[This article was first published in Army Sustainment Professional Bulletin, which was then called Army Logistician, volume 2, number 5 (September–October 1970), pages 16–19, 30–31. The text is reproduced as faithfully as possible to enable searchability. To view any images and charts in the article, refer to the issue itself, available on DVIDS and the bulletin’s archives at asu.army.mil/alog/.]
“Logistics problems associated with the supply of the M557 artillery fuze represent one of the most difficult challenges undertaken in ammunition program management during the Vietnam conflict. To meet this critical and unique program requirement a special management action team was formed by the Project Manager for Artillery Ammunition. It is about this team, their method of operation, some of the obstacles which they encountered and the unique solutions to problems that they developed which forms the basis for this article. The success achieved by this team might well dictate future close examination of their procedures and method of operation if the need again arises to accomplish critical procurement, production and supply tasks under similar circumstances.” — GEN F.S. Besson, Jr., Chairman of Joint Logistics Review Board
AMMUNITION can be the Achilles heel of the tactician. Combat forces can “live off the land” for limited periods when supplies of food and other items are curtailed, but when a balanced supply of ammunition is not available to counter enemy capabilities, disaster can be the result.
The Army’s responsibility of supplying ammunition to U.S. and other free world forces in Southeast Asia concurrent with meeting worldwide commitments frequently has taxed the ingenuity of the logistician. The critical and inseparable part played by logistics in military operations in the past has often received only lip service. Never before has the role of the logistician been so well recognized as during the Vietnam War.
Paradoxically referred to as “limited war,” the intense conflict in Southeast Asia produced logistics statistics of incredible proportions. Business Week observed in an 18 November 1966 issue that Vietnam “… is absorbing certain munitions three times faster than the Korean War.”
The task of keeping the pipeline charged with critical ammunition demanded innovative techniques in the procurement, production, and distribution of this important commodity.
Beginning with the major U.S. force deployment in 1965, consumption of artillery ammunition in Southeast Asia began to rise steadily. By January 1966, monthly consumption exceeded 14,000 tons; and by June 1966, consumption was over 32,000 tons a month. Less than a year later, consumption again had doubled.
The trend toward vastly increased consumption of artillery ammunition was recognized early and compensating new production programs were initiated for projectiles, propellants, and related components.
By July 1967, it became apparent that unanticipated increases in weapons densities in Vietnam and the drastic increase in the consumption of artillery ammunition had brought about an alarming reduction in the inventory of point-detonating (PD) fuzes.
Consumption of artillery fuzes posed a serious and perplexing logistics problem. General Besson described the problem as, “... one of the most difficult challenges undertaken in ammunition program management during the Vietnam conflict.”
Why did the M557 fuze represent such a complex problem and why the large demand for this particular fuze? Ammunition experts confidently had based fuze procurement on a mix of 75 percent point-detonating fuzes and a 25-percent composite of the time and proximity fuzes. The basic point-detonating fuze in the supply system was the M51A5, an M48A3 fuze with the older model M21A4 booster. Fuzes with the M21A4 booster did not provide the desired delay-arming-distance characteristic. The relatively high, in-close, premature burst rate of the M51A5, attributable to the absence of a delay-arming capability, was of great concern to field commanders in Vietnam.
The M557 was the preferred fuze because of its delay-arming-distance characteristic. The M557, new in the inventory, is essentially an M48A3 point-detonating fuze with the new M125A1 booster attached.
This was the situation confronting the Project Manager for Artillery Ammunition, U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC), who was responsible for the program, in July 1967. He must assess, decide, and execute a monumental effort to produce the needed fuzes in the shortest possible time with no margin for error. A series of unrelated but cumulative events had reduced the inventory by more than 10 million point-detonating fuzes. Point-detonating fuzes had not been produced since the Korean War and the specifications were now more difficult to meet. The planned production program was still months away. Procurement leadtime had been kept at a minimum and prospective producers, including some with Korean War experience, were being counted on to achieve maximum production rates. Yet the planned production program for the new M557 fuze would not offset the substantial inventory deficit and would not meet projected requirements.
