Adapting to Multi-Domain Battlefield: Developing Emissions Control SOP

The current fighting in Ukraine has demonstrated how electronic warfare systems can be employed to enable the protection and targeting of ground forces, foreshadowing how U.S. forces must be prepared to operate amidst a contested electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Managing emissions control (EMCON) can greatly reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces to enemy detection, targeting, and electronic warfare, while improving communications resiliency. Recent Army, as well as armor and reconnaissance doctrine, has outlined considerations for operating in an environment characterized by persistent enemy electronic warfare, but many armor and cavalry units have yet to develop EMCON standing operating procedures (SOPs) or integrate emissions control techniques and procedures into tactical training. This article outlines emissions control techniques and considerations to support the development of EMCON SOPs within combined arms battalions and cavalry squadrons and offers recommendations for building readiness to conduct operations amidst a contested electromagnetic spectrum.

Threat environment

U.S. adversaries, including Russia and China, each field multiple mobile electronic warfare (EW) platforms capable of radio frequency (RF) direction finding, signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, jamming, and spoofing. The variety of EW platforms Russia and China field enable both militaries to operate across the electromagnetic spectrum, including on high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), and ultra-high frequency (UHF) bands, but most Russian EW systems are designed to operate on VHF and higher frequencies.1 In Ukraine, Russia has arrayed electronic warfare systems to provide continuous coverage across its front and used them to jam Ukrainian drone-control station connections and GPS receivers on munitions, inhibiting collection and targeting efforts.2 In addition, Russian radio frequency direction finding capabilities have enabled it to identify drone control stations to target with indirect fires.3 Modern EW platforms enhance enemy capabilities to disrupt and target U.S. forces, reinforcing the multi-domain operations imperative to “account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.”4

For ABCT combined arms battalions (CABs) and cavalry squadrons (SQDN), enemy radio frequency direction finding in support of lethal targeting represents the most acute EW threat to tactical ground maneuver. Command posts, field trains, and maintenance collection points, which often offer stationary and consistent EMS emissions profiles, are the most vulnerable to direction-finding enabled targeting and represent high-payoff targets. The widespread proliferation of short-range precision munitions, such as the first-person view drones employed against military vehicles and positions in the Russo-Ukrainian War, has lowered the cost of targeting individual vehicles, increasing the chance armored vehicles will be targeted from above if detected.5 In addition to lethal threats, once an enemy detects the frequencies friendly units are employing, it can jam and spoof communications and GPS frequencies to disrupt combined arms maneuver, particularly during high-coordination operations, such as obstacle breaches. Jamming can also sever the link between UAVs and their control stations, inhibiting cavalry squadron collections using tactical UAS systems.

Figure 1. The Electromagnetic Spectrum and Communications Bands6 (U.S. Army)

Figure 2. ABCT Battalion/Squadron Communication System Bands7 (U.S. Army)

Doctrine, emissions control integration

By enabling units to adjust their EMS emissions based on threats present in the operational environment and mission requirements, EMCON procedures can reduce the vulnerability of armored formations and improve the resilience of communications. Emissions control is “the selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors, b. mutual interference among friendly systems, and/or c. enemy interference with the ability to execute a military deception plan.”8 Recent Army doctrine and writing have placed renewed emphasis on EMCON procedures and techniques, including the tension between controlling emissions and the robust communications architecture required to support convergence.9 A survey of armor and cavalry doctrine reveals mentions of electromagnetic spectrum considerations in FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations and an orientation to EMCON in ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion.10 However, current unclassified, uncontrolled doctrine offers limited guidance on operationalizing EMCON procedures and lacks example SOPs.

