The 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment “Tomahawks” of the 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) employed a multi-functional reconnaissance company (MFRC) during its rotation to the Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC) in March 2025. During the rotation, 1-23 IN worked as a maneuver battalion under a South Korean brigade, and the MFRC worked directly for the Tomahawk battalion. The operating environment of KCTC is unique from any of the U.S. Army’s existing combat training centers (CTCs). KCTC consists of severely restricted terrain with peaks up to 4,000 feet in elevation. During the exercise, temperatures fell into the single digits, mountains were covered in snow, and Soldiers were exposed to wind gusts up to 30 knots.
Although the MFRC concept has been employed by the 101st Airborne Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 10th Mountain Division, 1-2 SBCT was the first Stryker brigade to implement the concept. Using existing personnel from throughout the brigade, 1-2 SBCT rapidly organized and developed the company for this training exercise. The MFRC demonstrated enhanced capability through the synchronization of aerial, electromagnetic, and terrestrial reconnaissance in a single company. While development of an organic MFRC will demand personnel and equipment sacrifices across the brigade, the KCTC rotation proved the company’s capabilities are worth the investment.
MFRC Employment at KCTC
The MFRC consisted of elements from four battalions. A rifle company provided the headquarters and mortar section; the three scout platoons came from their organic battalions; and the engineer battalion provided the electronic warfare (EW) and unmanned aerial system (UAS) platoons. Prior to KCTC, integration of the MFRC consisted of leader visits to the training area to analyze our operating environment and conduct capability briefs from specialty platoons. The MFRC planned to screen a 5-kilometer front in mountainous and icy terrain. EW and UAS teams attached to each of the three scout platoons to aid in observation and targeting. The Stryker-mounted Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) operated as a distinct section a significant terrain feature behind the scout platoons and the dismounted EW assets. This distance challenged the company headquarters’ ability to effectively control the dispersed reconnaissance assets.
During the KCTC rotation, the integration of EW, UAS, scouts, and indirect fires paid dividends. Dismounted EW assets typically provided the earliest indication of attempted enemy infiltration. Their detection allowed scouts to reposition and gain visual contact through small UAS (sUAS) or direct observation. Scouts called for fire on confirmed positions to disrupt the enemy’s attack. The attached 120mm mortar section provided extremely responsive fires. On multiple occasions, the simultaneous use of direction-finding assets from dispersed EW teams allowed the MFRC to immediately suppress the enemy without visual observation.
The synchronization of reconnaissance assets under a single company headquarters effectively disrupted the enemy’s infiltration; however, follow-on forces triggered the MFRC’s displacement criteria. The enemy’s speed and the substantial soldier load of the MFRC prevented the company from utilizing planned passage lanes for a rearward passage of lines. The scout platoons moved into designated no-fire areas (NFAs) and allowed the enemy to bypass their position while continuing to observe and report. The MFRC used this information to provide early warning to adjacent units and the battalion headquarters.
The disruption of enemy infiltration forces and early warning of their main attack allowed the Tomahawk battalion to prevent enemy penetration of its primary defensive line. 1-23 IN was the only battalion to retain its defensive positions, in large part due to the MFRC’s integration of reconnaissance assets.
Lessons Learned from KCTC
1-2 SBCT successfully demonstrated the capabilities of a reconnaissance company integrated with EW and UAS assets. However, to be ready to win on the hardest days of ground combat, this formation deserves the opportunity to train, fight, and sweat together in deliberate training events months before execution. The MFRC operates best as an organic company with an experienced company commander.
The MFRC did not conduct standardized individual and collective training prior to employment as a company. While each section was proficient in their assigned individual tasks, several EW and UAS attachments were unfamiliar with operating dismounted and struggled to maintain pace. This contributed to the MFRC’s failure to conduct a rearward passage of lines at KCTC and likely increased casualties during the operation. Scouts demonstrated proficiency with their organic equipment and sUAS, but the company lacked redundancy for dismounted EW operators. During the exercise, an EW Soldier suffered a minor injury but remained in the field to operate his assigned system. While admirable, the lack of cross-training with scouts meant the MFRC could not quickly reposition and employ the asset with a healthy scout.
