Fords Against Ferraris: How the Principles of Simplicity and Mass Can Guide the Army of 2040

In 1986, GEN Donn Starry spoke at the American Defense Prepared­ness Association Conference at Fort Knox, Kentucky and discussed how “we remain outnumbered, out­ranged, and outgunned in new and im­pressive dimensions from armor to guns to missiles to helicopters to elec­tronic warfare systems.”1 Nearly four decades later the U.S. Army faces sim­ilar challenges when considering how to fight outnumbered and win in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). The U.S. Army can learn from Security As­sistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U) and other NATO partners on what is re­quired to train, sustain, and reconsti­tute combat power during LSCO. The principle of simplicity, when carefully synchronized, enables the generation of mass. When the U.S. Army develops solutions for the Army of 2040 it must develop simple solutions like a Ford versus exquisite Ferraris that are ex­pensive and take a lot of time to train, sustain and reconstitute.

The novel and innovative application of emerging technology in the Russo-Ukraine War reaffirms the importance of the principles of war to decisions about force design for LSCO. Of the nine principles of war, the Russo-Ukraine War clearly demonstrates the principles of simplicity and mass must guide the decisions of military leaders more than the others due to the unique challenges the U.S. Army will face. As the Russo-Ukraine War completes its second year, the defense and security studies community should assess the conflict and discern relevant implications for future force design de­cisions. An outcome of this conflict is that military leaders must weigh the continuities of the nature of war ver­sus the present character of warfare, such as how electronic warfare (EW) and the inexpensive first-person view­er (FPV) drones impact decision mak­ing for 2024 and beyond. The U.S. Army as an expeditionary-capable, campaign-quality force must be able to deploy globally, win its first battle, fight outnumbered to defeat a near-peer adversary while sustaining and re­constituting combat power.

To win a fight against a near-peer ad­versary the U.S. needs to mass mobile and lethal combined arms corps to ex­ecute multi-domain operations. These corps sized elements need agility to mass and penetrate an enemy defense in depth, then have the endurance to exploit this success across the depth of enemy territory until operational ob­jectives are accomplished. The ability to accomplish this penetration and ex­ploitation is inextricably tied to opera­tional reach and ability of the U.S. Army to sustain and reconstitute com­bat power.

The principle of simplicity when care­fully synchronized enables the genera­tion of mass. In tandem, the ability to have the endurance to sustain the fight for prolonged periods of time and in depth across enemy formations can achieve the lasting effects of a decisive penetration. Endurance should be tied to a simplified strategic logistics from the military industrial base, ensuring strategic mobility, and supporting tac­tical formations who must transport the various classes of supply. The prin­ciples of simplicity and mass enable strategic and tactical mobility by creat­ing commonality of equipment, streamlining manufacturing require­ments, reducing operator and mechan­ic training, and decreasing the amount of supply required to be transported. Division Sustainment Brigades must have the ability to fabricate and repair to reconstitute forces in austere envi­ronments. Theaters should develop plans for sustaining and regenerating combat power while the Army must re­duce the burden of policies to enable experimentation and transformation. The principles of simplicity and mass are inter-connected and should be viewed together to develop solutions to generate, sustain, and re-constitute combat power during LSCO.

Continuities of War

According to Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the characteristics of war­fare are “affected by changes in tech­nology, national policy, operational concepts, public opinion, and other factors.”2 An example of the impact of the characteristics of warfare on how nations fight occurred between WWI and the Gulf War. During WWI, the ma­chine gun caused massed formations to entrench themselves into defensive positions. Later, during WWII tanks and aircraft overcame the machinegun to again enable offensive operations. In the 1973 Arab Israeli War, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and air defense missiles made offensive maneuver costly for armored formations and air forces. Over the course of roughly fifty-five years, the character of war shifted from defense having the advan­tage in WWI to speed and offense hav­ing the advantage in WWII back to de­fensive advantages during the 1973 Arab Israeli War. Learning from 1973 the U.S. Army adopted Airland Battle to regain offensive abilities to fight outnumbered and win.

The Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOT­MLPF-P) changes of Airland Battle pro­vided the U.S. a solution to penetrate and exploit the defense of an enemy force with quantitative and qualitative advantages as proven during Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Today the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is dominated by strong defenses with complex obsta­cles 20 km in depth, a massed Russian Army of 670,000 Soldiers enabled with EW and a variety of drones providing constant surveillance and the potential for lethal strikes across the battlefield.3

Unlike the continuous change in the characteristics of warfare, the nature of war remains constant. FM 3-0, Op­erations, defines the nature of war as “1) fought to achieve a political pur­pose, 2) a human endeavor, 3) inher­ently chaotic and uncertain.”4 The prin­ciples of war are not a rubric for battle­field success, but instead summarize the essential elements of the nature of war so that tactical, operational, and strategic leaders may better under­stand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess forces in war. FM 3-0 de­fines the nine principles of war (see Figure 1). These definitions are narrow, and assessment of the Russo-Ukraine War demands an expansion of these definitions to guide military decision making.

The current definition of mass focuses on the tactical application of combat power. To produce the mass required to win the first battle, fight outnum­bered and win, sustain and reconsti­tute forces during a LSCO the U.S. Army must simplify and synchronize DOTMLPF-P solutions. Policies and pro­cesses to rapidly increase manufactur­ing of arms and munitions, recruit, house and train Soldiers, transport and sustain forces globally must be simpli­fied and synchronized to achieve the greatest efficiency possible. Synchronization is essential, for exam­ple to field the next generation squad weapon (NGSW) the Army must field the new weapon, the new optic, new ammunition, and develop new ranges capable of supporting the munition. To generate mass these elements must be simplified and synchronized.

Figure 1. Principles of War (U.S. Army graphic)

Once again, simplicity enables the gen­eration of mass as SAG-U and NATO forces have experienced with training, sustaining, and regenerating Ukrainian forces over the past two years. Again, the doctrinal definition of simplicity is too narrow focusing on the conduct of the orders process. As military leaders reflect on the Russo-Ukrainian War and how the U.S. Army will be able to gen­erate the combat power required at a particular place and time to achieve political aims, U.S. Army leaders must simplify and synchronize DOTMLPF-P solutions. To generate and sustain combat power simple material solu­tions must be adopted for future equipment. To the greatest extent pos­sible vehicles and equipment must have commonality of parts. This sim­plifies training requirements for oper­ators and mechanics while streamlining strategic and tactical lo­gistics requirements. Russia has prov­en to be more resilient than western military leaders thought, thus the U.S. Army must plan for reconstitution of forces to regenerate mass.6 Simplifying doctrine, training, material solutions, and policy enables the U.S. Army to in­crease the agility, endurance, and depth of combined arms corps during the conduct of multi-domain opera­tions.

The principles of simplicity and mass are key to enabling the U.S. Army to fight outnumbered and win when con­tested in all domains. In 1988, GEN Starry spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies stating, “The combination of armor/ anti-armor, in­direct fire, air defense, mine/ counter­mine, and electronic warfare capabili­ties clearly favors the other side (Rus­sia). We are behind, have been for some time, and are getting further be­hind at an alarming rate.”7 GEN Starry was instrumental in driving change within the “Army of Excellence” that would field new equipment, doctrine, and training. He passionately spoke about being able to fight outnumbered and win. When discussing Operation Desert Storm he stated, “The part of the force that brought the war to a suc­cessful termination was a corps-sized combined arms mechanized force em­ployed with lightning speed and devas­tating lethality. In summary, the equip­ment, organization, and training de­signed to support AirLand Battle doc­trine was an unqualified success.”8 For Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army, as part of a Unified Operation was able to mass multiple U.S. and coalition di­visions and conduct a tactical opera­tion to achieve national political aims through the delivery of effects from multiple domains.

