Observer-coach/trainers get an aerial view of the first brigade support area established by the 25th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, during a 14-day force-on-force exercise at the National Training ...
The Army is witnessing a fundamental shift in how supply support activities (SSAs) support operations that incorporate conventional, unconventional, and hybrid threats across a wide spectrum of conflict. Brigade support battalions (BSBs) are now developing procedures to change the SSA concept of operations from a framework that is based on large, static forward operating bases to one that is more mobile, responsive, and streamlined.
With maneuver units traversing more rapidly on the battlefield, the challenge to meet resupply demands, support endurance, and extend operational reach continues to expand. SSA operations are inherently more complex during decisive action than they are during a counterinsurgency. The differences between the two were obvious during the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team's (SBCT's) 2017 National Training Center (NTC) rotation. During the rotation, the 1st SBCT's SSA provided sustained readiness through SSA operations split across two locations: in garrison at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and forward at NTC.
SSA OPERATIONS AT HOME STATION
The modified table of organization and equipment of an SBCT SSA allocates 35 personnel to manage all operations at a single location. Even with the SSA fully manned, managing the two locations would be extremely difficult without assistance.
A mitigation strategy that proved effective was to leave a crew of six personnel at Fort Wainwright working seven days a week with oversight, assistance, and support from the installation logistics readiness center. This crew processed parts for units remaining at home station. Although this course of action eventually led to a shortage of operators to transport the SSA's authorized stockage list (ASL), keeping personnel at Fort Wainwright prevented a backlog of 20 flat racks and 2,590 lines of parts that would have taken more than three months to eliminate.
FORWARD OPERATIONS AT NTC
During the NTC rotation, the SSA had to manage its authorized to forecast list and assume break-bulk ration point operations with a minimally manned team.
Commodity management was tested as A Company (the distribution company) struggled to establish a battle rhythm for receiving, segregating, and packaging class I (subsistence) items for upcoming logistics package missions. Another challenge was providing effective personnel coverage for both day and night operations because the section was short 12 Soldiers.
Despite these challenges, the SSA executed its mission successfully. The 1st SBCT's SSA averaged seven days to order, receive, and deliver non-ASL parts to customers--six days fewer than the NTC average.
SSA ESTABLISHMENT
SSA establishment is one of the most difficult portions of brigade support area (BSA) operations. With a requirement to reestablish operations within 12 hours, the ASL was configured using M871 trailers provided by the NTC activity set. This configuration provided quick maneuverability; however, the trailers were limited to mostly flat areas and movement was achievable only with external combat sustainment support battalion support.
Transitioning to a rapidly mobile and rough-terrain-capable BOH Environmental field pack-up container, specifically designed for SSA operations, allowed the ASL to be transported by a load handling system or palletized load system. But, due to the manning shortage, A Company was unable to transport its ASL and had to depend on echelons-above-brigade support throughout the NTC rotation. Once this support was coordinated through the BSB support operations (SPO) section, A Company experienced minimal disruptions of commodity support.
The placement and layout of the SSA and the class I yard helped to establish increased economy of time as the rotation evolved. Initially, class I break-bulk operations encompassed approximately 10 hours of a 24-hour work period. The initial delay was attributed to a lack of detailed planning, which required reception and segregation to occur during hours of limited visibility with a crew that had little night vision device (NVD) training.
At home station, NVD training was reduced during the summer because of a lack of darkness in interior Alaska. Conversely, during winter months, training was drastically restricted because of the weather. A Company could not fully train on forklifts using NVDs prior to the rotation, so many of the Soldiers had to be trained at NTC. Once training was accomplished, break-bulk operations improved and took an average of four hours to complete.
THE IMPORTANCE OF VSAT
Arguably, the most important asset for the SSA was the very small aperture terminal (VSAT). This satellite terminal is the critical link for all ASL supply support. During the initial BSA jump, the VSAT was not placed in the correct container, which resulted in a 36-hour delay in processing supplies for customer units.
Throughout the 14-day force-on-force exercise, the SSA used its VSAT for 288 of the 336 hours that it was available. After action reviews identified the conditions that led to prioritization shortfalls and delays in VSAT operational time.
CUSTOMER RESUPPLY
Resupply planning and coordination with the SPO section was critical for ensuring anticipated requirements, responsiveness to customer needs, and continuity of the concept of sustainment. The preferred method for resupplying forward support companies was to meet them at logistics release points (LRPs).
A Company conducted 16 logistics convoys to LRPs; however, not all were completely successful. A Company missed start times, FSCs failed to arrive at the predetermined grid locations, and some FSCs bypassed the LRP and went directly to the BSA to pull commodities directly from the SSA. Throughout all these setbacks, Soldiers gained valuable training on navigating during limited visibility and executing LRP battle drills.
As the rotation progressed, combat trains command posts were routinely located 2 to 3 kilometers from the BSA, making LRP missions nearly impossible to conduct because of the short driving distance. One major challenge for LRP operations and logistics convoys was the failure of the battalion S-4s to accurately capture subordinate units' logistics statuses. This led to the field trains command posts, located with the BSB SPO section, having to coordinate commodity requirements.
After action reviews of the decisive action training event exposed how detailed planning and training influenced the SSA's ability to support the brigade's overall mission. SSA operations during decisive action require detailed planning and anticipation of how the unit will conduct survivability and sustainment operations simultaneously throughout all environments.
Taking advantage of available assets and continuing to refine standard operating procedures, A Company departed NTC with more confidence and insight on how to improve SSA operations. One lesson learned was that the unit needs to ensure that VSAT movement is closely monitored and incorporated into a detailed movement plan.
Overall, the NTC rotation provided many new experiences that were impossible to practice at home station. These experiences and the lessons learned from them will contribute greatly to the overall improvement of the SSA and its operations.
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Lt. Col. Garrick Cramer is the commander of the 25th BSB, 1st SBCT, at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Black Hills State University and a master's degree in emergency management from Touro University. He is a graduate of the Army Medical Department Officer Basic Course, Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the Command and General Staff College.
Maj. Joshua Ford is a liaison officer for NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey. He previously served as the battalion support operations officer for the 25th BSB, 1st SBCT at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Oklahoma. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, and the Command and General Staff College.
Capt. Stephen Chenault is the commander for A Company, 25th BSB, 1st SBCT, at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He holds a bachelor's degree in business management from the University of Memphis. He is a graduate of the Ordnance Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course.
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