A recent Armor article titled “Tanks Need the Infantry to Lead the Way” highlighted the significant advantage that infantry provides armored formations. A Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation in which that same armor company was attached to a Stryker battalion in 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 4th Infantry Division proved that tanks provide a decisive edge in restrictive terrain.
The tank company’s support was an overall net gain for our brigade’s lethality, and we recommend continued armor support to future JRTC rotations. We found great success in early integration of the armor company, centralized logistics, decentralized employment of tanks, and leveraging complementary capabilities.
Overview
In October 2024 during JRTC Rotation 25-02, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment “Mustangs” from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division (CD) provided one armor company (A/1-8, “Assault Company”) under operational control (OPCON) to 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment for the first JRTC rotation to combine Strykers and tanks. Fourteen M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks integrated into 2-23 IN to form Task Force (TF) Tomahawk. 2-23 IN in turn provided one Stryker company OPCON to 2/1 CD’s 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment for its NTC rotation, producing a task organization of two Stryker companies and one armor company.
Integrating Abrams tanks with Stryker infantry highlighted the power of a mutually supporting relationship in restrictive terrain. When paired properly, it proved to be a more formidable opponent to the opposing force (OPFOR) than pure infantry. Tanks and Strykers are excellent complements, achieving synergy due to the armored firepower and shock effects secured by dismounted infantry. They are symmetrical in both speed and sustainment requirements. While Stryker battalions have far fewer fuel capabilities, with augmentation they can sustain tanks while keeping pace.
In the offense, tanks helped maintain the battalion’s tempo and shock effect. They offered a decisive advantage to a Stryker battalion, enabling a more rapid sustained tempo and the capability to both penetrate enemy defenses and exploit enemy vulnerabilities. In the defense, tanks increased the flexibility of our defense with a mobile strike force and were invaluable for achieving penetration and defeating armored threats. While they were vulnerable to red air (and frequently hunted), tanks provided an additional air defense capability, successfully engaging several drones and enemy aircraft. Despite the advantages, tanks were limited to improved roads, but this limitation did not outweigh the advantages they provided.
While our operating concept decentralized allocation of combat power down to the infantry platoon level, we centralized sustainment at the battalion level. Doing so allowed TF Tomahawk to keep its tanks in the fight throughout the rotation by effectively prioritizing and sequencing Class III resupplies. Planning and synchronizing our Class III distribution with ongoing operations not only safeguarded our fuel assets but ensured our tanks were always sustained and ready to fight.
We tested our framework during the JRTC force-on-force phase. The enemy we faced was a mechanized infantry brigade with guerrilla augmentees. They generally fought a delaying action via succeeding area defense in depth. We began with a ground forcible entry (GFE) into the area of operations (AO), the JRTC Fullerton box. From there we conducted a movement to contact, deliberate defense, and deliberate attack, moving from east to west.
Early Integration
TF Tomahawk initiated dialogue and integrated Assault Company into the task force months before deploying to JRTC. Sustainment working groups, in-person capability briefs, and in-person tactical decision exercises all contributed to hitting the ground and moving out as a cohesive team at JRTC. During an in-person visit two months before the rotation, the team came together to develop an Abrams-Stryker framework for operating together in restricted terrain. The task organization we developed was not new — company teams with attached tank sections throughout the rotation. Before JRTC, we developed two frameworks: one for tactical employment and one for sustainment.
We created a doctrinal template for moving with tanks along roads and trails. Dismounted infantry led the way in defile, with tanks ready to rapidly attack in any direction. Strykers then followed behind to sustain and provide local support by fire.
Centralized and Deliberate Battalion Sustainment
TF Tomahawk’s experience underscored the importance of deliberate and adaptive sustainment when integrating a tank company into a Stryker battalion. Recognizing that the fuel consumption and maintenance demands of Abrams tanks far exceeded those of Strykers, the task force developed a comprehensive sustainment plan addressing Class III, V, and IX resupply. This plan was firmly rooted in doctrinal principles, applying service station, tailgate, and refuel-on-the-move (ROM) concepts but adapted to the severely restricted terrain and threat environment. A key consideration was the inherent difference in sustainment needs: Abrams tanks require logistics packages (LOGPACs) roughly twice daily compared to the 72-hour sustainment window for Strykers.
To meet the sustainment demands inherent to employing their tank company, 1-8 CAV attached additional assets for the rotation. These included a 2,500-gallon fueler, a 2,500-gallon modular fuel system (MFS), and two M88 recovery vehicles to supplement Assault Company’s organic field maintenance teams. The sustainment package augmented TF Tomahawk’s organic capabilities with three additional overhead lift assets (2x M88 and Forward Repair System [FRS]) as well as 5,000 gallons of Class III. The Raider Brigade aligned Assault Company to 2-23 IN to consolidate logistics support at the battalion level while enabling the option for distributed tank combat power to maneuver companies within the task force. This task organization allowed for more efficient LOGPACs to ensure the sustainment nodes for tanks could meet the operational demand and tempo required in an SBCT, where mobility and speed are paramount.