Over the last 30 years adversary na­tions have learned to contest the abil­ity of the U.S. to generate the required mass of combat power to achieve mil­itary objectives. Military leaders must now develop simple DOTMLPF-P solu­tions to achieve mass in a contested environment. While technology has changed, the U.S. Army faces similar challenges GEN Starry did decades ago. The U.S. Army must be able to win its first battle, it must be able to fight out­numbered and win, and it must sustain and re-generate combat power against a near-peer adversary. The first step is to use the principles of simplicity and mass to enable global operations.

Simplicity and Mass to Enable Global Operations

ADP 3-0 describes the U.S. Army’s re­quirement to have expeditionary capa­bility and campaign quality forces.9 As the predominance of the U.S Army ca­pabilities are permanently stationed within the United States the ability to promptly deploy world-wide and sus­tain operations as long as necessary to obtain success are essential to achiev­ing national interests.10 When consid­ering global operations, the U.S. Army must balance strategic mobility against tactical mobility. Strategic mobility is the balance to develop equipment that maximizes sea, air, and rail modes of transportation to deploy formations worldwide. Tactical mobility is the ability to develop equipment with maximum maneuverability across vary­ing geographic terrain. Together these factors impact operational reach, which is “the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities.”11 In short, the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy, fight, sustain, and repair on a global scale determines the options available to commanders. General Eisenhower was presented with just these sorts of options on the eve of the allied invasion of Europe in WWII.

Figure 2. Soldiers from 4th Squadron, 9th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, "Dark Horse," 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, drive through a low-water crossing in the AMPV after completing field testing on Fort Hood, Texas September 2024. (Photo by MAJ Carson Petry)

A historical example of strategic mobil­ity is the 1944 invasion of Normandy France, Operation Overlord. On D-Day, June 6th 1944, 156,000 Soldiers crossed the English Channel and by the end of June 1944, 850,000 Soldiers and 150,000 vehicles surged into France.12 As one of the primary vehicles for Al­lied Forces, 50,000 M4 Sherman Tanks were produced by US auto manufac­tures to support war efforts in both the Pacific and European theaters.13 The tactical mobility of the Sherman enabled Allied forces to fight across the varied terrain of Europe from the Mediterranean to Berlin and a multi­tude of islands across the Pacific.

The M4 Sherman found the middle ground to enable both strategic and tactical mobility to deliver the mass re­quired to defeat Axis forces. The sim­plicity of the Sherman platform gener­ated greater tactical options for opera­tional commanders. The Sherman chassis was used for the M7 105mm self-propelled howitzer, the M12 155mm self-propelled howitzer, the M30 Cargo Carrier, the M32 and M74 Tank Recovery Vehicle, the T34 Calli­ope multiple launch rocket system, M4A3R5 Flame Thrower, M4 dozer, M4 Mobile Assault Bridge, Mine Roller and Mine Flail variants.14

This one vehicle chassis enabled infan­try, armor, artillery, engineer, and oth­er formations. Simplicity of design across warfighting functions enabled simplicity of logistics. The U.S. indus­trial base could focus production on a specific set of parts able to be used across multiple platforms. The simplic­ity of logistics allowed operational commanders to generate mass and en­able tactical success through the abil­ity to seize, retain, and exploit the ini­tiative to gain a position of relative ad­vantage. The ability to mass a com­bined arms formation at a decisive point created favorable force ratios and enabled victory – this was strate­gic, tactical, and logistical simplicity at its best.

The M4 Sherman was akin to a Ford, a simple solution able to be produced in mass and easy to sustain globally. In contrast was the German Tiger Tank, analogous to a Ferrari. The Tiger IV tank for example was superior in every way with thicker armor, a more power­ful engine, more capable suspension, and larger cannon with higher pene­trating velocity. But only 1,350 Tiger IVs were produced.15 While the Tiger IV was a superior tank, the German Army lacked a simple solution they could sustain to generate sufficient mass to achieve decisive battlefield results.

