Purpose. To capture and communicate lessons learned by 1-307 IN and 174 IN Brigade from the 44 IBCT (NJ ARNG) Pre-Mobilization Annual Training (Pre-Mob AT), Post-Mobilization Training (Post-Mob) and subsequent deployment to the CENTCOM AOR. To provide TTPs, sustains, improves and recommendations for future mobilizations within 1Army. This White Paper discusses observations for the unit’s entire mobilization from the 174IN OC/T perspective to include, OC/T battalion sustains and improves during the partner unit’s train-up, difficulties in mobilizing a multi-State unit, and recommendations for the post-mob training focused on BDE and BN MDMP and the BDE CTE. A separate White paper outlines observations from the 44IBCT’s execution of the “Green Sands” Base Defense Operations training event.
Background. The 44 IBCT is a Compo 2 unit from New Jersey composed of 485 Officers, 730 NCOs, 670 Enlisted, totaling 1,885 personnel, with a mission to support Phase IV operations and transition to Phase 0 within the CJTF-OIR campaign plan. For this mission the 44th IBCT mobilized with the brigade headquarters and three organic maneuver battalions [44th BDE HHC (NJARNG), 1-102 CAV (NJARNG), 1-114 IN (NJARNG), 1-181 IN BN (MAARNG)] and provided ADCON for an infantry battalion [1-121 IN BN (GAARNG) (188 IN BDE partner)] deploying under a separate FTN. Over the last year, 1-307 IN has partnered with 44th IBCT in their training cycle that has included: a Joint Readiness Training Center Rotation, Integrated Weapons Training Strategy progression (from Individual Weapons Qualification to Platoon Live Fire), and Pre-Mobilization Annual Training. Critical dates for 44th IBCT follows: February 2022 – MCJA, June 2023 – JRTC, October- November 2023 – Pre-Mob Annual Training at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, November 23 – MCC-90, January 2024 – MTCAD and February - March 2024 – Post Mobilization at Fort Bliss Texas. This aggressive training glidepath provided multiple viewpoints to observe the difficulties associated with mobilizing a multi-state brigade combat team.
Mobilizing a National Guard brigade comprised of units from multiple states presented a myriad of challenges stemming from the decentralized nature of the National Guard structure and the diverse administrative procedures across states. Firstly, coordination among the various states (NJ, MA, GA) required extensive communication and collaboration to align training schedules and resources, understand and develop solutions to known equipment & manning readiness issues, and finally meet pre-mobilization administrative requirements. Depending on the unit (and the state) there may not be a habitual reporting relationship to provide situational awareness on unit readiness prior to the ramp up to a major training event (i.e. JRTC) or a mobilization. [As an example, 44IBCT does not habitually include 1-181 IN in their command and staff; nor does the current rear detachment track 1-181 IN on their task tracker. These are two examples close at hand, but is indicative of current environment].
Training. The least difficult aspect of mobilizing a multi-state brigade combat team during this iteration was the alignment of training schedules. 44IBCT was able to produce a coherent pre-mobilization training plan at the OCT 2022 MCJA which accounted for all their subordinate battalions. Although the MAARNG and GAARNG had to conduct separate out-briefs, the 1A UMA team (174th and 188th) ensured continuity of effort and clear site picture of potential friction points.
1-307th did observe friction in the resourcing and management of the pre-mobilization training requirements. First, 44IBCT was unable to forecast ammunition for their MAARNG subordinate battalion for the majority of pre-mobilization. Only after multiple months working through both state JFHQs and NGB was this issue resolved. Similar issues arose for land and school reservations. Each of these processes required efforts to be (at a minimum) duplicated by the requirement to submit the same paperwork through two states, three states for any requirement (such as schools and clearances) that also impacted the 1-121st (GAARNG). This duplication of effort was exacerbated by the task organization changes detailed in the paragraph below.
44IBCT was required to consolidate manning to build “full” companies and platoons prior to JRTC and mobilization. The result included a company from 2-113 IN (NJARNG) being attached to 1-181 IN (MAARNG). The 2-113 IN company was on a different drill schedule than 1-181 IN BN and was (as noted above) under a different state for land, ammo, etc. reservations. Although both units made efforts to use systems such as MS Teams to maintain oversight of training outcomes and overall readiness, the task organization changes were consistently put into place at the last minute (first upon arrival at JRTC – and only for the length of the rotation) and again upon arrival at the MFGI.
Manning readiness. In addition to the obstacles presented by the cross-state task organization, manning readiness required diligent review of administrative processes. Shortages in key leaders cannot simply be cross leveled across states, in the case of the 44th from NJARNG to MAARNG. Each state must attempt to fill shortages of leaders and critical MOSs. This is the equivalent of a COMPO 1 battalion being required to talk to HRC to fill shortages, and getting a letter of non-availability, before talking to their higher HQ. Security clearances provide another example of duplicative effort. NJARNG, MAARNG, and GAARNG all had to submit the required paperwork separately from each other, taking three man-hours of effort for every one man-hour of work. Because these were all submitted separately, there were also instances where a higher HQ would provide feedback (for example on exception to policy memos for security clearances in theater) that addressed one unit – usually 44IBCT – but not each of the subordinates, requiring all units to seek clarification if this was intentional, or if the response to 44IBCT was meant to apply to all.
We observed minor friction points where 44IBCT staff could not access or update systems of record (e.g. DTMS) on behalf of their cross-state subordinates. This was usually fixed through ‘swivel chair’ coordination, and needed to be a planning factor in selecting planning conference participants to ensure the data could be pulled and updated in real time vs. calling back to home station.
Lessons learned. Many of the lessons below seem obvious, and often were identified ahead of time. However, we often underestimated the organizational effort required from us as the partner battalion to assist in building a common site picture of friction points within 1A to leverage the whole of 1A resources:
- Engage partner units forward of the MCJA (NLT previous TYB) to align IDT windows across states
- The UMA team at MCJA should have representatives at the BN and BDE, with a OIC/NCOIC responsible for ensuring coherence across all echelons and states
- Bring SRAAGs into the conversation early. At a minimum, provide invite/notes from all planning conferences, and cc on all emails to the state JFHQ and/or MFGI; same note for sister 1A BDE partners when applicable
- Engage JFHQs immediately to work memorandums of agreement and move training resources (e.g. class V) under the parent unit
- Ensure that administrative actions that can’t be consolidated (e.g. TAG memos) are all developed using the same checklist
- Ensure all partner BNs have a trusted agent in all administrative meetings (specifically people empowered to make changes to systems of record) to avoid significant delays in meeting pre/post-deployment milestones
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