Lt. Col. Simon Flake: Good afternoon. I'm Colonel Simon Flake, your moderator for today's media roundtable. Thank you for your attendance. In a few moments, Lieutenant General Jody Daniels, Commanding General of the United States Army Reserve Command, will provide a statement concerning the 15-6 investigation findings and recommendations regarding Sergeant First Class Robert Card. In light of Senator Collins’ request, the Army Inspector General, Lieutenant General Donna Martin, conducted an independent investigative review of the Army Reserve's investigation. She is present with us today as well. Any queries outside of these investigations, findings, or recommendations, or the IG review related to Sergeant Card will be taken for record and addressed separately. We encourage you to keep your questions related to this topic. As a reminder, the information you received prior to this event, as well as the information you gather now, is embargoed for release. We will begin with a brief statement from General Daniels, and once she concludes, you will be permitted to ask one question. As the moderator, I will facilitate the question and answer portion of this engagement by recognizing each individual prioritized on my call sheet. Due to time constraints, we may not be able to give everyone an opportunity to ask questions. If we do not get to you, please send your media query to the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs or Army Reserve Press Desk and we will facilitate your response. I ask that when called upon you, please state your name and the organization you represent. I would also like to add that today's session is being recorded for our records. Ladies and gentlemen, I now give you General Daniels.
Lieutenant General Jody Daniels: So good afternoon. I'm Lieutenant General Jody Daniels, Chief of Army Reserve and the Commanding General of the US Army Reserve Command. The tragic events that unfolded in Lewiston, Maine have shaken us all, and I offer my deepest condolences to the families and the loved ones of the victims whose lives were seriously--were senselessly taken. My and the Army Reserve’s thoughts and prayers are with the survivors whose lives have been forever changed. In the immediate aftermath, I directed the Army Reserve to perform a comprehensive investigation of the circumstances, methods, and contributing factors surrounding the mass shooting and Sergeant First Class Card’s suicide. The goal of our investigation was to understand the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the culture of Sergeant Card’s unit, his medical history, the treatment he received at a mental health facility, and his behavior prior to the incident. Additionally, the investigation aimed to ensure accountability and implement processes to reduce the likelihood of such tragedies in the future. The investigative team included a senior military intelligence officer to provide sound logical reasoning, was supported by a judge advocate for legal acumen, a nurse to explore medical aspects, and a criminal investigation division agent to examine criminal acts. The team interviewed 43 witnesses, gathered 445 statements, exhibits totaling over 3300 pages, and they traveled to key sites in Maine, New York, and Florida. Our investigating officer was unable to interview several key family members and other civilian witnesses, who all declined interviews. The Army and the Army Reserve do not have the authority to compel their participation in our investigation.
This investigation made several findings and subsequent recommendations that I will now cover. First, while unit leadership took several consistent and sustained actions to address Sergeant Card's deteriorating mental health, his mental state, there were also a series of failures by unit leadership. I have held members of the chain of command accountable by taking appropriate administrative actions against the officers found derelict in their duties. These adverse administrative actions have the potential to prevent further military advancements of those officers. Second, the report identified procedural breakdowns in Sergeant First Class Card's medical care, which I've identified and shared with the Defense Health Agency and the Army Surgeon General. I have recommended these offices update their procedures for case management to account for the unique aspect of reserve component soldiers who are under federal jurisdiction for only a limited amount of time during the year. Third, the investigation found that several US Army Reserve programs were insufficiently followed. For instance, procedures for serious incident reports were not followed, nor was attendance at pre-command courses emphasized. Also, the Army Reserve Psychological Health Program Office did not adequately review Sergeant Card's medical records prior to closing his case, which they did due to Sergeant Card's unresponsiveness. The investigation determined the chain of command had an incorrect understanding of their authorities for storing personal weapons and their authorities under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA. I ordered procedural updates and reviews of these policies, as well as retraining of what is called the Military Command Exception regarding HIPAA for all commanders and legal advisors in the 108 training command, the parent organization which Sergeant Card was assigned. Finally, a key aspect of the findings and recommendations is the fact that a US Army Reserve soldier is only in a duty status for about 38 days per year, and outside of that duty status, unit commanders have no legal authority to compel soldiers to undergo medical treatment, to execute follow-on care, or surrender personally owned weapons, regardless of the circumstances. This is a complex challenge and one of the main reasons that unit leadership in their civilian capacity requested that the Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office conduct wellness checks on Sergeant First Class Card.
