supply point, Poland, July 2024. VIEW ORIGINAL
Forward support companies (FSCs) are the front lines of logistics and sustainment in a typical armored brigade combat team (ABCT). The purpose of an FSC is to support the maneuver battalion to which they are attached. In the case of a Foxtrot FSC, that battalion is a field artillery (FA) battalion, responsible for destroying, defeating, or disrupting the enemy with integrated fires while supporting maneuver commanders. A Foxtrot FSC in an ABCT consists of three basic supporting elements. If you break down each platoon or section of an FSC into its service provided, it totals approximately 14 sections and functions.
The FSC commander is the senior logistician in the battalion and is responsible for the performance of all sections. But one person can only do so much and keep track of so much at a time. The same can be said for commanders of all branches, specialties, and echelons. This is solved through the Army’s philosophy on mission command.
Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, defines this philosophy as the “exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of mission.” The principles of mission command are then further broken down to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create a shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.
Army doctrine provides a framework for leaders at all levels to manage their personnel and tasks effectively by giving subordinates clear guidance while also communicating left and right operational limits. This allows subordinates to make their own decisions and frees up leaders and commanders to supervise a variety of tasks or efforts at once. The volume of tasks that an FSC must complete to conduct daily operations requires the use of mission command. This was especially true for Fearless FSC, 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment (3-29 FA), 3rd ABCT, Fort Carson, Colorado, during their rotation to Poland in 2024 in support of Operation European Assure, Deter, and Reinforce.
In March 2024, Fearless FSC deployed to the European theater for a Poland rotation. Because the unit is attached to an FA battalion, they were stationed at Forward Operating Site (FOS) Torun, Poland, which is home to the Polish military’s artillery training school and their artillery training area. This FOS is located approximately 240 kilometers from the closest brigade asset, located at the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area (DPTA), and approximately two hours from the closest U.S. base, located at Powidz, Poland. The ammunition supply point (ASP) is about six hours away. One firing battery was located four hours away at the Bemowo Piskie Training Area (BPTA) as part of the NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Poland and still required FSC maintenance support. There is no bulk water supply located on the FOS, and when the unit first assumed their FOS Torun mission, fuel was provided through bulk-to-bulk transfer supplied by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
Artillery units have been rotating to Torun for years. 3-29 FA has personnel who have rotated to Torun multiple times, most recently in 2022. The life support on the FOS was almost entirely provided by KBR, a U.S. company responsible for providing logistics support to the U.S. military around the world. This, however, only held true for the start of the rotation.
At the beginning of the rotation, the FSC was able to coordinate with the support operations (SPO) section of the brigade support battalion (BSB) to request fuel. SPO then scheduled a DLA fuel truck to conduct a bulk-to-bulk Class III transfer in the FSC footprint of FOS Torun. This system, though now exercised in a forward environment, was very similar to how Fearless FSC was accustomed to operating at Fort Carson: if a support problem arose, they called SPO and allowed them to resource it.
In late June, approximately three months into the rotation, this system changed. Senior leaders ordered that the KBR contract for FOS Torun support be phased out and that Poland Provided Logistics Services (PPLS) provide all FOS support. Concurrent with this transition, funding for commercial line-haul movements was halted throughout the European theater. While these changes affected all FOS Torun tenants, the FSC was the only unit that experienced a major operational impact. The FSC relied heavily on American-based contracts to support their assigned battalion, and the standard operating procedure for Class V ammunition draws was to line-haul munitions due to the distance between the ASP and the FOS.
Normally, if the FSC hits a resourcing roadblock, SPO is the first call. In this case, SPO was unable to assist. SPO was able to provide guidance on the new systems, but they were located approximately four hours away at DPTA and had their own transitional problems. Fearless FSC was virtually on its own, but this is what FSCs are designed to be.
The daily maintenance demands in an ABCT had an increased level of complexity from being forward deployed. These maintenance demands competed with leadership’s ability to focus on addressing the rapidly changing life support, fuel, and ammunition situations. The maintenance control section was headquartered at FOS Torun, but had representatives at the Powidz Supply Support Activity and BPTA. These representatives had to independently coordinate with the 1221st Transportation Company to provide Class IX parts to Bull Battery. They also had to identify high-priority parts to be hand carried by the maintenance control section from FOS Torun to BPTA to repair pacing items essential to maintaining readiness on NATO’s eastern flank.
Routine missions from FOS Torun to Powidz, BPTA, and the BSB had to be co-opted to support communications and electronics maintenance; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment maintenance; and recoverable and repairable items management. The nearest laboratory for the Army Oil Analysis Program was in western Germany over 12 hours away, and each time samples were dropped off, the maintenance control section coordinated additional functions such as medical device services, transporting Soldiers to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, or a high-priority parts pickup. Without leaders in the maintenance control section who could independently foresee and react to obstacles, addressing changing mission requirements and maintaining the fleet in the forward environment would have been impossible.