Although proficient in their assigned mission-essential tasks, each scout platoon used slightly different techniques, equipment, and training progressions led by their organic battalions. In addition, each platoon brought a different number of snipers (some platoons operated with two scout sections while others had three). A different commander had also evaluated each platoon based on different training progressions with slightly varying results.
At KCTC, the MFRC operated as an asset under a single battalion, but the company would normally fall under a brigade-level command. In this operation, the scout platoons operated in relatively close proximity and screened a single battalion’s front and flank. In future utilization, the MFRC will increase dispersion, and coordination will only become more difficult. Therefore, standardized collective training is critical to ensuring MFRC platoons can effectively operate independently.
Task Organization
Based on the lessons learned from KCTC, Figure 3 highlights a proposed task organization for the MFRC. The recommended MFRC task organization assumes no changes to personnel assigned to the SBCT for an additional company. Instead, these personnel are already currently assigned throughout the brigade. The MFRC includes a company headquarters, three scout platoons, an EW section, and the chemical reconnaissance platoon.
This task organization does not perfectly mirror the version we employed at KCTC. It also doesn’t include a UAS platoon as scouts are fully capable of operating sUAS, nor does it maintain an organic mortar section. At KCTC, the attached mortar section allowed the company to provide responsive fires without unmasking a brigade-level indirect fire capability. The MFRC may maintain a similar effect through assignment of a mortar section in direct support of the MFRC. Additionally, the brigade may assign a 155mm battery in direct support of the MFRC during specific phases of the operation to increase lethality.
Company Headquarters. The commander, first sergeant, and executive officer are nominated from across the brigade and selected by the brigade commander as second-time leadership positions. While the brigade does not have an excess of E-8s, O-2s, and O-3s, the opportunity to be selected for leadership in the MFRC is likely to compel motivated officers and NCOs to delay a broadening assignment or Captains Career Course attendance. The same may be true for fire support officers/NCOs; however, nominations for other positions will pull some Soldiers from service in battalions without receiving a backfill.
Scout Platoons. The MFRC absorbs all three battalion scout platoons and their equipment, with the platoons operating their own sUAS. Each scout platoon maintains an attached EW team. Through daily physical and tactical training, EW Soldiers will prove to be the assets demonstrated at KCTC and mitigate some physical limitations. Additionally, this relationship allows EW Soldiers to train scouts on EW equipment and scouts to train EW Soldiers on reconnaissance fundamentals. Cross-training increases the formation’s capabilities while developing critical redundancies. Dismounted EW teams conduct the platoon consolidated electronic warfare training strategy (EWTS) with the EW section.
EW Platoon. The entirety of the EW platoon falls under the MFRC. Dismounted EW operators integrate with their assigned scout platoons, and the mounted TEWS operates as an independent section. Under command of the MFRC, EW platoon leadership controls the TEWS during tactical employment. The EW platoon is responsible for all technical training for both dismounted and mounted EW Soldiers.
Chemical Reconnaissance Platoon. While the MFRC did not contain the chemical reconnaissance platoon at KCTC, the MFRC is a natural headquarters for this reconnaissance asset. Under the new SBCT structure, the chemical reconnaissance platoon reports directly to the headquarters and headquarters company at brigade. The MFRC is more capable of controlling the tactical employment of the platoon. It can synthesize the information passed from the chemical reconnaissance platoon to alleviate the strain of the brigade tactical operations center managing the sustainment and reporting of a single platoon.
Training
As 1-2 SBCT experienced at KCTC, the MFRC is tasked with moving further and living in more austere environments for a longer duration than line companies. This takes a unique mentality that must be developed through realistic training over time. NCOs and officers should attend either the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) or Cavalry Leader’s Course to rapidly develop MFRC capability and competency. Additionally, the SBCT may provide MFRC leaders priority in schools that train sustained combat in austere conditions like the Cold Weather Leader Course (CWLC) and Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC). No matter where the MFRC is tasked to operate, the organization needs resident expertise to appropriately train and equip Soldiers.
