It was day three of force-on-force at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Johnson, LA. As I had anticipated, we were already collectively cold, wet, and tired. The rain had been coming down for hours, and enemy air assets had forced us to jump our combat trains command post (CTCP). Our deliberate occupation had gone well, and our initial set up of the command and control (C2) node, forward logistics element (FLE), and battalion aid station (BAS) was ahead of schedule. We disseminated priorities of work, and I began to reevaluate and refine our common operating picture (COP). My NCOs completed our security plans, and their Soldiers prepared their individual fighting positions. After regaining situational awareness of the battlespace, I went to troop the line. Suddenly, my feeling of self-assuredness and content with our progress faded. With every fighting position I spot checked, I became more frustrated. Fighting positions were not to standard, range cards (if complete) were abysmal, react to indirect fire plans had not been disseminated or understood, and uniforms were unsatisfactory. At that moment, I realized that the focus of our Leader’s Time Training (LTT) had failed to adequately prepare individual Soldiers for a scenario based around prolonged large-scale combat operations (LSCO). To build survivability, leaders at echelon cannot differ in their understanding of what trooping the line means. When enforced daily, standardization across echelon will reduce confusion and build grit; doing simple things to standard means doing things the same across the formation.
Trooping the line is an essential aspect of military readiness. The concept hails from the Dorain invasion of Greece around 1200 B.C. where commanders would inspect their formations prior to a campaign, assuring their preparedness. In a more modern context, pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) achieve the same end state. In my formation, the disconnect between this modern interpretation of an ancient technique was assuring that our checklists accurately represented what our formation wore. Soldiers having everything packed in a duffel and Soldiers understanding how to wear and employ their individual kit are two entirely different matters. Furthermore, once the formation understands a standard, NCOs must enforce it. Wearing full kit for three hours is different than wearing it for 10 days. Through repetition, uncomfortable situations become comfortable. Within my formation, I saw that our failure to enforce standards during unit LTTs resulted in our Soldier’s discomfort while surviving at the standard. As the enemy and environment tested our collective grit, our standards fell. Trooping the line begins long before the probable line of deployment. It must occur in rehearsals prior to deployment with adequate time to rectify deficiencies. Your unit’s ability to fill shortages based on class of supply and timelines for receiving equipment and supplies from the supply support activity (SSA) is the point at which trooping the line begins. By codifying those standards in standard operating procedures (SOPs), we provide our subordinate leaders clarity on what right looks like with time to build good habits.
In the minds of subordinate leaders and Soldiers, standards are open to interpretation. In 2016, the Army pushed sweeping guidance authorizing the cuffing of sleeves, giving commanders increased flexibility with the uniform. The key word here is commanders — any good commander, with the recommendations of the senior enlisted advisor, can change a uniform based on risk to force and mission. However, squad- and team-level leaders implemented changes to uniform for comfort while conducting operations with little thought to the risk assumed by our commander. This choice to deviate from the standard directly resulted in disease and non-battle injuries (DNBIs), causing real-world medical evacuation of multiple Soldiers due to environmental exposure to insects and poisonous plants. This highlights how enforcement of standards can reduce or worsen non-combat injuries, which historically can attrite up to 60 percent of a fighting formation in LSCO. Standards must be clearly defined with a backbrief conducted at the platoon level, not just published in an SOP, so leaders at every level are empowered to exercise initiative in accordance with the commander’s guidance. NCOs must brief company leadership, assuring that adequate mitigation is in place to manage the commander’s assumed risk prior to deviating from published SOPs and taking liberties with uniform standards.
Standardization needs to mean doing things the same for simplicity’s sake. This concept seems self-evident; however, my experience at JRTC suggests it is anything but clear. The prevailing opinion in my formation was that Soldiers should set up their kit based on their own desires so long as they meet minimal requirements. Though this belief benefited Soldiers during the global war on terrorism, I believe it is counterproductive to a LSCO fight. In World War II, the Ivy Division suffered a total of 22,454 casualties. This number suggests that nearly the entire division was replaced while in contact. I can only imagine a young NCO’s struggle to get a replacement in-step with their formation under those conditions. By creating standards for how Soldiers wear and employ their equipment, NCOs reduce the amount of thought and time needed to train subordinates. This allows for repetition to yield proficiency and alleviates the ambiguity in what right looks like. A well-established and rigidly enforced standard down to the individual Soldier’s load will produce a more replicable and lethal force.
My company achieved so many great things while deployed to JRTC. Our BAS treated more than 800 casualties with a four percent died-of-wounds rate. Our FLE conducted six separate logistic resupplies resulting, in no forward element ever running out of Class I, III, or V. The C2 node accurately tracked forward elements aiding our main command post and provided clarity across the formation throughout complex transition periods. However, our individual Soldiers struggled to survive — the key task for all personnel in LSCO.
To build survivability, NCOs must inspect their Soldiers at every opportunity to rectify deficiencies. Enforcing standards daily will reduce misunderstanding and build good habits; simplicity dictates that NCOs enforce uniformity. My company’s collective struggles at JRTC were a result of missed opportunities to enforce standards during LTTs. This prompted NCOs at echelon to misinterpret what right looks like and Soldiers to be uncomfortable living at the standard. This resulted in diminished warfighter capacity and non-combat-related injuries. We can overcome this at the unit level through a replicable standard that all Soldiers at echelon understand and all NCOs strictly enforce, building survivability and grit.
1SG Philip J. Piennette currently serves in the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. His previous duty assignments include serving with the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 4th SBCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA; 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Chemical Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, MO; 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 1st SBCT, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright, AK; and 1st Battalion, 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade, Fort Hood, TX. He has served in almost every duty position available for an Infantryman with leadership roles as team leader, squad leader, weapons squad leader, drill sergeant, senior drill sergeant, platoon sergeant, and first sergeant. 1SG Piennette deployed twice to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn and twice to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Inherit Resolve. He has additionally served in an operational capacity in Thailand, Egypt, and Kuwait.
This article appears in the Summer 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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