Although organic (or tactical) aviation had proved invaluable to Army Ground Forces commanders during World War II, less than four months after the cessation of hostilities, the number of AGF organic aircraft declined from about 1,600 to 200.
Such rapid demobilization was not uncommon in U.S. history, but growing post-war congressional interest in nuclear air forces as well as the formal separation of the Army Air Forces into the independent Air Force in 1947 did not bode well for the future of Army Aviation.
Remaining tensions between the services' separate visions of strategic versus organic aviation were further exacerbated by budgeting changes that accompanied the creation of the Department of Defense. Previously separate requests by the Army and the Navy once made directly to the federal government's executive branch morphed into an intense annual inter-service competition for as large a share of DoD's budget as each branch could wrangle.
The obviously unequal ranking of the Air Force and the Army within the new DoD hierarchy as well as the vastly changed circumstances of post-World War II international relations once again left aviation support for Soldiers on the ground almost totally dependent on the one branch of the Armed Forces that considered the nation's oldest military service to be archaic and irrelevant on the modern battlefield.
As negative as this attitude was for Army Aviation's pursuit of additional fixed-wing assets between 1946 and 1950, it was even more destructive of its vision for incorporating rotary-wing aircraft into its evolving battlefield maneuver strategy. By the end of the war in September 1945, both the Air Force and the Navy had proven the combat value of helicopters. The Marine Corps, which procured its aircraft through the Navy, had no difficulty in acquiring helicopters in the late 1940s because the Navy supported the Marine Corps' efforts to update its amphibious assault and heliborne movement methods and doctrine. Despite Army aviators' interest in similar modernization techniques, the Air Force's refusal in 1948 to obtain Army requested rotary-wing aircraft severely delayed Army Aviation improvements for almost five more years.
Even though the Air Force's lack of interest and numerous restrictions hobbled the Army's ongoing endeavors to expand its organic aviation capability, in 1946, the branch's continued interest led to tests of the Bell YH-13 helicopter as a possible replacement for the lightweight, fixed-wing aircraft used so effectively during WWII for observation and artillery fire coordination. In addition, the Army Transportation Corps began its push to acquire rotary-wing aircraft in November 1949 with a request for six types of helicopters deemed necessary for the improved transport of cargo and Soldiers.
Previously, in May of that year, the chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force negotiated specific terms in an attempt to define aviation mission boundaries and aircraft capabilities. Setting aircraft weights and delineating tasks to expedite and improve ground combat in forward areas, a jointly promulgated regulation allowed Army aviators to provide fire adjustment, route reconnaissance and courier services to Soldiers on the front. Also permitted was aerial surveillance of enemy forward areas to assist in locating targets, adjusting fire and obtaining information on enemy defenses.
The invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops who crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, marked the start of the first armed clash of the Cold War. Even with its early interest in helicopters, the Army was the last service to deploy such aircraft to address the twin obstacles of mountainous terrain and bad communications confronting troops committed to carry out the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing armed intervention in Korea. Unlike the Marines, who entered the fight equipped with helicopters for which they had developed tactics and on which they had trained extensively, Army Aviation continued to suffer serious shortcomings for much of the conflict. The first Marine Corps heliborne combat airlift on Sept. 21, 1951, achieved in eight minutes what a debilitating road march uphill would have taken nine hours to accomplish. By the time the truce was signed in July 1953, Marine Corps helicopters had transported over 60,000 troops and 3,750 tons of cargo as well as airlifted over 9,800 casualties.
Unfortunately for the Soldiers fighting in Korea, intense Air Force opposition to the Army's efforts to establish its first transport helicopter companies in May 1950 delayed the procurement of needed aircraft until 1951. While the invasion of South Korea eventually led to the removal of weight restrictions on Army aircraft to ensure the availability and immediate responsiveness of tactical aviation support to ground troops on the front lines, it took over a year to win formal approval of the new agreement in October 1951. Subsequent refinements in another agreement adopted in November 1952 increased Army aircraft weight limits and extended their range to 100 miles, while assigning medical evacuations within the combat zone and other functions to the Army Aviation mission. Due to these delays, it took 17 months after the Marine Corps' first helicopter combat operation for the Army to bring a similar aviation capacity to the fight in Korea.
The recognition of additional hurdles complicating the coordination of the Air Force and Army Aviation in Korea as well as the realization that a nuclear response was not always a viable defense option ultimately helped to secure a clear way forward for the Army's evolving aviation mission. The successful use of Army helicopters in Korea, along with extensive technological developments and further doctrinal changes, not only strengthened Army leadership's commitment to aviation but helped to transform the Army in response to the modern battlefield and changing international relations.
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