The Hidden Wargaming Output
No. 25-917, Defining Conditions for Success - The Hidden Wargaming Output
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INTRODUCTION
A common theme that battalion and brigade commanders hear at the National Training Center (NTC) is the need to “set conditions.” Setting conditions means making preparations, across all of the warfighting functions, for an upcoming operation. At its core, the difficulty in setting conditions is that each echelon must first define and understand those conditions before they can be “set.” Setting conditions by warfighting function (WfF) and establishing clear triggers for subsequent actions before an operation is one of the most difficult things that staffs and commanders struggle with. Typically, this is not a failure of buy-in from the part of the rotational training units, but rather there is a challenge in understanding the how and when to set during the planning process.
Doctrine does not provide a clear guide of how to do this. For example, a scan of Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Planning and Orders Production (16 May 2022)[1], only yields two matches for setting conditions, one pertaining to Army design methodology and the second to publishing a fragmentary order (FRAGORD). Similarly, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.2-1, Staff Reference Guide (7 December 2020)[2], contains no concrete information on what setting conditions by WfFs means and how staffs go about defining those conditions. Clearly within doctrine, there is not much information explaining when staffs define conditions that must be set and how to go about doing so.
While there is no clear solution, a deeper interpretation and understanding of why there are certain steps in the military decision-making process (MDMP) yields the answer: wargaming. Typical wargaming outputs are refined courses of action (COA), decision points, critical events, and the synchronization/execution matrix. These outputs require understanding time/distance analysis, relative combat power, and sequencing of events, which are inherent in defining conditions. By making the definition of conditions a deliberate output of wargaming, staffs and command posts will be more capable to receive and analyze information, assess conditions, and make recommendations to commanders.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING CONDITIONS
Clearly defining conditions at echelon enhances situational understanding, facilitates reporting, and enables command posts to orient the formation. If units do not clearly define conditions by WfF, separate echelons will make assumptions and there will not be shared understanding. On the ground, this looks like commanders with different expectations and understanding of what the term “ready to execute” means, which results in operational friction and risk to mission.
During a recent armored brigade combat team (ABCT) rotation, a battalion battle captain and mortar platoon leader separately wrote down what their understanding of the mortar platoon being “in position, ready to fire” meant.
Figure 1. What “In Position, Ready to Fire” Means[3]
Figure 1 highlights several important things. First, it is clear there is a gap between echelons in understanding what “in position, ready to fire” means in terms of conditions. Second, both leaders missed key elements from other WfFs that directly contribute to the mortar platoon being ready to fire. For example:
- Does the platoon have the correct mixture of ammunition on-hand to support the mission?
- Is ammunition resupply on standby to push forward?
- Did the platoon identify and reconnoiter alternate mortar firing points?
- Is the airspace clear?
- Will they fire as a platoon or split section, and do they have the correct Infantry Mortar Leader Course graduates in the correct positions to support split section?
- Which targeted areas of interest (TAI) are active?
Neither leader considered the conditions to fire outside of the command and control (C2) and fires WfFs. This is neither leader’s fault. Either the organization should have standard operating procedures (SOP) that define these conditions, or the staff should have identified the conditions during MDMP. Otherwise, commanders and command posts will not understand what a “We are in position and ready to fire” radio transmission means without a clear understanding of conditions. Which conditions are mission essential and which conditions are mission enhancing? Clearly, defining conditions is a critical step, but how and when should staffs and commanders at echelon identify them?
USING WARGAMING TO DEFINE CONDITIONS
Defining conditions is not a doctrinally defined output of COA analysis (wargaming) as part of the MDMP process. However, wargaming is the most appropriate step to do so. During COA analysis, the COA synchronization matrix typically includes the results of the wargame to cover the macro level detail of the operation. The Sync Matrix has conceptual level detail but will typically lack the detail and fidelity needed to synchronize and combine arms in the close fight. This is regardless of the method of analysis used. When executed correctly, it drives all WfFs of the staff to collaborate. Typical key outputs are refined COAs, refined decision points, identification of critical events, an execution checklist, and a synchronization matrix. Condition definitions support the detail needed to fully develop the COA for the decision points, critical events, and the synchronization matrix. The sketch note method lends itself well to defining conditions. However, it does not support the sketch note as detailed analysis appears in doctrine. Figure 2 is a sample sketch found in FM 5-0.