Overall, our fuel assets remained distributed, and we utilized both tailgate and supply point distribution to minimize the signature of both the Abrams and our fuel assets as the mission dictated. We assessed that the enemy would prioritize destroying fuel assets to defeat friendly force’s ability to project armored combat power to the forward line of own troops (FLOT). As a result, Assault Company trains prioritized survivability above all else.
Beyond fuel, TF Tomahawk carefully tailored its approach to Class V resupply, balancing main gun ammunition allocations based on the anticipated enemy situation. Understanding that the restricted terrain would amplify the effectiveness of enemy obstacles and infantry ambushes, the task force prioritized a larger allocation of canister rounds to enhance the tanks’ ability to breach obstacles and neutralize dismounted threats. This balanced load, combining canister with multi-purpose anti-tank (MPAT) and sabot rounds, ensured that the tanks could effectively engage a wide range of targets. For Class IX (maintenance), the task force dispersed M88 recovery vehicles and an FRS for redundancy to quickly repair and replace parts on tanks. Furthermore, they worked with maintenance professionals within the SBCT for expertise and support and utilized a “Red Ball Express” for rapid delivery of critical parts when needed in addition to the JRTC Supply Support Activities (SSA).
Finally, recognizing the challenging terrain and potential for vehicle breakdowns, TF Tomahawk implemented innovative recovery tactics. By prepositioning tow cables on the front and rear of each tank, we significantly reduced preparation time for tank-on-tank recovery operations. This simple but effective measure minimized exposure time for immobilized assets. The task force also leveraged the superior recovery capabilities of M88 recovery vehicles in the most difficult terrain, using them to recover even Strykers when necessary. This approach demonstrates how to successfully project armored combat power in a modern operational environment.
Decentralized Tank Employment
Throughout the rotation, TF Tomahawk’s companies used a company team task organization to ensure infantry dismounts and tanks were in position to mutually support one another. At minimum, a Stryker company had the support of a tank section, and a tank company had the support of a Stryker platoon. It was necessary to adjust task organization throughout the force-on-force phase, but Assault Company tanks always operated with infantry support. Building company teams by integrating tank platoons into Stryker companies, infantry platoons into the armor company, or even tank sections into infantry platoons achieved maximum flexibility and rapid decision-making.
The TF Tomahawk commander and S-3 enabled company success through simple, detailed plans to maintain shared understanding. In turn, the Assault Company commander and first sergeant clearly explained their capabilities to ensure proper employment.
Throughout the rotation, TF Tomahawk generally employed tanks with two offensive tactical mission tasks: follow and support and attack by fire. During the initial movement to contact, the task force’s two Stryker companies cleared restricted terrain and seized battalion objectives while Assault Company assumed a follow and support role.
In the defense, Assault Company prepared engagement areas through engagement area development to destroy the enemy while providing a brigade mobile strike force (MSF), which successfully defeated an enemy penetration. During the deliberate attack, TF Tomahawk conducted a penetration and distributed tank platoons to each maneuver company.
Movement to Contact/Follow and Support. During the initial movement to contact, Assault Company maneuvered behind two infantry companies in a follow-and-support role. When given this tactical mission task, Assault Company was task organized with two tank platoons (Task: Follow and support, Purpose: Enable freedom of maneuver for infantry companies to seize terrain) and one infantry platoon (Task: Clear, Purpose: Enable freedom of maneuver for tank platoons). The infantry platoon proved essential to providing local flank security for stationary tanks in hides. The third tank platoon was used as a battalion reserve during this task organization. When Assault Company was tasked with follow and support, two infantry companies fought 3-5 kilometers forward, clearing along tank trafficable avenues of approach while maneuvering to seize objectives. The trigger to commit Assault Company from their hides was identification of a BMP platoon or greater on the objective. This framework proved successful during movement to contact, when time was available, or when obstacles were expected along avenues of approach. AAR lesson learned: Company commanders must coordinate to ensure Strykers are off tank avenues of approach to ensure rapid movement to the FLOT and avoid congestion that risks desynchronizing an attack. When operating behind friendly units, tanks are limited to Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS) and coaxial engagements until they reach the FLOT, and friendly elements are behind main gun surface danger zones (SDZs).