FM 3-0 discusses the requirement for reconstitution by stating, “commanders must plan for the possibility of heavy losses to personnel, supplies, and equipment. Even with continuous and effective sustainment support, units may become combat ineffective due to enemy actions. Commanders at all lev­els must be prepared to conduct recon­stitution efforts to return ineffective units to a level of effectiveness that al­lows the reconstituted unit to perform future missions.”16 As of 27 May 2024 Russia has lost, 502,304 Troops, 7,671 armored vehicles, 12,981 howitzers, 14,818 vehicles, 457 planes, 326 heli­copters, and 27 ships. U.S. military lead­ers must develop and synchronize DOT­MLPF-P solutions to win its first battle, fight outnumbered and win, sustain and re-constitute combat power.

For the armored brigade combat team (ABCT), the Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team (NGCV CFT) is focused on fielding the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) to re­place the M113 family of vehicles (FOVs), field the XM-30 Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), then develop the Next-Generation Main Bat­tle Tank (NGMBT), given the M1E3 des­ignation.17 For each of these platforms there is a focus on improving survivabil­ity and force protection, increasing mo­bility and transportability, increasing le­thality, reducing logistical impacts, and providing growth for future capabili­ties.18 These vehicles are being built to fight and win in an operating environ­ment with the constant threat of obser­vation and strike by drones. The defeat of FPV drones will be integrated into these future platforms. While not a sin­gle platform conducting multiple func­tions like the M4 Sherman, these plat­forms are striving to have increased commonality of parts through a Modu­lar Open Systems Approach (MOSA).

The AMPV will replace 2,800 of the 60-year-old M113 family of vehicles (general purpose, mortar carrier, med­ical treatment, medical evacuation, and mission command). The AMPV shares a common powertrain and suspension with the M109A7 Paladin and M2A4 Bradley.19 The XM-30 OMFV will be more lethal, more survivable, and have lower sustainment requirements than the M2A4 Bradley. Rheinmetall and General Dynamics have produced XM-30 prototypes for testing and evalua­tion.20 The NGMBT will incorporate the best of existing technology while hav­ing the ability to fight and win in the contemporary environment full of drones and EW.21 Program Executive Of­fice for Ground Combat Systems (PEO-GCS) is using open systems software and hardware architecture.22 This means as the U.S. Army modernizes its combat platforms, they will share com­mon parts and digital systems and be able to upgrade and repair rapidly.

Figure 3. Message to the Army team from Sergeant Major of the Army Michael R. Weimer, Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George, and Secretary of the Army Christine E. Wormuth signed Oct 27, 2023. (U.S. Army graphic)

The Modular Open Systems Approach not only allows for commonality, but also rapid upgrading and moderniza­tion into the future.23 By designing MOSA systems the U.S. Army will cre­ate combat vehicles with the greatest amount of commonality possible. This will decrease tactical sustainment re­quirements as battalions will carry few­er varieties of parts in their on-hand stockage. The simplification of parts required to be carried by tactical for­mations increases the agility of units and improves their ability to mass at a decisive point to gain a position of ad­vantage. The MOSA simplifies the de­mands on military industrial partners as many companies can manufacture parts common to multiple systems. Which, in-turn, allows the U.S. Army to generate mass strategically. The prin­ciples of simplicity and mass are inter-connected and must be viewed togeth­er to develop solutions to generate, sustain, and re-constitute combat pow­er.

Simplicity and Mass to enable Multi-Domain Operations.

In the July-August 1975 edition of AR­MOR magazine, GEN Starry said, “win­ning the first battle(s) is critical, and they will have to be won by U.S. Army forces fighting outnumbered. The se­cret to winning is not in numbers. Mo­bility provides the means to mass in the time and place arriving at a reason­ably matched force ratio, say three, four, or six to one.”24 Thus, if Russia does have 670,000 troops committed to the war in Ukraine, it does not mean the U.S. must have over 2 million forc­es to achieve a 3:1 force ratio to win the war. Instead, as GEN Starry states, the ability to mass combat power at a decisive point creates the favorable force ratios required to achieve a posi­tion of relative advantage where joint and coalition partners can penetrate and exploit.

