The Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) — the U.S. Army’s newest combat training center (CTC) — is how the U.S. Army Pacific enhances warfighting and builds readiness in its unique environments. For the 25th Infantry Division, that means the tropical climate of the Pacific, and for the 11th Airborne Division (Arctic), that means the extreme cold weather and high-latitude environments. Using the expansive terrain of Alaska contained within the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), the 11th Airborne Division builds readiness in its own backyard. JPARC consists of more than 1.5 million acres of available training area with more than 65,000 square miles of airspace, which is over two times the size of South Carolina.
Geographically, the available training area stretches from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (Anchorage) to Fort Wainwright (Fairbanks) and beyond. The division annually rotates which of its two infantry brigades serves as the rotational training unit (RTU). This allows the division to focus on building lethality across the formation while annually exercising in the coldest months of the year. If not serving as the RTU, the infantry brigade serves as the opposing force (OPFOR) and provides other backside support requirements. As JPMRC is based in Alaska, it leverages the region’s harsh conditions — subzero temperatures, heavy snowfall, and mountainous terrain — to train Soldiers and multinational partners in realistic large-scale combat scenarios to not only survive but dominate in the Arctic.
Importance of Arctic Warfighting
Although the strategic interest in the Arctic and associated security may appear to be a fairly new concept — as underscored by the reactivation of the 11th Airborne Division in 2022 — the reality is there are numerous historic examples of combat in unforgiving extreme cold environments. Those examples include the Russo-Finnish war or “Winter War” in 1939-1940 and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir in 1950 during the Korean War.
During the Winter War, the Finnish Army used their over-the-snow mobility and knowledge of the terrain to ambush and delay Russian forces until the Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on 12 March 1940 — ending the 105-day war. The Finnish Army put on a master class of guerrilla warfare tactics as they conducted decentralized operations and carefully chose less protected targets on advantageous terrain when on the offense. The Finnish Army “fought small” and used cross-country skiing or skijoring behind reindeer to move much faster around the snow-covered battlefield. This speed advantage allowed them to fight at the platoon and squad level unburdened by the extreme temperatures or the snow due to their fieldcraft and expertise. Conversely, the nearly 250,000-man Soviet Army found themselves canalized due to their dependence on vehicles to the few road networks that existed in the far eastern portion of Finland’s wilderness. The Soviet Army’s dependence on the road network led to a decisive defeat during the Battle of Raate Road where just 6,000 Finnish soldiers from the 9th Infantry Division were able to destroy between 4,600 and 9,000 personnel of the 146th and 25th Soviet Rifle Regiments while capturing 1,900 more through a series or coordinated flank attacks.
Similarly, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir involved U.S. Marines and United Nations (UN) forces withdrawing under pressure in subzero conditions over icy mountain passes in order to preserve combat power. This battle took place between 27 November and 13 December 1950 during one of the coldest winters of the Korean War. On 24 November, the U.S. X Corps pursued the 124th People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) north from Wansun to the Chosin Reservoir as the PVA had hoped. Once UN forces were established at the reservoir, a cold front moved in from Siberia and temperatures plummeted to -36 degrees Fahrenheit (F). It was so cold that weapons began to freeze, rendering them useless, and medical supplies such as plasma and morphine became degraded, if not unusable, once frozen. The PVA 9th Corps entered the theater and massed on the reservoir, forcing the withdrawal of UN forces over some of the harshest terrain and most extreme weather the war had seen. Soldiers were without food, ammunition, or proper medical supplies for weeks as they were harassed by PVA forces along the single unimproved road south to eventually evacuate at Hungnam.
These cases — spanning European and Pacific theaters — demonstrate the need for Arctic expertise to succeed.
In addition to the historic examples outlined above, the Department of Defense (DoD) recently published an Arctic Strategy in 2024 that highlights the need for extreme cold weather training and Arctic warfighting readiness as critical to the department’s success in future wars. Moreover, the Arctic Strategy emphasizes the need to conduct Arctic warfighting alongside our allies and partners to build capacity with Pacific and European armies. Arctic Strategy line of effort (LOE) number three states the DoD will: “Exercise presence in the Arctic by training both independently and alongside Allies and partners to demonstrate interoperability and credible joint capabilities while supporting homeland defense and global power projection operations.” This aligns with the 11th Airborne Division’s annual JPMRC rotations and participation in Operation Pathways, reinforcing its strategic relevance.