The proposed MFRC must conduct a deliberate training progression from individual to company certification. Individual training consists of professional military education, emphasis on technical competencies with equipment exclusive to the MFRC, and reconnaissance skills. The first echelon of multi-functional certification by the MFRC commander is section situational training exercise (STX). MFRC section and platoon STX can nest with rifle company and infantry battalion echelon training to maximize concurrent training opportunities. Depending on mission requirements, the MFRC may attach scout platoons directly to a battalion. Concurrent training will ensure both the infantry battalion and the MFRC’s scout platoons are prepared for enabler integration. The brigade commander will certify the MFRC through a full mission profile company STX prior to utilization during the brigade culminating training event or CTC rotation.
As the MFRC develops its collective training model, current doctrine is insufficient in defining the company’s proficiency. In the interim, the MFRC should utilize the cavalry troop’s mission-essential task list (METL) as a baseline along with platoon battle tasks for scouts, EW, and the chemical reconnaissance platoon. As a brigade asset, the MFRC should work hand in hand with its headquarters to prioritize specific tasks nested within the commander’s intent.
The MFRC may struggle to find the frontage required to replicate the brigade’s deep area at local training areas. Traditional company STX or combined arms live fires are less likely to provide a realistic training scenario for the MFRC vice a traditional infantry rifle company. To train the MFRC as a collective while limiting additional costs, brigades should seek opportunities to deploy the MFRC as part of larger exercises. SBCT MFRCs are excellent candidates to serve as opposing force (OPFOR) support at the National Training Center (NTC). This presents a unique opportunity to strain communications, logistics, and provide the OPFOR commander a capable asset. This utilization will have to nest within the NTC scenario and requires prior coordination with NTC OPFOR.
Command Relationships
By moving battalion scout platoons to the MFRC, an organic MFRC fills the reconnaissance capability gap at the brigade level by creating a similar issue for the infantry battalions. Depending on the mission, the brigade commander may choose to attach scout platoons to the battalions or maintain the organic MFRC. The MFRC can prepare for both types of employment through two courses of action.
Course of Action 1: Organic MFRC throughout the training progression
Scout platoons align under the MFRC headquarters. All training besides MFRC certification is planned and executed by the company. In addition to the MFRC training progression, scout platoons must attach to infantry battalions for specific exercises to train enabler integration. Platoons may certify through an MFRC-specific exercise or as an attachment to an infantry battalion.
Course of Action 2: Organic MFRC only for collective training
Scout platoons and their attached EW Soldiers align under infantry battalions for individual through platoon-level training. In this scenario, the brigade must standardize individual and collective gates for the scout platoons. Infantry battalions are responsible for preparing scout platoons to meet these requirements. The MFRC commander works with the infantry battalions to certify scout sections and platoons. Finally, the MFRC must be afforded the opportunity to train and certify as an organic company.
1-2 SBCT’s lessons learned from KCTC reveal the limitations of a part-time MFRC. The standardization of training gates and MFRC certification at the scout section and platoon level will mitigate some of these disadvantages. However, an organic MFRC through the duration of the training progression maximizes the reconnaissance capability in the brigade.
Conclusion
1-2 SBCT’s employment of the MFRC at KCTC proved that a SBCT can task organize and equip the MFRC to be an extremely capable asset. The combination of aerial, electromagnetic, and terrestrial reconnaissance is essential to maximize the brigade’s reconnaissance capability. The integration of the personnel and equipment assigned to the MFRC requires a deliberate training progression and multi-functional certification. The removal of the cavalry squadron severely limited a brigade’s ability to see the battlefield. If the brigade does not maximize remaining reconnaissance assets through training synchronization, redundancy, and survivability, it risks entering the next conflict blind.
CPT Mark Parillo currently serves as commander of Apache Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). During Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC) rotation, he served as the commander of 1-2 SBCT’s Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company. CPT Parillo is a graduate of James Madison University.
This article appears in the Fall 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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