As The Command, I Will: Command and Warfighting Fundamentals at The National Training Center

There are no easy days in the desert of the National Training Center (NTC), es­pecially for commanders. The NTC’s Box is an unforgiving environment that tests our ability to fight and lead through constant contact and incom­parable demands for our time, our au­thority, and our direct and organiza­tional leadership. We fail to manage our sleep cycles in an attempt to sprint the entire fourteen days of simulated large scale combat operations during the force on force and live fire periods, insecure of where to best place our­selves before and during the fight, and frustrated that our staff cannot turn our guidance into fighting products faster. We look back over our shoul­ders with guilt that we failed to prog­ress as far as we wanted in our collec­tive training plans at home station. We experience frustration that our opera­tional readiness rate is not as high as we had hoped, due to a combination of long lead time parts and misman­aged service programs, and we are equally frustrated about the signifi­cant personnel turnover right before our rotation. We are confused, angry, and disillusioned by the role our high­er headquarters should have, did, or did not play in our path to the rota­tion. I have heard all the justifications and am equally complicit, having said and believed a version of these same words myself. Then, over two years ago, in February 2023, I was tested, falling short many times during rota­tion 23-05 with the Spartan Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division. If I could give myself advice before that rotation on how to better prepare myself, my leaders, and my organization with the knowledge and lessons that I have now…this is what I would say: “As the commander, I will.”

This is for commanders, from a com­mander. The following thoughts are my observations and recommenda­tions informed by my own failures, grounded in doctrine, and enabled by others coaching me as I continue to learn alongside incredible leaders training to conduct large scale combat operations. First, the desert does not care (and neither do our adversaries). We are deployed to the NTC to lead our Brigade Combat Team in the cru­cible of ground combat with the team we brought, the team we are still de­veloping, and the team that deserves our best. Second, the leadership fac­tory of the high Mojave Desert will ex­pose us by combining the unforgiving physical environment and a world class sparring partner in the Opposing Force (OPFOR) who will employ all nine forms of contact, never cheating, but doing their best to make every fight unfair. Finally, there is no magic formula to ‘win’ at the NTC. Presence, toughness, and fundamentals in train­ing are a great start but do not guar­antee anything. Commanders must be aggressive by leaving nothing at rest, fight to generate combat power, and make multiple forms of contact with the enemy constantly, especially when synchronizing brigade efforts to dom­inate the close fight. The article is commander-centric, using the frame­work of the Army operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess, as well as the commander activities: un­derstand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess to train commanders so they can fight better, period.

Figure 1. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, FM 6-0

Plan

As the commander, I will remember that I am the most experienced staff officer in my formation and while I am not on the staff anymore, I still owe the staff my time. My experience helps us abbreviate for efficiency and effec­tiveness. If I am upset at the staff be­cause they are not giving me the prod­uct I want as fast as I want, I bear the responsibility to fix it. This is where I understand, visualize, describe and di­rect with the staff and subordinate commanders.

I will lead through the Majors and sub­ordinate commanders with simple, clear guidance and priorities:

• The Executive Officer will control time and a battle rhythm that integrates the staff so they do the work in the main command post as well as the admin and logistics operation center: maintain staff running estimates, generate the required inputs and outputs of battle rhythm events, and help the commander think by thinking for and like the commander.
• The Operations Officer will synchronize the plan in time and space: ensuring all capabilities and warfighting functions are accounted for and focused where the commander directs domination in the close fight, building a battlefield framework that allows focus and tempo with prioritization, and creating the minimum executing products required to fight.
• The battle rhythm will allow us to plan the next operation while executing the current one so planners develop a plan that is grounded in reality.

Figure 2. Commander's Planning Guidance, Diven 23-06 (Graphic by author)

1. I will not project how good I was on my last day as a Company/Battalion Commander or Battalion/Brigade Field Grade onto my leaders. I will coach them. I am their trainer.
2. I will specify responsibilities and authorities at echelon as well as the minimum number of execution products the staff must develop for planning and for fighting. Leaders two levels down are my primary customer.
3. I will not be an observer of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) because I will drive the 1/3 to 2/3 rule by developing and issuing my own planning guidance, my commander’s intent, and by directing the course of action. I will develop and approve the essential fire support tasks with my senior fire supporter, the concept and priorities for sustainment with my senior sustainer, and approve priorities across the warfighting functions with the subject matter expert. I will endeavor to leverage information and make first contact with something that is not a human.
4. I will direct the senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to hold the unit accountable with clear authorities that get results. The Operations Sergeant Major will ensure the command post and staff have the infrastructure and resources to plan for the next fight while executing the current fight from a standardized common operational picture that remains current, is common at echelon, and enables me to command and to control. The Command Sergeant Major (CSM) will move to my specified points of friction that ensure we are generating combat power today and preparing for tomorrow. These tasks could include: observing the arrival and download of combat vehicles or throughput of Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) installation to confirm prioritization and resource allocation, the execution of maintenance operations in an assembly area of the main effort unit, and ensuring the reception and integration of non-organic units and task organization changes.

