[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 3, number 1 (January–February 1971), pages 4–7, 40–41. The text, including any biographical note, is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
One year ago we launched the Logistics Offensive. We did this to inject a sense of urgency into the routine management of the Army’s logistics system, to inspire dedication to the job, and to foster a fertile environment for advanced logistics thinking. As the decade of the sixties closed, the Army was faced with increasing fiscal retrenchment presenting logisticians with an unprecedented challenge.
SUPPORTING COMBAT OPERATIONS in a limited war while simultaneously conducting large-scale troop withdrawals; increasing combat support and combat service support of our allies as they replace U.S. combat forces; and achieving and maintaining a high state of combat readiness for both U.S. forces and those of our allies is the logistician’s challenge of the seventies. This challenge must be met despite significantly reduced monetary resources. The actions required to meet this challenge have been termed the Logistics Offensive. We have established objectives and we are attacking logistics problems with the same aggressiveness that a combat commander uses in an offensive. We must proceed toward our objectives of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of logistics operations at an accelerated rate. Delay will only compound our problems, since we will still have the same job to do later on, but then with fewer available resources.
The Logistics Offensive is not a reckless program. It strives to sharpen existing management tools and to apply proven concepts and techniques with minimum delay. There is little in the Logistics Offensive that is new or unique. For the most part, it applies worldwide many of the management techniques used successfully in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and elsewhere in the Army. Objectives of the Logistics Offensive fully support General Westmoreland’s four M program — mission, motivation, modernization, and management — and are consistent with the national policy of reducing forces overseas while maintaining a strong and viable base within the United States.
Aims Publicized
During 1970 we made an intensive effort to broadcast the objectives and purpose of the Logistics Offensive to commanders and logisticians throughout the world. Appropriate Department of the Army regulations and circulars have been published or revised. Articles on various aspects of the Logistics Offensive have appeared in many publications. I have spread the word through staff visits to continental United States (CONUS) and oversea commands and through more than 50 speaking engagements at service schools and colleges and joint civilian-military seminars and symposiums. At the end of 1970, the Logistics Offensive was moving forward on all fronts.
It has been encouraging to me to observe the enthusiasm that Army logisticians and their commanders have shown by participating in the program. As a result of individual initiative and organizational resourcefulness, the Army can show cost benefits in excess of $2.3 billion in actual savings or cost avoidance after the first full year of operation under the Logistics Offensive.
Logistics operations today are a complex business. Army logistics commitments around the world, in support of U.S. forces and the forces of our allies, are at their highest level since the Korean War. In addition, the logistics system supporting these commitments has grown increasingly complex because of the increasing sophistication of Army equipment and the Army’s growing dependence on outside agencies for major support.
Central Coordination Required
Thus, it is essential that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), Department of the Army (DA), serve as the central coordinating point for all major programs and objectives of the Army-wide Logistics Offensive. It is imperative that we keep the logistics system operating at peak efficiency during a period of general austerity. All personnel involved must contribute to the program not only by vigorously executing the various tasks and projects but also by suggesting ways and means of reaching our objectives of better support to the combat soldier at less cost.
The Logistics Offensive was developed as the prime management technique to integrate and coordinate the many aspects and functions of logistics operations. Because so much had to be done in so many areas, we first identified the major areas in which management improvements were required. We then divided the management improvement areas into projects and divided the projects into tasks. Each project was defined to show its scope, objectives, and time-phasing and was underscored with a sense of urgency. Thus, the Logistics Offensive facilitated the evolution of the supervisory effort to progress from detailed control by project management to management by exception, based on periodic project reports.
At the end of fiscal year 1970, more than 75 Logistics Offensive projects had been initiated. Projects are added as the need for high-level emphasis becomes apparent and are deleted as final objectives are reached. There are over 120 projects currently under the umbrella of the fiscal year 1971 Logistics Offensive. To tie all the programs together and to inform each participant of his role in the overall effort, we publish an objectives document listing all projects in the program for the next fiscal year, stating project definitions, goals, and time-phasing,
Target Dates Met
Our goals are ambitious but realistic. Actually, very few of our goals have slipped from their original target dates. Logisticians on the Department of the Army staff and in the major commands have been more than equal to accomplishing their tasks. On 21 September 1970, for example, the 1st Logistical Command, United States Army, Vietnam, received Presidential recognition for their outstanding accomplishment in reducing costs and improving management. While engaged in combat operations, the 1st Log Command significantly increased logistics responsiveness to the combat units in Vietnam and at the same time saved more than $353 million. Savings since 1968 have exceeded $1 billion. This is the first time that a logistics unit in a combat zone has received this award.
