables us to move further undetected or to hide our true intentions. Blackhorse would rather take a route that enables undetected movement than one that enables speed or mass. At a minimum, the commander of the advance guard needs to conduct this reconnaissance, but, at times, the military intelligence battalion (MIBN) commander will per­sonally recon the route. In the best of conditions, this is ideally done in like-light conditions and like vehicles to simulate the attack conditions. This will identify the rate of march, the for­mations available, and the positions of defilade as well as frequency modulat­ed (FM) communication blackouts and other factors affecting the tempo and control of the attack. This is important because the map and the actual terrain often look different and finding this out on the march is often a fit of folly and leads to slow and stalled attacks, proving time to the enemy to detect movement and reposition.

Employ smoke and suppression to en­able maneuver. The key element of this tenet is that smoke and suppres­sion are enabling all maneuver, not just actions on the breach. The tenets of SOSRA remain fundamental to actions, but smoke and suppression enable the approach as well as the actual breach.

Employing artillery delivered smoke is difficult and requires understanding of wind and a ready observer to adjust the smoke immediately. It also requires patience to allow smoke to billow. All sorts of weather affect smoke. Since the BTG lacks a weather officer, typi­cally it uses data from apps and obser­vations from those on the ground. However, units can come up with more is that the smoke target belongs to someone. While fire support officers can plan a primary and alternate ob­server, the Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR) or fires technical rehearsal will help determine the right person. The commander must assign someone and there must be criteria for movement. The assigned soldier must be in posi­tion to observe and have direct liaison with the firing organization.

Figure 3. Example BTG Mission and Commander's Intent (Image provided by author)

The BTG uses fires to suppress or de­stroy positions that use direct fires on the approach, such as javelin positions and fighting positions. The BTG also uses fires to suppress or destroy ene­my fire support and disrupt command and control. While logistics are lucra­tive targets in general, during an attack the usefulness of counter-logistics fires wanes since the enemy is static and has interior lines. Overall, the com­mander and the staff must consider the broad use of fires to disrupt the en­emy and enable the attacking force to close with the front line of the de­fense.

In this case, attack aviation must be seen as a fires asset because aviation is enabling maneuver. The task force prefers to use aviation to soften up its point of penetration to enable the ma­neuver of the main effort. The task force receives little in the way of air support, so a normal unit should think more broadly on how to use available air assets to layer against a defending enemy. The BTG does not push aviation to subordinate battalions. Though the asset may be in support, it is a limited resource and must fit into the overall intent of the commander.

Using fires and smoke in a coordinated method requires a fires technical re­hearsal to validate the timing of fires, to ensure all parties are ready to fire, and to ensure observers are in position and understand their requirements.

While not covered in this tenet, the at­tacking force must consider how air defense enables maneuver. The BTG spends time in planning and rehears­als to ensure that it has an air defense bubble established and that it jumps air defense at the right time so that there is never a time when all assets are jumping. This includes the totality of assets. While the BTG does not use US systems, think of this in terms of Stinger positions on high ground, Avengers on the move, and higher as­sets further back.

Employ a capable advanced guard and focus on a narrow point of penetra­tion. It can be tempting to try to push hard against the entire line or find mul­tiple points of penetration, but it is easiest when focusing on a narrow area. Placing overwhelming strength on a vulnerable enemy location makes the likelihood of success much more assured. The advanced guard should be small; in the case of the BTG it is usually one tank and two fighting ve­hicles. The advanced guard should be sufficiently far forward to ensure that follow on units don’t run into it if it gets bogged down and that follow on units can shift to a new route or point of penetration based on the results. The advanced guard must have comms with follow-on forces to let them know when to halt in defilade and when to be prepared to pass. A unit that en­ables the advanced guard to make the call to pass follow on forces will be more efficient and maintain a better tempo. The next tenet discusses this further, but a unit must, in the words of LTC Rick Ferrell, former commander, 1/11 ACR, “march dispersed and fight united.” It is unlikely that on the cur­rent and future battlefield, a unit can survive massing into large assembly ar­eas or attack positions of company size or higher. Units should seek to only hit a column once in formation for the at­tack.

It is important to use deception and a capable fixing force. The best decep­tion reinforces the enemy’s bias or demonstrates a plausible scenario. For example, the BTG decoy command posts are located in areas a brigade might place theirs. While these are not in areas the BTG would place its CP, it reinforces the biases of the enemy and enables deception. Similarly, any de­ception the task force employs will re­inforce a bias or a likely scenario. One way the BTG does this is to consider how it can, with a small force, trip a particular intelligence system to see an action as something bigger. Another option is to use a fixing force that looks like an attacking force. This happens al­ways in the attack, where a fixing force employs the same elements that a penetration force might. This means, at a minimum, conducting the first three steps of a SOSRA and possibly giving engineer assets to the fixing force. Typically, this force will take the more likely avenue of approach, thus selling it as the main effort. Some­times, the task force follows this force with a group of tracked vehicles such as M88s and M113s to kick up dust and look like a larger second echelon force. The feint must look like the main at­tack, or it won’t work. The added ben­efit of beefing up the feint and fixing force is that it can exploit a seam and potentially contribute to or become the attacking force as has happened on more than one occasion. At times, the BTG will send two attacking forces with the exploitation force sufficiently dis­tanced to allow flexibility. In this case, neither attacking force is the penetra­tion or fixing force, but the BTG is pos­tured to exploit success and both at­tacking forces are resourced to pene­trate.

