Interwar Mechanization to Transformative Robotization

U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, based out of Fort Benning, Ga., take part in a human machine integration demonstration using the Ghost Robotic Dog, and the U.S. Army Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET) of new U.S. Army capabilities at Project Convergence - Capstone 4 in Fort Irwin, Calif., March 15, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Samarion Hicks)

Introduction

History suggests that the winner of the next fight will be the country who de­termines the most effective employ­ment of a technological advance – such as robots and autonomous systems -­vice the inventor or an early adopter.(1)Winning this race requires a clear tac­tical or operational problem to solve, a rapid iteration cycle, and a willing­ness to drive the technological leaps between the developers and Army for­mations. Today’s challenge is not un­like one that the Army has faced be­fore. Between 1923 and 1943, the U.S. Army developed 51 light and 38 medi­um Tank variants in partnership with U.S. industry to drive the capability leaps needed to go from a Renault light tank at the end of World War I to the M4 Sherman workhorse of World War II.(2) The Army’s current efforts to field and integrate robotics, particularly through platform testing, software de­velopment, and synthetic training en­vironments, resemble the challenges and arguments encountered during the mechanization of ground forces in the 1920s and 1930s. This article examines historical parallels with a focus on force structure, employment concepts, and the broader implications of inno­vation under conditions of doctrinal uncertainty – the key point being that innovation doesn’t just happen, it must be driven.

The Interwar Period and the Challenge of Mechanization

The initial introduction of tanks during World War I occurred under experi­mental conditions. Early models like the British Mark I and the French Schneider CA1, struggled with me­chanical reliability and lacked coordi­nation with infantry forces. Despite these issues, these platforms highlight­ed the need for armored mobility to break away from the grueling stale­mate of trench warfare. By the end of the war, American tank forces had formed under Col. Samuel Rockenbach, participating in limited but significant combat at St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne with borrowed French Renault FT tanks.(3)

Figure 1. Mechanized and mounted cavalry units participated in maneuver training. This image captures one of the few tanks deployed in support of interwar training activities. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Samarion Hicks)

The interwar period saw global diver­gence in how tanks were integrated into doctrine, force structure, and de­sign. In the United States, despite post­war enthusiasm for the role armor might play on the battlefield, the Na­tional Defense Acts of 1920 and 1921 imposed significant budgetary and per­sonnel constraints. U.S. tank develop­ment focused primarily on light tanks, notably influenced by the Renault FT’s layout. However, no consensus emerged on whether tanks were infan­try support assets, independent ma­neuver tools, or something else entire­ly.(4) Interestingly, critiques of these first mechanized tanks described them as “noisy and overheated easily, its speed was 5.5 miles an hour” and weighed roughly 7.25 tons which parallel many of the entry level ground robots from 2020 until now.(5)

Figure 2. 10th Sustainment Brigade Soldiers learn to operate the PackBot during training at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (U.S. Army photo by SSG Cory Thatcher)

Meanwhile, Germany, though con­strained by the Treaty of Versailles, be­gan developing an armored doctrine covertly in collaboration with the So­viet Union. German Gen. Heinz Gude­rian emphasized the integration of communications, maneuver, and com­mand into mechanized formations to enable rapid maneuver and overcome the superiority of the defense in World War I. Germany pioneered the use of 3-person turrets and radios, facilitating rapid tactical decision-making—a doc­trinal edge revealed dramatically in Po­land and France in 1939–40.(6)

Britain and the Soviet Union took more divergent paths. U.K designs including variants such as the Vickers Mediums and the multi-role cruiser/infantry tank, as the British Army struggled to produce a coherent armored doctrine. Soviet interwar development produced heavy multi-turreted tanks like the T-35 and an ambitious theory of Deep Battle, but political purges undermined its application in practice.(7)

This lack of doctrinal consensus—com­bined with diverse technological experiments—resulted in a spectrum of tank designs, employment concepts, and organizational structures by the outbreak of World War II. The Ger­mans, who optimized their tank devel­opment to solve the maneuver prob­lem, began the war with an over­whelming advantage.

Robotization: A Modern Analogue

Robotics within the U.S. military emerged gradually, often isolated in specialized domains. As early as 1946, discussions referenced remote-con­trolled vehicles, and by the 1960s, De­fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-led projects began ex­ploring basic robotic autonomy. The development of “Shakey” in the 1970s represented a milestone: it was the Ar­my’s first robot capable of limited plan­ning and decision-making using on-board sensors and logic.(8)

The 1980s saw more robust programs such as the autonomous land vehicle (ALV), a wheeled robot equipped with sensors and cameras for autonomous off-road navigation. Despite the tech­nical promises, these platforms were constrained by computational limita­tions of the time period. Obstacle avoidance, real-time processing, and battlefield survivability proved elu­sive.(9)

Unlike interwar tanks, which were prominent symbols of national power and military theory, robotic systems re­mained within the science and tech­nology (S&T) realm, distant from the operational concerns of force planners and lacking a clear tactical problem to solve. The limited adoption of un­manned systems during the Gulf War and the early 2000s reflected this de­tachment—platforms existed, but without an accompanying doctrine or training framework for their integra­tion into maneuver forces.