Lethality and firepower are inter-relat­ed elements which enable the massed formation to deliver combat power to achieve tactical success. Lethality is the capability and capacity to destroy, and firepower is the primary source of lethality.25 According to FM 3-0, fire­power facilitates maneuver by sup­pressing enemy fires and disrupting or preventing the movement of enemy forces.26 The ability for a combined arms formation to use tactical mobility and devastating lethality to gain a po­sition of relative advantage preserves combat power and creates opportuni­ties to exploit success. If a friendly for­mation can conduct such operations throughout the depth of the enemy formation without reaching a point of culmination, then tactical victory can be achieved.

The 1973 Arab Israeli War, the 2017 Siege of Mosul, the 2020 Second Nago­rno-Karabakh War, and the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War all highlight the le­thality of the modern battlefield. In 1973, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) lost 800 armored vehicles and 100 at­tack aircraft in three weeks.27 The 162nd Division alone lost 83 of 183 tanks on 8 October 1973.28 To over­come the Arab defense a joint and combined arms approach was re­quired.

The initial Israeli armored assault lacked combined arms integration and tanks drove into anti-armor ambushes with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Similarly, attack aircraft flew into inte­grated air defense networks of surface to air missiles (SAMs). As the IDF incor­porated infantry to clear enemy battle positions armored forces could pene­trate the defense with mobility and le­thality. The ground corps exploited this success destroying SAM sites creating clear air corridors for the air force. The complementary effects of joint and combined arms operations enabled freedom of maneuver across multiple domains.

During the Russo-Ukraine War, Russian EW systems have proven capable of neutralizing U.S. precision strike capa­bilities.29 Simultaneously, the M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle has proven to be one of the most capable platforms on the battlefield in Ukraine. Its com­bination of mobility and lethality has resulted in devastating destruction to Russian formations including the high­ly publicized destruction of a T-90 main battle tank with the 25mm Bushmaster auto cannon.30 Another high visibility event is the destruction of a T-80 main battle tank with a TOW missile from over a mile away.31 With an abundance of confirmed kills on the battlefield the mobility and lethality of the Bradley demonstrates the capabilities required to defeat a near-peer army in depth and enable multi-domain operations.

If the U.S. were engaged in LSCO against a near-peer military, the U.S. must plan for destruction at scales sim­ilar to 1973 and Ukraine. The U.S. needs to have mobile and lethal com­bined arms corps to enable multi-do­main operations. U.S. Army combined arms corps will be essential to the de­struction of SAM and EW sites to en­able surface to ground and air to ground strike capabilities throughout the depth of the enemy formation. These strikes will be required to de­stroy drone launch and recovery sites and control stations, which will further protect the ground force from future enemy drone strikes.

The M2A2 Bradley represents the im­pact of simplicity and mass required to enable MDO. With the U.S. donating over 200 M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehi­cles to Ukraine the Bradley has made a tremendous impact for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).32 The simplicity of the vehicles’ design has enabled the UAF to repair battle-damaged vehicles and return reconstituted forces to the fight.33 The simplicity of the vehicle makes it easy to operate and easy to train new Soldiers how to employ and maintain. The Bradley’s small size gen­erates mass through numbers facilitat­ing efficient strategic mobility while having superior tactical mobility on the battlefield. Together, the simplicity of the vehicle enables rapid generation of combat power which provides endur­ance to the operating force. The suc­cess of the M2A2 in Ukraine validates the MOSA approach and commonality of parts across the AMPV, XM-30, and M1E334. The principles of simplicity and mass have been proven on the bat­tlefield with the M2A2 during ODS and the Russo-Ukraine War and must in­form U.S. Army modernization for LSCO. Winning ground wars requires Fords not Ferraris.