Area Defense. Assault Company tanks fought distributed with two tank platoons in prepared engagement areas with tasks to destroy. The brigade planned to turn the enemy into Assault Company’s engagement area. Their tanks coordinated with attached engineers from the brigade engineer battalion to emplace obstacles and conduct engagement area development. A third tank platoon operated as the brigade’s MSF with a trigger to deploy if a seam was penetrated by three T90s or greater. This platoon, led by 1LT Justin Evenson, successfully destroyed an enemy mechanized infantry company minus with T90 support while taking no friendly casualties. AAR lesson learned: Allocating additional sustainment nodes and dedicated LOGPAC assets from the brigade to the MSF reduced the time required to sustain distributed tank platoons.
Counterattack/Attack by Fire. Following the defense, TF Tomahawk prepared to conduct a penetration through sequential tank-led attacks by fire with infantry support. When ordered to conduct an attack by fire, Assault Company tanks operated distributed with tank platoons attached to each maneuver company. Under this task organization, tanks generally led the order of march in their respective companies to enable use of the main gun and mitigate SDZs and achieve penetration. This task organization proved most effective when rapid tempo was necessary and templated enemy obstacles were limited to simple concertina wire, or when enemy armor was assessed at the probable line of contact. Distributing tank platoons generated more options for the commanders. As tanks engaged in direct fire contact, Strykers deployed dismounts to provide flank security, establish support-by-fire positions, and reduce obstacles. Leading with tanks provided rapid attack-by-fire establishment and reduced risk of infantry becoming fixed by armor and light armor assets. AAR lesson learned: When tanks lead formations, Strykers best support when they are 50-100 meters behind the tanks to deploy dismounts against simple enemy obstacles and anti-tank ambushes.
Leveraging Complementary Capabilities: Mutual Support, Mobility, Multiple Dilemmas
The mutually reinforcing and mobile attributes of Abrams and Strykers enabled a wide array of options that consistently offered marked advantages. Additionally, the increased speed and firepower of TF Tomahawk posed multiple dilemmas to the enemy, impacting his decision cycle.
Mutual Support. Both the Abrams and the Stryker (platforms/formations) have strengths and weaknesses that support each other, and when combined, make a more lethal force. For example, Abrams have armored protection and an overwhelming amount of firepower, while Strykers have limited armor and lack substantial firepower but do transport a considerable volume of infantry (substantially more than a Bradley). When paired together, these weaknesses/strengths balance out and work positively — possibly better than an Abrams/Bradley combination because the Stryker consumes considerably less fuel. Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle Variants (ICVVs) and Abrams tanks are naturally symbiotic in JRTC’s severely restricted terrain. The Stryker’s capacity to deliver squads of dismounted Infantrymen at speed, combined with the tank’s ability to provide overmatch on the enemy, is a lethal combination if sequencing the two assets is done correctly. The tankers were surprised at the relative stealth of Strykers compared to the Bradleys organic to an armored unit; they not only operated more quietly but were also easily concealed.
Mobility. Both platforms/formations are highly mobile and can move rapidly around the battlefield. While one is wheeled and the other tracked, they had similar movement rates and maintained tempo in restrictive terrain. We assess that a light infantry unit would struggle to keep pace with tanks or be able to rapidly maneuver while mutually supporting with infantry. A mechanized infantry unit would consume a considerably larger volume of fuel, creating other challenges. Additionally, because an SBCT is a mobile formation, its sustainment enterprise is also better suited and prepared to support resupplying the Abrams, given its Class III consumption rate. Clearing up to urban terrain and then launching tanks provides shock effect to seize. It took the OPFOR by surprise.
Multiple Dilemmas. The OPFOR knew TF Tomahawk had Abrams tanks, which consistently posed another dilemma. The task force had the ability to weigh the volume of Abrams it committed to the fight because it also had motorized infantry that could maneuver and pose a dismounted threat to the enemy’s armor assets. The speed and mobility of the Abrams allowed TF Tomahawk to keep the tanks in hide and commit only when required. During the defense, an augmented platoon of Abrams served as the brigade’s MSF. Given the enemy situation and the Abrams’ speed and mobility, the MSF was rapidly committed to a penetration in the southern sector of the brigade defense, which defeated the enemy’s attack.
Key Lessons
Three key lessons stand out from testing our Abrams-Stryker framework in the restricted terrain of the western Louisiana woods. First, the tank company enabled an expanded set of employment options to include enhanced deception plans in the offense. The brigade massed the tank company in the north, allowing a Stryker battalion to shift unnoticed from one axis of advance to another and surprise the enemy.
