
(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Samarion Hicks) VIEW ORIGINAL
U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, based out of Fort Benning, Ga., take part in a human machine integration demonstration using the Ghost Robotic Dog, and the U.S. Army Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET) of new U.S. Army capabilities at Project Convergence - Capstone 4 in Fort Irwin, Calif., March 15, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Samarion Hicks)
Introduction
History suggests that the winner of the next fight will be the country who determines the most effective employment of a technological advance – such as robots and autonomous systems -vice the inventor or an early adopter.(1)Winning this race requires a clear tactical or operational problem to solve, a rapid iteration cycle, and a willingness to drive the technological leaps between the developers and Army formations. Today’s challenge is not unlike one that the Army has faced before. Between 1923 and 1943, the U.S. Army developed 51 light and 38 medium Tank variants in partnership with U.S. industry to drive the capability leaps needed to go from a Renault light tank at the end of World War I to the M4 Sherman workhorse of World War II.(2) The Army’s current efforts to field and integrate robotics, particularly through platform testing, software development, and synthetic training environments, resemble the challenges and arguments encountered during the mechanization of ground forces in the 1920s and 1930s. This article examines historical parallels with a focus on force structure, employment concepts, and the broader implications of innovation under conditions of doctrinal uncertainty – the key point being that innovation doesn’t just happen, it must be driven.
The Interwar Period and the Challenge of Mechanization
The initial introduction of tanks during World War I occurred under experimental conditions. Early models like the British Mark I and the French Schneider CA1, struggled with mechanical reliability and lacked coordination with infantry forces. Despite these issues, these platforms highlighted the need for armored mobility to break away from the grueling stalemate of trench warfare. By the end of the war, American tank forces had formed under Col. Samuel Rockenbach, participating in limited but significant combat at St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne with borrowed French Renault FT tanks.(3)

Figure 1. Mechanized and mounted cavalry units participated in maneuver training. This image captures one of the few tanks deployed in support of interwar training activities. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Samarion Hicks)
The interwar period saw global divergence in how tanks were integrated into doctrine, force structure, and design. In the United States, despite postwar enthusiasm for the role armor might play on the battlefield, the National Defense Acts of 1920 and 1921 imposed significant budgetary and personnel constraints. U.S. tank development focused primarily on light tanks, notably influenced by the Renault FT’s layout. However, no consensus emerged on whether tanks were infantry support assets, independent maneuver tools, or something else entirely.(4) Interestingly, critiques of these first mechanized tanks described them as “noisy and overheated easily, its speed was 5.5 miles an hour” and weighed roughly 7.25 tons which parallel many of the entry level ground robots from 2020 until now.(5)

Figure 2. 10th Sustainment Brigade Soldiers learn to operate the PackBot during training at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (U.S. Army photo by SSG Cory Thatcher)
Meanwhile, Germany, though constrained by the Treaty of Versailles, began developing an armored doctrine covertly in collaboration with the Soviet Union. German Gen. Heinz Guderian emphasized the integration of communications, maneuver, and command into mechanized formations to enable rapid maneuver and overcome the superiority of the defense in World War I. Germany pioneered the use of 3-person turrets and radios, facilitating rapid tactical decision-making—a doctrinal edge revealed dramatically in Poland and France in 1939–40.(6)
Britain and the Soviet Union took more divergent paths. U.K designs including variants such as the Vickers Mediums and the multi-role cruiser/infantry tank, as the British Army struggled to produce a coherent armored doctrine. Soviet interwar development produced heavy multi-turreted tanks like the T-35 and an ambitious theory of Deep Battle, but political purges undermined its application in practice.(7)
This lack of doctrinal consensus—combined with diverse technological experiments—resulted in a spectrum of tank designs, employment concepts, and organizational structures by the outbreak of World War II. The Germans, who optimized their tank development to solve the maneuver problem, began the war with an overwhelming advantage.
Robotization: A Modern Analogue
Robotics within the U.S. military emerged gradually, often isolated in specialized domains. As early as 1946, discussions referenced remote-controlled vehicles, and by the 1960s, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-led projects began exploring basic robotic autonomy. The development of “Shakey” in the 1970s represented a milestone: it was the Army’s first robot capable of limited planning and decision-making using on-board sensors and logic.(8)
The 1980s saw more robust programs such as the autonomous land vehicle (ALV), a wheeled robot equipped with sensors and cameras for autonomous off-road navigation. Despite the technical promises, these platforms were constrained by computational limitations of the time period. Obstacle avoidance, real-time processing, and battlefield survivability proved elusive.(9)
Unlike interwar tanks, which were prominent symbols of national power and military theory, robotic systems remained within the science and technology (S&T) realm, distant from the operational concerns of force planners and lacking a clear tactical problem to solve. The limited adoption of unmanned systems during the Gulf War and the early 2000s reflected this detachment—platforms existed, but without an accompanying doctrine or training framework for their integration into maneuver forces.
