Large-scale combat operations (LSCO) demand that classes of supply move at the speed of war, massing effects at decisive points. The transparent and lethal nature of the modern battlefield has eliminated the safety once guaranteed by distance from the forward line of troops, forcing sustainment lines of communication into higher degrees of dispersion and complexity.
In LSCO, being late to a logistics release point could be fatal. Any flaws in brigade (BDE) sustainment planning or execution could be catastrophic and create unplanned BDE culmination. Combat training centers (CTCs) are the premiere training locations that place a mirror in front of BDE formations and let us see ourselves clearly. There are several observed CTC trends among brigade support battalions (BSBs) that hinder our BDE formations from being successful in LSCO. The BSB shortfalls that CTCs have highlighted will only get worse once our BSBs enter LSCO and BSBs face additional requirements.
The Army’s Transformation in Contact initiative addresses greatly needed shortfalls in technology, data analytics, force restructuring, streamlined maintenance processes, doctrine, and equipment modernization. A focus on the modernization of data, equipment, and analytics alone is not the solution to solve the BSB shortfalls at CTCs. The success of a BSB hinges on a consistent adherence to the operations process; effective, well-coordinated base defense of the brigade support area (BSA); and continuous assessment and coordination across the BDE area of operations.
To solve systemic failures in these areas, the Army must look beyond equipment modernization and address a critical gap in senior NCO leadership by authorizing a logistics career management field (CMF) sergeant major within the BSB S-3 current operations (CUOPS) section. BSBs need an additional master trainer and operations expert to assist with developing and executing BSB staff training and BSB collective training at home station.
MDMP Institutional Knowledge Deficit
NCOs, specifically sustainment CMFs, are rarely institutionally trained in the military decision-making process (MDMP) or complex staff synchronization until they attend the Sergeants Major Academy. There is the Battle Staff NCO Course, which is an excellent course, but it does not train NCOs to the depth required to assist support battalion (BN) commanders and executive officers (XOs) in the home station training of a BSB staff or to assist BN commanders and XOs with ensuring BSB staff can meet the requirements of sustainment missions at a CTC or in LSCO. This lack of institutional knowledge places the training burden on staff leads and XOs. Due to the many competing requirements on those individuals at home station and in the collective BSB, staff training is often not effective.
The senior tactical sustainment observer/coach at the National Training Center (NTC) has observed that many BSB staffs have not completed a full MDMP session before arriving at the NTC Leadership Training Program. This lack of repetition at home station hinders the ability of the BSB staff to work through the planning process at the depth required and within the time constraints. NTC recommends home station training for all sustainment units. The BDE suffers when the BSB staff, which includes a support operations (SPO) section, does not complete a thorough MDMP repetition with enough time to assist the BDE planners and BDE S-4 with refining the BDE sustainment plans.
The importance of the operations process within a BDE or BN staff has been discussed across the force, and CTCs continue to see similar trends. The Army is currently adjusting and refining the NCO professional education system to reflect the future needs across all CMFs, but we may not get a vote on when LSCO begin, and this burden cannot be placed on future NCOs. The urgency is now.
A dedicated logistics CMF S-3 sergeant major in the BSB would possess the institutional knowledge and experience to immediately elevate a staff’s ability to train at home station, advise the BN XO, coordinate with BDE plans, and ensure that the BSB staff adhered to the operations process and executed a coordinated base defense while at any CTC. Unit personnel authorizations can be approved and filled more quickly than the NCO education system can create a better prepared NCO corp.
Adherence to the Operations Process
In a BSB, the SPO operates similarly to any unit future operations (FUOPS) section while the BSB S-3 operates similar to any CUOPS section. These BSB staff sections are not manned in similar ways to their maneuver counterparts, and the SPO is focused on the future sustainment operations of the BDE, not just the BSB or BSA. The SPO uses the forward support companies (FSCs), organic BSB distribution, supply, and maintenance assets to sustain the BDE. The BSB S-3 must then synchronize SPO plans and publish them to all subordinate units and staff. While this operates like any unit FUOPS and CUOPS, BSB CUOPS are often small, led by a logistics captain and master sergeant, and there is often a throughput issue within BSB CUOPS, resulting in orders being pushed late or not at all.
The orders handover between the SPO and the S-3 is a frequent point of failure at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), and similar trends have been observed at other CTCs. Observations indicate that the BSB S-3 often lacks the bandwidth to translate SPO plans into executable orders to FSCs and BSB companies at the speed required at the CTC. This can result in the SPO jumping over the BSB S-3 within the orders process, with the intent of ensuring BDE sustainment is met on time, tasking FSC and BSB companies directly. This can lead to conflicting orders, desynchronized logistics packages, and general confusion among BDE sustainment leaders.