An emergency program to insure that everything possible was done to produce sufficient M557 fuzes to meet spiraling demands had to be initiated. “We cannot fail” became the slogan for a unique program of intensive management for this critical commodity.
A complex, three-pronged accelerated effort, involving defuzing, remanufacture, and new fuze production was undertaken. A balanced program of production valued in excess of $50 million was established. The first step was to give an emergency briefing to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, in order to gain approval for immediate program implementation.
The criticality of the product prompted the project manager for artillery ammunition to create a special management team to formulate management strategy and direct the program. The team was staffed with young, energetic, well-qualified engineers and technicians whose sole mission was to obtain production of quality fuzes in sufficient quantity to meet demands.
This team began by assessing numerous elements of the problem:
- Millions of fuzes were needed long before the availability of new production. Would inventory stocks of fuzed shell, unusable in Southeast Asia, provide a source of desperately needed fuzes? If so, what was the condition of the fuzes? Where could defuzing be done? What fuze renovation would be necessary? Where could it be done? How long would it take?
- Could the planned producers for the M557 fuze, booster, and delay plunger speed up preparations to produce? By how much? How many additional fuzes were required? Who would produce them? When could production begin?
- What Government equipment would be required? How much Government equipment was available? What was its location and condition?
- Could the load, assemble, and pack plants meet a greatly accelerated fuze production program?
- What quality under maximum production was acceptable from producers? What ballistic performances must be obtained? Could waivers and test data be expedited without delaying release of acceptable fuzes and yet prevent release of substandard materiel for shipment overseas?
- What organization and procedures would be required to control and manage procurement, production, quality control, acceptance, loading, testing, shipping, worldwide asset position, and a multitude of other program requirements? What would the total program cost and how much should the project manager request?
These logistics problems — complicated by constraints of time, the Nation's “bullets and butter” economy, the competition for resources, and the dynamics of changing requirements — reveal the magnitude of the difficulty and the management challenge presented by the M557 fuze program.
The impact of the team effort was felt immediately. They located M51A5 fuzes and fuzed shell that was either obsolete or unusable in Southeast Asia because of caliber or type. Continental United States (CONUS) depot stocks of M51A5 PD fuzes, procured during the Korean War, consisted of fuzed projectiles and bulk-packed fuzes in fiber or metal containers.
Fourteen Army depots, four Army ammunition plants, and two proving grounds undertook a massive defuzing and fuze remanufacturing process to restore CONUS existing depot stocks to a reliable and usable condition.
Three significant accomplishments summarize the success of this project:
- Nine million fuzes were remanufactured as planned.
- Over 50 percent of all CONUS depot stocks of M51AS fuzes were converted to the M557 before shipment to Vietnam, substantially reducing the in-close, premature burst rate in combat.
- The project manager was able to use scarce components to the best advantage in supporting both remanufacture and new production operations. This vital factor permitted rapid completion of the remanufacture program and permitted the required buildup in new fuze production rates without any substantial slippage.
A six-month in-house assembly cycle, using component stocks from the industrial account and monitored by the management team, proceeded on schedule. The team concurrently planned and executed the new accelerated production program for M557 fuzes. The result was the assembling of five million critically needed fuzes.
New fuze procurement presented the greatest challenge of all. The management team and Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (APSA) contracting officers met with scheduled producers and load plant officials to analyze production capabilities to squeeze every fuze possible out of their production lines. Equipment needs were compared with lists of Government industrial plant equipment and its locations. Contractors were encouraged to examine the condition and acceptability of onsite equipment so that transportation and rehabilitation requirements could be established.
Capabilities of scheduled producers to accelerate production provided the answer to how many more fuzes would have to be made by new producers. The management team worked around the clock with APSA to develop the procurement plan and a prospective list of producers for all fuze components. Delivery incentives were included to bolster production. Normal procurement leadtime was cut virtually in half by the unprecedented cooperation the management team gained from every echelon of both Government and industry.
