Since its founding, the United States has established strong military alliances with partners worldwide. These partnerships are vital to maintaining strategic alliances and mutual trust in the Indo-Pacific area of operations (AO). During a recent Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) rotation, the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Provisional) — 2LBCT(P) — collaborated with the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to strengthen its partnership, improve interoperability, and increase warfighter readiness while validating the Army’s Transformation in Contact (TiC) directives.
Initial Engagement
Last summer, the SAF sent a delegation to Schofield Barracks, HI, to meet with members of 2LBCT(P) in preparation for the JPMRC rotation. During this engagement, the SAF outlined their training objectives while 2LBCT(P) Soldiers showcased their maneuver, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capabilities.
In the fall, a battalion within 2LBCT(P) received confirmation that the SAF would operate under its operational control during JPMRC. This decision enabled that battalion to grow and learn alongside the SAF, ensuring both units could fully leverage their respective capabilities. Leveraging the SAF to the battalion enabled the brigade staff to operate unimpeded throughout the exercise.
SAF Capabilities/Limitations
Later that fall, the SAF deployed personnel including observer controller/trainers (OC/Ts) and their S-4 to Schofield Barracks, demonstrating their commitment to training. Although the SAF did not bring mobility assets or anti-tank (AT) weapons, they provided a robust package consisting of two organic platoons and several machine guns that added tremendous value throughout the exercise.
The battalion partnered the SAF personnel with each rifle company; this collaboration enhanced our collective capabilities, cultivated greater emotional intelligence among the forces, and improved interoperability. The SAF’s integration did not hinder the battalion’s TiC validation; rather, it demonstrated how to collaborate more effectively and allowed the battalion to incorporate new equipment and technological advancements in support of their efforts.
Company 1 (Attack)
The SAF partnered with the first rifle company at the start of the JPMRC rotation. During this phase, the SAF led the initial air assault infiltration as part of a shaping operation for the battalion. This operation was critical in setting the stage for subsequent missions. Towards the end, the company used the SAF as the decisive operation for its attack to seize mission. The SAF executed the mission effectively, focusing on thorough mission planning and adhering to basic infantry tactics. While the SAF successfully integrated and added value to the company, the unit identified two key areas for improvement in future collaborations with the SAF: breaching procedures and call-for-fire procedures. The company recognized the need to rehearse these concepts more thoroughly with its partner forces, as a lack of shared understanding had created challenges during the operation.
Company 2 (Attack)
During a subsequent phase of JPMRC, the SAF integrated with another rifle company and conducted an attack to seize mission. Immediately after the battalion combined arms rehearsal (CAR), the company commander directed all SAF squad leaders to meet and review basic infantry doctrine. This allowed the company and the SAF to establish a shared understanding while building mutual trust. Simultaneously, platoon leaders began troop leading procedures (TLPs) and engaged in parallel planning with the SAF.
The unit’s task organization consisted of two assault elements led by the SAF and a support-by-fire element commanded by the company commander. To facilitate command and control, the company assigned its executive officer to the SAF. The commander and the fire support officer remained with a platoon and the SAF’s weapons squad. This arrangement allowed the commander to focus on coordinating fires while the maneuver platoons concentrated on the movement and assault. Despite the effective use of task organization and a clear common operational picture, the unit identified the need to conduct more rehearsals for actions on contact with the SAF.
Company 3 (Defense)
The SAF collaborated with the final rifle company during a later phase of JPMRC. Their mission was to defend a drop zone, a key terrain feature for both enemy and U.S. forces. Like the previous companies, this unit attached one of its platoons to the SAF. The platoon leader served as the company’s liaison officer (LNO) and communicated the SAF’s concept of operations and requests for information (RFIs) to his commander. The two commanders then met up to synchronize their scheme of maneuvers, determining how they could best support each other in the AO.
The company identified three areas for improvement with their partnered forces: call for fire, contingency planning, and deliberate movements. Enhancing these aspects would have provided the SAF with a better understanding of our fire processes, systems, and TLPs.
Lessons Learned
The integration of the SAF in a partnership role with companies within 2LBCT(P) proved to be beneficial throughout the JPMRC rotation. The SAF augmented combat power, upheld rigorous physical fitness standards, and maneuvered quickly. However, there were noticeable limitations related to warfighting functions. For example, the SAF had limited communication capabilities, which could have been mitigated with more in-depth discussions and a primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) plan that could accommodate both units. Furthermore, the absence of various weapon systems required staff planners to meticulously evaluate the task organization for each mission and maintain flexibility.
In the context of sustainment, the SAF and U.S. forces encountered several logistical constraints. However, both units found adaptive and flexible solutions to address these challenges. It is crucial not to underestimate the importance of addressing potential logistical disparities, especially when collaborating with partner forces. Lastly, the inclusion of LNOs played a significant role in bridging the communication gap with the SAF during the exercise.
Conclusion
The partnership between 2LBCT(P) and the Singapore Armed Forces during JPMRC served as a valuable learning experience, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement. The commitment of the SAF, as demonstrated by their active participation and integration into our operations, significantly enhanced our collective capabilities and operational effectiveness. This collaboration sets a strong precedent as we continue to learn from one another and seek opportunities to strengthen our partnership and improve interoperability.
CPT Luis C. Zamora currently serves as the commander of Able Company, Task Force (TF) Rattlesnake, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Provisional), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI. His previous assignments include serving as the heavy weapons platoon leader, Dog Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade; a rifle platoon leader in Attack Company, 1-503 IN; executive officer for Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade; and assistant operations officer, TF Rattlesnake, 2LBCT(P). CPT Zamora earned a bachelor’s degree in political science from Tarleton State University.
This article appears in the Summer 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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