An electronic warfare (EW) team in a hide site deep in the woods notices a suspected enemy frequency. At the same time, an aerial EW platform using the same equipment finds the same signal. With both platforms locating the emitter, a computer automatically calculates the probable location of the enemy. A platoon leader, seeing this on his integrated EW display, tasks an unmanned aerial system (UAS) to confirm or deny the enemy presence. The UAS spots three enemy armored personnel carriers and an antenna farm. He immediately launches three loitering munitions, stacking them over the target area. As that happens, the platoon leader jams the hostile frequency, then strikes the target and rapidly displaces. The enemy command post is destroyed.
The previous paragraph reads like a fictional scene from a John Antal novel, but it actually happened this spring during a training exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). This vignette, far from fiction, illustrates the emerging capability of the multi-domain effects platoon (MDEP). The scenario underscores how integrating electronic warfare and unmanned systems at the brigade level can produce decisive results in real time. The MDEP is a new formation designed to bring multidomain effects to the brigade fight, enabling rapid detection and destruction of threats by converging capabilities across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), cyber, and physical domains. In an era where the Army’s doctrine emphasizes that “all operations are multidomain operations,” the MDEP provides a practical way for brigade commanders to harness effects traditionally only available at higher echelons. [1] It is a direct response to the Army’s ongoing effort to implement multidomain operations (MDO) at lower levels, mirroring some principles of the multi-domain task force (MDTF) concept on a smaller scale. Just as the theater-level MDTFs integrate long-range fires with cyber-electronic effects, the MDEP combines EW and UAS capabilities under one tactical leader to achieve “convergence” or “an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects.” [2] In short, the MDEP is a brigade-level solution to fight and win in a contested, multidomain environment.
The MDEP Concept and the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company (MFRC)
The MDEP was born from the recognition that brigades lack an organic means to sense and strike across domains in their close and deep fights. Organizationally, the MDEP is a platoon within the MFRC, working alongside hunter-killer platoons (HKPs). Unlike a traditional cavalry troop or military intelligence company, the MFRC is a separate company under the brigade headquarters, reporting directly to the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) commander. This command relationship empowers the brigade to employ the MDEP’s effects without layers of coordination, placing multidomain tools at the brigade commander’s immediate disposal. The two HKPs provide traditional reconnaissance and small UAS, while the MDEP adds technical sensors and long-range precision effects. Together, these platoons form a layered and multi-functional reconnaissance asset for the brigade commander: The HKPs find and fix the enemy, and the MDEP can find, fix, or finish targets though kinetic or non-kinetic fires. In effect, the MDEP within the MFRC gives the brigade a mini-MDTF: It integrates non-kinetic and kinetic effects under one commander at the tactical level, albeit on a far smaller scale than an MDTF. It is important to note, however, that while the MDEP mirrors the MDTF’s principles of convergence and integration, it does not replicate the theater-level range or strategic impact of an MDTF. Instead, it provides a scaled-down, brigade-focused capability that aligns with MDO principles without equating the two formations directly.
Organization and Capabilities of the MDEP
The MDEP is unique in its combination of personnel and equipment from what were previously disparate and siloed career management fields. It includes both EW specialists and UAS operators and maintainers working side by side, forging a new kind of platoon that can sense, kill, and protect on behalf of the brigade commander. While the platoon leadership can be military occupational specialty agnostic, having someone with either maneuver leadership experience or brigade staff experience would be ideal. This leadership blend helps bridge the doctrinal gap between technical EW and UAS operations, maneuver, and synchronization with staff.
Dismounted Electronic Warfare Teams: A portion of the MDEP consists of dismounted EW Soldiers equipped with the Terrestrial Layer System Manpack (TLS Manpack). These are backpack-based electronic support and attack systems that allow Soldiers on foot to detect and jam enemy signals. Carrying the TLS Manpack, MDEP Soldiers can scan for enemy electronic emissions and quickly relay signals of interest. Once an emitter is identified, these Soldiers can conduct electronic support (ES) by precisely locating and identifying the signal source, providing target data to the platoon leader and higher headquarters. If authorized, they can then execute electronic attack (EA) using the manpack’s jamming capability, disrupting the enemy’s communications or sensors.