All of this is subject to intense scrutiny during CARs as the BTG commander and staff work to ensure all the observ­ers are covered (smoke, fires) and that all calls are covered (suppression, ob­scuration, etc.). Every aspect of the at­tack must have someone responsible and a shared understanding of condi­tions (i.e. suppression means 50 rounds of 155 mm and is called by the advanced guard commander, alternate OP1). The BTG will often redo portions of its CAR when planning attacks on dug in enemies to ensure every aspect is synchronized in time, space, and purpose. Commanders must commit to detailed rehearsals to ensure success. Rehearsals cannot be back briefs.

Figure 4. 11th ACR maneuvers under a smoke screen while being observed by senior leaders. (Photo by author)

Not explicitly covered in this tenet, but important, is that a commander must secure his or her flanks. The BTG usu­ally plans to send in dismounted infan­try in advance of an attack to secure the high ground anchoring the defense and push out anti-tank gunners. This allows the maneuver commander to focus on the enemy to his or her front.

Conduct bounding overwatch and make rapid sprints from areas of defi­lade. Units must be in formation as they cross the probable line of contact (which must be on their map board) and move into bounding overwatch. No vehicle or section should bound without support and without knowing its next position of defilade. A good route reconnaissance will ensure that units can rehearse this prior to moving out. There also must be someone directing the bounds to ensure that units do not bunch up. Inevitably, the tempo slows around the breach and even getting to a bypass takes time. If a commander is not directing move­ment across phase lines, then units in­evitably bunch up and become prime targets for artillery and aviation.

When stopped, vehicles must use the terrain to cover and conceal them­selves. If not, they will be easily detect­ed and likely not survive. As the tempo slows, units must be prepared to pass the next echelon forward at any time. In fact, the attack of a brigade looks similar in some ways to a platoon as­saulting a trench or building. As teams must stop to lock down a bunker or hallway, sections and platoons often have to suppress or fix an enemy. Therefore, the follow-on unit must be ready to continue the attack. Just like any fire team must be able to carry out any portion of the attack on a building or trench, any platoon or section must be able to pick up any portion of the attack. Thus, leaders at echelon from section on up must understand the breadth of the plan. Similarly, leaders must know all available routes and be prepared to divert as those in front of them become fixed or a position ap­pears stronger than expected. This may seem counterproductive to the con­cept of picking a narrow point of pen­etration, but a commander should not continue to throw tracks against an en­emy wall if the wall isn’t cracking.

Conclusion

These five tenets have proven success­ful for the 11 Armored Cavalry Regi­ment attacking with a smaller force against a prepared ABCT defense. When well planned, rehearsed, and ex­ecuted they can be successful. Com­manders must apportion assets to be successful and use CARs to make sure actions and assets are synchronized in time, space, and purpose. The Russo-Ukraine War has demonstrated that without effective combined arms ma­neuver, war will stagnate into stale­mate and the military will find it tough to achieve its objectives. It is incum­bent on units that prepare to attack a prepared defense. This article offers one method of doing that.

Lieutenant Colonel Darrell Fawley is a Defense planner, Defense Planning and Capabilities Branch, International Mil­itary Staff, NATO, Brussels, Belgium. LTC Fawley’s previous assignments in­clude commander, 2nd Squadron, 11 Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA; professor of military science, Ohio University Army Reserve Officer Train­ing Corps (ROTC); executive officer, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Di­vision, Fort Stewart, GA; and executive officer, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, Fort Stewart. LTC Fawley’s military schools include the U.S. Army Ranger Course, Airborne Course, Air Assault Course, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course, Sniper Employment Leaders Course, Heavy Weapons Leader Course, Bradley Lead­ers Course, Combatives Level 1 and II. LTC Fawley has bachelor of science de­gree in Arabic and Spanish from the U.S. Military Academy.

LTC Fawley also holds a master of public administration degree (MPA) and a master of social science degree from Ohio University. LTC Fawley also holds a master in mili­tary art and science degrees in both “Art of War” and “Theater Operations” from the U.S. Army Command and Gen­eral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. LTC Fawley’s awards and badges in­clude Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, the Expert Infan­tryman Badge, and the Combat Infan­try Badge. LTC Fawley has authored one book, 4-31 Infantry in Iraq’s Trian­gle of Death (McFarland, 2019).

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