The term “end of strategic sanctuary” sounds like the ominous title for a science fiction movie. Strategic sanctuary is ending for U.S. deployments. The U.S. can no longer rely on natural geography to prevent attacks on the homeland in the face of advancing and emerging technologies. Near-peer adversaries can attack military movements at home stations and on public infrastructure using unmanned aerial systems (UAS), cyber attacks, and other forms of non-conventional, asymmetric operations. These threats could seriously damage or otherwise interfere with the Army’s ability to alert, mobilize, and deploy forces for large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Because the deployment enterprise depends on commercial carriers and dual-use nodes, the Army must assume the potential for disruptions at installation gates, rail and highway chokepoints, seaports, airports, and the cyber domain.
The Russia-Ukraine War and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East illustrate that enemies can wage war beyond traditional means and strike deep into each other’s homelands. These lessons serve as a cautionary tale for the U.S.
A fully contested military force deployment from the homeland is currently the least likely scenario. What is more likely is a homeland partially contested by protests and riots, sabotage at key chokepoints, non-attributable cyber attacks, and aggressive disinformation operations to sway public opinion against military operations.
Our ability to project military power critically depends on the successful movement of Army units from their home installations to civilian seaports and airports, a process which near-peer adversaries can contest with effective frequency and intensity.
As the Army continues to plan for mobilization and deployment in a potentially contested environment, the issue of deployment from a contested homeland has not been widely addressed.
The Threat Triad
Modern Army planners face a threat triad, which could complicate LSCO before a single unit clears the assembly area. This triad consists of the following:
- Cyber Intrusions: Pre-positioned malware, such as from the Volt Typhoon group, targets the information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) of civilian utilities and port authorities.
- Physical Interdiction: Adversaries may use UAS for surveillance or employ low-cost sabotage (e.g., arson or disabling rail switches) at critical chokepoints.
- Information Warfare: Disinformation campaigns can mobilize protests or create civil unrest at port entrances, using bot-amplified narratives to stoke public opposition or cause panic regarding military movements.
Adversarial tactics for contesting deployment in the Russia-Ukraine War serve as case studies, particularly with the use of UAS for kinetic attacks, reconnaissance, and surveillance. We see cyber warfare as a primary weapon with opponents prepositioning for disruption. Adversaries are not waiting for conflict to begin; they are actively infiltrating critical infrastructure networks now to enable future disruption. The goal is to interfere with the deployment of forces before they can reach the fight.
Living Off the Land
Malicious actors use legitimate, built-in network administration tools to move through systems, making their activity difficult to distinguish from normal traffic.
We have seen that foreign influence actors use social media and other platforms to spread narratives designed to stoke public opposition to national policy and military operations, to create confusion, and to delegitimize and undermine trust in the government. This includes the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-generated images, audio, and video to amplify and spread opposing narratives. During a crisis, such amplified opposing narratives could create panic or direct protests and riots toward key logistics nodes such as highway intersections, ports, or rail junction lines.
Current wars have seen the widespread use of UAS to conduct kinetic attacks and surveil military installations to gain intelligence on military movements by monitoring compromised civilian transportation and infrastructure networks. We must expect that in a future conflict there will be a persistent threat of physical sabotage against poorly secured infrastructure, such as rail lines or electrical substations powering ports of embarkation.
A 2020 RAND Corporation study underscored these vulnerabilities, concluding that current Army threat assessment methodologies are insufficient for the modern age. The study found that installations are often protected by traditional inside-the-wire security measures that fail to account for emerging threats such as AI, smart-city technologies, and social media disinformation. Crucially, RAND noted that the Army lacks an entity to comprehensively assess how these innovative threats might converge to impede the flow of forces from road and rail to ports of debarkation.
The Response
Since the publication of the RAND study, senior Army leadership has shifted focus toward securing the strategic support area. In the U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, Bruce Busler, director of the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) at U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), provides insight into the Fourth Component — the commercial partners critical to the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE).
Busler notes that while Department of War (DOW) networks are robust, commercial carriers in programs such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) are not always subject to the same cyber security rigors. To bridge this gap, USTRANSCOM provides tools to these partners to enhance their resilience. Similarly, MAJ Brennan Devereaux, writing for War on the Rocks, argues that no amount of traditional armor can mitigate non-kinetic attacks; rather, DOW restructuring must be couched in a threat assessment that addresses cyber and AI-driven disruptions.