Building Arctic Expertise
Every Soldier in the 11th Airborne Division completes the Cold Weather Indoctrination Course (CWIC) annually to build a baseline of Arctic fundamentals. The one-week course covers terrain, cold weather risks, Soldier-issued clothing, and unit-provided equipment. Specifically, it includes the wear and proper use of Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS), sleep systems, 10-person Arctic tent groups called “ahkios,” snowshoes, skis, and subzero risks like frostbite and hypothermia. During CWIC, Soldiers are introduced to the ahkio tent, which will be their lifeline throughout JPMRC as well as other cold weather training events. The ahkio consists of a canvas tent with cover capable of housing 10 Soldiers and an internal stove system that can burn solid and a variety of gas fuel types on a sled equipped with multiple harnesses to allow Soldiers to traverse the large shelter and its accessories across the battlefield. Soldiers learn to use arctic space heaters, set up tents, build snow shelters, and fight while on skis and snowshoes in addition to the importance of how nutrition and hydration differ in subzero temperatures. The course also explores Arctic terrain and historical warfare lessons to ensure Soldiers understand environmental and operational demands. The culminating event for the course is a 5-kilometer movement in snowshoes. This sets the foundation for Arctic warfighting that squads and platoons can build upon during subsequent winter training.
In addition to its home-station training, the 11th Airborne Division is fortunate to have the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC). NWTC — located in Black Rapids, AK —further develops Arctic and mountain expertise. In winter, NWTC offers Cold Weather Leader and Orientation courses (CWLC/CWOC), equipping leaders with the necessary skills to train their units in cold weather environments. In summer, it shifts to mountaineering, running multiple iterations of Basic and Advanced Military Mountaineering courses. NWTC often hosts additional courses tailored to unit demands, using their Arctic and mountaineering experts in its unique training area. These programs ensure leaders integrate Arctic and mountaineering tactics into unit training plans, enhancing division-wide Arctic readiness.
JPMRC 25-02 Overview
During JPMRC 25-02 — which occurred in January 2025 — temperatures ranged from 40 to -37 degrees F. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 11th Airborne Division (Arctic) served as the RTU and entered the frozen arena of Donnelly Training Area (DTA) through numerous means: joint forcible entry (JFE), air assault, and ground assault. The JFE consisted of 13x C-17s and C-130s that dropped more than 1,000 Paratroopers and subsequently air landed 100 pieces of equipment over two drop zones. That equipment ranged from snow machines and Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicles (CATVs) for over-snow mobility and command and control as well as fires and sustainment platforms. The air assault consisted of 400 Paratroopers and multiple snow machines capable of towing arctic sustainment (i.e., ahkios). The ground assault initiated out of Fort Wainwright and totaled more than 700 vehicles and 1,400 Soldiers. With the help of the larger joint force, the brigade massed 3,000 Paratroopers and more than 1,300 vehicles in DTA within 72 hours to fight and win against a well-trained Arctic OPFOR.
Arctic Airborne and Air Assault Operations
At the division and brigade level, Arctic airborne and air assault operations require meticulous planning and coordination to ensure success. JFE planning must not only consider the sustainment deficits inherent in any airborne operation but also the snow depth and temperature conditions in which formations will seize and expand the lodgment. Paratrooper loads — averaging 90 pounds for Arctic sustainment (gloves, layers, sleep systems, snowshoes) plus water, food, and ammunition — pose challenges at departure airfields and on the ground. To offset this, units use Container Delivery Systems (CDS) and door bundles, but Arctic sustainment minimums remain non-negotiable to mitigate cold weather injury risks. Heavy drops of ahkios and snow machines enhance mobility and warming capabilities, extending operational reach. Even routine pre-jump training in subzero conditions demands leader oversight to minimize risks, including ramp-side inspections and ruck-hanging to prevent frostbite.
Air assault operations face similar Arctic constraints. Snow depth and landing zone (LZ) selection are critical. In pick-up zones (PZs), warming shelters and arctic sustainment prevent cold weather injuries before takeoff. Moreover, the rotor wash in subzero temperatures exponentially increase the risk of cold weather injury for exposed skin. Snow machines and ahkios — loaded onto CH-47s and driven off ramps — enable rapid LZ dispersal with sustainment and mobility. Deep snow may require immediate use of snowshoes or skis, and helicopter floors require shoring to avoid damage. These adaptations ensure units reach objectives efficiently and require extensive planning and coordination between ground and aviation units. Moreover, they require numerous repetitions to get right through cold and hot load training before actual execution.
As a battalion task force within 2/11, the 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry Battalion (Airborne) learned critical lessons in movement and maneuver, sustainment, and command and control. Offensive operations highlighted the need to balance tempo with sustainment to maintain operational reach. Defensive operations emphasized anticipatory logistics and rehearsals to withstand repeated enemy attacks in subzero temperatures. Arctic-specific challenges, such as extreme cold and heavy snow, demanded specialized expertise, mirroring historical examples where sustainment determined success.