Simplicity and Mass to Be Combat Ready, Transform, and Strengthen the Profession

In October 2023, Army senior leader­ship delivered a Tri-Signed with priori­ties for the Army. It stated, “we are a global force that fights when called upon at the scale required.”36 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) GEN Randy George further set four priorities for the U.S. Army as Warfighting, Deliver­ing Ready Combat Formations, Contin­uous Transformation, and Strengthen­ing the Profession.35 CSA George chal­lenges the Total Army enterprise to build lethal cohesive teams with lead­ers of character and competence that enforce standards and take care of Sol­diers and their families and become leaner, more mobile, and more lethal through rapid iteration. As Army lead­ers analyze contemporary problems and generate solutions in-line with the CSAs priorities, the principles of sim­plicity and mass viewed through the DOTMLPF-P framework can guide how the U.S. Army generates the combat power required to win.

To build warfighting ability CSA George challenges Army leaders to cut out un­necessary activities to build lethal and cohesive teams. Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen Gerras discussed these challenges in their 2015 article “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession” where they present the challenges leaders at echelon face to meet mandatory requirements as well as those related to operations and readiness.36 Simplicity is required to meet the CSA’s intent. Policy changes must be made to reduce or modify mandatory requirements or remove as many activities as possible that detract from building lethal and cohesive teams. For example, the Army Spon­sorship Program. It takes a lot of time and organizational energy for company leaders to sponsor every Soldier arriv­ing to their unit. Why is it mandatory for units to sponsor every single Sol­dier coming to the unit? Does it make sense to sponsor an E-6 making their third or fourth permanent change of station (PCS)? Sponsorship makes sense for initial term Soldiers and Out­side the Continental United States (OCONUS) moves where there are many different rules and regulations. But, for Continental United States (CO­NUS) moves, non-initial term Soldiers should opt in to the sponsorship pro­gram if they feel they need assistance instead of making it mandatory for ev­ery Soldier.

The CSA wants iterative experimenta­tion and transformation of forces as well as a reduction in requirements on units. To achieve this policy changes will be required to allow for divisions to rapidly procure or locally produce and test experimental equipment. Is­lamic State (ISIS) flew armed small drones in Iraq in 2014 but the US Army still lacks a similar capability. Divisions could 3D print drones and use a simple application to get Federal Aviation Ad­ministration (FAA) clearance and fly within the local training area to allow Soldiers to maneuver with aerial sup­port. Until these policy changes can be made the U.S. Army will continue to be decades behind our adversaries who rapidly iterate without bureaucratic barriers.

Reconstitution of forces is an area Army leaders should focus now to pre­pare theaters for future conflicts. Army leaders can identify facilities to house, feed, and train forces on a rotational basis and design reconstitution plans based upon the capacities of these lo­cations. Then, decisions weighting risk can be made regarding what level of training is acceptable for a reconstitut­ed force and in what amount of time. Failure to develop theater reconstitu­tion plans now will delay future battle­field endurance, agility, and depth of operations. For example, as Ukrainian battalions were attritted they would be pulled off the front line and veteran Soldiers would serve as the core cadre of companies and replacement Soldiers are then added to re-consti­tute the battalion. From there units would complete squad, platoon, and company situational training exercises (STX) and live fire exercises (LFX) then returned to the front line.

Repair and fabrication capabilities must become a major focus for Army transformation to build combat ready forces. Although the Israeli 162nd Di­vision lost 83/183 tanks on October 8th, 1973 battle damage and repair ca­pabilities reconstituted dozens of tanks within a week. Facilities like Mainte­nance Activity Vilseck (MAV) at Rose Barracks Germany and Material Sup­port Command-Korea (MSCK) at Camp Carroll, Korea must be present within Division Sustainment Brigades (DSB). Facilities like the MAV and MSCK can repair faults to wiring harnesses and line replaceable units (LRUs) and fab­ricate hundreds of different parts. These facilities represent the ability to reduce demands on the military indus­trial base, repair equipment more rap­idly and at a cost savings to the govern­ment. The ability to repair and fabri­cate close to operational units simpli­fies the ability to sustain and re-gener­ate units which enables commanders to mass combat power in the most ef­ficient manner possible.