Second, the tank company led to a net-zero gain against the enemy air threat. Although enemy aviation prioritized them as targets, tanks provided additional air defense capabilities, accounting for half of the brigade’s red air kills. Protecting tanks against red air was a challenge, and we lost one in the defense, even in a hide site. More air defense artillery (ADA) assets are needed. Tanks can engage tanks (and did kill two OPFOR Hinds), but this unmasks them, putting the formation at risk. It is necessary to deliberately protect tanks, especially against attack aviation. Keep them concealed in hide sites and protected with ADA.
Lastly, the company placed an increased demand on the brigade’s Class III requirements, as expected. In addition to the company’s organic fueler, 2-23 IN had to commit an additional two fuelers and four MFS, consistently allocating at least 15,000 gallons of fuel to the company. That allocation was sustainable for the SBCT throughout the rotation but required a battalion headquarters to continuously manage that requirement, which is why the tank company remained under the same battalion headquarters throughout.
Way Ahead: Optimizing Abrams-Stryker Capabilities
Stryker infantry and armor units are naturally synergistic, as both rapidly deploy combat power while mitigating risk for each other’s weaknesses. As demonstrated by TF Tomahawk at JRTC 25-02, infantry forces excel at clearing severely restricted terrain and seizing objectives, whereas tanks deliver shock effects through rapid combat overmatch while conducting penetrations and isolating objectives. Several changes could maximize the synergy.
With additional Class III assets, dedicated systems to move 120mm main gun ammunition, and an established Class IX parts flow, attaching a tank company to an SBCT under an OPCON command support relationship or experimental modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) has the potential to be an unstoppable force on the modern battlefield.
One friction point is that established Stryker and Abrams communications systems work in a minimally effective capacity, as they are not optimized for simultaneous lethality and responsiveness demanded in combat. In a Stryker, Joint Battle Command - Platform (JBC-P) operation is a dedicated responsibility independent of simultaneous combat operations within the platform. M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 JBC-P capability is enabled from the Commander’s Display Unit (CDU) rather than the traditional stand-alone kit present in a Stryker or Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. The CDU also controls the CROWS, the vehicle systems screen, and the JBC-P. In severely restricted terrain, frequency modulation (FM) is often intermittent, and JBC-P quickly becomes the primary and sometimes only viable method of communication. To solve this effectiveness triad dilemma, perhaps a software update can be implemented to enable tank commanders to configure their CDUs based on “shooter preference” to simultaneously view the CROWS, systems information, and JBC-P.
Alternatively, Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) systems issued to tank commanders could help to solve communications friction as these systems would allow tank commanders to communicate and battle track while using the CROWS simultaneously or maneuvering the tank from outside the turret. This allows tank commanders to retain situational awareness and communicate with dismounts. Additionally, high frequency (HF) capability, such as an AN/PRC-158 or AN/PRC-160, would enable each tank to operate further dispersed within its own formation, maximizing the main gun’s planning range and increasing protection from enemy air. This would also ensure armor leaders could communicate with the battalion and brigade, maximizing their role as a reserve or mobile strike force.
Regardless of any future MTOE alignments between ABCT and SBCT assets, a “playbook” for sustainment detached personnel and an equipment package could serve as an efficient blueprint to ensure critical classes of supply reach the warfighter at the point of friction. TF Tomahawk’s centralized sustainment operations concept — supplemented by the parent armor unit — can serve as a blueprint.
LTC Jon Bate is a U.S. Army Infantry officer serving in the Joint Staff J5. He previously commanded 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 4th Infantry Division. He has served in the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st Armored Division, and as an assistant professor of economics in the U.S. Military Academy Department of Social Sciences. A Goodpaster Scholar in the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3), he holds a Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School and a PhD in political science from Stanford University.
MAJ Wade Redenius currently serves as the executive officer (XO) for 1/4 SBCT. His previous assignments include serving as the executive officer for 2-23 IN; commander of A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and commander of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 2-2 SBCT. MAJ Redenius is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Military Academy.
MAJ Adam Timms currently serves as the XO for 2-23 IN, 1/4 SBCT. His previous assignments include serving as operations officer for 2-23 IN; armor advisor for the U.S. Military Training Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; operations officer for 3rd Battalion, 362nd Infantry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX; commander of C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss; XO of D Troop, 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort Wainwright, AK; and scout platoon leader in B Troop, 5-1 CAV. MAJ Timms earned a bachelor’s degree in political science from Wright State University.
CPT Mitchell J. Nelson currently serves as a small group leader for the Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Benning, GA. His previous assignments include serving as commander of Assault Company, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division (CD); squadron operations officer for 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2/1 CD; battalion maintenance officer for 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment (Opposing Force), Hohenfels, Germany; and tank company platoon leader and XO in 1-4 IN. CPT Nelson earned a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice/homeland security from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss) and a master’s degree in organizational leadership from Columbus State University.
This article appears in the Fall 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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