Emergency facility projects were submitted to provide the essential equipment for the accelerated program. Through the unfaltering efforts of the management team a production combination representing the best possible production situation short of mobilization was established.
It was imperative that an experienced Government engineer be assigned to assist producers in resolving production problems so that quality production could be accelerated. A general engineer, known by reputation as a fuze expert, was assigned that responsibility.
Tiger Team
The engineer-leader of the production assistance element established a task group which he named the “Tiger Team.” The name symbolizes the tenacity of the team in problem solving which contributed extensively to the success of the M557 program. Special cloth patches embroidered with a tiger grasping an M557 fuze were given to those who made outstanding contributions to the program. The desire for membership far outstripped the supply of patches. This idea provided a central theme that helped to increase morale and ease the tensions associated with this critical program.
Early in the program, overall planning pointed up the need for rapid handling of problem areas in production of fuze metal parts. The term “fuze metal parts” refers to the metal, nonexplosive components of the fuze. Technical teams visited producers to give guidance where possible or bring back technical problems to both Picatinny and Frankford Arsenals for resolution. Occasionally producers visited competitors’ plants to assist in solving problems. All producers were made honorary “Tiger Team” members.
Government and industry cooperation can best be shown by citing the example of a prime contractor who had difficulty meeting production quotas. At the contractor’s request, the “Tiger Team” met at his plant to discuss the problem. The problem dictated that production be stopped, that the production line be purged of all component parts, and that it be restarted employing acceptable quality control standards. The contractor agreed and gave the orders to shut down the line.
When production started up again, initial deliveries were slow; but the contractor’s production progressively increased from 35,000 in February 1968 to 150,000 in April 1968, to 201,000 in May 1968, and leveled off at 400,000 in October 1968. The contractor overcame his production problems and became one of the top producers of the M125A1 booster.
Program Controls
Charting: Program control procedures reflected significant Government-industry coordination. A series of operating charts were maintained covering the varied aspects of production. The charts displayed end-of-month inventories or components on hand and those in transit and awaiting acceptance. Charts were maintained recording the progress of each assembly line that was being established.
Constant updating and reviewing of these charts highlighted problem areas that were resolved by dispatching an engineer or a “Tiger Team” depending upon the magnitude and gravity of the problem.
Satisfying the required monthly delivery schedule for M557 fuzes is testimony to the effectiveness of these management procedures with “Tiger Team” support.
Communications: A direct communications system among 24 individual contractors was established. Use of direct communications with APSA, seven regional Defense Contract Administration Service Offices, and two technical agencies was intensified. The improved communications allowed a system of checks and balances and assured dissemination of data that was compiled for the project manager’s monthly progress report to higher headquarters. This system all but eliminated time-consuming program status inquiries.
Weekly meetings were held with component engineers and status reports presented on all the major problems at the manufacturing plants. Solutions were derived and then applied at individual plants.
Waivers: A workable method for expediting contractor requests for waivers for deviated material was developed by mailing information copies to all concerned agencies after receipt and approval by the respective plant quality assurance representative in charge. Answers were dispatched by teletype. Disposition time was cut from three weeks to as little as two days.
Test data: A procedure for expediting ballistic acceptance testing data proved to be a major contributing factor to the success of the program. A direct route to accept fuzes for use with production of specific shells was established. The project manager later chose to use the normal route except for unusual circumstances.
The M557 fuze program is one example of this country's ability to meet a challenge under the most adverse conditions. Courage and desire, but above all, absolute need resulted in the unique management innovations and procedures described here. The program could succeed only through understanding and cooperation between the Army and industry. It is of interest to note that the M557 fuzes produced under these circumstances of extreme urgency have a functional reliability of greater than 99 percent in their primary or superquick role.
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Colonel James R. Gober is currently assigned to the Directorate of Materiel Acquisition, ODCSLOG, DA. He was the USAMC Project Manager for Artillery Ammunition from May 1967 to July 1969. Colonel Gober is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and holds a master’s degree in mechanical engineering.
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