USTRANSCOM has instituted a risk management approach that focuses on three areas of concern:
- Minimize the impact of high-probability and consequential cyber threats on vulnerable elements of the JDDE. Busler points out that while the DOW cyber network is robust and has elevated protective measures, the commercial carriers in various emergency response programs (CRAF, VISA, Voluntary Tanker Agreement, and the Universal Services Contract) are not subject to the same cyber-security restrictions as is DOW. To mitigate this vulnerability, USTRANSCOM provides tools to commercial carriers to measure and enhance their cyber security.
- Maximize the JDDE’s ability to recover rapidly or execute alternate transportation solutions given the likelihood of node/network infrastructure degradation. USTRANSCOM continues to assess the deployment infrastructure of highways and rail lines to the various ports of embarkation. The mitigation solution to any degradation is the identification and use of alternative routes and seaports to overcome barriers.
- Optimize relationships with critical transportation providers and leverage federal, state, and regional transportation agency interactions to support elevated levels of deployment activity rapidly when faced with disruptions.
USTRANSCOM recognizes the importance and value of the commercial deployment carriers both within the transportation industry and interagency federal government partners.
The Vulnerable Path
The U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command’s Deployment Process Modernization Office has also defined the scope of the problem and identified the vulnerable path of contested deployment. Most military forces, over 85%, and equipment deploy from the U.S. homeland, relying heavily on commercial infrastructure and resources. This reliance creates a complex web of dependencies on civilian-owned rail, and government owned highways, ports, and airports, each presenting unique vulnerabilities.
The vulnerable path for deploying units in the fort-to-port journey includes key chokepoints and threats, many of which are in after-action reports, surveys, and audits. These include incomplete or inaccurate movement data, the inability to securely transmit deployment data, operations security risks, and the dangers of social media compromising security and operational deployment.
Once units move off the installation, controlled and synchronized by the U.S. Army Transportation Command (ARTRANS), they rely on their respective Strategic Networks of the Strategic Highway Network and Strategic Rail Corridor Network, which connect military installations to 18 strategic seaports. Once on the road or rail, deploying units may face physical threats or impacts from natural weather events. While widespread interdiction is difficult, chokepoints near installations and ports are susceptible to sabotage or attack, aiming to create bottlenecks or otherwise disrupt the process.
The DOW relies on military-operated seaports, managed by the ARTRANS, and a network of critical commercial seaports, used through strategic agreement. Large-scale deployment of necessity relies on sealift to transport most of the equipment and unit vehicles into theater. The seaports of embarkation (SPOEs), as the maritime nexus of deployment, present some potentially unique challenges during contested deployment.
Cyber security risks, including Chinese-backed hacking groups like Volt Typhoon, have been identified pre-positioning malicious code within the IT and OT systems of U.S. ports. An attack could disrupt the civilian power grid, crane operations, cargo tracking, and loading schedules, causing significant delays.
To mitigate some of these potential threats, ARTRANS relies on resilience through diversification. The command employs port diversification, rehearsing the shift of large-scale deployments to alternate commercial ports to mitigate the impact of an attack or disruption on a single location.
We expect that the majority of Soldiers will deploy via military or commercial airlift. The air nexus of military and commercial airports immediately presents a dual-use dilemma. Many deployments occur from dual-use airports that host both military and civilian operations, creating a blended threat surface and competition for resources. Airports present unique challenges because of their very nature. Potential threats could come from IT issues to OT threats. Beyond simply hacking IT networks (impacting ticketing and baggage), adversaries will also target OT systems like runway lighting, fuel lines, and building access controls, which could halt flight operations.
Airfields also present a unique vulnerability outside the fence line. While the military can secure its own assets, commercial flight operations depend on civilian-run power grids, air traffic control systems, and other local infrastructure that are also targets for cyber intrusion.
USTRANSCOM designed and leads the JDDE as a platform to build resilience during the fight to get to the fight. It is a collaborative enterprise that integrates military components, commercial carriers, and government agencies to plan and execute deployments. Commercial carriers have a critical role in the JDDE.
