Indo-Pacific Theater Operations
Operational reach refers to the distance and duration a military force can effectively project its capabilities. During a long-range maritime air assault, this concept is directly tied to the limitations of basing and lines of operation. The tyranny of distance across the Indo-Pacific region presents a significant challenge, one that can only be mitigated by higher headquarters providing a well-thought-out support and sustainment plan. Brigade and battalion-level units assume significant risk when conducting long-range maritime air assaults, especially when the operation occurs hundreds of miles away from support.
It is unrealistic to expect a brigade or battalion to support and sustain itself from such a distance without external assistance. This risk extends to medical support, where a battalion’s medical platoon and physician’s assistant are insufficient for managing casualties over long distances. Dedicated air medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support must be planned and on standby for immediate response. Additionally, joint capabilities, such as U.S. Navy vessels with onboard surgical departments, are critical to mitigating the distance in the event of medical emergencies.
Similarly, naval gunfire support is invaluable for prepping objectives and providing fires that enable ground forces to maneuver freely. The phrase “We will never fight alone again” should be taken seriously, particularly in the context of long-range maritime air assault operations. Units must plan, resource, and train for these types of air assaults.
Air Assault Operations
During a Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center training rotation, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment “Wolfhounds” practiced one of the most challenging joint operations in our modern strategic catalog: a long-range maritime air assault. During this exercise, the Wolfhounds conducted operations over the north Pacific Ocean, flying from Dillingham Army Airfield on the northern shore of Oahu to Pohakuloa Training Area on the island of Hawaii — more than 200 miles from their higher headquarters. A basic air assault operation is a military mission in which ground forces utilize rotary-wing aircraft and their mobility to combine all available firepower and maneuver assets under a single ground force commander, known as the air assault task force commander. The goal is to enable the commander to envelop the enemy and gain a battlefield advantage by seizing and securing key terrain.
For light infantry units, specifically those assigned to the Indo-Pacific theater, mastering the planning and execution of air assault operations is essential. The ability to rapidly move assault forces across a dynamic battlefield can be the decisive factor in determining victory or defeat. Now, consider the added complexity of conducting an air assault over the Pacific, a vast, unforgiving body of water.
Military Maritime Forces and Long-Range Maritime Air Assault
Military maritime forces are defined as those that operate on, under, or above the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, achieve sea control, deny the sea, and/or project power from the sea. The Wolfhounds’ mission was to execute a 400-to-500-Soldier long-range maritime air assault, a complex operation. The likelihood of conducting such an assault is real in the Indo-Pacific region, which consists of numerous island chain countries. Such terrain demands combined and joint coordination to achieve success across all domains: land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace.
The challenges from the get-go were significant, particularly in determining the minimal force required to achieve fire superiority and secure the objective. Planning factors, such as the tasks of organizing maneuver, fires, medical support, and sustainment, had to be balanced, with difficult decisions being made on the risk to mission and force.
Ultimately, the number of rotary-wing aircraft available dictated the task organization, influencing how combat power would be delivered due to the limited seating capacity of the aircraft to the helicopter landing zones. The decision was made to deploy two infantry companies, the dismounted command and control node, and a small attachment of medical personnel to provide coverage. A long-range maritime air assault inherently adds friction to an already complex mission set due to the distance covered and the isolation of the unit conducting the air assault. When adding in the challenges of outlining which headquarters owns specific planning tasks, all planning and coordination must be clearly briefed and rehearsed at echelon to minimize friction.
Friction During the Air Assault Planning Process and Rehearsals
Planning for air assaults requires collaborative and parallel planning and the allotment of additional time for executing units to continue to rehearse and refine the ground combat plan, culminating in the development of a detailed plan to ensure a successful operation. Initially, 1-27 IN began deliberate planning, attached a liaison officer, and coordinated directly with their aviation counterparts. This flattened the communication and planning process with the assumption that the battalion commander would act as the air assault task force commander. The battalion then formed a plan, issued guidance, and initiated the mission execution timeline.
After initial planning, a decision was made to consolidate responsibilities back to the brigade staff, which led to confusion and friction with planning and rehearsals. This caused an unnecessary duplication of effort (having to repeat coordination meetings and rehearsals between the ground unit and the air assets). In an already compressed planning environment, this wasted precious time and energy.
Ultimately, this was resolved by correcting communication gaps; critical leaders ensured that all stakeholders were on the same page and committed to not repeating the error. In the end, the brigade led the overall planning, air mission coordination, and execution, while the battalion focused on its ground tactical plan. The brigade then tasked the Wolfhounds with running pick-up zone rehearsals, which due to the rapid shift in duties, further delayed critical rehearsals needed for the ground tactical plan.