Prepare

The major activity where a command­er identifies and mitigates risk through presence and interaction with leaders across the organization using deliber­ately planned battlefield circulation, directing rehearsals, and ensuring the right amount of detail and control ex­ist within the plan. This is where I con­tinue to improve my understanding, visualization, and description. I in­crease the strength of my directing and leading while assessing through back briefs, battlefield circulation, and feedback from the CSM.

1. I will give clear guidance for rehearsals: type, sequence, and expectations of leaders in execution. Sustainment is the foundation and run by the Brigade Combat Team Executive Officer (BCT XO) in coordination with the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Commander. The Squadron Commander and Fires Support Coordinator run the information collection and fires to shape the environment, and the Brigade S3 runs the combined arms rehearsal to confirm decisions, intent, risk, and triggers (DIRT). The Brigade Engineer Battalion Commander ensures we are integrating the protection warfighting function throughout the battlefield framework.
2. I will communicate what fighting products will be used and the Brigade XO will ensure they are validated during the execution of rehearsals by specifying what conditions must be set before critical event execution or decisions are made.
3. I will conduct battlefield circulation to ensure my intent is understood at echelon, to further ensure subordinate execution of MDMP and troop leading procedures (TLPs) and to improve my understanding of what the staff is briefing from their staff running estimates. I will endeavor to conduct commander visualization and dialogue on key terrain if possible.
4. I will drive the execution of rehearsals not as a measure of performance but a measure of effectiveness, with multiple repetitions of friction points and transitions as required. I will ensure we can maneuver the network to command and control at distance, anticipate sustainment requirements at scale, protect critical capabilities, and exploit opportunities through disciplined initiative thanks to detailed control measures and simple, clear intent that is understood at echelon.
5. I will direct the Operations Sergeant Major to ensure the terrain model provides the scale, the terrain relief, and the control measures required for an effective rehearsal while enabling the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) Commander and 1SG to develop the command post (CP) transition plan. The CSM will conduct pre-combat inspections of critical task execution and commodity preparation. These tasks could include: observing subordinate breach and non-standard casualty evacuation rehearsals and ensuring mine plows and rollers are mounted, operational, and the crews are proficient, as well as medical node critical equipment and personnel readiness. The CSM’s pre-combat checks help assess our readiness to execute the start point (SP) and / or the line of departure (LOD).

Figure 3. Delineating the Fights, Spartan Leader Book, 23-06 (Graphic by author)

Figure 4. Daily Questions, Diven 23-05 (Graphic by author)

Execute

The major activity where a command­er struggles the most to place them­selves and where we learn if our com­mand post is conducting the six com­mand post functions effectively. Ob­servations from the Russo-Ukraine conflict often drive us to emphasize survivability over functionality, at our own peril. The commander must be able to communicate in order to com­mand and control with the clear em­phasis on directing, leading, and as­sessing. Work to function first, and then survive.

1. I will ensure the required conditions are set before executing critical tasks and actions, noting that the time may be sooner than expected and with less conditions set than expected. Not having all the conditions set is simply risk and I will determine what is prudent and acceptable.
2. I will not be the Battle Captain nor the Chief of Operations (CHOPS) as the XO runs the MCP. I will fight from my command post because that is where the information is relevant through the staff’s running estimates, updated on the common operational picture and good reporting in accordance with our standard operating procedures (SOPs) and my approved commander’s critical information requirements.
3. I will not abandon the main command post because I want to move forward in a tactical command post (TAC) or mobile command group (MCG) so I can better ‘see’ the fight. If I don’t want to fight from my CP it is likely because the CP is not functional. The TAC exists as a temporary node that enables the commander to command and control through a transition period or a discrete event; it is not enduring. The TAC maintains the people, the processes, and platforms the commander needs to fight for 6-12 hours at most. The MCG enables battlefield circulation.
4. I will use the fighting products validated during the execution of rehearsals until conditions change to the extent we transition to the next phase or we conduct the rapid decision making and synchronization process. The XO ensures the staff maintains updated running estimates and continues to plan for the transition to the next phase while the S3 ensures timings, triggers, and synchronization of the current fight.
5. I will hold the Operations Sergeant Major accountable for the COP remaining current, the duties and responsibilities of the CP are being executed, and the HHC Commander and 1SG are prepared to execute the CP transition plan. The CSM will move to specified friction points to ensure transitions occur as planned. These tasks could be: ensuring mission or combat configured loads are prepared to move to their designated location according to planned triggers, forward logistics elements and medical nodes are moving or postured as planned, or inspect coordination and risk mitigation efforts between two converging elements.

