Middle: Leroy Cowden, a heavy mobile equipment operator at area maintenance support activity 158 in Anniston, Alabama, does annual maintenance on a vehicle.
Bottom: A Soldier assigned to 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, arranges their tools to perform maintenance on a vehicle preparing to go into “the box” at Fort Irwin, California, August 3, 2022. VIEW ORIGINAL
There have been significant changes in funding and readiness within the Army due to war efforts, which have impeded unit training and financing for maintenance operations. This has led to decreases in educated maintainers, detached leadership, and a reliance on maintenance contracts. As the military shifts in a new direction, maintenance is now at the forefront for commanders, who will not have contractors in some theater locations, putting more weight on maintainers. Capability-based assessments (CBAs) become possible through examining capabilities on maintenance readiness for current and future operations based on statistics, such as solutions from the National Defense Strategy (NDS) Army Capabilities Integration and Development System, which focus on modernization concepts and fulfilling assessed capabilities. Moreover, using doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) creates initiative-based solutions to overcome equipment neglect, avoids adjustment of funding, trains undertrained maintainers, and highlights a way forward for funding efficiency through restructuring training and raising operational readiness.
Army Capabilities: Force Management
Army force management (FM) forms solutions and concepts throughout the decision-making process to meet the mission of tomorrow’s operational structure. Developments look at integrating and developing materials, training, structuring, and resources. The goal is to enable the Army to meet its mission through necessary changes. Synchronization and process allow for the development of organization and personnel to meet these needs with clear and concise guidance. Moreover, capabilities are at the forefront of change and encompass the components of development, sustainment, separation, acquisition, training, distribution, and deployment of change. Army maintenance readiness has overcome challenges with a strategic plan that encompasses the FM components.
Past Maintenance Operations in Theater
Throughout operations in the Middle East, theater-provided equipment (TPE) included vehicles and equipment provided to units upon arrival. Using contractors, equipment remained mission ready. At the time, U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN Mark A. Miley stressed the importance of TPE in meeting the Army’s missions, intent, and high performance. With his guidance for operations, TPE included 155,000 combined radios, vehicles, gym equipment, and computers for deployed troops. However, this initiative had issues posturing for the future when funding and mission adjustments required military mechanics to resume being the primary maintainers.
The Future of Maintenance Operations in Theater
The first issue is that equipment is often unavailable for unit support in the front and back of deployment operations due to the extensive time to execute property handover. Maintenance costs create more issues, with a 2017 report showing a maintenance cost of $140,000 for one deployed heavy equipment transporter alone, while in the U.S. prices only reached $25,000 for the same service. Meanwhile, trained maintenance service members (SMs) became less focused on training due to contract support service, and maintenance programs suffered and ceased being primary concerns for commanders. With TPE provided in theater, deployed vehicles were used for training in stateside garrison units, making them less of a priority. This hurt their equipment readiness and accountability focus, and created undertrained SMs, underprepared units, and posturing for a future where TPE could not go.
Problem: Maintenance Readiness Shortfalls
The NDS and CBA allow the Army to see the existing guidance, find the means, weigh the risks, and meet the commander’s intent and end state. Functional area analysis (FAA) assesses the need to raise maintenance readiness without relying on TPE. The functional needs analysis (FNA) identifies components of the problem and gaps in current postures, using the functional solution analysis (FSA) to drive a way forward. Finally, creating conducive output through DOTMLPF-P is paramount and aligns with Army doctrine and posturing structure.
Funding is key to changes in the Army. In fiscal year 2023 (FY23), distributed funds reached $70.32 million, with a request of $71.87 million for FY24, and $156.57 million alone for contract support. Annual maintenance costs for repairs and operations peak at around $59.56 million. The goal is to reallocate funding for internal training for the SM, who will primarily manage the Army’s maintenance readiness in the future. With cost and risk most prevalent, military-trained mechanics and contractors play the most vital roles in meeting the Army’s needs in these initiatives.
Military-Trained Mechanics
Military-trained SMs differ from contractors because they receive less specialized training, do not receive Automotive Service Excellence (ASE) certifications, and do not work for a business that specializes in equipment systems and components. However, SMs are the first line of defense for vehicles. Instead of extensive specialized training, SMs receive shorter training: they receive 12 weeks to learn the basics and field knowledge of equipment repair. Training ranges from brakes, fuel, electrical work, engine repair, and air conditioning. Upon graduation, SMs become entry-level apprentices and receive training in classrooms, shops, and field settings. However, the training is rushed, does not provide certification, and must allow SMs to be effective in operational settings without aid from contractors.
Military Contractors
Military maintenance contractors primarily come from Logistics Response Assistance Teams (LRATs), which cover operations for support responses. The U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) manages the Army’s ground equipment supply chain, which constitutes about 60% of the Army’s equipment. Oshkosh Corporation aids the Army in building tactical vehicles such as the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. Finally, a logistics readiness center (LRC) executes depot-level maintenance on each installation, supporting units if TACOM cannot solve the problem at the lowest level.
Unit maintenance support consists of well-trained and certified maintenance personnel, primarily civilian employees and contractors. We need to train SMs to perfect their craft and not overuse them on tasks on which they need training. Further training with entities, higher-level assisted support, more emphasis from commanders on readiness, and using funding geared toward initiatives are the road to a more operationally sound Army. Training SMs and using contract support more effectively will avoid spending money on faulty maintenance, parts, and repairs when contractors cannot support units.
Solution: Internal and External
We must compare the previous posture and format of maintenance readiness to the future of the Army and its operations. Assessing the shortfalls in funding, training, personnel issues, and the extensive gap in training and knowledge between contractors and SMs can provide insight into pivotal areas. The overall goal is to save funding and expand the readiness through SMs by assessing internal and external solutions through DOTMLPF-P to define a way forward for the Army.