Conclusion

Napoleon Bonaparte is often attribut­ed to the saying that, “amateurs dis­cuss tactics, but professionals discuss logistics.” The tactics of the Russo-Ukraine War like EW and FPV drones make headlines, but the lessons for U.S. Army leaders to learn centers around logistics. To fight and win against a near-peer adversary the U.S. Army must:

1. Develop products with the greatest amount of part commonality possible.
2. Every Division Sustainment Brigade must have the ability to repair and fabricate components in a remote location without civilian contractors and battalions must be proficient in battle damage and repair procedures to regenerate combat power.
3. Theaters must develop plans to reconstitute combat power.
4. Policy changes are required to enable increased experimentation by allowing units to rapidly procure or fabricate solutions.

The Army needs to develop solutions akin to a Ford. Simple solutions able to generate rapidly and easy to sustain globally. From WWII to 1973 to the present this same formula has proven successful. Exquisite technological so­lutions go against the principles of war and the history of mechanized warfare does not favor Ferraris like the German Tiger Tank. As Army leaders reflect on lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War they should synchronize simple solu­tions across DOTMLPF-P to enable the generation of mass as this will empow­er corps with agility, endurance, and depth to conduct multi-domain opera­tions and win.

LTC Kyle Trottier is the Battalion Com­mander of 1-37AR, 2ABCT, 1AD, Fort Bliss, TX. His previous assignments in­clude Career Manager, HRC, LTC and MAJ; Executive Officer, 1ABCT, 3ID; Ex­ecutive Officer, 2-7IN, 1ABCT, 3ID; and G35, 3ID. His military schools include School of Advanced Military Studies; Command and General Staff College; Air Assault Course; Maneuver Captains Career Course; Armor Officer Basic Course; Northern Warfare Course; and Basic Airborne Course. LTC Trottier has a Bachelor of Science degree in Crimi­nal Justice from Texas Christian Univer­sity; a Master’s of Arts degree in Secu­rity Management from Webster Uni­versity; and a Master’s of Military Art degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies. His awards include four Bronze Star Medals, one Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and four Meritorious Service Medals.

Notes

1 Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry, Volume 1, September 2009. 2009. 113. https://www.armyu­press.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/PressOnI.pdf

2 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing­ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), 1-35.

3 “Russia-Ukraine Tensions: Putin Orders Troops to Separatist Regions and Recog­nizes Their Independence,” New York Times, 21 February 2022.

4 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing­ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), 1-29

5 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing­ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), Table 1-1

6 “They’ve Grown Back: How Russia Sur­prised the West and Rebuilt Its Force,” Defense News, 21 May 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/global/eu­rope/2024/05/21/theyve-grown-back-how-russia-surprised-the-west-and-re­built-its-force/

7 Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry, Volume 1, September 2009. 2009. 125. https://www.armyu­press.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/PressOnI.pdf

8 Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry, Volume 1, September 2009. 2009. 31. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-insti­tute/csi-books/PressOnI.pdf

9 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Opera­tions (Washington, DC: Government Print­ing Office, 2019), 1-59 thru 1-62

10 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Opera­tions (Washington, DC: Government Print­ing Office, 2019), 1-62

11 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Opera­tions (Washington, DC: Government Print­ing Office, 2019), 1-60

12 Editors, History.com. 2009. “D-Day.” HISTORY. October 27, 2009.

https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/d-day#victory-in-normandy

13 “Landing Ship, Tank, Navy Ship. N.d. En­cyclopedia Britannica. https://www.bri­tannica.com/technology/landing-ship-tank

14 M4 Sherman (1942). https://tank-afv.com/ww2/US/M4_Sherman.php

15 Hill, Andrew. The Online Tank Museum. April 30th, 2019. https://tanks-encyclope­dia.com/ww2/germany/panzer-vi_tiger.php

16 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing­ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), 6-95

17 The Kyiv Post keeps a running tally of these figures and other Russian losses in a ticker across the top of their homepage: https://www.kyivpost.com/

18 Heaton, Dan. 2022. “Combat Vehicle Developments to Propel Army of 2030 and Beyond. https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/is­sues/2022/Fall/4Heaton22.pdf

