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Introduction

Purpose. This handbook serves as an aid to corps- and division-level headquarters staffs as they plan and prepare to conduct reconstitution operations. It provides insights into challenges staffs will face when planning reconstitution operations. This handbook also provides planning considerations to facilitate an all-encompassing reconstitution plan.

Problem. The Army lacks the capability and capacity to reconstitute brigade forces and above during large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

Contributing/Limiting Factors. Commanders and planners need to understand that at a certain point, generating personnel and materiel to support large-scale reconstitution of units becomes a major limiting factor.

Doctrinal gaps exist when it comes to reconstitution operations. Field Manual (FM) 100-9, Reconstitution¸13 JAN 1992 (inactive), which supported the Army of Excellence force model, has become obsolete and has been rescinded. FM 4-95, Logistics Operations, 01 APR 2014, provides little information for planning reconstitution operations. FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations, 31 JUL 2019, was recently revised to expand on the doctrinal foundation of reconstitution operations since the requirement for reconstitution was reestablished in FM 3-0, Operations, 06 OCT 2017.

Organizational changes have degraded capacity at echelons above brigade (EAB) to conduct reconstitution operations. The capability to conduct limited reconstitution operations migrated to the tactical level, such as material management and human resource capabilities. This has led to a lack of operational-level capability to execute reconstitution operations. Currently at EAB, organizations are challenged when conducting necessary reconstitution requirements such as:

  • Heavy equipment distribution
  • Materiel integration and management
  • Field-level pass back maintenance
  • Sustainment-level maintenance
  • Battle damage assessment and repair
  • Human resource operations (division and corps)

Policy decisions have also affected the Army’s ability to conduct reconstitution operations. Current regulations outlining wartime replacement operations such as Army Regulation [AR] 600-8-111, Wartime Replacement Operations, 13 AUG 1993, are outdated, do not support current force structure, and do not support LSCO. As the Army moved to Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and units rotated out of Iraq and Afghanistan on a frequent basis, reconstitution operations were not essential in theater, as ARFORGEN allowed units time to bring in replacements and train them in preparation for their next mission as well as reset equipment. However, this will be a challenge as the Army moves to a Sustainable Readiness Model that does not allow a deliberate reset phase to conduct reconstitution operations. Finally, no Department of the Army policy currently exists on reconstitution. Policy and doctrine must address the significant resources required to support reconstitution operations.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 1. Defines the elements of reconstitution and additional key terminology. It addresses new doctrine the Army is developing and identifies common mistakes planners make when planning for reconstitution operations.

Chapter 2. Outlines commander and staff roles and responsibilities in executing reconstitution operations. It also identifies the roles and responsibilities of units supporting reconstitution operations such as the sustainment brigade and regeneration task force (RTF).

Chapter 3. Provides staff planners with some planning considerations to help plan, prepare, and execute reconstitution operations. Additionally, it provides points to consider when establishing the RTF and site selection.

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