Tempo Increasing
Momentum of the Logistics Offensive built up rapidly during the first year and is increasing in tempo this year. I am provided a status report of each project in the Logistics Offensive program monthly, or more frequently if needed. Some of the more significant, current programs are described below.
- The Army Logistics System Master Plan (LOGMAP). LOGMAP was started in March 1970 when we began to pull together into one document all those things we are doing that would give uniform direction to our efforts. LOGMAP is a refined approach to developing and maintaining a master management plan that announces the objectives and provides the methods, schedules, and interrelationships of logistics subsystem development efforts from the present to a future time frame. Several editions of LOGMAP have been published as draft documents, and as development continues, it eventually will be issued as the single source for logistics systems development planning. One facet of the plan is entitled “Project TURN-THE-CORNER.” This project is designed to determine where we are in the development of systems, identify the best parts of each system, and apply them Army-wide. As a part of the effort to “turn-the-corner” and gain control over the vertical development of logistics systems, baseline requisites were developed and teams were sent to the field to compare on-going systems to the requisites. The data obtained on these trips are being analyzed and after appropriate study and approval, the best of what we have today or under development will be used to develop a standard system or modify current systems. Follow-on evaluations and further refinement of the baseline requisites will be required until such time as there is developed a set of logistics requisites and standards by which the development of Army-wide vertical logistics systems can be controlled.
- Inventory in motion. This is a management technique developed a few years ago in Vietnam for managing ammunition supply. The concept now includes other classes of supply and has helped to reduce our Vietnam stockage lists from almost 300,000 Federal stock numbers (FSN’s) to 90,000 FSN’s. Inventory in motion is a revitalized supply management program that minimizes the requirement for large stock levels at immobile depot activities in the combat zone. Fewer supplies on hand mean fewer problems of in-storage maintenance, security, and inventory management. While continuing the high level of combat service support, oversea stockage lists during the 15 months of worldwide operation under this program were reduced from an aggregate of 1,063,000 to 459,000 FSN’s. Based on recent experience, we have been able to revise the original goal for fiscal year 1971 downward from 360,000 to 180,500 FSN’s. The inventory-in-motion concept is being applied in over 20 different Logistics Offensive projects.
- Project DA Clean. This project was established as an integral part of the Logistics Offensive under the inventory-in-motion concept to eliminate excess supplies from the Army Supply System by determining what supplies were on hand in the field but were no longer required for mission accomplishment and then to redistribute them to where they were required. During the first nine months of 1970, supplies valued at almost $835 million were eliminated from oversea areas. In fiscal years 1969 and 1970 the U.S. Army, Vietnam, alone retrograded over 750,000 short tons of supplies.
- Containerization. Containerization is a valuable shipping technique that reduces damage, loss, and pilferage of cargo while improving distribution capability. Army use of intermodal containers and intermodal container systems has been significant since fiscal year 1969. For example, 11.6 million tons of cargo was shipped from CONUS to oversea destinations in fiscal year 1969. Of the cargo shipped in fiscal year 1969 that could be containerized, only 28 percent of it was shipped by container. That percentage rose to 45 in fiscal year 1970. Military vans (MILVAN), 8- by 8- by 20-foot containers, are being used to ship supplies to the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand. These cargo containers are moved as far forward as the tactical situation and the ability of the units to receive and unload supplies permit. A limited test of containerized ammunition shipments last year indicated operational benefits as well as potential dollar and manpower savings both at the ports and within the theater. We will continue to expand the use of MILVANS in support of the inventory-in-motion concept.
- Operation STREAMLINE. This project is designed to eliminate unnecessary stocks and supply echelons, reduce the order and ship time, modify certain procedures to accomplish more maintenance at less cost, establish theater-oriented depot complexes, accelerate direct delivery from the United States to direct-support-unit (DSU) and general-support-unit (GSU) levels in combat areas, and improve logistics intelligence and asset control (particularly in-transit). STREAMLINE capitalizes on recent improvements in communications, heavy lift aircraft, and automatic data processing. This Logistics Offensive project is divided into six subprojects, each similar but with local adaptations for the Pacific (PALOS), Europe (EURLOS), CONARC (CONLOS), Alaska (ALLOS), Southern Command (SOLOS), and the Army Reserve and National Guard (REGLOS). Under PALOS we have, for example, released the lkego Ammunition Depot, Japan, to the U.S. Navy. That eliminated over 50,000 short tons of ammunition stocks and reduced manpower requirements by well over 300 spaces. Similar actions are scheduled for other areas. The emphasis of Operation STREAMLINE is to improve the efficiency of the logistics system by eliminating the unnecessary rather than simply reducing costs. Any savings, however real and important, in reality are fringe benefits.