Movement and Maneuver
In the Arctic, operational reach is a dynamic metric that leadership within the battalion and companies closely manage. It takes into consideration the formation’s overall combat power and a thorough look at tempo combined with the ability to sustain the formation at the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Dismounted movement in subzero temperatures and variable snowpack slows tempo significantly. Soldiers use snowshoes or skis to navigate snow, yet when wearing rucks (weighing approximately 90 pounds with critical Arctic gear) and also pulling ahkios as a squad (weighing up to 200 pounds), the speed at which a unit can move is greatly reduced. Squads set up ahkios based on temperature zones and cold exposure risks, which can lead to cold weather injuries such as hypothermia, frostbite, and trench foot — if mismanaged. Exposure times vary, with sweating in cold conditions accelerating hypothermia and cold weather injury risks. In subzero temperatures, if you stop for more than 15 minutes, it is highly likely that the unit will need to stop for hours and set up ahkios for warming shelters to mitigate cold weather injury risks and keep water from freezing. Leader involvement is critical when maneuvering in the Arctic. They must stay engaged because every Soldier has a different threshold for extreme cold weather exposure to the elements and, if mismanaged, could have life-changing impacts to the men and women under their charge.
In extreme cold weather temperatures, the battalion executed movements to contact by bounding companies in overwatch to maintain tempo and manage sustainment. One company would bound forward to locate the enemy, setting up ahkios if none are found, while another company bounds past. Platoons and squads would mirror this at smaller scales, with ski squads maintaining contact and rotating into ahkios for warming. This cycle continues until the enemy is located and destroyed through a controlled balance of tempo with cold weather risk mitigation.
Sustainment Challenges
Sustainment in the Arctic amplifies logistical demands. Water, which is critical for dismounted units, freezes in subzero temperatures in as little as 90 minutes, which can then take upwards of multiple hours to thaw. Soldiers adapt by keeping water worn close to the body and inside their jacket to prevent freezing. Squads and platoons also place 5-gallon water cans in their ahkios that need to be monitored as well. Once resupplied, platoons must reserve space inside their 10-man tent for their water cans in order to keep them freezing. At scale, the division employs heaters for water buffalos to maintain an available water supply. Managing water intake requires constant leader oversight and accurate reporting.
While executing priorities of work during long halts, squad ahkios and tent heaters are vital for preventing Soldier cold weather injuries and keeping water from freezing. Heaters require fuel, and heater intensity levels must balance injury prevention with resource conservation. There is a constant balance that must be considered when dealing with resupply operations in the Arctic. Companies must be predictive when requesting classes of supply from battalion as the company must be light enough to maintain mobility but not so light that they don’t have the necessary fuel or water to maintain combat power. This often requires platoons to cross load classes of supply in order to balance the burden of weight as well as mitigate cold weather injuries within their formations.
Nutrition requirements pose another unique challenge in the Arctic. 11th Airborne Soldiers are taught during CWIC that the calorie expenditures in extreme cold conditions are 4,600 and 3,150 calories per day for men and women, respectively, per day. Standard Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) are less desirable in the extreme cold because the packaged food contains roughly eight ounces of water and will freeze. First Strike Rations are intended for 24 hours of consumption and contain snack foods that also freeze; however, they contain 2,900 calories per day, compared to an MRE that has roughly 1,300 calories per meal. The Modular Operational Ration Enhancement (MORE) contains 1,100 calories to supplement the above three options. The preferred combination is storing MORE snacks close to the body to prevent freezing (and unwanted trips to the dental clinic), paired with Meals, Cold Weather (MCWs) or “Winter MREs.” These meals are comprised of dehydrated “Mountain House” meals, which average 1,450 calories per meal and require one liter of heated water — drastically increasing water intake at scale and amplifying the need for resupply. On the topic of water, Soldiers in the Arctic require between four and six liters a day. During combat operations in extreme cold conditions, each rifle squad consumes 9 gallons daily. This covers the one liter per MCW requirement. In order to offset some of this requirement, squads will melt snow using their MSR stoves once set up in their ahkios.