The safety and well-being of our hometowns is integral to the Army Reserve culture. We are committed to working closely with relevant stakeholders to ensure that the USAR’s commanders, leaders, and soldiers have the tools and resources to ensure the health and well-being of our force--to ensure the health and well-being of our force and that we can promptly respond to and assist to those in crisis. In full transparency, the findings and recommendations of the investigation will be posted publicly tomorrow, 23 July, in the Freedom of Information Act reading room at https.www.RMDA.Army.mil/readingroom, and we will repeat that later if you didn't quite catch it. The investigation is redacted with the least number of possible redactions in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. Thank you, and I will now take questions.
CSF: And our first question will go from virtual, Mr. David Sharp, Associated Press. David.
David Sharp: The fundamental issue that's come up time and time again during the Independent Commission Hearings in Maine is that reservists are under military command only when on drills and of course, not when they're back in their civilian lives, as you just noted. Given those constraints, what's the primary takeaway on how the Army can address these--what the Army can do to prevent such tragedies in the future?
LTGJD: Even though we are on a limited duty status, that doesn't stop us from calling our soldiers and caring about them and checking in with them and seeing how they're doing and asking others to go and do those wellness checks. You know, good leaders care about their soldiers, and they make sure that their civilian life is proceeding as well as it can. So having those good contacts and knowing about your soldiers is what we can continue to emphasize and make sure that our leaders actually follow through and care for their soldiers.
CSF: Thank you, David. Next question. Mr. Steve Misler, Maine Public Radio [brief silence] Going to move on to Mr. John Hilliard, Boston Globe.
John Hilliard: Just one question, General. I note from the report that Four Winds staff didn't speak to the reserve investigators. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the efforts the Army took to find out more about what happened during Card's stay at Four Winds.
LTGJD: So unfortunately, we could not--we don't have the authority to compel them to participate. What we can receive is the records from his treatment, and we can have those available to our medical professionals for review.
CSF: All right, thank you, John. Mr. Chris Costa, News Center, Maine.
Chris Costa: Thank you all for your time today. I want to make sure that I'm explicitly clear on this point. It appears in the investigation report that multiple times medical personnel had recommended that not only Mr. Card's military issued weapons be restricted, but that they had also recommended that his personal weapons be taken away from him. At any point, did anyone from the Army contact anyone in Maine local law enforcement to communicate these concerns? Thank you.
LTGJD: There was a wellness check that was requested, and we were--had--the Army did have contact with family members, and there was a miscommunication as to who was removing weapons, who had possession of weapons, but there were multiple instances of conveyances by Army Reserve personnel to recommend that those weapons be stored outside of Sergeant First Class Card’s care. I'd have to check the record to see if that was requested of the--of the--of the legal--of the local law enforcement.
CSF: All right. Norah Hogan, WMTW TV.
Norah Hogan: Hello. Thank you for your time. Are there any sort of punishments beyond the inability to be promoted for some of those officers who were found in dereliction of duty, or is that the only consequence for those officers?
LTGJD: As a result of the administrative actions, there's the potential for what is called a Show Cause Board, and that is where an individual is asked to show why they should be retained for service, so they could be administratively separated based on the actions that were taken.
CSF: All right.
NH: Does the public have any opportunity to learn about those consequences and the results of any of those hearings?
LTGJD: Not at this time.
CSF: All right. Thank you. John Terhune, Press Herald.
John Terhune: Hi there. I noticed the report is dated early March. Can you talk about why it's only now in July that the report is being released and what has happened behind the scenes in the last four months?
LTGJD: The version that was dated for--the March date was a draft version. I did a review of it to ensure that we were giving unemotional factual language as well as providing some clarity of how the report read because there were some places where there were some gaps in understanding. The team--the IO team went out and did a little bit more work to fill in some of those gaps. So, the report itself wasn't completed and approved until late June.