Internal Solutions
Internal solutions must drive training, experience, and knowledge at lower costs while reducing risks. Raising commanders’ leadership knowledge and educating maintainers are paramount. Unit training is vital and serves as the baseline for all levels of involvement. This structure is based on predictive maintenance, understanding historical issues with each piece of equipment, statistics on why the problems arose, and what is on hand for components. However, executing such an initiative will take senior leaders’ investment.
First, leaders must assess their formation statistics and know how to read status reports to understand the unit they lead and its readiness. Historically, mechanics worked longer hours, pushed through never-ending missions, and tried to find solutions without ever receiving leadership guidance or support. There are two options for the commander to overcome this failure: One, understand all maintenance components, statistics, and reports, structuring and arming their maintainers, starting from the unit format. Two, train to work with installation support.
Maintainers consistently deal with never-ending maintenance problems. Nevertheless, each Monday morning, they become overloaded with vehicle inspections, added training, unit formation, and a line of vehicles to inspect or fix. Units can help their maintenance teams by spreading out their inspections throughout the week. For example, headquarters can execute their operator inspection on Monday, with maintenance then executing their checks and inspections, preparing them for dispatching procedures, and following this sequentially over the work week. Furthermore, they can leave one day a week to examine historical data and reports, find what areas need help, and brief higher-level issues, which will drive post-wide training. A concept for training at the lowest level could be a stand-down Thursday, where unit training with a combat focus is done in the morning. In the afternoon, leaders and maintainers could train on overcoming historical issues and then brief the commander and the executive officer.
Post-wide training establishments use external entities such as LRAT, LRC, and TACOM to provide insight into training needs. At least monthly, senior leaders must come together in the maintenance arena using a sustainment academy where facilitated training answers questions on pitfalls, gets answers on what needs support for the future, and gives senior leaders the tools to train their subordinates in their operational setting. Moreover, on-post facility capabilities, post-wide support from contractors and sustainers, and rotations trained in prominent training areas allow for a shared understanding and solutions from contract teams without relying on them to execute the mission.
Furthermore, the training audience must consist of senior maintainers and commanders for a shared understanding at all levels. The structure begins as the units brief their G-4, who in turn briefs their brigades, with briefs brought to the brigade (BDE) commanders’ (CDRs’) attention in monthly sustainment syncs, and with support from division G-4 maintenance and the support operations (SPO) maintenance material branch. Once all echelons get briefed, the information is given to the sustainment BDE CDR and drives readiness and understanding of the issues from a big-picture view. Once the training course is completed with officers, warrant officers, and NCOs, it is then shared with the subordinate units, who train on their available timeline. After-action reviews are vital to improve future training.
External Solutions
External training allows tactical training outside the unit, provides education, fills gaps in the echelons, and provides for specific qualifications outside the unit for the best support. Internal solutions are the best option for commanders when saving or reallocating funds while mitigating risk. They allow all leadership levels to understand each other and their units’ constraints and shortfalls. However, setting up internal programs is not always feasible, and deployed units cannot always set up sustainment academies. Internal and external solutions through CBA must still fall under DOTMLPF-P, using training, leadership education, and personnel. External solutions using a mix of contractors and added training will answer the call.
Funding external solutions creates a lower risk in the long term, but funds must be reallocated to pay for them. However, structured training and certifications that contractors receive significantly lower the risk and offset future contract funding. One solution is for ASE to become available for more SMs. ASE certifications include 11 tests using tuition aid and testing without in-person instruction. SMs who excel in these programs take one entry-level test, seven intermediate tests, and three advanced tests to complete their certification at Fort Gregg- Adams, Virginia. The tests allow them to become experts.
Historically, courses were available to maintainers, such as MRAP University out of Texarkana, Texas, which trained more than 14,600 troops in a six-week school covering all families of MRAP vehicles. The training did not cost the SMs anything. The Army spent $14 million to $18 million on these programs, but funding quickly depleted as the war efforts shifted. The Training with Industry (TWI) program overcome the loss of MRAP University.
TWI places officers and NCOs in specific companies for one year to provide them with industry exposure and to aid them after they leave the military. They return to their duty location after the TWI tour. TWI provides them with a broader understanding of operations, teaches them techniques to solve maintenance challenges above basic levels, and enables them to receive ASE certificates.
The best solution is for BDE CDRs and maintainers to spread maintenance days, training, and time-shift other duties based on statistics. This will lower risks and save money.
Conclusion
Initiative-based solutions overcome equipment neglect, prevent adjustment of funding, prepare and train maintainers, and highlight a way forward for funding efficiency. They do this by examining maintenance readiness capabilities for current and future operations based on statistics, while providing solutions using the structure of the NDS, FAA, FNA, FSA, and CBA against DOTMLPF-P. Solutions that involve contractors to overcome undertrained maintainers and TPE will change based on new missions and theater locations. Creating time for training, spreading out preventative-maintenance days, and giving maintainers additional training will reduce the need for more contractors, will promote operational readiness in the absence of contractors, and will enable mission success. Failing to provide maintainers with post-wide training and TWI, and having commanders merge with their senior maintainers to analyze shortfalls, will lead to overworked and undertrained maintainers, overspending on replacement parts, more damage to equipment, spending more money on contractors, and a loss of confidence in unit readiness.
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MSG Caleb J. Gallagher is currently a student at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. He previously served as the 10th Mountain Division Sustainment Brigade Support Operations Materiel Readiness Branch NCO in charge. His military experience includes three wartime deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan with one short tour to Korea in support of South Korean Defense. He possesses experience in wheeled vehicle maintenance, recovery operations, brigade, and division maintenance support. He has a master’s degree in management.
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This article was published in the spring 2025 issue of Army Sustainment.
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