[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 3, number 2 (March–April 1971), pages 8–11. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
ALTHOUGH the Vietnam War has been a dominant factor in the Army’s logistics management system since 1965, heavy responsibilities in Southeast Asia have not relieved the Army from its obligations in Europe, Korea, Alaska, and in other parts of the globe. As expected, the military forces in Southeast Asia receive top priority since they must be combat-ready at all times. However, the provision of adequate quantities of required materiel and supplies to Army forces worldwide must still be considered as a major logistics objective.
An Important Factor
Logistics readiness is just one of the factors to be considered in the overall readiness picture as the Army seeks to insure that each unit has the capability to accomplish the mission for which it was organized. Logistics readiness means the supply and maintenance of materiel, facilities construction and management, and the acquisition and furnishing of services. This includes having the number of skilled and trained personnel required, a full complement of operational equipment on hand, as well as all of the supplies needed.
The Logistics Readiness Analysis Office (LRAO), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, is the contact point for the Department of the Army (DA) on logistics readiness. Personnel in the LRAO must know what the actual requirements are in order to take necessary action to overcome reported shortfalls and to maintain a logistics readiness posture on a worldwide basis. The LRAO analysts must know what assets are on hand, where they are, and their condition.
Readiness Reporting
A unit readiness measurement and reporting system based upon uniform standards and reporting procedures is used to measure unit requirements and identify problem areas. The current readiness reporting system, outlined in AR 220-1, is one of the main elements of an Armywide program to insure that each unit has the basic resources to move, shoot, and communicate. This medium provides statistical facts that enable logistics managers to measure rather than to estimate the readiness of Army units. The system is designed to inform Headquarters, DA, and commanders at all levels of the readiness of units, to assist commanders in making the most effective use of available resources, and to determine requirements for additional measures.
The overall logistics readiness condition (REDCON) of units is tracked primarily by the use of two indicators, equipment on hand (EOH) and equipment deployability. The equipment-on-hand indicator measures the equipment on hand in a unit against the full table of organization and equipment (TOE) requirements for equipment that is listed in SB 700-20, “Army Adopted Items of Materiel and List of Reportable Items” as a reportable item. This materiel is identified through a reportable item control code (RICC) and includes TOE items, authorized major end items, and selected secondary items, designated by DA, for evaluating unit readiness and for which asset data is required from all active Army and Reserve components.
These items are type-classified as —
- Standard A — a combat-acceptable item that will fill an operational requirement and that is being produced to fill shortages.
- Standard B — a satisfactory item that will fill an operational requirement but which is being, or has been, replaced by a newer generation or series of items.
- Standard P — a limited production item.
The criterion used in measuring and reporting units’ readiness status is established as a specific percentage of full TOE line items at a specified percentage of fill. For example, 90 percent of the full TOE line items at 90 percent fill equates EOH to REDCON 1. The REDCON is the actual level of readiness of a unit at a particular time. The ultimate readiness goal of a unit is its ability to perform its complete mission as stated in its TOE. The unit commander determines REDCON based on his knowledge of conditions within the unit. Unit conditions in personnel, training, and logistics are summarized and expressed in terms of C-1, fully ready; C-2, substantially ready; C-3, marginally ready; and C-4, not ready.
Shortage Lists
The simplicity of measurement has been a significant factor contributing to the effectiveness of the EOH indicator. In addition, major units not achieving their authorized level of organization in the EOH indicator are required to submit equipment shortage lists to provide visibility at command echelons. These shortage lists, in turn, trigger intensive management actions. Moreover, in oversea commands, this information provides a cross-check on pre-positioned and earmarked stockage requirements, thereby compensating for the built-in percentage of equipment nonavailability. Thus, equipment on hand has proved to be an effective readiness indicator and a catalyst for management actions necessary to isolate, define, and correct logistics problem areas.