CSF: All right. Thank you, John. Lori Gliha, Scripps News.
Lori Gliha: Hi. I was hoping you could shed some more light on this dereliction of duty and expand on in reviewing the actions of Card's chain of command, do you believe that Card's chain of command downplayed concerns about his behavior to local law enforcement?
LTGJD: We do know the statement that was made by the captain to local law enforcement and how they interpreted that, but that was not sort of--that was not a part of the dereliction to duty. This had to do with him turning in the various serious incident reports, initiating a line of duty report, which is a responsibility to happen anytime a soldier is hospitalized for greater than 24 hours. There was also a responsibility for all of the various levels of command to attend pre-command courses, and in many cases, they did not attend so they were not aware of the authorities that they had available to them because of the deemphasis on that course.
LG: To clarify, though, do you believe he downplayed the--do you believe that he downplayed the concerns about Robert Card's behavior to local law enforcement?
LTGJD: Ma'am, I don't know. I was not there. I'd have to look at the statement that he made and how law enforcement interpreted that. That is--that is between those two folks. I was not a participant in that call.
CSF: All right, thank you, Lori. Alex Horton, Washington Post.
Alex Horton: Hey, thanks for doing this. I was hoping you could be a little bit more kind of clear and elaborate on what exactly the failings were of the chain of command. What did they not do that they should have done and they got punished for? And two, the people who were taken to account were colonel and below. Do you believe that at that rank, that's the appropriate punishment level? Should there have been other senior leaders above that that should have been punished?
LTGJD: So, a thorough review was looked at all echelons and where information did get to or did not get to. As Sergeant Card's leadership became--so, I have a series of points. I'm going to read these just for clarity's sake. As Sergeant Card's leadership became aware of escalating issues through contact with fellow soldiers and family members, they failed to submit a commander's Critical Information Requirements Report to higher level commanders or contact the Army Insider Threat Hub. After Sergeant Card's release from Four Winds in early August, his unit did not conduct the line of duty investigation that I just mentioned. Upon his release in early August, his chain of command was not provided with any information regarding his diagnosis, prognosis, or discharge instructions. Those eventually were received, but they were not related to the chain of command. The discharge instructions weren't uploaded into the Army Medical System until August of ‘23, 18 days after his discharge. Sergeant Card's commanders failed to understand their authorities regarding their access to the HIPAA information. Following the command directed behavioral assessment in July of ‘23 and Keller Army Hospital and his subsequent release from Four Winds civilian hospital, there was a lack of communication between the medical facility staff and Sergeant Card's unit leadership. This led to Sergeant Card being escorted home by a fellow soldier in an unofficial capacity. And then there were some additional challenges with some of our policies and procedures.
CSF: All right. Yes, ma'am. Susan Sharon, Maine Public Radio.
Susan Sharon: Thank you very much. Can you elaborate on why a court hearing was not held for Robert Card in New York State before his released from Four Winds? And who was responsible for making that happen? And finally, was that information passed on to his chain of command?
LTGJD: The information was not passed on to his chain of command, and that was a responsibility or a decision made there at Four Winds. It was not made through the Army medical military channels.
CSF: And now we transition to our people in person. John Chrisos, WMTW, Portland, Maine.
John Chrisos: Thank you for having us here. So, on one hand, the report notes that Robert Card was not under the direct control of the US Army. That seems to be a theme throughout this report, but the investigation also says adverse action was taken against the officers in his chain of command. So, can you talk about that relationship and how much responsibility the Army feels that it has in not getting Mr. Card the care that he needed?
LTGJD: So, the administrative actions were more related to reporting requirements, initiating the line of duty, which would then have--provide fiscal reimbursement to him if any expenses came to his direction. And in terms of turning in the report so that higher headquarters were aware of what was happening to one of their soldiers at the lower echelons, and then of course, attending mandatory training related to knowing how to be a commander, knowing what resources were available to you, what authorities you had to request information from medical, whether it was civilian or military, and also authorities that you had to store privately owned weapons should they be surrendered to you. So, there's a lot of administrative things that did not take place that were--that they should have known how to do.
JC: And just a quick follow up between the civilian and military balance there. Robert Card, in July of ‘23, was at West Point for that annual training when these troubling signs of mental instability were reported, but then he was taken to a civilian facility.