Figure 3. Emission Control Status11 (U.S. Army)

To better integrate EMCON concepts and procedures, armor and cavalry units should develop EMCON SOPs at the squadron/battalion echelon. In addition to enabling the rapid adjustment of unit emissions profiles through standardization and shared understanding, EMCON SOPs provide a basis for building training proficiency, assessing performance, and refining or adapting codified procedures. In designing EMCON SOPs, units should consult ATP 3-12.3, Electromagnetic Warfare Techniques and ATP 6-02.53, Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations, which together offer both practical techniques for limiting the emissions of tactical systems as well as information on the scientific concepts involved in radio wave propagation (including visual examples of directional antenna design and setup instructions).12 Units can implement multiple techniques and procedures for controlling emissions without special equipment or specialized training on radio system electronics, as outlined by the “EMCON” acronym below. 13

Emit on least vulnerable frequencies

• Communicate on the portion of the spectrum the enemy is least capable of direction finding, intercepting, or jamming within the area of operations (AO) (based on enemy EW platform capabilities). Always use frequency hop (FH) modes.
• HF frequencies are the least impaired by jamming measures. Low power UHF frequencies (GPS; Joint Battle Command Platform (JBCP)) are more vulnerable to jamming.14
• However, the greater propagation distance of lower frequency bands (HF) increases the distance at which they can be detected, compared to higher frequency bands (VHF, UHF), which have greater atmospheric absorption.

Mask wave propagation from enemy

• Use antennas with the shortest range possible.
• Use directional antennas. Directional antennas for HF and VHF radios can be erected using standard equipment or improvised designs.
• Limit stray emissions propagation toward the enemy by surrounding antennas with radar-scattering camouflage netting, leaving a gap for the direction of transmission (for both directional line-of-sight antennas and satellite systems).15
• Mask line-of-sight (LOS) system propagation using terrain features.
• Consider where civilian EMS usage and communications infrastructure provide masking. For example, commercial cell networks (UHF) usage near urban areas can mask military communications using similar bands (as occurred in Ukraine when Russian advanced closer to Kyiv).16

Communicate Concisely

• Ensure all transmissions are necessary. Convey orders and critical information rapidly.
• Preplan messages before transmitting them.
• Transmit clearly, quickly, and precisely to avoid repetition.
• Use brevity codes. See ATP 1-02.1, Brevity: Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Multi-Service Brevity Codes (March 2023) to add relevant codes to unit SOPs.
• Use an alternate means of communication, such as wire or physical message copies.

Only use power necessary for transmission

• Use the lowest power setting possible to achieve message receipt.

No predictable emissions patterns

• Minimize recurring emissions at the same location, frequency, time-interval, and duration.
• Execute net calls, situation reports/updates, and remote meetings on a variable schedule.
• Use offset (remote) antennas for command post/C2 node radio systems (>1km if possible).
• Transmit (VHF; HF) or unmask/turn-on JBCP transceivers (which transmit and receive continuously when powered on) only during reporting windows.

Figure 4. Example Squadron/Battalion EMCON SOP17 (U.S. Army)

Essential considerations

In determining the EMCON levels for their units and the criteria for changing them, leaders must consider the trade-offs with situational awareness and responsiveness when operating at more restrictive levels. Leaders and command posts will have less ability to actively control maneuver, disseminate guidance, coordinate changes, and receive frequent updates as EMCON levels become more restrictive. Systems with continuous, significant emissions signatures, such as JBCP, also provide near real-time situational awareness and reduce the likelihood of fratricide when operated without restrictions. Thus, more restrictive EMCON levels are generally better suited to operations requiring less frequent decision-making, coordination, and maneuver, such as defense, area security, and logistics operations, in which more static dispositions increase the threat from enemy direction finding and targeting. During offensive, combined arms operations, the advantages of more resilient command and control (C2), achieved by operating multiple communications systems spanning the electromagnetic spectrum, likely outweigh the risk posed by enemy EW systems. To reduce the trade-off between vulnerability to enemy collections and friendly C2, leaders should consider how they can adapt to operate effectively at more restrictive EMCON levels, such as by increasing their reliance on mission-type orders, using prowords, and scrutinizing reporting requirements.

