Many scientists suggest that problems rarely occur in isolation. Rather, many setbacks transpire as a result of interactive behaviors or patterns. This is especially critical when one considers the vast number of system interactions necessary to process forces through the Defense Transportation System (DTS).
For this reason, leaders must observe deployment readiness challenges as interrelated functions instead of attempting to evaluate the issues individually. This type of investigation is called "systems thinking."
In a 2003 article in "The Clearing House," Melanie M. Minarik, Bill Thornton, and George Perreault suggest that systems thinking is most suitable when multiple compounding issues surround a specific challenge, when the actions or functions of others are necessary to achieve success, and when ineffective coordination is likely.
WHAT IS THE DTS?
The DTS is the global transportation infrastructure, managed by the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The structure consists of military and commercial resources such as aerial ports, automated information systems, highways, railways, and seaports. This infrastructure also includes essential customs, in-transit visibility capabilities, and traffic management services to enhance the Department of Defense's ability to project power around the world.
Each organization within the DTS works in a collaborative effort to move maneuver forces from home station to their designated point of assembly. Everything begins with a supported geographic combatant commander (GCC) generating requirements for forces. Once the capabilities are approved, the Forces Command (FORSCOM), as the force provider, matches the required capability to the appropriate organization. Transportation requirements are then analyzed and determined by USTRANSCOM based on the supported GCC's timelines and mission objectives.
Once the GCC and USTRANSCOM agree that a surface deployment meets operational requirements, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) begins to identify military or commercial assets to support the operation. Next, FORSCOM pushes transportation information, such as modes and timelines, to the designated unit and simultaneously pushes the data to the servicing Installation Transportation Office (ITO).
The ITO is a critical component of this system. It assists the units throughout the movement process and is the linchpin between the unit and the servicing SDDC terminal transportation battalion.
Also assisting in the process is the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), which is responsible for training unit movement officers (UMO) throughout the Army. Now that you have a general understanding of how the different agencies and organizations must function cooperatively to deploy the assigned unit, we can discuss some observed challenges within the DTS.
DEPLOYMENT TIME AND SPACE
The GCCs initiate the deployment process by defining requirements and determining when re-sources are required in theater. The required delivery date (RDD) indicates when a resource is need-ed. Once the RDD is established, FORSCOM is responsible for backward planning to ensure the unit is properly prepared for deployment.
As illustrated in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-35, Army Deployment and Redeployment, one essential aspect of deployment planning is possessing a working knowledge of the total deployment process. FORSCOM organizations must have not only an understanding of the deployment process but also of the importance of defining their mobility requirements and identifying critical milestones.
Unlike units that performed Army Force Generation cycle deployments, units now must posture for expeditionary deployments with their assigned equipment. FORSCOM planners must ensure units are given the appropriate time and space to achieve success. Hence, weeks before the assigned available-to-load date (ALD), units should focus on preparing their equipment to move from the fort to the port.
There is a growing trend of deploying units conducting major training events with the same vehicles that they have identified for deployment, in some instances, a week before their ALD. Not allowing units ample time and space to prepare for their ALD could lead to not-mission-capable equipment being towed onto transportation assets. It could also result in unit deployment lists (UDL) not being validated promptly, which could affect the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System validation process and the availability of adequate transportation assets.
The Army cannot project combat power around the world if it is towing its equipment off of vessels. To showcase force projection, units should cease using designated equipment approximately 45 days before ALD. In the event of further training requirements, senior commanders should borrow necessary and available equipment from other organizations on the installation.
EQUIPMENT RECONCILIATION
UDLs are necessary documents to validate transportation requirements, but before the UDLs can be developed, units must ensure organizational equipment lists (OELs) are created in the Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II).
The Command Deployment Discipline Program Handbook recommends that company commanders update their OEL semiannually or when significant property book changes occur. However, during one major deployment exercise, less than half of the brigade's subordinate units had created OELs in TC-AIMS II.
This is a significant issue. If a unit fails to reconcile its property book with its OEL quarterly or semiannually, inaccurate data will be transmitted to TC-AIMS II. Inaccurate data could potentially impact vessel allocation and the buildup of combat power. For example, if a unit is issued mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles in lieu of up-armored humvees and fails to reconcile its property book and OEL, the unit might not be assigned a large enough ship to move all of its equipment. If dimensions are not updated and a UDL is built with this inaccurate information, SDDC may not acquire the space to support the deployment and may leave equipment on the pier for a follow-on move. This can hamper combat effectiveness.
Commanders above the battalion level should evaluate their subordinate organizations' deployment data quarterly or semiannually. Also, upon deployment notification, commanders must publish a warning order and an operation order that require their formations to update OELs. Accurate UDLs will follow.