LTGJD: Check.
JC: Is that common to transfer when someone is already at a military facility?
LTGJD: Yes.
JC: Because you give up a level of control when you send to a civilian facility.
LTGJD: You’re still under orders, but you're being given care by the medical professional who has the expertise to deal with the situation at hand. Same thing would happen if you were at a medical treatment facility that didn't have trauma care and it was a trauma that came in, you'd immediately take them to that location where physical, you know, emergency care could be rendered, or physical therapy or some other specialty care where there are providers that have those skill sets.
JC: So, the military facility where he was, was not equipped to handle these kinds of mental health issues?
LTGJD: Correct. He needed a greater level of care and so they did the transfer. He remains under military orders to be there, which is why the line of duty needs to be initiated so that we can keep track and do the correct fiscal remuneration for that.
JC: So, the failure was not being able to get the appropriate reports from the civilian facility?
LTGJD: No, the failure was not generating report to the Army within the Army channels to say, I had a soldier who was hospitalized for more than 24 hours, and that is a requirement to do that and to start the line of duty so that it gets documented for not only his current care, but should he then later on be under the Veteran--VA, then have the entitlements on that front as well. So that's why we get these things documented as to whether or not it was a military related condition.
JC: And this all goes back to the military mental health issue. One part of the report says the Army is committed to working with Congress. Are there changes that need to be made in Congress--to federal law, to prevent something like this from happening again?
LTGJD: I know that there are various initiatives that are being pursued and we will again work with Congress to see that they make sure that they match up between the reserve and the active and how we can help each other.
CSF: Thank you, John. We're going to move on to Haley Britzky, CNN.
Haley Britzky: Thank you and thank you both for doing this. You mentioned, General Daniels, that part of the investigation was to look at unit culture. Can you expand on what it found about the culture within Sergeant First Class Card’s unit? And I'm also wondering if you can kind of touch on, I think this seems to be sort of a trend issue sometimes when it comes to the Reserve and the National Guard about the jurisdiction between civilian law enforcement and commanders and military, you know, investigative services. So, sort of what that gray area looks like and how maybe going forward that's going to be improved.
LTGJD: So those are two quite different topics. The culture of the unit was one--it was not a negative culture. There were some challenges within the unit in terms of accountability of personnel and making sure that we knew where everyone was and had met all the different requirements they needed to go through. But it was a reasonable culture, if you will. The second question pertained to the relationship between military reserve components and civilian law enforcement. That's a challenging area. We frequently do--and even on the active duty side, if someone's living out in civilian communities, we will make contact with the folks out there if we were looking for a wellness check, we're looking to make sure that someone's okay. So that's something that we always like to--on a case by case basis, assess do we need some assistance? Do we need someone else to sort of help us out? I'm not sure if I answered the question.
HB: Yeah. Well, I guess I'm curious if there are going to be steps taken going forward to maybe improve that communication because it seems like some of this fell----
LTGJD: That's a tough--that's a really tough place because each one varies and there are so many different law enforcement agencies, and we have to be careful to balance protection of, you know, civil rights versus, you know, we need--we need--if we're concerned about health--health safety concerns, then the commanders will obviously initiate an action. But each jurisdiction also varies as to how they will respond to those. And so, we just, there's so much variance. I don't know how, you know, we'll have to see how we can proceed.
CSF: Thank you, Haley. Ellee Watson, CBS news.
Ellee Watson: Thank you for doing this. Maybe I missed it, but how many officers were disciplined as a result of this investigation? And then second, you talked about how they--his chain of command didn't really understand the authority they had about private weapons. What--what is their authority?
LTGJD: So, there were three individuals. And in terms of authorities, private weapons--we can request, we can ask, but we cannot compel that they store them anywhere. We can store them for them. We can say, hey, let me take your weapons, put them here. We can recommend that they lock them in a safe. We can provide all kinds of other safeguards and advice, but there's nothing that we can actually compel them to do unless there has been a medical determination. And in this case, there was not because Sergeant Card was released by the civilian providers to go home. At that point, he was deemed not at risk by the civilian providers.