An EMCON SOP creates opportunities for units to employ deception and better enable friendly SIGINT collection efforts by adjusting their emissions signatures. In an environment in which EMS collections contribute to enemy intelligence assessments, commanders can direct certain units to minimize their signatures while others operate at less restrictive EMCON levels to make their actions more convincing to deception targets, such as to enable a feint (ambiguity-decreasing deception). Commanders could also adjust unit emissions signatures to increase ambiguity in the enemy’s understanding of likely friendly actions.18 Tactical military communications systems may have readily identifiable emissions profiles, while commercial cell phone communications could be masked amidst civilian use, complicating enemy electromagnetic reconnaissance efforts. Although pervasive reliance on commercial cell communications attributable to U.S. military operations poses operations security risks, the limited use of civilian cell phones without military encryption to send prowords or messages obfuscated to external interceptors could provide sufficient C2 for units concealing their military system emissions through radio silence. Through operating at more restrictive EMCON levels, leaders may also enhance friendly electromagnetic reconnaissance efforts by reducing the noise and clutter present on the spectrum, making it easier to detect and focus collections on enemy emitters.19

There are multiple historic examples of large, mounted units training to operate amidst a contested electromagnetic spectrum by employing EMCON procedures. During the 1988 Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise “Certain Strike,” the 1st Cavalry Division conducted a division movement of two combat brigades and support elements under radio listening silence. In 42 hours, the division deployed 4,534 vehicles, including 813 tracked vehicles, over 150 kilometers along three routes from the staging area to a tactical assembly area. Employing military police and G-3/G-4 teams at refuel-on-the-move and maintenance halt locations to control movement, overcome friction, and provide only necessary reporting, the division successfully executed the movement under radio listening silence (a pre-execution movement exercise achieved shared understanding essential to the operation’s success).20 More recently, during the Marine Air Ground Task Force Warfighting Exercise 1-20 at Twenty-Nine Palms, CA in 2019, the 2nd Marine Division tested emissions control concepts during a division level, force-on-force exercise. Units used their own or division-standard EMCON procedures and practiced movement under restrictive EMCON levels. In addition to gaining experience employing various emissions management techniques, units experienced and learned from the C2 trade-offs associated with operating at restrictive EMCON levels.21

Limitations

Although the development and integration of EMCON SOPs have the potential to reduce the vulnerability of armored forces to enemy EW and lethal targeting, EMCON procedures must be combined with other concealment techniques and tailored to AO-specific threats to be most effective. ABCT CABs and SQDNs have significant visual signatures, especially when many vehicles are co-located together during maintenance and logistics operations. Satellite imagery and drone cameras, collection tools widely available to peer and non-state adversaries, increase the difficulty of concealing armored unit positions. Thus, units must employ visual camouflage, noise discipline, and light discipline in conjunction with EMCON procedures for effective concealment. For EMCON procedures to work and be worth the tradeoff in C2 capability, they must also be tailored to minimize signatures based on the collection capabilities of enemy EW platforms in the AO. Different variants of Russian and Chinese EW platforms collect on different portions of the spectrum, with varying ranges, interception, and jamming capabilities. During pre-deployment training and upon receiving intelligence updates in theater, battalion signal and intelligence officers must collaborate to refine the EMCON SOP based on enemy capabilities.

As with other SOPs, the effectiveness of EMCON SOPs will be largely determined by training proficiency and equipment readiness. Underpinning the shared understanding of EMCON levels built through integrating EMCON procedures and posture changes into the unit’s training progression is the proficiency of individual Soldiers operating each communications system. Soldiers must be capable of performing the tasks required to restrict the emissions of their vehicle or dismount team, such as adjusting power levels, using directional antennas, and transmitting only in designated windows or to report specific information. Limited proficiency operating HF radios, particularly in combined arms battalions, could hinder transitions to restrictive EMCON levels. Achieving a breadth of proficiency in EMCON procedures and communications systems operation across the formation is essential, as crews must be able to adjust their emissions from dispersed locations without additional assistance.

Ensuring the property and maintenance readiness of communications systems is critical for ensuring it remains feasible for units to operate at various EMCON levels. To ensure key leaders and required elements have the communications capabilities needed to operate at each EMCON level, battalions/squadrons may need to redistribute communications systems between subordinate units, for example to achieve the required density of HF or JBCP systems in each formation. Pending EW threats and mission requirements, leaders should consider requesting the support of other communications capabilities resident in the brigade or division, such as tactical satellite radios or iridium phones, to augment their primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plans and EMCON procedures. Units can requisition additional components available through the Army supply system, such as long RF transmission cables and HF directional antenna kits, to support EMCON procedures. The equipment readiness of all communications systems must be addressed in battalion maintenance reporting and SOPs and should be validated during training and maintenance events.

