SUBJECT: Best Practices for Combined Arms Training Brigade (CATB) coverage of a Division CPX III
Purpose: To outline lessons learned and best practices from 174 IN BDE’s coverage of the CPX III for 42 ID which occurred from 11-23NOV24 at Fort Indiantown Gap, PA.
EXSUM: This white paper offers best practices from the Patriot Brigade’s coverage of 42 ID’s CPX III. The Brigade maximized the use of the First Army Mission Assessment Team (MAT) before and during the initial days of the exercise, which proved to be extremely beneficial to helping the unit get software updates, stabilize their Division tactical network, and coordinate contractor expertise to assist 42 ID configure their Mission Command Information Systems (MCIS) with their associated servers. Second, the brigade surged efforts towards initiating the HICOM battle rhythm 96 hours prior to STARTEX to initiate the targeting cycle. This took significant effort, but paid dividends by having a smoothly running HICOM within 24 hours after the HICOM role players arrived. Finally, this paper provides a summary of how we integrated the First Army MAT Team into the exercise.
Background: Covering a division-level organization is inherently difficult for any CATB for two primary reasons. First, few individuals in the average CATB have experience working on a division staff. Second, most CATBs lack the knowledge and structure of a Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Operations Group, responsible for covering division warfighter exercises. As we planned and prepared for the exercise, we focused staff efforts on solving these two problems.
Planning: To overcome the lack of division staff experience across the brigade, we sought out opportunities to expose OC/Ts to division-level operations. Primarily, this can be achieved through volunteering to be a guest or augmentee OC/T with MCTP at warfighter exercises or with 120 IN BDE during division post-MOB Culminating Training Exercises (CTEs). Additionally, the brigade sent 20 OC/Ts to the MCTP Division Academics alongside the training audience (42 ID). Finally, the brigade coordinated with the Global Simulation Capability (GSC) to send two guest instructors to teach the brigade about the simulations software used in CPXs.
Preparation: At the start of CPX III, the Patriot Brigade initiated the HICOM battle rhythm three days before any HICOM role players arrived. This involved the building of agendas and notional data to replicate corps-level battle rhythm events. These products, as well as the conduct of the meetings themselves, were then passed on to the HICOM role players once they arrived. This ensured the training audience (42 ID) could begin their targeting cycle 96 hours prior to STARTEX.
Execution: One of the most significant issues we faced during the execution was the OPFOR. By the typical exercise design, the training division is responsible for providing the OPFOR personnel, however, 42 ID outsourced the requirement to their state Joint Force Headquarters and was unable to adequately prepare those personnel to fulfill their role upon arrival to the CPX. As a result, the Military Intelligence OC/Ts from 174 were forced to rapidly develop a refined plan for OPFOR maneuver to pass off to the OPFOR role players for execution in the simulation. A well-led and well-executed OPFOR is critical to a successful exercise since it is the primary driver of friction into the simulated scenario. As a result, 174IN BDE recommends that personnel from within the CATB or the greater First Army enterprise take on responsibility for manning the OPFOR either partially or entirely. We recommend the OPFOR Commander to be an O-4 MI officer, with a deputy (O-3) maneuverist, and a deputy (O-3) fires officer. This structure will ensure EXCON can maintain adequate control over the OPFOR while not distracting other OC/Ts from focusing on the training audience. By taking ownership of these lines on the ESMD it will also lessen the manning burden on the training unit.
First Army Mission Assessment Team (MAT):
In the months leading up to CPX III, 174's primary focus was on supporting the 42 ID in preparing their Mission Command Information Systems (MCIS), server systems, and tactical network. To achieve this, our Brigade S6 team actively participated in weekly G6 Technical Working Group (TiWG) events with the unit, fostering a collaborative environment. Additionally, 174 coordinated to secure support from a First Army MAT Team, based on observations from CPX I and II. This support proved invaluable, as it brought in six contractors and a Division East G6 Network Technician Warrant Officer with specialized expertise. Notably, the 1A MAT team's contractors filled critical knowledge gaps in areas such as Network Engineering, Server Technician, AFATDS, ADAM Cell, Network Transport, and DCGS. Their contributions significantly enhanced the 42 ID's readiness to execute CPX III, particularly given the limitations of signal expertise in a CATB.
At the start of CPX III, early integration of the First Army MAT into 42 ID’s G6 with Signal OC/T oversight to manage priorities, helped ensured conditions were set for 42 ID to execute CPX III with their digital systems. Signal OC/Ts battlefield circulating across Division and Brigade Command Posts ensured coordination with 1A MAT team to provided assistance was properly managed.
Friction Point: Stabilizing the Division Tactical Network. During the initial stages of CPX III, the 42 ID encountered a significant challenge in leveraging their MCIS. The main issue was stabilizing the Division tactical network. The 42 ID and participating brigades at Fort Indiantown Gap utilized a variety of systems, including six Satellite Transportable Terminals, four Star Shield satellite terminals, three High Capacity Line of Sight (HCLOS) systems, as well as fiber lines connecting all Command Posts. When these systems were set up simultaneously, they created multiple paths for data to travel within the Division Tactical Network. However, the network routing had not been optimized, which caused connectivity issues. To resolve this, 42 ID Network Technicians collaborated with the 1A MAT team to re-engineer the network routing, ensuring seamless data transfer across the Division. This was crucial, as all mission command systems rely on servers connected across Divisional nodes, requiring constant network connectivity. These issues effected users in the form of chat applications not working, breaks in AFATDS not passing data to higher echelons, and simulation data not properly populating onto CPCE. Fortunately, the 174 OC/Ts and 1A MAT team personnel were able to assist the 42 ID in identifying and addressing these issues throughout CPX III.
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