Institutional Experimentation and Robotics
During the Global War on Terror of the early 21st century, the Army began to integrate robotic platforms more deliberately. Remote-controlled explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots like PackBot and TALON became standard equipment. These systems, though unarmed and teleoperated, demonstrated the potential for robotics to save lives by reducing Soldier exposure to high-risk tasks.(10)
The 2010s brought greater investment in autonomy. Programs like the small multipurpose equipment transport (SMET) robot were developed to support small unit logistics and reduce the loads carried by dismounted squads. The Army also explored utilizing mounted robotic platforms for reconnaissance, including M113-based surrogates equipped with sensors and communications payloads.
The robotic combat vehicle (RCV) concept grew out of these efforts. Soldier operational experiments at Fort Carson and Fort Hood used modified platforms in live scenarios to evaluate ground robots utility in reconnaissance, security, and fires integration in an attempt to limit Soldier risk at the point of contact with the enemy. In parallel, Project Convergence—a joint modernization initiative designed to aggressively advance and integrate the Army’s contributions to the Joint Force—evaluated human-machine teaming using live and virtual test environments.(11) Project Convergence (PC) originated from a need to rapidly integrate AI and sensors/shooters – to solve the practical problem of faster, more effective target engagement. The initial phases focused on establishing and demonstrating the feasibility of linking these systems. As the project evolved, expanding to include international partners, it consistently emphasized refining interoperability and gathering data – mirroring the iterative development process that was essential to the technological advancements of interwar mechanization.
These layers of experimentation—live testing, synthetic environments, and software-in-the-loop simulations—represent a shift from S&T isolation to institutional engagement. However, as in the interwar period, experimentation is occurring in the absence of universal consensus regarding employment or a clear problem to solve, organization design, or a concept for training pipelines.
Comparative Roles and Institutional Integration
One of the clearest historical parallels between interwar tank development and the emergence of robotic and autonomous systems lies in the ambiguity surrounding battlefield roles and organizational placement. In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. military struggled to define where tanks belonged within the force structure. The National Defense Act of 1920 formally placed tanks under the control of the infantry, reinforcing the concept of armor as a support asset rather than a holistic maneuver element.(12)
Tank design reflected this doctrinal uncertainty. The M1 and M2 light tanks prioritized speed over protection or firepower, optimized for reconnaissance and exploitation but not direct confrontation with enemy armor or anti-tank weapons. U.S. light tanks such as the M3 Stuart performed in roles consistent with this doctrine—especially in the Pacific and early North African campaigns—but were outmatched when tasked with confronting German Panzer III and IV tanks, and Pak 40 anti-tank guns in direct combat. This mismatch revealed the consequences of designing platforms without a settled operational concept and resulted in less effective technological leaps than the German Army, which optimized around a clear problem.
Similar doctrinal and employment debates extended beyond the U.S. Army. In Britain, conflicting concepts of “infantry tanks” and “cruiser tanks” led to fragmented development. The Soviet Union pursued bold theoretical frameworks like Deep Battle but struggled to implement them consistently. Germany’s eventual adoption of integrated armored formations—anchored by clear doctrinal principles and a flexible command structure—emerged as the exception rather than the norm.(13)
Modern robotic and autonomous systems face a comparable institutional challenge. While technological experimentation is advancing rapidly— through efforts like Project Convergence, Human-Machine Integrated Formations, and integration into synthetic training environments—the placement of robots within the Army’s operational force structure remains unsettled. Constructive debate continues over optimal payloads, tactical problem focus, and at what echelon robots will integrate with dismounted and mounted maneuver units, and what level of tactical autonomy is acceptable in contested environments.(14)
Like the interwar tank, U.S. robot employment to date has focused on enabling manned formations supporting reconnaissance, logistics, breaching, or limited security roles. Although future concepts for the Army require it, current employment has yet to reach the point of reshaping operational doctrine or prompting reorganization of the combined arms team. This is not necessarily a failing; rather, it reflects the same iterative, uncertain process that characterized interwar mechanization. Overcoming these obstacles and achieving the technological leaps to achieve robots with which the Army can win requires coalescing efforts around critical tactical problems, designing a path that enables rapid robotic advancement between industry and the government, and continued experimentation and evaluation under realistic conditions.