EW: Okay. So, it's a combination of not knowing what they had access to under HIPAA and then what they're--
LTGJD: Under HIPAA--HIPAA authorizes commanders--if you have a specific question that you want to ask of the medical professionals for a specific reason, you can use that exemption and say, this is the information I'm seeking and why. It’s not a HIPAA’s a blanket, you can't ask anybody anything. And that was where the disconnect was. They thought, I can't request because HIPAA’s going to protect as opposed to knowing, no, you're a commander. You have a reason you need for specific questions, you can ask those questions.
CSF: All right, thank you, Ellie. Luis Martinez, ABC News.
Luis Martinez: Question for both of you. General Daniels, what were, if the proper paperwork had gone through, what were some of the potential outcomes for Sergeant Card? Because I know we're looking back----
LTGJD: When you’re saying particular paperwork, could you be more specific?
LM: Like the one that you're specifically talking about, the failure to present that paperwork up the chain of command about, you know, what happened there at Four Winds. But in other words, what were some of the potential outcomes for him if he--I mean, would he have then returned to the civilian sector, or would you----
LTGJD: So that was--that was a release by the civilian medical authorities to release him back to the unit, so that----
LM: Correct, but if everything had been----
LTGJD: So, our leadership could have said, I want you to go attend--if I had seen your military one source, I need you to continue to receive some behavioral health care. I need you to make some additional appointments. I need to make sure that you're fiscally covered for your, you know, number of days stay medically to make sure you don't receive any bills. There's things that they could have done on that front.
LM: So potentially, what could have happened for him? Would he have stayed in for the duration of his Army contract until he received--while he received his care, or would he potentially have faced some kind of separation?
LTGJD: If Four Winds decided that he needed additional medical care and they needed to keep him or send him to a different facility, his orders could have been extended to allow him to stay under professional medical care until they released him. I mean, we have a particular pot of money, it’s referred to as a medical ADOS that we use for individuals who--physical ailments, behavioral health ailments, and we can continue their care [crosstalk]
LM: So that would have been a long term situation?
LTGJD: Yes, then we would have found--then he goes into a different process, but we continue to monitor that as well. But that is entirely possible.
LM: And for General Martin, when you have a situation like this, how does your office work interact with the 15-6? I mean, how--can you describe the distinctions between how the two investigations work?
Lieutenant General Donna Martin: Absolutely. So, the Inspector General is an independent review source, and so I work directly for the Secretary of the Army, and so I don't work for the commands. I am a total independent source. And so, what we did in this case, we didn't want to do a duplicative effort with the Reserve Component while that investigation was going on. So once USARC concluded their investigation and General Daniels approved the findings, we then took that report plus we also look at the policy gaps between the Army Reserve, the active component, and we will facilitate our own independent review after that is done. But we look at everything separate after it's complete, to basically determine whether that review is complete and thorough. And if it is not, I have the authority to open a separate investigation, and I was prepared to do that if the investigation that was completed by the Reserve Component was not comprehensive enough.
LM: Your judgment this is----
LTGDM: We found it to be very thorough. To be very comprehensive.
CSF: Thank you, Louis. Konstantin Toropin, military.com.
Konstantin Toropin: One of the questions shortly after this incident was about--sort of came up, there was reporting that Sergeant First Class Card had brain injuries. The report seems to theorize that those brain injuries occurred due to a fall that he had at his home. If I may, is it safe to say that the Army and the investigation didn't believe that any component of his service caused the brain injuries?
LTGJD: That is correct. The amount of--so the fall from the house on a ladder, I believe, is the injury that took place. The amount of exposure that he had to other shock is relatively minor. So, yes.
KT: Okay. So, there's not a belief that anything connected to his service would have had an impact on his brain health?
LTGJD: I'm going to defer that to Walter Reed Medical Center, who--and then the other folks who actually got portions of his brain for review for examination. I'm not a trained neuroscientist, and they can provide that information.
KT: Got it.
CSF: All right, thank you. We have two other gentlemen in the room. I want to give you an opportunity to ask your questions. Could you please state your name and the medium that you represent?