- Troop Dining Facilities. Of particular interest to the lower enlisted grades is our action to obtain authorization for spaces and funds to use civilian KP’s in Army appropriated-fund dining facilities worldwide. Korea was converted in October 1970, and Panama, Okinawa, and Europe are scheduled to be converted in fiscal year 1972. Another action to improve food service during this fiscal year is a short-order menu to widen the variety of food offered in dining facilities. We are also preparing to test the feasibility of having civilian caterers operate Army garrison mess facilities.
- Direct Supply Support (DSS). Delivery of supplies direct from a theater-oriented depot complex in CONUS to oversea DSU’s and GSU’s, bypassing oversea depots, is a system designed to operate effectively in peace or war. The initial 120-day phase of the test of the system was conducted between CONUS and Europe from 1 July through 31 October 1970. The test objectives were to reduce from an average 95 days to 35 days the order and ship time from the wholesale system in CONUS to the consumer in Europe. Overall goals for the system are to provide effective support and improved asset visibility while reducing budget and resource requirements. Operation of the system will also shorten the distribution pipeline in oversea areas. The test is being expanded incrementally to include all of the VII Corps and class II and IV supplies for all issue priority groups and fringe items including VULCAN/CHAPARRAL and aircraft. The direct supply support concept is also being tested in Korea. (See Army Logistician, Jul-Aug 1970, and page 14, this issue.)
- Selected Item Management System (SIMS). A program for the intensive management and control of selected items of materiel, SIMS encompasses the functional aspects of logistics — procurement, supply, storage, distribution, transportation, maintenance, and retrograde. At the beginning of fiscal year 1971, we had 4,600 FSN’s under SIMS. This represents approximately 50 percent of the procurement dollar and approximately 50 percent of the annual demands for secondary items. Much remains to be done before the advantages of SIMS can be fully exploited.
- Maintenance Support Positive (MS+). MS+ is a hard look at the total maintenance concept to see how and where maintenance tasks can best be done. In view of the increased sophistication of equipment, shortage of skilled maintenance personnel, and reduced financial resources, we must devise more efficient maintenance methods. MS+ will exploit modular design in maintenance, make necessary changes in doctrine and regulations, revise the maintenance task allocations, determine organizational impacts, develop mobile maintenance concepts, revise the maintenance management process, and expand the advantages of direct exchange procedures in order to achieve an optimum balance of maintenance support.
Through increased emphasis on modular replacement rather than piece-part repair and an improved use of diagnostic equipment and techniques, especially in the lower echelons of maintenance, we will be able to shift the emphasis of the maintenance repair functions from forward to rear echelons.
A few months ago we completed an initial revision of 40 maintenance allocation charts and 130 repair parts and special tool lists. This resulted in easing the maintenance burden at the organizational level and reducing the number of parts and tools required to be in the supply system.
- The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS). Formerly The Army Equipment Record System (TAERS). TAMMS is a system of recording essential data concerning equipment operation and maintenance. The transformation from TAERS to TAMMS, initiated in October 1969, preserved the standard recordkeeping system, but made major changes in the requirements to record and process data, especially at the national level. Under TAMMS we reduced reportable line items from 556 to 297 line item numbers (LIN). In September 1970, we further streamlined TAMMS by reducing the reportable items to only 40 LIN’s, primarily aircraft, combat, and tactical vehicles. This action has virtually eliminated most of the reporting to the national level of the data submitted on DA Form 2407, Maintenance Request. Instead, a system of selective sampling will be used to gather the management data still required at the national level.
Conversion from TAERS to TAMMS eliminated millions of forms and reduced the overall workload. At the installation level, for example, processing maintenance data requires 25,000,000 fewer punchcards and 193 less man-years of key-punch effort. This alone represents annual savings of approximately $1.1 million in manpower and material. Converting to TAMMS Streamline has reduced the key-punch workload by still another 9,800,000 cards.
Further streamlining TAMMS will reduce the volume of data generated, received, and processed and will allow us to focus our attention on critical maintenance areas and provide for necessary improvements in the Army maintenance system.