Figure 2: Sample Sketch Note Method (Table 5-6 in FM 5-0)[4]
The sketch note identifies the critical event, the enemy reaction, and required blue forces (BLUFOR/friendly) response. It also identifies units in time and space and relates them to critical events. However, it does not facilitate setting conditions because the focus is almost solely on the movement and maneuver WfF. It does not provide the detail needed for subordinate leaders to backwards plan against and for the main command post to collect reports, make decisions and/ or make recommendations to the commander. The sketch note provides some detail that is useful to facilitate the construction of a synchronization matrix, but it does not translate well into future fighting products, causing the staff to repeat analysis and duplicate efforts.
A remedy for this is to add blocks of information at the bottom that can identify and specify the key conditions. As the staff moves through the war-game process, they identify events by WfF that are on the current sketch note, or even a previously built sketch note as they identify friction points later in the wargame.
An example of what this could look like is Figure 3. In this example, we take a common critical event that units often discuss but rarely detail out for setting conditions: crossing line of departure (LD). At the NTC, units infrequently identify conditions to LD in detail, resulting in friction at LD or later in the operation. Battalion command posts are often unaware of the true readiness of subordinate elements. Subordinate commanders are at a loss as to what information they should report. The operations group typically observes units reporting that they are ready to LD when they are not. In this example, the staff identified that in addition to typical LD readiness conditions, the mortar platoon needed to be “in position and ready to fire” to suppress suspected enemy observation posts (OPs). Later in the wargame, during the analysis of the combined arms breach, the staff saw that the armored breaching vehicle (ABV) would not have the opportunity after LD to execute continuity tests on the mine clearing line charge (MICLIC) and, thus, is able to add it to the conditions to LD.
Figure 3: Sketch Note Example (Cross LD)[5]
Next, the staff analyzes the combined arms breach. They consider all the WfFs when developing the conditions necessary for the battalion to execute this breach. These conditions include not only the friendly conditions, but also some enemy conditions as part of breaching criteria. In Figure 4, the mortars are actively suppressing the enemy. The staff identifies that the support force of the combined arms breach must destroy at least two tanks and three Boyevaya Mashina Pehoti’s (BMP/Soviet mechanized infantry vehicle) before they can initiate the combined arms breach.
Figure 4: Sketch Note Example (Combined Arms Breach)[6]
In time-constrained environments, there is pressure for staffs to cut corners and skip steps of the MDMP. Units typically curtail, if not completely omit, wargaming, as it consumes a significant amount of time. However, identifying conditions that must be set by warfighting functions becomes even more important in these time constrained environments. As the unit is under pressure to plan and execute with reduced time, subordinate echelons are prone to overlooking key preparations and staffs are likely to ignore defining conditions that must be set. In doing so, friction during execution increases as units encounter obstacles created because of the lack of preparation and foresight.
Even in a time constrained environment, the staff can still implement the above process in a more rapid manner. First, the staff can focus on identifying several critical events for an operation. In the offense, these events will typically be crossing LD, executing a breach, isolating an objective, and actions on the objective. In the defense, the typical events are engagement area development, conduct of the defense, and reacting to a penetration. Once the staff identifies those events, the WfF proponents identify the key conditions by WfF to support each event. Then either the synchronization matrix or execution checklist will capture these conditions in a FRAGORD for execution.
LINKAGES TO OTHER WARFIGHTING PRODUCTS
Conducting this level of analysis during wargaming also helps the staff build and refine additional warfighting products. By identifying specific conditions, wargaming increases the detail level of fighting products. Additionally, command posts and subordinate commands have specific reporting requirements that are useful for tracking readiness levels and informing the commander on readiness and risk.
Units can and should use this method for determining actions that are triggered by decision points. Most unit decision support matrices (DSMs) have very general actions detailed in the “Then” column of the DSM, such as: “Commit the reserve,” “Execute branch plan,” or “Transition to defensive operations.” Decision points often occur in time constrained environments or during crisis events. Planning out the actions by WfF that result from a decision point relieves commanders and command posts of analysis while in contact and enable command posts and staffs to execute necessary actions and movements without having to develop those actions “on the fly.” Instead of having a general phrase in the “Then” column of the DSM, the unit has actions taken by each WfF because of that decision. Figure 5 is an example of a sketch note that a staff made during wargaming.
Figure 5: Sketch Note Example (Commit the Reserve)[7]
With that analysis, the DSM now has the detail needed for the various command posts and the battle staff to drive actions that support the commander’s decision. The benefit of this additional detail in the DSM is that when leaders are cold, tired, and hungry, they can fall back on the previously executed analysis to begin issuing orders and initiating unit movement proactively. See Figure 6 as an example.