Vehicle sustainment also presents challenges. With respect to troop transport, vehicles must have a working Arctic Heater in the rear of the vehicle in order to prevent passengers from receiving cold weather injuries such as frostbite or hypothermia. Soldiers use their closed-cell foam sleeping pads as seat covers to insulate and protect themselves from contact frostbite with metal seats found in most military vehicles. Vehicles in the 11th Airborne Division have oil pan heaters, block heaters, and snow chains installed for winter use; however, these upgrades are only beneficial when in garrison where you have the opportunity to plug the vehicle in. In austere conditions similar to those faced at JPMRC, turning off your vehicle can cause the battery to die or the fluids in the oil pan or transmission case to freeze. To overcome this challenge, vehicles ran continuously for the duration of JPMRC — decreasing the formation’s audible signature and increasing fuel requirements. Snow machines and CATVs deliver supplies to the FLOT, but anticipating logistical needs is critical for maintaining tempo and operational reach. To maximize tempo during the battalion’s final pursuit, ahkios were consolidated and loaded onto LMTVs to be moved as far forward as possible while the mounted heavy weapons company pulled security. This allowed the rifle companies to move unencumbered by the weight of their ahkios and served as a creative solution to increase the distance and speed of the battalion’s over-the-snow movement. Due to the formation’s enhanced speed, the battalion surprised the enemy during their consolidation and reorganization.
Additional Arctic Considerations
Defense
In the defense, food, water, and fuel are easier to manage — relative to the offense — at the tactical level. At scale, it’s critical to get engineer assets to the FLOT as quickly as possible. Obviously, determining the obstacles and associated priorities matter, but how they are emplaced is unique, especially with the snow depth, permafrost, mobility corridors, and subzero temperatures. The same cold weather exposure times and sustainment problems are applied in the defense, but engineer assets become the main effort. Ahkios are established and camouflaged behind battle positions, and fighting position construction begins immediately. Ski squads are dispatched to conduct security patrols and establish a network of false trails. Track discipline is paramount in the defense as to provide early warning. Snow machines and CATVs help with Class IV movement to obstacle locations, but snow depth impacts where blade assets can get to. Unique to the Arctic is the use of snow berms and obstacles to help build defensive lines and battle position integration.
Medical Considerations
Arctic medical operations demand specialized approaches. Casualty care on objectives requires rapid stabilization in extreme cold to prevent hypothermia. The ability to execute intravenous care requires a warming shelter as a needle itself could cause frost bite. Moreover, saline bags can freeze and require similar warming shelters for storage and use. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) methods must account for snow-covered terrain and subzero temperatures. Snow machines and CATVs facilitate rapid casualty transport while warming shelters at aid stations maintain patient stability.
Command and Control
Subzero temperatures significantly reduce battery life (up to 80 percent), complicating command and control. Poor battery management at the company level has drastic impacts on brigade-level coordination. Entire companies will become combat ineffective simply due to the extreme cold weather greatly degrading their ability to coordinate with adjacent units or their higher headquarters. The effects of the cold on batteries require formations to use communication windows, a common technique during reconnaissance, in order to reduce the required number of radios to be on at any given time. As a battalion expands the FLOT, the Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) relies on retransmission systems to expand the mesh network. With many radios cycled off to preserve battery life across a prolonged engagement, formations constantly fight degraded communication capabilities. With the help of Army Research Labs and Montana Technological University, Ghost retransmissions systems have been upgraded into Arctic-capable “Phantom” systems to extend the network while reducing the cold weather impact on batteries. These insulated, battery-powered systems operate without additional security or management for up to three days depending on the temperature.
Conclusion
JPMRC 25-02 revealed that Arctic warfare demands innovation and adaptation. From individual Soldier discipline and fieldcraft to battalion-level sustainment, the 11th Airborne Division’s lessons underscore the importance of balancing tempo, sustainment, and combat power. The great equalizer of a potential conflict in the Arctic or high-latitude environment will undoubtedly be the conditions described throughout. The lessons learned at Chosin Reservoir and during the Russo-Finnish war still apply today, and conversely no amount of modern gear or cutting-edge tech can completely solve the problem sets unique to the Arctic. It takes a unique caste of Soldier to fight and win in the “High North.” As the 11th Airborne Division modernizes and refines its Arctic modified table of organization and equipment, it stands ready to jump, air assault, and win in the harshest environments, ensuring dominance on any modern Arctic battlefield.
LTC Cody Grimm is an Infantryman and currently serves as the commander of 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry Battalion (Airborne), 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 11th Airborne Division. He previously served in Alaska as a rifle and headquarters company commander in 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Battalion and later the aide-de-camp to the U.S. Army Alaska Commanding General.
CPT Matthew LaFleur is an Infantryman and currently serves as the commander of Baker Company, 3-509 IN (ABN). He previously served as a rifle platoon leader, heavy weapons company executive officer, battalion S-4 OIC, and brigade S-3 air OIC in 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Airborne).
This article appears in the Summer 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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