Download the full document here: How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, TRADOC G2 (Apr 25) [PDF - 11.7 MB]
Foreword
As the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 for the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), I am pleased to introduce this timely paper, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations. This will be the first of a series of papers focusing on our key potential adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—and we chose to start with the most capable and formidable of the four. In an article I wrote for Military Review, I argue that large-scale combat operations (LSCO), will be won and lost at the operational level of warfare. Understanding how China fights at the operational level is the first step in ensuring that the Army will be prepared for any conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater. It is my hope that this paper fills a key gap in our understanding of how the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) approaches warfare.
This document builds upon two seminal TRADOC G-2 publications. The first is TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations, which addresses 12 key conditions we assess are present in LSCO and adds another five implications for the U.S. Army when contemplating LSCO. The second is Army Techniques Publication 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, which describes China’s military strategy, operational concepts, and the likely characteristics of future PLA operations. This new paper sheds light on how the Chinese Communist Party views its security environment and how this perception shapes the PLA’s approach to warfighting, particularly its emphasis on “active defense” and “systems confrontation.” The insights presented here are not merely academic; they are essential for informing our training methodologies and force development initiatives.
This paper will be disseminated across the Army, the Joint Force, the Intelligence Community, and to our allies and partners to promote a deeper understanding of Chinese military thought and operational practices. It will drive curriculum development at our schools and centers, inform professional military education, support the writing of Army doctrine, and enhance the realism and relevance of U.S. Army training scenarios at Combat Training Centers. By incorporating the PLA’s operational doctrine, tactics, and technological capabilities into our opposing force representation, we can also better prepare our Soldiers and leaders for the challenges they would face in a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater. It will help us fulfill our primary mission, which is to know our potential adversaries, and to ensure that our key customers do too.
I encourage all members of the Army community to engage with this material and consider its implications. If we are to visualize how the Army will participate as part of a Joint, Combined, and interagency team in a future conflict in the Indo-Pacific, then we must begin with an understanding of our potential adversary. This paper offers a fine starting point for that visualization.
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