Figure 6: Decision Support Matrix Example[8]
Many units also use execution checklists (EXCHECK) as a method to synchronize and control operations. Like synchronization matrixes (SYNCHMAT), EXCHECKs are often an output of the wargaming process. Many leaders prefer the EXCHECK because of the ease of reading, the ability to clearly show sequencing, and the utility in tracking the progress of the operation. The friction that many units face when building and using EXCHECKs is that they skip over important details and conditions setting to enable actions on the EXCHECK. In addition, there is temptation for leaders to take and use the EXCHECK they receive from their higher headquarters without adding any refining information appropriate to their echelon. Leaders also fail to identify parallel actions.
Many units also struggle to structure their EXCHECKs and populate them with meaningful information to enable synchronization and control. When the EXCHECK does not provide the return on investment, they stop using them. Figure 7 is an example of a typical brigade combat team (BCT) EXCHECK that units produce at the NTC.
Figure 7: Execution Checklist Example[9]
There are a few issues with this EXCHECK. First, the numbering does not allow for easy revision, and any adjustments identified in the combined arms rehearsal require a full renumbering of all events. Second, the primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) column filled with “no change” makes it largely irrelevant. Third, all the events are solely oriented on the movement and maneuver WfF, which prevents full WfF synchronization. However, with refinements to the structure, the EXCHECK becomes a more effective synchronization tool.
Figure 8: Modified Execution Checklist[10]
The EXCHECK has become more useful by adding and removing specific fields. The staff and subordinate units can more easily inject additional lines identified during rehearsals without throwing off the entire numbering sequence by increasing the line number increments. Establishing planned H-Hour (time of execution) times allows commanders to better plan sustainment and other actions around the operation. Establishing which follow-on events are triggered by an action helps leaders identify actions being completed in parallel. However, Figure 8 is still movement and maneuver centric. Staffs can correct this by identifying conditions by WfF. After adding the conditions by WfF, the EXCHECK in Figure 9 now has sufficient detail to allow staffs and subordinate units to plan for future actions and operate in parallel without waiting on direction from their higher headquarters.
Figure 9: Modified Execution Checklist Encompassing all WfFs[11]
CONCLUSION
Establishing conditions for execution is critical to success; however, doctrine does not clearly define the process of how to do so. In the absence of a detailed, doctrinal “how to,” many organizations struggle to define the required conditions. Within BCTs at the NTC, this results in operational plans that are movement and maneuver centric that do not adequately consider all the warfighting functions. Such plans create risk to mission and force and reduce the BCT’s operational reach.
To define conditions, staffs must execute some type of COA analysis in the form of wargaming. Proper wargaming brings all the WfF proponents to the table and creates the opportunity for good synchronization. Planners looking at a critical event and asking the question of whether capabilities are “in position, ready to ,” allows them to visualize on the map where those capabilities need to reside and identify the required preparations to enable them to fully support the operation. With this approach, planners ensure that the BCT can leverage all its resources toward accomplishing the mission.
The process of defining conditions is not an activity performed in isolation. Clearly defining conditions before execution creates the opportunity to add detail and refinement to existing warfighting products that commanders at echelon need to fight. Doing so not only alleviates the cognitive demands placed on commanders at the forward line of troops, but it also empowers command posts to be proactive in driving the operation and providing commanders with readiness assessments.
Commanders and staffs cannot answer the question “Are conditions set?” until they define those conditions. Doctrine does not provide the clear answer, but it does inform how we can do it. Commanders empower their subordinates, their command posts, and their organizations for success by making the effort to clearly define conditions as part of wargaming.
ENDNOTES
1. Planning and Orders Production, FM 5-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2022), https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details_Printer.aspx?PUB_ID=1024908.
2. Staff Reference Guide Volume I, ATP 5-0.2-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2020), https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details_Printer.aspx?PUB_ID=1021331.
3. What “In Position, Ready to Fire” Means. Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 28 May 2024.
4. Table 5-6. Sample sketch note method. Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, 16 May 2022, page 5-47.
5. Sketch Note Example (Cross LD), Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 28 May 2024.
6. Sketch Note Example (Combined Arms Breach). Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 28 May 2024.
7. Sketch Note Example (Commit the Reserve). Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 28 May 2024.
8. Decision Support Matrix Example. Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 28 May 2024.
9. Execution Checklist Example. Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin. 28 May 2024.
10. Modified Execution Checklist. Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin. 28 May 2024.
11. Modified Execution Checklist Encompassing all WfFs. Panther Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 28 May 2024.
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