Institutional Experimentation and Robotics

During the Global War on Terror of the early 21st century, the Army began to integrate robotic platforms more delib­erately. Remote-controlled explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots like PackBot and TALON became standard equipment. These systems, though un­armed and teleoperated, demonstrat­ed the potential for robotics to save lives by reducing Soldier exposure to high-risk tasks.(10)

The 2010s brought greater investment in autonomy. Programs like the small multipurpose equipment transport (SMET) robot were developed to sup­port small unit logistics and reduce the loads carried by dismounted squads. The Army also explored utilizing mounted robotic platforms for recon­naissance, including M113-based sur­rogates equipped with sensors and communications payloads.

The robotic combat vehicle (RCV) con­cept grew out of these efforts. Soldier operational experiments at Fort Carson and Fort Hood used modified plat­forms in live scenarios to evaluate ground robots utility in reconnais­sance, security, and fires integration in an attempt to limit Soldier risk at the point of contact with the enemy. In parallel, Project Convergence—a joint modernization initiative designed to aggressively advance and integrate the Army’s contributions to the Joint Force—evaluated human-machine teaming using live and virtual test environments.(11) Project Convergence (PC) originated from a need to rapidly integrate AI and sensors/shooters – to solve the practical problem of faster, more effective target engagement. The initial phases focused on establishing and demonstrating the feasibility of linking these systems. As the project evolved, expanding to include interna­tional partners, it consistently empha­sized refining interoperability and gathering data – mirroring the iterative development process that was essen­tial to the technological advancements of interwar mechanization.

These layers of experimentation—live testing, synthetic environments, and software-in-the-loop simulations—rep­resent a shift from S&T isolation to in­stitutional engagement. However, as in the interwar period, experimentation is occurring in the absence of universal consensus regarding employment or a clear problem to solve, organization design, or a concept for training pipe­lines.

Comparative Roles and Institutional Integration

One of the clearest historical parallels between interwar tank development and the emergence of robotic and au­tonomous systems lies in the ambigu­ity surrounding battlefield roles and organizational placement. In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. military struggled to define where tanks belonged within the force structure. The National De­fense Act of 1920 formally placed tanks under the control of the infantry, rein­forcing the concept of armor as a sup­port asset rather than a holistic ma­neuver element.(12)

Tank design reflected this doctrinal un­certainty. The M1 and M2 light tanks prioritized speed over protection or firepower, optimized for reconnais­sance and exploitation but not direct confrontation with enemy armor or an­ti-tank weapons. U.S. light tanks such as the M3 Stuart performed in roles consistent with this doctrine—espe­cially in the Pacific and early North Af­rican campaigns—but were outmatched when tasked with con­fronting German Panzer III and IV tanks, and Pak 40 anti-tank guns in di­rect combat. This mismatch revealed the consequences of designing plat­forms without a settled operational concept and resulted in less effective technological leaps than the German Army, which optimized around a clear problem.

Similar doctrinal and employment de­bates extended beyond the U.S. Army. In Britain, conflicting concepts of “in­fantry tanks” and “cruiser tanks” led to fragmented development. The Soviet Union pursued bold theoretical frame­works like Deep Battle but struggled to implement them consistently. Germa­ny’s eventual adoption of integrated armored formations—anchored by clear doctrinal principles and a flexible command structure—emerged as the exception rather than the norm.(13)

Modern robotic and autonomous sys­tems face a comparable institutional challenge. While technological experi­mentation is advancing rapidly— through efforts like Project Conver­gence, Human-Machine Integrated Formations, and integration into syn­thetic training environments—the placement of robots within the Army’s operational force structure remains unsettled. Constructive debate contin­ues over optimal payloads, tactical problem focus, and at what echelon robots will integrate with dismounted and mounted maneuver units, and what level of tactical autonomy is ac­ceptable in contested environments.(14)

Like the interwar tank, U.S. robot em­ployment to date has focused on en­abling manned formations supporting reconnaissance, logistics, breaching, or limited security roles. Although future concepts for the Army require it, cur­rent employment has yet to reach the point of reshaping operational doc­trine or prompting reorganization of the combined arms team. This is not necessarily a failing; rather, it reflects the same iterative, uncertain process that characterized interwar mechani­zation. Overcoming these obstacles and achieving the technological leaps to achieve robots with which the Army can win requires coalescing efforts around critical tactical problems, de­signing a path that enables rapid ro­botic advancement between industry and the government, and continued experimentation and evaluation under realistic conditions.