- Small Shipment Consolidation Centers. Consolidation points were established during fiscal year 1969 to improve control over shipments, reduce transit time, and lower transportation costs. Test consolidation points — one in Philadelphia and one in Toledo — resulted in a savings of over $228,000. Additional points were opened at Atlanta, Memphis, and Chicago, on 1 August 1970.
- Mechanization of DSU/GSU Supply Operations. Mechanization of supply operations is proceeding on schedule. Over 140 NCR 500 systems have been installed, and by fiscal year 1972 installation of the NCR 500’s will be complete.
- The Closed Loop Support System (CLSS). CLSS was one of the most successful intensive management techniques that we used in the Republic of Vietnam, achieving a high degree of asset visibility and control throughout the supply, maintenance, and transportation system. During fiscal year 1970, equipment worth $1.4 billion was put into the Republic of Vietnam, while reparables valued at $1.5 billion were retrograded under CLSS. The difference of $100 million represents equipment no longer needed as a result of better management of assets and of troop redeployments. It is currently planned that the CLSS will he expanded to include support of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. and other allied programs.
- International Logistics. President Nixon has stated on numerous occasions that we must do what we can to help our allies help themselves. To supplement Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds and to obtain maximum use of any long supply or excess items, procedures have been established to transfer those items to MAP at no cost. Major items (MIMEX), secondary items (SIMEX), and property disposal items (MAPEX) transferred under these procedures totaled $231 million in fiscal year 1970. The MIMEX/SIMEX/MAPEX estimate for fiscal year 1971 is $270 million.
- Personnel and training. These are the keys to any successful logistics system. In June 1970 a DA Review Board was convened to develop recommendations to improve the methods by which logistics doctrine, training, and military career development are formulated, coordinated, and accomplished. The Board studied structuring of Army logistics personnel into control-management groupings and suggested career progression and training patterns that will produce the kind of professionals required. Additionally, plans are being developed for establishing a professional logistics program for civilians.
Logistics Intelligence Needed
It is rather obvious that the common denominator in each of the management improvement areas is logistics intelligence. Throughout my career, l have been hampered by the lack of good logistics intelligence. Although we have been making tremendous progress in recent years, we still do not have an adequate method for an accurate and timely determination of true requirements and conditions in all areas of logistics. Feedback of data and processing of logistics information through the reporting system are still slow and deficient in many areas. Management systems, both new and existing, must be structured to include adequate provision for the free flow of meaningful and timely logistics intelligence.
As stated earlier, there is nothing startlingly new in the Logistics Offensive. It simply is a management technique used to get a big job done in a hurry. The accomplishments of the Logistics Offensive in the first year of operation have been remarkable.
Many Logistics Offensive projects have softened the impact of funding limitations. Wholesale Army Stock Fund obligational authority, for example, has been cut from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1968 to $0.7 billion in fiscal year 1970. During the same period, obligational authority for procurement of equipment and missiles, Army, secondary items dropped from $484 million to $187 million. Improved logistics management not only permitted us to absorb the cuts but in some cases prompted cuts by reducing material requirements and by effectively redistributing excesses. Other recent management improvements made throughout the logistics spectrum have resulted in estimated total cost benefits of between three and four billion dollars.
Congressman Chet Holifield of the House Committee on Government Operations complimented Army logisticians when he pointed out recently that the Army had mounted an impressive campaign to improve logistics and supply operations. It demonstrated, he said, an awareness of the need to learn from the Vietnam experience and to modernize its supply systems to exploit new computer, transportation, and communication technologies. Current Army programs singled out by Congressman Holifield for special mention were those to reduce oversea stockage, to control expensive repair parts, and to pare down the number of items stocked at ports, camps, and stations in the United States.
Despite the success of the Logistics Offensive, there yet remains much more to be done. By no means is our job finished; we have only just begun. New ideas and individual initiative are needed as we continue to explore avenues which will assist in answering the challenge of the seventies. This will make up later phases of the Logistics Offensive, preparing us for the 1970’s and for the transition into the 1980’s. We must continue with a sense of urgency to provide efficient and effective logistics support to the combat soldier.
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Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army. Upon his appointment as DCSLOG, he initiated the Logistics Offensive to improve the Army Logistics System.
Lieutenant Colonel Albert F. Boll was Chief of the Logistics Management Data Branch, Review and Analysis Division, ODCSLOG, DA.
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