A BSB operations sergeant major would serve as the permanent bridge, ensuring the transition from planning to execution would be faster and more deliberate. Orders must be published on time to ensure BDE sustainment is synchronized and maneuver BNs maintain the required tempo. The operations sergeant major’s ability to train staff NCOs, across all warfighting functions, while at home station, could multiply the BSBs ability to plan and publish orders by using cross-trained staff NCOICs to create more throughput within BSB CUOPS.
Continuous assessment is an often-overlooked aspect of the operations process. Too often, assessments are saved until a pause or the conclusion of training. Leaders are so focused on ensuring training objectives are met, missions are accomplished, and Soldiers are safe that we do not feel like we have the time to step away from the exercise and mission to reassess whether our plan is still meeting the intent. The continuous assessment often falls on a BSB command team because they are the least stuck in a planning and execution cycle. An additional sergeant major in the BSB would greatly assist the command team and XO with stepping back and making a deliberate assessment of their unit, companies, and staff processes. Sustainment must be dynamic because LSCO is dynamic. Continuous assessments must be emphasized for BSB success.
Land Management and Survivability
Effective base security is another trend identified by JMRC for improvement. LSCO forces the BSA to configure to dispersed base clusters to survive aerial, ground, enemy observation, and long-range threats. However, this creates a spatial deconfliction crisis within the BDE, complicates BSB command and control (C2), and places additional requirements on the BSA defense plan.
The base cluster method requires three times as much land space as a traditional BSA. This puts the BSB in direct competition for terrain with other BDE war fighting functions, such as field artillery. BSB staff must advocate for themselves with BDE planners to deconflict position areas for artillery (PAAs) from the BSA footprint. Planning and coordination become more difficult as secondary and tertiary PAA and BSA locations are being planned, placed on the BDE priority protection list, and synchronized with the BDE protection assets, such as engineers digging in fighting positions large enough to conceal bulk fuel systems.
An operations sergeant major would greatly assist the BSB command team and XO with the required BDE staff coordination and planning. BDE sustainment C2 nodes, equipment assets, and commodities must be protected by having engineer-prepared areas. The days of going to a CTC and hoping the BDE engineers show up to create a burm around your BSA are over. The BDE and BSB commanders assume unnecessary risk when BSA protection is not resourced appropriately and synchronized with the overall BDE maneuver plan. It is a requirement for BDE survival that requires knowledgeable, experienced senior NCO advocacy between BSB staff and BDE staff.
The Science vs. the Art of Sustainment
Sustainment has often been treated as a math problem. Every logistics officer fought from spreadsheets, calculating pallets allocation by vehicle system and requirements by class of supply and time-distance factors. While the science of sustainment remains foundational to forecasting material requirements, LSCO demand an increase in the art of sustainment.
LSCO may force BSB commanders and staff to make decisions that are more nebulous, with triggers that are not as clear. BSB commanders’ decision matrices and risk management tools must reflect the fog of LSCO. Does the BSA conduct a survivability displacement, even though the secondary BSA location is still waiting on engineer assets and is unprepared? How does the BSA mitigate the risk associated with making a sudden survivability displacement, requiring multiple large convoys, when every main service route is assumed to be observed by enemy aerial threats? A sergeant major provides the intuition to recognize a trigger before the situation becomes a crisis.
Conclusion: A Personnel Solution to Correct a Long-Term Trend
These are trends that have been observed and reported by expert observers and coaches at every CTC for dozens of rotations, across multiple years, but BSBs routinely still fall short. BSB leaders know what they must do to succeed. They want to put their staff through multiple planning sessions at home station. The BSB CTC shortfall is not due to a lack of understanding the problem or an unwillingness to fix it. The shortfall is that we are simply failing to provide BSBs with the NCO support required to execute at the level the mission requires.
The Army is restructuring and modernizing across multiple warfighting functions and headquarters. This provides Army senior sustainment leaders with a unique opportunity to not just modernize equipment but to potentially gain additional logistics CMF sergeants major from across the force.
LSCO will find our flaws and shine a bright light on them for every enemy to see. It is imperative that a personnel change is made within BSB formations to correct CTC trends that have shown years of shortfall. The Army must formalize the position of an operations sergeant major within the BSB.
When the mission is nebulous, the terrain is contested, and the math fails, the Army has successfully relied on the experience of the sergeant major to find a way. It is time to put that experience where it is needed most: in the heart of the BDE formation.
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MSG Robert Ford is a student at the Sergeant Majors Course, Class 77, U.S. Army NCO Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. He has served in a variety of leadership positions ranging from M1 Abrams tank system maintainer to a brigade support battalion first sergeant and brigade operations. He is a graduate of the Support Operations Course at Fort Lee, Virginia.
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This article was published in the summer 2026 edition of Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin.
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