The Game Tape Shows All: Using sUAS to Improve After Action Reviews

Over the past year, our battalion — 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team (MBCT), 25th Infantry Division — transitioned from an infantry brigade combat team to an MBCT as part of the Army’s Transformation in Contact (TiC) initiative. We fielded the Army’s newest equipment, such as the Infantry Squad Vehicle, the XM-250, Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET), Silent Tactical Energy Enhanced Dismount (STEED), and small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS). Our training path began in January 2024, allowing us to field and integrate this equipment into every training event, from team live-fire exercises (LFXs) through platoon and company combined arms live fires. Our training path culminated in our deployment to the Big Island of Hawaii through a long-range maritime air assault during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) 25-01 in October 2024.

As we progressed from training event to training event, our Light Fighters worked daily to master the basics as a light infantry battalion under the MBCT construct. We found that our TiC equipment made us faster and more lethal. The more reps we got in something such as launching a short-range reconnaissance (SRR) sUAS or conducting a map reconnaissance to establish a vehicle drop-off (VDO) point, allowed us to be more effective in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from the squad up to battalion staff. As leaders in 1-27 IN, we observed and pushed the organization through each step of Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle, which includes active experimentation, concrete experience, reflective observation, and abstract conceptualization. Each training event presented an opportunity to start the model over, allowing us to experiment continually and then cement lessons learned into the next event. Applying this model allowed us to achieve our goal of getting better by 1 percent every day. After completing JPMRC 25-01, we quickly looked ahead at future training opportunities to continue this learning cycle, cementing lessons learned and not creating lessons observed.

Key takeaway: Learning is a cyclical process: Kolb’s model emphasizes that learning involves a continuous cycle rather than linear progression.

Fielding of the C-100 medium-range reconnaissance (MRR) system in February of this year presented our battalion with another opportunity. Not only did we have a new UAS with an extended range and more sophisticated camera system to train on, but we also realized that we had an asset that could help us critique ourselves while we conducted training. Our new MRR not only allowed us to progress through Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle by experimenting with how we operate with this new capability, but it also enhanced the way that we conduct training, focusing explicitly on Step 7 of the Eight-Step Training Model — conduct after action reviews (AARs).

“We have got to use every opportunity to improve individually so we can improve collectively.” — Nick Saban

As infantry trainers, we inherently know that not all individuals learn through the same methods. Some Soldiers learn best through reading, demonstration, or verbal explanation. A large portion (roughly half) learns best from a visual depiction of a task.

The idea of video recording training is not new. Professional and college sports teams have been recording gameplay since they had the means to do so. The most successful teams and players are known to spend hours reviewing game tapes to build upon the team and individual performance. This inspired the idea of using our MRR to create a “game tape” for each of our platoons as they progressed through the blank/live iteration of our platoon LFX lane.

Our platoon-focused training density began with each company deploying to the Kahuku Training Area for 24 grueling hours of platoon situational training exercises (STX). This opportunity provided each platoon with successive missions that ended with trench clearance, mirroring the requirements for the LFX lane they would see approximately 48 hours later. We developed a waterfall schedule, offsetting each company by 24 hours. After completing the STX lanes, each company would self-deploy to Marine Corps Base Hawaii for platoon LFXs.

During the first day of platoon LFX lanes, we did not have the final clearance to operate our MRR on the range so the first company to complete the training did not receive a recording. In retrospect though, this company served as our control group for our game-tape trials. This company gradually progressed through the feedback of traditional observations delivered at the hotwash upon conclusion of each iteration. Those platoons took notes and made necessary adjustments through subsequent rehearsals before their next iteration. This represented the AAR model for an LFX lane that we were accustomed to.

The final two companies that conducted training on our platoon LFX lane were provided a game tape and demonstrated a shorter learning curve than the first company. The flow of each iteration, incorporating the video recording, looked like the following:

1) Before initiating the lane, MRR crew members launched the UAS and stationed themselves to observe the beginning of the lane.

2) The platoon initiated the lane, moving through the limit of advance (LOA). We made no changes to our execution, using a team of safeties and observer coach/trainers. The MRR crew then quickly returned the UAS to a designated area and cycled the controllers with the recording to the AAR building.

3) At the end of the lane, the platoon returned to the starting point, downloaded all unexpended ammunition, and received the hotwash from company and battalion leaders.

4) The platoon then moved into an adjacent AAR building to view the recording on a projector. The MRR crew used our second controller to repeat the above steps, ready to present the footage to the next platoon.

The audience for the MRR-enabled game-tape AAR solely included the platoon that had just executed the lane, and the platoon leader/platoon sergeant led the session. This was intentional; we wanted to create an environment where every platoon member felt comfortable speaking. Following the review of the MRR footage, each platoon had roughly three to four hours of rehearsal time before their next iteration. The results were more than impressive.

After subsequent iterations, the hotwash comments evolved. We were no longer harping on basic critiques such as spacing and tempo. The platoons saw this in the recording, made adjustments, and cemented the lessons on the game tape into their rehearsals and planning — creating lessons learned. Platoon leadership benefited greatly as well; platoon leaders and platoon sergeants could now see issues with sequencing, timing, and triggers.

After reflecting on this training event with the 1-27 IN team, we are confident that the Eight-Step Training Model provides trainers with everything they need to be successful. But, as we transform in contact as an Army, we also need to ask ourselves how can we use our new equipment to transform the way we train — not just how we operate? Hotwashes remain a must in the AAR process. This is the opportunity for leaders to provide instant critiques and corrections, but safeties and leaders only have two eyes and cannot be at every point or observe every micro-decision made. The game tapes provided another way platoons could see themselves.

This AAR technique was one idea that we developed, and we encourage others to continue sharing ways to transform how we train. To conclude, here are some anecdotes from three platoon sergeants who executed our platoon LFX.

SFC Christopher Marshall, Borzoi 1-7: “I believe it was a good tool for senior leaders to have and be able to coach and mentor the junior Soldiers. It would be helpful to have been able to talk to operators beforehand so the leaders conducting the MRR-enabled AAR could pinpoint the biggest friction points from previous iterations and ensure that we have footage of those friction points, or a more concerted effort on those friction points, going forward. The junior Soldiers really enjoyed being able to see what they messed up on, and it did help me lighten the mood on mistakes that were made while still being able to coach, teach, and mentor.”

SFC Edward Didonato, Death 2-7: “The MRR was an unrivaled asset to conducting platoon-level AARs. Providing ‘game-day’ footage covering the entire battlespace allowed our platoon to find friction points and tailor our rehearsals in areas we were less proficient. Additionally, it enables confidence in the leaders down to the Soldier level by visually capturing the areas we did extremely well. In war, there are no rewinds or pause button. With this system, it creates real-time feedback that can only help us improve and enhance our capabilities at any echelon. Not only does it allow us to rehearse until we get it right but rehearse until we can’t get it wrong.”

SFC John Woods, Coldsteel 3-7: “Very excited for this capability moving forward. The game tape will remove perception and be able to clearly highlight our weaknesses. By having these blind spots identified without a shadow of a doubt, we can continue to raise our ceiling.”

LTC Teddy Borawski commands 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI.

CPT Cody McCurry currently commands C Company (Coldsteel), 1-27 IN.

This article appears in the Fall 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.

As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.