International Context: Divergence and Convergence

Just as the interwar years witnessed di­vergent tank doctrines across the globe, modern robotic development reflects a range of national approach­es. Ukraine has employed unmanned ground systems for surveillance and explosive delivery over short ranges on a fixed front, often in improvisational ways driven by battlefield necessity. Is­rael has developed semi-autonomous border patrol systems, as well as un­manned variants of armored fighting vehicles for urban combat in Gaza.(15)

Figure 3. The Maneuver Innovation Lab hosts an open house at Fort Benning, GA. (U.S. Army photo by Daniel Marble)

Russia’s Uran-9 and China’s Norinco Sharp Claw systems illustrate varying degrees of autonomy and doctrinal clarity. Many of these platforms re­main in developmental stages or are deployed for narrow mission sets to solve current tactical problems. Over­all, global militaries are experimenting without universal agreement on de­sign, force structure, or employment, just as they had in the 1930s.(16) The United States has opted for an in­cremental and layered approach—pair­ing prototype platforms with iterative field experiments and cross-branch collaboration, a strategy reminiscent of the extensive experimentation with ar­mored vehicle designs between 1923 and 1943. It took 20 years to evolve from the limited capabilities of the post-WWI Renault FT to the M4 Sher­man. This deliberate pace now seen in the realm of robotics and human-ma­chine integrated formation (HMIF), while potentially slower than outright adoption, is informed by the lessons of history: the premature fielding of un­proven systems as seen with early tank designs that were ill-suited for direct combat, risks ineffective capabilities when rigorously testing. Today’s pro­cess, demonstrated though initiatives like Project Convergence, follows the essential drive of the mechanization era.

Conclusion

The interwar period offers more than just a historical comparison for the U.S. Army’s engagement with robotic sys­tems. It provides a structural ana­logue—one in which technological pos­sibility outpaces institutional under­standing. The parallels between inter-war mechanization and the current drive toward transformative robotiza­tion are striking. Just as in the 1920s and 30s, the U.S. Army finds itself nav­igating a landscape where technologi­cal possibility outpaces institutional understanding. The development of tanks then, and robotic systems now, demonstrates that innovation alone is insufficient for victory. To truly win this race and determine the most effective employment of robots will require a clear tactical or operational problem to solve, a rapid iteration cycle fueled by continuous experimentation and data analysis, and a deliberate willingness to drive the technological leaps be­tween developers and Army forma­tions. The Army’s current layered ap­proach, mirroring the extensive exper­imentation with tank variants in the in­terwar years, reflects a recognition that progress isn’t about simply build­ing robots, but about systematically re­fining them through rigorous testing and integration. Like the interwar pe­riod, we are not waiting for the “per­fect” system to emerge but actively shaping robotic development to solve defined tactical problems and ensure they contribute to a cohesive, and ul­timately, winning force. This commit­ment to rapid iteration, embracing fail­ure as a learning opportunity, and bridging the gap between technology and operational needs is the key to un­locking the full potential of robotic and autonomous systems and securing a decisive advantage on the future bat­tlefield.

Kathleen (Kasey) O’Donnell is currently serving as the Historian for the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team (NGCV CFT) at DTA. A Professional Archivist and Historian specializing in Holocaust Studies, Kas­ey O’Donnell’s experience includes work with institutions such as the Wal­ter P. Reuther Library, Zekelman Holo­caust Center, and Ford Motor Compa­ny, as well as volunteer service with the Hamtramck Historical Society. Kasey O’Donnell holds a BA in History and both an MA in Public History and an MLIS with certifications in Archival Ad­ministration and Non-profit Manage­ment from Wayne State University. Kasey O’Donnell is responsible for tracking and establishing narratives for NGCV CFT signature efforts, conduct­ing oral histories, performing research, and maintaining a comprehensive ar­chival repository.

NOTES

1 For the purposes of this article, the word “robots” can refer to any autono­mous or semi-autonomous system de­signed to support a Human-Machine Inte­grated Formation.

2 Icks, Robert J. 1945. Tanks and Armored Vehicles. New York, NY: Phillip Andrews Publishing Co., 48-49

3 David P. Harding, “Heinz Guderian as the Agent of Change: His Significant Im­pact on the Development of German Ar­mored Forces Between the World Wars,” Army History, no. 31 (1994): 26–34.

4 John J. Reidy et al., Report on RCV De­velopment Mission Analysis (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor Center, 1988).

5 Icks, 45. 6 M.C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for In­ternational Politics (Princeton University Press, 2010), 102–108. 7 Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet Tanks and Com­bat Vehicles of World War Two (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984).

8 DARPA, “Strategic Computing: DARPA’s Efforts to Advance Machine Intelligence,” DARPA Technical Summary, 1983–1993.

9 GAO, Directed Energy Weapons: DOD Should Focus on Transition Planning, GAO-23-105868 (Washington, DC: Gov­ernment Accountability Office, March 2023).

10 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com­mand (TRADOC), “The Evolution of Robot­ics in the Post-9/11 Army,” TRADOC Anal­ysis Center briefing, 2016.

11 U.S. Army Futures Command, Project Convergence: Campaign of Learning Re­port, 2021.

12 National Defense Act of 1920, Public Law 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (1920).

13 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer­sity Press, 1998).

14 Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battle­field Part I: Range, Persistence, and Dar­ing (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014).

15 Dennis E. Showalter and Harold C. Deutsch, If the Allies Had Fallen: Sixty Al­ternate Scenarios of World War II (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), 215– 217.

16 Michael Raska, “Military Innovation and the Rise of Autonomous Weapons,” in AI, Robotics, and the Future of War­fare, ed. Michael Raska and Richard A. Bitzinger (Singapore: RSIS, 2015).

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