James Blue: Hi, I'm James Blue. I'm with PBS Frontline. I guess my first question is to General Daniels. What is interesting to me, because there's such an intersection between these Reserve units, which have a real cohesive sort of sense of camaraderie, friendship, and they're very tight. And somehow the leadership didn't really act or move on any of the--well, they didn't act or move very sufficiently. Was it because they just didn't know what to do? They were misguided? They didn't know what the guidelines were? It's not clear to me exactly what the breakdown was, and it's also not clear to me exactly what you're doing to repair that gap.
LTGJD: So, there were--yes. There were a number of communications breakdowns within his unit. There were a number of concerns that could have been addressed. So, what we're doing to fix things going forward, one of which is that re-emphasis--we're relooking the course material, making sure that the pre-command courses are sufficient as they cover the different areas. We're also--the unit in which the training command, the two-star level command all the way up to that level, redid training on HIPAA and authorities regarding weapons and those kinds of things. They also looked at providing counseling for those soldiers who were also affected by this in terms of their own behavioral health and the loss because they were neighbors and friends from that area and making sure that all those personnel were taken care of and were being given adequate behavioral health and spiritual assistance as well. They continue to have contact with the Veterans Affairs and the Veteran Centers in Saco, Maine, looking at the mental health of their soldiers up there in the area. And they've got counselors that have continued to come and visit with the unit to provide assistance to those who would desire it at no cost to the soldiers.
They've reviewed the CCIR, that Critical Information Requirement process to ensure compliance across the command, particularly as it relates to medical issues. They do better in other cases, but medical was a little lapse. They verified that their commanders were aware of how to get soldiers continuous medical care as needed. They reinvigorated their command validation of all those who have access to medical resources, making sure that those were validated, that the commanders have an ability to access medical records and have a portal they can go in to make sure that those were all up to date and current. And then they also just in general, just encourage those who are requested by the commission to go and participate in those proceedings.
CSF: All right, thank you, James. Sir, can I have your name and the medium you represent?
Charlie D’Agata: Charlie D’Agata, CBS News. General, thank you for doing this. You said yourself there was a series of failures. Procedural breakdown, serious dereliction to duty, multiple psychological health assessments suggesting that personal weapons be taken away. The point is there were several warning flags. And in addition to whether or not those things have been addressed and how it would change in the future, will this investigation in any way bring closure to the families of the victims?
LTGJD: That is something that I have no control over. My heart and soul goes out to all those families, the folks that were witnesses to what happened. I mean, we're doing the best that we can in terms of understanding what did transpire and then make changes for the future.
CD: It reads as a chapter of verse that this could have and should have been avoided.
LTGJD: Perhaps there are multiple different agencies that could have done--made different actions, and whether or not it could have been avoided is anyone's, you know, hindsight at this point.
CSF: Thank you, Charlie. State your name, sir.
Dan Lampariello: Yes, my name is Dan Lampariello. I work with WGME TV here in Portland. I have a question related to how the investigative findings were sent over to the Defense Health Agency. It says that, you know, they could make some recommendations pertaining to Four Winds Hospital as well as the Spectrum Services Group that provides some case management work at Keller Army Hospital. I want to find out if you've heard anything more from the Defense Health Agency after your investigation was forwarded to them and if you can confirm if either the Four Winds Hospital is still working with the Army, if you're sending soldiers there, or if Spectrum Health Services or Services Group is still at Keller Army Hospital.
LTGJD: So, I have not--I received acknowledgement from the director of DHA and the Army Surgeon General that they received the recommendations. I have not yet heard any response of whether or not they've had a chance to make determinations and make any changes based on what I sent them. I do not know. I am not in a position to know what changes may or may not have happened with--with the medical facilities. That would have to--DHA would be the one to respond to that.
CSF: All right, thank you, Dan. Is there anyone else virtually that did not get an opportunity to ask one question?
Patty Nieberg: Yes, this is Patty Nieberg with Task and Purpose. If I can. So, in the report, there's a mention of a policy from the Army Reserve Psychological Health Program, and it said that they closed Card’s case because he was unresponsive to efforts to contact him. And it mentions that was in line with policy at the time. So, it sounds like there's a change. I'm wondering if you can just kind of go over that policy, but then also other Army policies that are kind of looking--you're looking at to revise?