Mounted EW Platforms: The MDEP also fields mounted EW teams operating the Tactical Electronic Warfare System – Infantry (TEWS-I), a vehicle-mounted EW suite for mobile brigades. The TEWS-I is integrated onto the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), giving the platoon a mobile electronic sensing and attack platform. These mounted teams complement the dismounted teams by covering more ground quickly and carrying more powerful systems. Networked together, multiple TEWS-I platforms and manpacks can triangulate emitters in real time, dramatically shortening the sensor-to-shooter loop.
Aerial Electronic Warfare and Sensors: To extend its reach, the MDEP employs aerial assets carrying EW payloads. In some configurations, the platoon can mount EW systems that are typically Soldier-borne onto a UAS, creating an airborne EW platform. In addition to official programs of record, MDEP Soldiers have experimented with homegrown solutions, such as attaching commercially available electronic sniffers to quadcopter drones to improvise an airborne collection tool. By elevating sensors, the platoon greatly increases line of sight in the EMS, detecting low power or distant signals that ground teams might miss. Aerial EW assets can also rapidly reposition around the battlespace, enabling the platoon to hunt for enemy emitters across a wide area or to provide overwatch EW support to a maneuver company on short notice. This airborne component of the MDEP brings a unique convergence of air and cyber/EW domains at the platoon level.
Long-Range Reconnaissance and Loitering Munitions: The platoon operates the Anduril Ghost-X and loitering munitions to deliver lethal effects. Once targets are confirmed, the MDEP can launch loitering munitions to strike. The ability to find, fix, and finish an enemy command post with organic sensors and shooters, without calling for assets held above brigade, allows the brigade commander to still provide kinetic fires within the context of Army Structure.
Integrating EW and UAS: Overcoming Historical Misuse
The creation of the MDEP also addresses a history of misuse and underemployment of EW and UAS assets in brigade operations. For years, EW teams and tactical UAS existed in parallel, often siloed in separate units with narrowly defined roles. If equipped, EW personnel at the BCT level were typically used for static signals collection, not as a maneuver support asset. Similarly, brigade UAS were managed by military intelligence companies and primarily tasked, if tasked at all, with surveillance of named areas of interest. This resulted in neither capability being fully integrated into the brigade’s scheme of maneuver or fires. Commanders tended to view EW as a strategic or theater-level tool, and UAS as an adjunct to the intel staff, not as direct contributors to the close fight. This stove-piped approach led to missed opportunities and, often, skepticism from maneuver leaders as to the effectiveness of either. In training exercises, it was not uncommon for maneuver battalions to ignore available jamming capabilities, or for UAS feeds to go unused by those who needed them most, due to communication gaps and classification issues. Additionally, doctrine for many years lacked clarity on how electronic attacks could be offensively employed at the tactical level. This created a cautious mentality where jammers were seldom used for fear of breaking rules or causing collateral interference.
The MDEP looks to actively change this paradigm, but not without overcoming institutional inertia. A vivid example of breaking the mold occurred during a recent exercise at JMRC called Spectrum Blitz 25. In that event, the brigade’s maneuver force was tasked with breaching a well-defended obstacle belt over a 1.5-hour period, under constant enemy observation and fire. Many EW leaders strongly disagreed with this approach. Normally, jamming is done sporadically and for short periods of time for the protection of the jamming unit. In the context of supporting a combined arms breach, this is fundamentally misguided and shows the large gap that exists in understanding how EW should support maneuver. The MDEP leadership saw an opportunity to support maneuver with non-kinetic fires. For the entire breach window, they deployed an EW team to continuously jam a detected signal of interest. This level of prolonged, aggressive jamming was unconventional, but it exemplified the kind of EW support required as the Army adapts to MDO and large-scale combat operations. However, sustaining such extended jamming is only feasible when synchronized with the other warfighting functions. Prolonged jamming is easily detected by enemy sensors, yet refraining from it solely out of fear of detection would be as shortsighted as suggesting engineers refrain from breaching a mined wire obstacle because they might be observed or insisting that artillery never fire because enemy counter-battery radars will track it. Instead, this risk underscores the importance of fully integrating EW into the brigade’s scheme of maneuver and across the other warfighting functions, ensuring these capabilities are employed to maximum effect while also improving the EW element’s survivability.