The first issue for the FSC to solve was fuel. The fuel section still had approximately 5,000 gallons of fuel from their last fuel draw, but with no scheduled refuel it was only a matter of time until they ran out, especially with artillery live-fire exercises approaching quickly. The fuel section of the BSB was approximately six hours away and had tenant units collocated at DPTA that needed Class III(B) services. The BSB was unable to help. How then would the FSC provide fuel to the batteries they served?
The distribution platoon leader for Fearless FSC and the fuel NCOIC were tasked by the commander to fix this issue. They were given an end state: “figure out how to get fuel to support artillery tables VI-XIV as well as support day-to-day operations.” They were directed to speak with the mayor cell, the local U.S. Government employees hired to manage the FOS. The mayor cell typically worked with KBR exclusively but were also transitioning to PPLS and had been working with the local Polish government much longer than had Soldiers local to FOS Torun.
The distribution team worked with the mayor cell to find a local army airfield approximately 35 minutes away that could provide fuel. The only problem was that no one had ever done it before. Therefore, it was up to the distribution team to contact the local nationals, plan a route, coordinate a timeline, and conduct the movement to and from the airfield. The team returned and briefed the FSC commander, and Operation Big Gulp was born. Operation Big Gulp supplied fuel to all units stationed at FOS Torun, to approximately six logistics units conducting convoy operations throughout Poland, and to artillery units outside 3ABCT conducting training for the remainder of 3-29 FA’s stay in Poland.
Mission command was the main reason for Operation Big Gulp’s success. The distribution team knew what they had to do, but they had no idea how to do it. No guidebook was available to them, and no system was in place. This was not the only issue brought up by the imminent contract transition, and higher-level leadership had no time to be closely involved with the process of securing Class III(B) for the battalion. They had to make their own system and process to accomplish the mission. Junior leaders were empowered to make decisions, and the command was freed to deal with other issues.
One such issue was Class V ammunition draws from the Swiettzko ASP. Swiettzko is at least four hours away from Torun. Most Class V movements before May 2024 were made using commercial trucks to pick up and drop off ammunition. In late April to early May 2024, funding for 3ABCT line haul operations, and for most line haul operations throughout the European theater, was cancelled. Units now had to use military vehicles for most movements. For a majority of 3ABCT units this was not an issue. The BSB conducted most supply runs using Alpha Distribution Company’s fleet of M1120 Load Handling Systems and SPO’s network of contacts to coordinate movements. Fearless FSC was once again on its own, and the company executive officer (XO) and the distribution platoon were left to coordinate the receipt and transportation of ammunition and its turn-in for 3-29, a unit that is almost useless without ammunition.
Once again, the principles of mission command played a crucial role. The company commander was unable to personally coordinate the movement, so the platoon leader and XO were left to coordinate with outside entities such as the 21st Theater Sustainment Command and the movement control battalion to secure clearance for movement of hazardous goods in Poland. Such a key high-visibility mission generally requires command emphasis, but for an FSC it was just a normal Tuesday.
The FSC field feeding section generally flies under the radar. Their job is to provide food to the supported battalion. A good field feeding section is the most well-liked section of any maneuver battalion. Fearless FSC had one such section for the Poland rotation. Even though the section had few NCOs, this had no effect on its mission performance, and the transition from the KBR to PPLS dining facilities (DFACs) heightened the importance and visibility of the food services operations on FOS Torun.
After PPLS assumed DFAC responsibility, many Soldiers complained of unsanitary DFAC conditions, uncooked or inedible food, or stomach issues from their meals. To solve this problem, the local DLA contracting agent and the PPLS DFAC manager, the Polish military officer in charge, and the 3ABCT’s preventative medicine officer worked with the Fearless FSC’s field feeding NCOs to assess the DFAC and outline guidelines for the Polish civilian and military personnel working in the DFAC. This situation was monitored closely by U.S. Army Fifth Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, the headquarters in charge of the units rotated to Poland. Important personnel appeared on the FOS for DFAC and transitional updates, and the junior NCOs of the field feeding team were called to assist with making decisions that affected diplomatic relations with the Polish military. Just as with fuel, ammunition, and maintenance operations, personnel were given an end state and guidelines but were allowed to operate as they deemed best.
While other military units are often faced with undefined problems such as this one, very rarely does it fall to such low-level leadership to solve issues that adversely affect an entire FOS. Typically, a unit commander or a battalion operations section is involved in implementing a new operating system for a renewed diplomatic agreement.
FSCs operate like this regularly. Low-level leaders are responsible for missions and tasks that are answerable at the battalion and brigade echelons. The FSC commander, while responsible for the entire company, cannot manage all the FSC’s functions and must rely on mission command to empower their subordinates to complete the FSC’s missions.
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CPT Sarah McCann is currently the Fearless Forward support company commander in 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado. She previously served as the current operation OIC for the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) of Fort Story, Virginia. She was commissioned as a Transportation officer in 2019 and attended Transportation Officer Basic Officer Leaders Course and Logistics Officer Captains Career Course. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree in marketing from Seton Hall University.
1LT Mark Fitzpatrick serves as the executive officer of Fearless Forward Support Company 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado. He was commissioned as a lieutenant of Transportation in 2022 and attended the Transportation Basic Officer Leaders Course. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Military Academy.
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This article was published in the summer 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.
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