19 Heaton, Dan. 2022. “Combat Vehicle Developments to Propel Army of 2030 and Beyond. https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/is­sues/2022/Fall/4Heaton22.pdf

20 Heaton, Dan. 2022. “Combat Vehicle Developments to Propel Army of 2030 and Beyond. https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/is­sues/2022/Fall/4Heaton22.pdf

21 https://www.army.mil/article/269609/army_awards_full_rate_production_con­tract_for_ampv

22 Magnuson, Stew. Park, Allyson. 2024. Nationaldefensemagazine.org.2024. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/6/26/gd-rheinmetall-win-optionally-manned-fighting-vehicle-contract

23 Saballa, Joe “US Army OKs Major M1 Abrams Tank upgrade.” The Defense Post, September 11, 2023. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/09/08/us-ar­my-abrams-upgrade/

24 Dr Dattathreya, Macam, MG Cummings, Brian, Mr. Sharaif, Fasi. “Reusable and Re­freshable: Open System Architecture for Fighting Vehicles. August 23, 2018. Accessed 28 May 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/210117/reusable_and_refresh_able_open_systems_architec­ture_for_fighting_vehicles

25 Defense Standardization Program. “DSP MOSA.” https://www.dsp.dla.mil/Pro­grams/MOSA/

26Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry, Volume 1, September 2009. 2009. 51. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-insti­tute/csi-books/PressOnI.pdf

27 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing­ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), 1-23 and 2-19.

28 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing­ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), 2-20

29 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Insights for Multi-Domain Operations. 2022. AUSA. December 16, 2022. https://www.ausa.org/publications/1973-arab-israeli-war-insights-multi-domain-operations

30 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Insights for Multi-Domain Operations. 2022. AUSA. December 16, 2022. https://www.ausa.org/publications/1973-arab-israeli-war-insights-multi-domain-operations

31 Cohen, Alex Marquardt, Natasha Ber­trand, Zachary. 2023. Russia’s Jamming of US-Provided Rocket Systems Complicates Ukraine’s War Effort. CNN Politics. CNN. May 5, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/russia-jam­ming-himars-rockets-ukraine/index.html

32 “Watch Two Ukrainian Bradleys Outma­neuver Russia’s Might T-90M Tank through Sheer Grit.” 2024. Popular Me­chanics. January 23, 2024. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weap­ons/a46446996/ukrainian-bradleys-out­maneuver-russias-mighty-t-90m-tank/

33 Axe, David. N.d. A Ukrainian M-2 Fight­ing Vehicle Sneaked up on a Russian T-80 at Night – and Hit it with a Missile from a Mile Away. Forbes. Accessed May15, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/05/08/a-ukrainian-m-2-fighting-vehicle-sneaked-up-on-a-rus­sian-t-80-tank-at-night-and-hit-it-with-a-missile-from-a-mile-away/?sh=45f30a3­6774b

34 Epstein, Jake. n.d. New Photos Show the US Army’s Latest Version of the Brad­ley Fighting Vehicle That Proven Itself in Ukraine. Business Insider. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://www.businessinsider.com/see-us-army-new-bradley-vehicle-ar­mor-battle-tested-ukraine-2024-5

35 Axe, David. n.d. “The Ukrainian Army Piled 15 Wrecked M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles in One Scrapyard.” Forbes. Ac­cessed May 15, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/12/24/the-ukrainian-army-piled-15-wrecked-m-2-bradley-fighting-vehicles-in-one-scrapyard/?sh=6b2a5bac108f

36 Message to the Army Team. Tri-Sign CSA Range George, SMA Michael Weimer, Sec­retary of the Army Christine Wormuth. https://www.army.mil/article/271225/oc­tober_26_2023_message_to_the_army_team

37 Message to the Army Team. Tri-Sign CSA Range George, SMA Michael Weimer, Sec­retary of the Army Christine Wormuth. https://www.army.mil/article/271225/oc­tober_26_2023_message_to_the_army_team

38 Wong, Leonard, Gerras, Stephen. Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Pro­fession. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. 1 February 2015. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=monographs