As part of the training and preparation efforts for LSCO, the DOW is increasing the frequency of realistic exercises that simulate mobilizing forces while critical infrastructure is under cyber attack, forcing units to practice fighting through disruptions.
Any large-scale mobilizations and deployments will require pre-existing public-private partnerships and policy structures to enable movement. Within USTRANSCOM, an initiative is underway to standardize cyber security regulations across different transportation sectors to create a unified defense. There are also proposals for federal grant programs to help civilian port and airport authorities fund necessary cyber security improvements that they cannot afford on their own.
These types of partnerships will enable cross-institutional information sharing. This assists in establishing trust and robust channels for sharing threat intelligence between the government and private sector transportation providers for early warning and coordinated response.
Sustainment Mitigation: A Scenario for Planners
Consider a scenario where a primary SPOE’s electrical grid network fails 48 hours before a brigade’s load window. Simultaneously, a social media campaign falsely reports an American invasion force is being prepared to intervene overseas in a country where the civil strife has gained a sympathetic audience in the U.S., drawing 200 protesters to the access gates.
In this environment, sustainment success depends on the following:
- Redundancy: Maintaining digital and hard-copy movement data (Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II backups).
- Liaison: Pre-established relationships with local law enforcement and port authorities to manage outside the fence line disruptions.
- Flexibility: The ability to divert rail shipments to a secondary node without losing accountability.
The Criticality of the Reserve Component
Any large-scale mobilization relies heavily on the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. These forces compose approximately 65% of military airlift, 85% of aeromedical evacuation, and 90% of the personnel required to manage seaports under wartime conditions. Within the land domain, this capability is heavily anchored by the Deployment Support Command (DSC), the U.S. Army Reserve component of ARTRANS.
The DSC provides an integrated Total Force capability that is critical to sustaining global readiness, accounting for approximately half of ARTRANS’ total strength. By providing reserve transportation brigades, an Expeditionary Rail Center, and specialized deployment and distribution support battalions, the DSC acts as the crucial connective tissue for terminal operations, movement control, and strategic seaport operations. Their seamless integration into daily operations and the broader JDDE is a prerequisite for a successful, large-scale deployment from a contested homeland.
Conclusion
Winning in LSCO begins with winning the fight to get to the fight. This requires planners to move beyond an administrative mindset and adopt a tactical approach to movement within the U.S. homeland. Strategic sanctuary has ended, but decisive movement remains achievable.
Mobilization and deployment plans must include redundancies and alternative methods to load, ship, and track vehicles and equipment and maintain accountability of personnel. Rigid plans tied to inflexible timelines will fail in a contested deployment environment.
Deployment planning needs not just coordination, but scenario wargames and exercises, like the one mentioned above, including red team participation designed to mimic hostile activities. Such wargames and exercises assist in building institutional muscle memory, providing vital experience to all, regardless of their rank or current position.
Success will be dictated by the ability of USTRANSCOM, its Service components, including ARTRANS and the broader Army, to integrate cyber, physical, and information resilience across the JDDE. Through rigorous exercises, the seamless integration of Total Force components such as the DSC, shared cyber security standards with commercial carriers, and the validation of alternate transportation routes, the Army can ensure that the transition from fort to port remains decisive, even under the persistent gaze and interference of a near-peer adversary.
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Mr. Stacey Lee serves as the chief of the Deployment Standards Branch within the Army’s Deployment Process Modernization Office at Fort Lee, Virginia. A retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, he served as an enlisted combat engineer and commissioned field artillery and Transportation officer. He holds a Master of Military Art and Science from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Master of Divinity from Liberty University.
Dr. Stewart W. Bentley is currently a military analyst with the Deployment Process Modernization Office at Fort Lee, Virginia. His previous articles have been published in Studies in Intelligence, Military Intelligence, the U.S. Military Academy’s Modern Warfare Institute, and U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command’s Mad Scientist Laboratory. He is a former infantry and military intelligence officer. A graduate of the Citadel, he earned a Ph.D. in organizational management from Capella University.
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This article was published in the summer 2026 edition of Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin.
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