International Context: Divergence and Convergence
Just as the interwar years witnessed divergent tank doctrines across the globe, modern robotic development reflects a range of national approaches. Ukraine has employed unmanned ground systems for surveillance and explosive delivery over short ranges on a fixed front, often in improvisational ways driven by battlefield necessity. Israel has developed semi-autonomous border patrol systems, as well as unmanned variants of armored fighting vehicles for urban combat in Gaza.(15)

Figure 3. The Maneuver Innovation Lab hosts an open house at Fort Benning, GA. (U.S. Army photo by Daniel Marble)
Russia’s Uran-9 and China’s Norinco Sharp Claw systems illustrate varying degrees of autonomy and doctrinal clarity. Many of these platforms remain in developmental stages or are deployed for narrow mission sets to solve current tactical problems. Overall, global militaries are experimenting without universal agreement on design, force structure, or employment, just as they had in the 1930s.(16) The United States has opted for an incremental and layered approach—pairing prototype platforms with iterative field experiments and cross-branch collaboration, a strategy reminiscent of the extensive experimentation with armored vehicle designs between 1923 and 1943. It took 20 years to evolve from the limited capabilities of the post-WWI Renault FT to the M4 Sherman. This deliberate pace now seen in the realm of robotics and human-machine integrated formation (HMIF), while potentially slower than outright adoption, is informed by the lessons of history: the premature fielding of unproven systems as seen with early tank designs that were ill-suited for direct combat, risks ineffective capabilities when rigorously testing. Today’s process, demonstrated though initiatives like Project Convergence, follows the essential drive of the mechanization era.
Conclusion
The interwar period offers more than just a historical comparison for the U.S. Army’s engagement with robotic systems. It provides a structural analogue—one in which technological possibility outpaces institutional understanding. The parallels between inter-war mechanization and the current drive toward transformative robotization are striking. Just as in the 1920s and 30s, the U.S. Army finds itself navigating a landscape where technological possibility outpaces institutional understanding. The development of tanks then, and robotic systems now, demonstrates that innovation alone is insufficient for victory. To truly win this race and determine the most effective employment of robots will require a clear tactical or operational problem to solve, a rapid iteration cycle fueled by continuous experimentation and data analysis, and a deliberate willingness to drive the technological leaps between developers and Army formations. The Army’s current layered approach, mirroring the extensive experimentation with tank variants in the interwar years, reflects a recognition that progress isn’t about simply building robots, but about systematically refining them through rigorous testing and integration. Like the interwar period, we are not waiting for the “perfect” system to emerge but actively shaping robotic development to solve defined tactical problems and ensure they contribute to a cohesive, and ultimately, winning force. This commitment to rapid iteration, embracing failure as a learning opportunity, and bridging the gap between technology and operational needs is the key to unlocking the full potential of robotic and autonomous systems and securing a decisive advantage on the future battlefield.
Kathleen (Kasey) O’Donnell is currently serving as the Historian for the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team (NGCV CFT) at DTA. A Professional Archivist and Historian specializing in Holocaust Studies, Kasey O’Donnell’s experience includes work with institutions such as the Walter P. Reuther Library, Zekelman Holocaust Center, and Ford Motor Company, as well as volunteer service with the Hamtramck Historical Society. Kasey O’Donnell holds a BA in History and both an MA in Public History and an MLIS with certifications in Archival Administration and Non-profit Management from Wayne State University. Kasey O’Donnell is responsible for tracking and establishing narratives for NGCV CFT signature efforts, conducting oral histories, performing research, and maintaining a comprehensive archival repository.
NOTES
1 For the purposes of this article, the word “robots” can refer to any autonomous or semi-autonomous system designed to support a Human-Machine Integrated Formation.
2 Icks, Robert J. 1945. Tanks and Armored Vehicles. New York, NY: Phillip Andrews Publishing Co., 48-49
3 David P. Harding, “Heinz Guderian as the Agent of Change: His Significant Impact on the Development of German Armored Forces Between the World Wars,” Army History, no. 31 (1994): 26–34.
4 John J. Reidy et al., Report on RCV Development Mission Analysis (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor Center, 1988).
5 Icks, 45. 6 M.C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton University Press, 2010), 102–108. 7 Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984).
8 DARPA, “Strategic Computing: DARPA’s Efforts to Advance Machine Intelligence,” DARPA Technical Summary, 1983–1993.
9 GAO, Directed Energy Weapons: DOD Should Focus on Transition Planning, GAO-23-105868 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, March 2023).
10 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), “The Evolution of Robotics in the Post-9/11 Army,” TRADOC Analysis Center briefing, 2016.
11 U.S. Army Futures Command, Project Convergence: Campaign of Learning Report, 2021.
12 National Defense Act of 1920, Public Law 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (1920).
13 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
14 Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part I: Range, Persistence, and Daring (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014).
15 Dennis E. Showalter and Harold C. Deutsch, If the Allies Had Fallen: Sixty Alternate Scenarios of World War II (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), 215– 217.
16 Michael Raska, “Military Innovation and the Rise of Autonomous Weapons,” in AI, Robotics, and the Future of Warfare, ed. Michael Raska and Richard A. Bitzinger (Singapore: RSIS, 2015).
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