LTGJD: So that one in particular, just because someone is nonresponsive doesn't mean that we don't need to have additional contact with them. And if we don't necessarily reach that individual, that doesn't mean that we should--that the PHP folks shouldn't be reaching out to that chain of command so that the next time the soldier attends any event, that we can then have contact with them there for follow up care. So, we don't want to close it just because they didn't answer the phone. So, we're making that change so that we continue to press to get a better resolution and make sure that we've got good closure on that front. I think I mentioned some of the other policies had to do with making sure that the leaders knew what their--what their authorities were when it came to weapons and when it came to HIPAA, as well as what requirements there were for training, to make sure that they know what those resources were. Additionally making sure they know they've got outside of that military one source, an ability to go and get treatment at no cost through that source as well.
CSF: All right, we have time for one more question.
Steve Misler: I'd like to ask a question as well, please. Just a quick question--I got skipped over earlier because my mic wasn't working. I have a question about the relationship between the Army and Four Winds Hospital. Is that a contracted relationship? And if it is, why wasn't the Army investigators able to compel officials from the hospital to cooperate with the investigation?
LTGJD: I don't know the relationship. It could be simply they're a matter of the part of the Tricare network which is not a contract relationship. So, we'd have to come back to you with a better answer on that one. I don't have an answer.
CSF: All right, we have time for one more. Just want to confirm [crosstalk]
Unknown: I have a question as well.
Sasha: Yeah, pardon me, I got skipped over on virtual as well.
Unknown: I did too.
CSF: Sasha. Go ahead, Sasha.
Sasha: Hey, well, thanks for doing this today, guys. A couple parts to this question. Who specifically canceled Mr. Card's court hearing when he was at Four Winds and rescinded his request to leave? It's in the past tense in the report, and I'd like to--I think it would be important to understand who specifically canceled it, whether it was an Army person or someone at Four Winds.
LTGJD: Four Winds. It was someone at Four Winds. It was not an Army--Army did not cancel the court hearing.
Sasha: Thank you for that. And so, we've heard you say that there's a lack of communication. I think while it's understandable, it's not sufficient in clarifying what exactly happened here. It strikes me that if there had been sufficient recognition of the threat that Mr. Card was increasingly posing, and this is not just a few days that we're talking about, there had been multiple flags by family members, by his colleagues over the course of many, many months, and that threat appeared to have been escalating. Why wasn't that threat recognized when it had been flagged multiple times? It strikes me that if it had been recognized, there would have been immediate escalation and proper communication. Thanks.
LTGJD: I think one of the challenges is the fact that professional behavioral health--behavioral health professionals released him and said that he was low threat and that would ameliorate many people's concerns. He'd just been in a facility for some number of days, they have decided to release him. Without knowing the specifics of what transpired while he was there, one would make the logical assumption that he was okay to go back out into the civilian environment. And as a commander, you're going to accept that. Now, when Sergeant Card got into a bit of a fight with his friend, that friend reported it, and that's what caused the wellness check that the Army Reserve personnel requested from the civilian law enforcement. So, there was, you know, those folks did the right thing in contacting local law enforcement. They had no other authorities to do anything at that point because he was in a civilian status, and he'd been in a civilian status from the day that he departed Four Winds, and he never returned into another--returned for another military status after that departure. So, our jurisdiction was quite limited.
CSF: Just a friendly reminder that this information is embargoed for release. We're going to give the floor back to General Daniels for her closing comments. Ma'am.
LTGJD: So, the Army Reserve is deeply committed to working with Congress, local, and federal governments, and all stakeholders to prevent tragedies like this from reoccurring. It is important to note that the US Army Reserve Command's investigation and the independent Army Inspector General's case review are not the only ongoing investigations. The Maine State Police and the Maine Commission are also conducting investigations. The Army and the Army Reserve are making our personnel available for those commissions. It is my sincere hope that these medical reviews, expert analyses, refined process and policies, updated training and information sessions, and adverse administrative actions against those who are derelict of their duties will help us prevent such tragedies from happening in the future. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the survivors and families of the deceased whose lives have been forever changed. Thank you.
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