Figure 5. Spartan Brigade tanks fire during the live-fire portion of the NTC rotation (Photo by author)

Assess

The major activity where a command­er must trust and use judgment. We must trust in subordinate reporting, weighing heavily when a subordinate commander reports their own assess­ment of the situation. The command­er synthesizes the inputs and informa­tion provided by the staff and applies judgment in decision making. Some­times a commander must trust their own instinct, leveraging the coup d’oeil or inward eye that Clausewitz talks about where commanders devel­op absolute clarity in battle and exe­cute or adjust the plan accordingly. The emphasis is rightly on assessing but also how the commander’s assess­ment then feeds back into the other commander activities as a continuous process.

1. I will incorporate reporting from higher headquarters, subordinate units, and the staff to update my own commander’s running estimate.
2. I will expect commanders to report their assessments with relation to being on or off plan and on or off time to understand our operational tempo and if prioritization needs to change. I will expect commanders to solve problems through their assessments, that are often transparent to me.
3. I will expect commanders and staff to make recommendations to maintain shared understanding, seeking opportunities, and conducting risk management throughout execution.
4. I will share my assessment vertically and horizontally because our brigade is fighting as part of a division, amongst Special Operations Forces, and in support of Joint and Multinational Forces.
5. I will hold the Operations Sergeant Major accountable for maintaining combat power, readiness, and endurance across the staff and in the command posts in coordination with the Executive Officer. The CSM will provide candid feedback of the operational tempo and stress on the force to help assess where to consolidate and reorganize as a planned or unplanned transition. The CSM will also provide an assessment of how we are taking care of our casualties and regenerating combat power through the evacuation process, mortuary affairs, and replacement processes.

Figure 6. Example LD Conditions Check (U.S. Army Graphic)

So What

We (brigades and commanders) un­derstand the importance of establish­ing an operational tempo but are chal­lenged to execute the current fight while simultaneously planning and preparing for the next one. We struggle to describe specific condi­tions required for execution across the warfighting functions to truly combine arms in time and space. We continue to experiment with command post configuration by balancing survivabil­ity with functionality. We are getting better at visualizing our sustainment as the foundation of our operations with anticipation and not as an after­thought. We try to enable command and control by maneuvering the net­work across a multi-channel Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE). We see the need for simple fighting products, that enable com­manders to conduct commander ac­tivities and employ senior enlisted leaders to drive action. We see the need to find the enemy and make con­tact using a non-human first, and ma­neuver to employ all-domain fires. We should be happy with our intent and efforts to improve and fight better, but never satisfied.

The NTC remains focused on warfight­ing and developing leaders in the most stressful and realistic environment in preparation for future combat. There are no easy days in the desert and this is a leadership factory where one cannot help but be better after a rota­tion. Our observations are intended for professional development, to in­form home station training, and most importantly to prepare leaders for the challenges of large-scale combat op­erations by preparing us to not only win the first fight, but dominate our adversaries through the last fight.

This article reflects the sweat, the parts hung, the caked dust, and the or­ders issued over the net at the high Mojave desert that builds leaders, builds readiness, and is helping to transform our Army. The embedded products are not the answer, but “a way” to help leaders drive the opera­tions process and fight better. The NTC and Operations Group exists to Train the Force. We must Lead, Train, and Win. Now, let’s go fight.

COL Ethan Diven is the 31st Command­er of Operations Group at the Nation­al Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. His previous assignments include Com­mander, 2nd ABCT “Spartans” of the 3rd ID at Fort Stewart, GA; Command­er, 1-40 CAV (ABN) of the former 4-25 (ABN) of the 11th DIV (ABN) at JBER, AK; and Commander, B/1-34 AR of the “Devil” Brigade of 1st ID at Fort Riley, KS. His other assignments include Joint Planner and Operations Chief at the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command Norfolk Naval Station at Norfolk, VA; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 of the 3rd ID at Fort Stewart, GA; SQDN XO, BCT XO, and Senior Live Fire Trainer at the Joint Readiness Training Center Oper­ations Group at Fort Johnson, LA; 1-327 IN BN XO and BCT S3 1/101 ABN DIV (AASLT) Fort Campbell, KY; Train­ing Officer and S4 3rd BN, 75th Ranger Regiment Fort Benning, GA; Infantry Captains Career Course Instructor at Fort Benning, GA; and S1 and AS3 in 2-12 CAV, 2/1CD at Fort Cavazos, TX. His military schools include Joint Ad­vanced Warfighting School; Command and General Staff College; Combined Arms Services Staff School; and Infan­try Captains Career Course. COL Diven has a Bachelor of Arts from Texas Tech University; a Master of Strategic Stud­ies from CGSC; a Masters of Adminis­trative Science from Central Michigan University; and a Masters in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School.