We also soon experienced that even the most well-developed plans are vulnerable to the unknown. As the saying goes, Murphy’s law can and will strike at the most inconvenient moments.
The Unknown to the Unknown
Conducting a long-range maritime air assault brings many unknowns. Staffs make assumptions based on intelligence reports and past experiences, yet they may not have vital data to make the soundest decisions. Assumptions provide commanders with a general understanding of the situation, but they are not foolproof.
The Army cannot plan for every eventuality, but we must be prepared to respond to unexpected events with agility and expertise. One key area of preparation that enhances our flexibility during a long-range maritime air assault mission is ensuring that Soldiers and alternate aircraft load plans are thought out and rehearsed. This ensures that combat power reaches the objective at the right moment.
Once 1-27 IN was finally in the air, Murphy reared his ugly head. One incident during the operation starkly illustrated the unpredictability of such missions: Thirty minutes into a two-hour flight, the helicopter carrying the battalion commander had to divert due to an emergency with its partner aircraft. Both helicopters diverted from their planned air assault corridor and landed at the nearest airfield.
The pilot’s emergency decision saved lives and preserved equipment; without a doubt, it was the right choice. However, it also resulted in separating the command-and-control node that oversees and manages the entire operation from the intended air assault objective, delaying the ground commander by hours. The battalion had not considered the “what-ifs” or contingencies for aircraft malfunctions while enroute to the objective, a foreseeable and moderately probable circumstance.
But as reliable Soldiers always do, they adapted and overcame to get the job done! Subordinate company commanders, already in position, adjusted the plan, and word passed between aircraft that a subordinate commander would assume command in the interim. Eventually, the battalion commander moved to an alternate landing zone where he resumed command of the already initiated attack.
Despite the setback, the operation succeeded due to the flexibility and initiative of subordinate leaders who fully understood the commander’s intent and executed the mission violently and effectively.
The JPMRC-X is a Department of the Army initiative consisting of a deployable package of personnel and equipment designed to support training exercises across the Pacific. (U.S Army National Guard photo by Spc. Carleeann Smiddy) VIEW ORIGINAL
Conclusion
While air assault operations are inherently challenging, conducting a long-range maritime air assault significantly amplifies the need for meticulous planning at all levels. The friction and confusion experienced during this long-range maritime air assault became frustrating at multiple echelons; quickly identifying which unit at echelon owns what specific responsibility will significantly reduce friction and confusion. The battalion should have been allowed to continue to refine and complete the plan independently; this would have streamlined and simplified the planning process.
By failing to think through every problem set, we didn’t allow subordinate commanders to take appropriate action when the unexpected happened. War game, war game, war game every phase of the operation. Echelons above brigade must recognize the importance of such operations and provide the necessary support and sustainment that only they can offer. Having the air assault unit directly report to its higher headquarters would have made coordinating and receiving the appropriate echelons of support so much more effective. Requiring a unit to report through multiple levels of command slowed battlefield effects and forced the battalion to rely solely on its internal mortars and attached 105mm artillery.
Having the division as the echelon of action requires fast and flat communications directly to the headquarters that owns the assets which impact the battlefield and turns the fight in favor of friendly forces.
Conducting a long-range maritime air assault is a mission uniquely suited to the Indo-Pacific region, where vast distances and island chains create distinct challenges and opportunities. There were many lessons learned at echelon during this JMPRC rotation, especially regarding training for long-range maritime air assaults. Units assigned to the Indo-Pacific region must train for this type of strategically impactful mission consistently and build proficiency.
References
Field Manual (FM) 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations, March 2015, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_99.pdf
FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, November 2024, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN42404-FM_5-0-000-WEB-1.pdf
Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, December 2023
Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in the Small Wars Journal at https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/07/long-range-maritime-air-assault-operation-in-the-indo-pacific-theater/.
CSM Jason B. Chase enlisted in the Army as an Infantryman and has served in every level of leadership from fire team leader to command sergeant major. His combat service includes two tours to Iraq as well two tours to Afghanistan. CSM Chase is currently serving as command sergeant major of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment at Schofield Barracks, HI, where he advises the commander on all matters ranging from tactics to warfighter readiness in order to remain at the cutting edge of the battlefield and win our nation’s future battles.
CSM Garrett S. O’Keefe enlisted as an Infantryman and has served in every infantry position of leadership over 24 years of service. He served two tours in Iraq and two in Afghanistan. As the senior enlisted advisor for the 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team-Prototype, 25th Infantry Division, he provides critical enlisted perspectives and advice pivotal to unit transformation and the development of new standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures around new emerging technologies. He has been selected to be the next XVIII Airborne Corps G3/5/7 sergeant major.
This article appears in the Summer 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/ or https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/.
As with all Infantry articles, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
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