The equipment deployability indicator depicts the units’ logistics readiness with respect to both the availability and the serviceability of specified equipment. The equipment specified for reporting in this indicator normally requires certain maintenance to insure continued operability and reliability over a predesignated time interval, usually 90 days. This method of management compares a profiled percentage of short and unserviceable items with established criteria to determine the readiness condition. Because of its greater scope and its percentage base, equipment deployability requires additional management analysis to isolate problem areas, particularly those involving mobility and weapons. Review and analysis of readiness conditions, triggered by these indicators, establishes the bridge between the wholesale system and the individual unit requirement.
Intensive Management
In 1968, the Army initiated an intensive management program to provide timely and adequate information about the personnel, training, and logistics status of Army forces and to take what actions were necessary to overcome reported shortfalls. At that time, most all major combat units were found to be marginally ready or not ready. The units’ readiness criteria in AR 220-1 were selected as the basis for monitoring the readiness condition of units for this special program.
The intensive management program, concentrating on equipment on hand, began with selected continental United States (CONUS) Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) units. This program has since been expanded to include all of the major field Army commands. The objective of the original program was to bring the selected CONUS STRAF units up to their assigned readiness goals by 30 September 1968. The equipment-on-hand logistics readiness objective for these units has been achieved. Steps are now being taken to improve their equipment deployability readiness status.
USAREUR
Phase I of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) intensive management program began in December 1968 at the division and brigade level. It was expanded later to include more than 210 units. The DCSLOG goal to bring all of USAREUR’s units up to their readiness objective by December 1969 was substantially achieved, the exception being a few units that were below their level of authorization at that time due to modified tables of organization and equipment problems. These problems have since been resolved.
Phase II was implemented 1 January 1970. Its specific objective was to achieve a C-1 readiness condition for reserve stock and pre-positioned materiel by 30 June 1970. The DCSLOG objective to fill these stocks, REFORGER, TWO+TEN, operational projects, and theater reserves, to REDCON C-1, was met by 1 July 1970.
The intensive management program was expanded to U.S. Army Forces Southern Command (USARSO) and U.S. Army, Alaska (USARAL). Through the use of intensive management techniques, the 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama is now meeting its assigned readiness objectives. Two separate brigades in Alaska were reorganized from mechanized to light infantry brigades on 22 September 1969. On reorganization, the readiness condition of equipment on hand in both brigades fell below their level of authorization. The DCSLOG, in coordination with USARAL and USAMC, began followup actions to correct these readiness problems. The two brigades are now meeting their required readiness levels for the first time since they were reorganized.
In the Pacific Command, a similar intensive management program has been established for the Eighth Army, Korea. When the program started in August 1969, the equipment on hand for many of the Eighth Army’s 140 readiness reporting units was below authorized levels. As of the end of the third quarter, fiscal year 1970, the equipment on hand of the Eighth Army reporting units equalled or exceeded authorized levels. The Eighth U.S. Army readiness improvement program has been recognized by the U.S. Army, Pacific and the Eighth Army as a significant factor contributing to the improvement of logistics readiness in Korea. Due to the success of this program, it was expanded during May 1970 to include all units in the Eighth Army.
Successful Techniques
When measured in terms of accomplishment, the intensive management program has been a success. Effective management is a vital element in logistics readiness. Through the use of such improved in-theater management techniques as relocation of theater assets, deletion of erroneous authorizations, and expediting of shipments within priority, improvements have been noted in all reporting areas. When one dissects the intensive management program, it becomes apparent that the success of the program may be attributed to better in-house management techniques rather than the introduction of new or novel ideas.
Readiness Improvements
The most significant conclusion drawn from our experience with the readiness improvement program has been the improvements in all commands attributable primarily to such in-house efforts as increased emphasis on logistics readiness, redistribution of theater major item assets, and better management of resources.
In view of anticipated fund restrictions on logistics support operations to be imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it becomes more apparent that we must manage our assets in such a way as to attain the highest possible readiness condition with available resources.
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Colonel Mitchel J. Hazam was special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L) for Vietnamization and Materiel Readiness. He was a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Mr. Donald D. Paolini was assigned to the Logistics Readiness Analysis Office, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (S&M). He was graduated from Ohio State University with a bachelor of arts degree.
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