Critically, this “non-standard” use of EW was doctrinally justified as both a maneuver support and a fires function. Army doctrine has evolved to recognize electronic attacks as a form of fires: “Electronic attack… is considered a form of fires.” [3] By jamming enemy communications, the MDEP effectively delivers suppressive fires in the EMS. Analogous to an artillery smoke screen or a suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission, it neutralized the enemy’s ability to interfere with the breaching force. This action is in line with doctrine that places offensive cyber and EW effects within the fires warfighting function to “deny, degrade, disrupt, and destroy” enemy capabilities as part of the combined arms fight. Moreover, Field Manual 3-12 states, “EW professionals deliver effects in the EMS against adversary networks, systems, and weapons. These actions reduce adversary combat power, protect friendly forces, and enhance friendly forces and weapons’ lethality.” [4] In this breach vignette, the MDEP’s jammer was employed exactly in that spirit, demonstrating that the mindset of holding back EW and having it focus on passive collection is not conducive to supporting the maneuver units and MDO. Brigades must use these capabilities dynamically and even offensively in accordance with doctrine and the tactical situation.
Toward Multidomain Integration at Lower Echelons
The MDEP is more than just an experimental platoon — it is a pioneering model for integrating MDO concepts into brigade-level formations. In an Army that envisions convergence and cross-domain synergy as keys to victory, the MDEP offers a concrete, field-tested way to bring those abstract concepts down to the ground level where platoons and companies fight. It serves as a bridge between the strategic/theater capabilities of organizations like the MDTF and the immediate needs of brigade commanders on tomorrow’s battlefields. By mirroring MDTF principles (integrating cyber, EW, information, and precision fires) within a brigade unit, the MDEP fills a critical gap in the force structure. It does so appropriately scaled (the brigade is not launching hypersonic missiles or engaging in offensive cyber operations), but it is leveraging the EMS and robotic systems to enhance its lethality and survivability. This platoon has shown that a brigade can sense and strike across multiple domains in near-real time, creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy and protecting friendly forces.
The need for such formations is underscored by current threat trends. Near-peer adversaries have invested heavily in EW, drones, and anti-access/area denial systems; they will contest U.S. forces in every domain down to the tactical level. Our brigades can no longer afford to regard EW or UAS as niche enablers controlled from afar. The maneuver leader of 2025 must understand and employ these tools as readily as they do organic kinetic fires. The MDEP provides the expertise and command-and-control structure to make that possible. It embeds specialists who can advise and execute, ensuring that multidomain effects are not only planned but also immediately responsive to the fluid tactical fight. This aligns with the Army’s doctrine of mission command and initiative: give lower echelons the means to solve problems in real time, in line with the commander’s intent but without needing step-by-step direction.
The MDEP has demonstrated that the multidomain battle can be fought and won not just by specialized theater armies or corps but by a brigade’s Soldiers. It harnesses the power of electrons and drones alongside rifles, machines guns, and cannons — bringing the fight to the enemy in novel ways. The enduring lesson is that achieving dominance on the modern battlefield requires integration at the lowest practical level. “Multi-domain operations are the rapid and continuous integration of all forms of warfare;” the MDEP answers that call at the brigade level. [5] It is a proven, scalable model for the kind of agile, lethal, and hyper-enabled formations the mobile brigade needs in order to prevail in the next conflict. By embracing and further developing the MDEP, the Army can accelerate the integration of multidomain effects into the tactical fight, ensuring that our brigades remain one step ahead of adversaries in every domain of battle. The multi-domain effects platoon is not science fiction or conjecture — it is here now.
Notes
1 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, March 2025.
2 Ibid.
3 Army Doctrine Publication, 3-19, Fires, July 2019.
4 FM 3-12, Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare, August 2021.
5 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 6 December 2018, https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf.
1LT Parker Mitchell currently serves as the innovation officer for 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He previously served as a multi-domain effects platoon leader, robotics and autonomous systems platoon leader, and rifle platoon leader in 2/101 MBCT.
This article appears in the Fall 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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