Recommendations

Given the risks presented by adversary EW and electromagnetic spectrum-enabled targeting capabilities, combined arms battalions and cavalry squadrons should develop EMCON SOPs to reduce their vulnerability to these capabilities and improve the resilience of their C2 architecture. Battalion/squadron signal officers, with the support from the intelligence section and other staff leaders, should coordinate with the brigade staff signal section to ensure the unit’s EMCON SOP is nested with the brigade EMCON SOP and PACE plan. If EMCON SOPs are undeveloped at the brigade and even division levels, the process of designing nested SOPs provides an opportunity for signal staffs to assess threats and capabilities through collaboration to integrate EMCON concepts and procedures at echelon. The review of draft EMCON SOPs must involve representatives from across the battalion staff sections and key company-level leaders to ensure the SOP accounts for trade-offs with other capabilities and operational considerations, and its adoption is feasible based on available equipment.

After developing EMCON SOPs, units should ensure EMCON procedures, and their supporting tasks are integrated into individual and collective training events to develop proficiency in adjusting emissions signatures. Units can use a variety of forums to improve leader and Soldier understanding of emissions propagation and how different tactical communications systems use the EMS, such as leader professional development sessions on wave propagation and brevity codes, or competitions to setup and use directional antennas. To build confidence and proficiency operating at various EMCON levels, units should operate at multiple EMCON levels during collective training events and integrate EMS-based injects into tactical scenarios.22 A new emphasis on building proficiency in techniques to manage electromagnetic signatures also provides an opportunity to revitalize training on tactical communications systems and validate existing C2 SOPs, including PACE plans.

The development of EMCON SOPs should serve as a basis for the peacetime experimentation with and assessment of procedures to reduce emissions signatures. Using the Networked Electronic Support Threat Sensors, which can generate EMS “heatmaps,” the National Training Center Operations Group can offer units feedback on their EMS signature and emissions management efforts during rotations to determine the effectiveness of their EMCON procedures and enable refinement. Armored formations should also use combat training center (CTC) rotations to fully assess the tactical trade-offs associated with operating at restrictive EMCON levels. Empirical data on the effectiveness of various EMCON procedures and associated trade-offs collected at CTCs should be aggregated and considered in conjunction with intelligence on the performance of adversary EW systems, for example the Russian systems operating in Ukraine, to inform updates to armor and cavalry doctrine.

Conclusion

For the last two decades, Army tactical formations have operated with little consideration of their electromagnetic signature and spectrum access. Facing adversaries with significant EW and EMS-enabled targeting capabilities, armor and cavalry units must now adopt procedures to manage their emissions and spectrum usage in future operations. Developing, integrating, and assessing EMCON SOPs offers combined arms battalions and cavalry squadrons a means to reduce vulnerabilities and improve communications resiliency as they adapt to the challenges of the multi-domain battlefield.

CPT Ryan McGovern is an Army Advanced Civil Schooling student at the Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge, MA and an amateur radio operator (callsign KC1UBB). His previous assignments include Commander, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; plans officer, 2nd ABCT, Camp Buehring, Kuwait; executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; scout platoon leader, HHC, 1-68 Armor. His military schools include U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School, Quantico, VA; Cavalry Leaders Course, Fort Moore, GA; Army Reconnaissance Course, Fort Moore; and Armor Basic Officer Leader Course, Fort Moore. CPT McGovern has a bachelor’s of science degree in political science: international relations from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY.

Notes

[1] EW platform characteristics are available on the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) OE Data Integration Network; 2021, “ODIN - OE Data Integration Network,” Army.mil. 2021, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/.

2 Carlotta Gall and Vladyslav Golovin, “Some U.S. Weapons Stymied by Russian Jamming in Ukraine,” The New York Times, May 25, 2024, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/world/ europe/us-weapons-russia-jamming-ukraine.html., and Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Yuri Shyvala, “‘Jamming’: How Electronic Warfare Is Reshaping Ukraine’s Battlefields,” New York Times, March 12, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/world/europe/ukraine-drone-russia-jamming.html.

3 Paul Mozur and Aaron Krolik, “The Invisible War in Ukraine Being Fought over Radio Waves,” The New York Times, Nov. 19, 2023, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techno logy/russia-ukraine-electronic-warfare-drone-signals.html.

4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, D.C., 2022), 3-10 – 3-11.

5 Gibbons-Neff and Yuri Shyvala, “Jamming.”

6 See Figure A-3 in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-12.3, Electromagnetic Warfare Techniques (Washington, D.C., 2023).

7 ATP 6-02.53, Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations (Washington, D.C., 2020), 3-1 – 3-15, 5-1; J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “Joint Battle Command-Platform Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation Report,” (2015),

https://www.esd.wh s.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Science_and_Technology/16-F-0250_(REPORT)_ MOT&E_Report_on_the_Joint_Battle_Command_-_%20Platform_(JBC-P).pdf, 8.

8 ATP 3-12.3, Electromagnetic Warfare Techniques. Emission control techniques fall into the category of electromagnetic protection, alongside measures including spectrum management operations, electromagnetic hardening, electromagnetic masking and electromagnetic compatibility.

9 MAJ Matthew Tetreau, “Convergence and Emission Control: Tension and Reconciliation,” Military Review November-December 2023 (November). https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Jo urnals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2023/Convergence-and-Emission-Control/, 60-61.

[1]0 ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion (2021); and HQDA, Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations (2023).

[1]1 See Figure 5-1 in ATP 3-12.3, Electromagnetic Warfare Techniques.

[1]2 Chapter 10 of ATP 6-02.53, Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations also includes essential procedures for identifying and overcoming enemy jamming efforts.

[1]3 Techniques provided in ATP 3-12.3, Electromagnetic Warfare Techniques, served as the basis for developing the “EMCON” acronym.

[1]4 ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion.

[1]5 Units must validate techniques for using radar-scattering camouflage nets to conceal EMS emissions, as the configuration and distance of the nets from transmitting antennas (pending transmission bandwidth) could induce distortion.

[1]6 Bryan Clark, “The Fall and Rise of Russian Electronic Warfare,” IEEE Spectrum, July 30, 2022, https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-fall-and-rise-of-russian-electronic-warfare; Tetreau, “Convergence and Emission Control.”

[1]7 See TRADOC, Threat Handbook: Battlefield Survival and Radioelectronic Combat (Fort Monroe, VA, 1983) for description of radio frequency direction finding procedures and protection measures.

[1]8 FM 3-13.4, Army Support to Military Deception (Washington, D.C., 2019).

[1]9 Electromagnetic reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations (energy). Electromagnetic reconnaissance is an action used to support information collection and is an element of the tactical task reconnaissance. FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations.

20 MAJ Michael W. Everett, “Moving a Heavy Division Under Radio Listening Silence,” Edited by MAJ Patrick J. Cooney, ARMOR, January-February 1989. https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/eA RMOR/content/issues/1989/JAN_FEB/ArmorJanuaryFebruary1989web.pdf.

21 LTC Chris Niedziocha, “Fighting a Peer Adversary Part 1: Observations and Recommendations from MAGTF Warfighting Exercise 1-20,” Edited by Christopher Woodbridge, Marine Corps Gazette, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazettemagazines/gazette-july-2020/.

22 An example inject could be a react to jamming battle drill.

Acronym Quick-Scan

ABCT – armored brigade combat team

CAB – combined arms battalion

C2 – command and control

EMCON – emissions control

EMS – electromagnetic spectrum

EW – electronic warfare

HF – high frequency

JBCP – Joint Battle Command Platform

LOS – line of sight

PACE – primary, alternate, contingency and emergency

RF – radio frequency

SIGINT – signals intelligence

SINCGARS – Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SOP – standing operating procedure

SQDN – cavalry squadron

UHF – ultra high frequency

VHF – very high frequency