INFORMATION SYSTEM OBSTACLES
During the 841st Transportation Battalion command team's battlefield circulation with the 10th Mountain Division and around Fort Drum, New York, the ITO asked the command team why TC-AIMS II rejected nonstandard or modified dimensions when creating or updating OELs. This problem presented second and third order effects for the ITO.
The Army directs unit commanders to build and maintain OELs to sustain an expeditionary posture. However, TC-AIMS II does not retain accurate in-formation, which forces UMOs to reinsert data at the time of deployment.
This network interface issue causes delays and inefficiencies at the strategic level. This is a significant matter because maintaining an accurate OEL is the first step of deployment readiness. After conducting some analysis, the 841st Transportation Battalion command team identified that the issue resided within the Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS).
UMOs are directed to submit updated OELs semiannually or when significant changes to the property book occur. However, when a unit modifies a piece of equipment and uploads the accurate dimensional data into TC-AIMS II, COMPASS returns an error message if the information is more than two percent different from the standard characteristics found in Technical Bulletin 55-46-1, Standard Characteristics (Dimensions, Weight, and Cube) for Transportability of Military Vehicles and Other Outsize/Overweight Equipment (in TOE Line Item Number Sequence).
This default function may be a precautionary measure to prevent the input of incorrect information. And while some transporters may see this error as an insignificant obstacle, it can frustrate UMOs who are assigned this task as an additional duty and are not transporters by trade. Subsequently, OELs may contain inaccurate information.
In a time of haste, a UMO may input inaccurate data when creating a UDL if the system has already rejected the information. Taking this into consideration, if inconsistent data is entered during OEL development, the system should generate a message to verify the provided dimensions instead of just rejecting the files.
Also affecting data accuracy are Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) limitations. During a recent deployment, a unit loaded 965 pieces of equipment into TC-AIMS II with the assistance of its servicing ITO. Of the 965 pieces of equipment, 617 were dropped from the system, and of the remaining 348 pieces, only 12 items--less than 1.3 percent of the equipment loaded--were valid in GATES and prepared for manifest.
The issue was classified as a "sequencing problem" between the Integrated Booking System (IBS) and GATES. Resolving this issue entailed days of crosstalk among battalion, brigade, and SDDC headquarters personnel.
Information system shortcomings are creating inefficiencies throughout the transportation net-work. USTRANSCOM and SDDC must lead an effort to create an end-to-end information system that ensures systems interface, booking capabilities, and in-transit visibility to enhance efficiencies throughout the deployment process. This effort must include all essential stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
OPERATIONALIZING AND PRIORITIZING
According to Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, the only staff elements responsible for the movement and maneuver warfighting function are the G-3 and S-3. The deployment process is a major operation that requires the G-3 or S-3 to publish an operation order. However, over the course of several strategic deployments, we have observed that division G-3s and brigade-and-below S-3s are rarely involved in the deployment process.
When an operation order is published that consists of critical responsibilities, timelines, and milestones, commanders and S-3s push all of the movement responsibilities onto the brigade mobility officer (BMO). The BMO has no tasking authority, so some unit commanders may emphasize other priorities.
Sometimes commanders also order UMOs to perform tasks outside of preparing the unit to deploy. ATP 3-35 clearly highlights the need for a command emphasis throughout deployment planning and preparation by saying, "Without unit command involvement and emphasis … the UMO will not have the resources required to accomplish his tasks."
The BMO may also not possess a firm appreciation of the link between the deployment and employment of forces. A lack of expertise may lead the BMO to neither properly prioritize equipment for shipment nor monitor critical assets to facilitate the buildup of combat power. The Army must ask if transporters and leaders are effectively mentoring inexperienced BMOs as they are assigned to these key positions. Schoolhouse training is not enough.
For an organization to operationalize its commander's intent, the staff must have a firm under-standing of the link between deployment and employment. The process of making ideas reality requires the G-3 and S-3 to develop feasible plans and orders with the assistance of the BMO. Doing so will ensure that the right capabilities are in the right location at the right time and in the right qualities.
ENGAGEMENTS
Operationalizing requires the assistance of external partners. It is critical that ITOs and SDDC terminal brigades and battalions--especially terminal battalions--engage with deploying units early and often. If these organizations assist with identifying critical shortfalls at the fort instead of at the port, it benefits all parties and the entire DTS.
Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, calls such engagements "movement and support meetings." The publication suggests that "identifying and resolving transportation shortfalls and/or limitations" must happen early. It goes on to say, "Another key interface required during these support meetings is between the deploying units and the C2 [command and control] elements of the air and sea POEs [ports of embarkation]." These engagements are critical for successful deployments.
The terminal brigades and battalions possess unique skills that have atrophied across the Army. Using the Army Force Generation model, a unit deployed to a known location with equipment already in place and replaced a similar unit. As the Army returns to expeditionary deployments, transportation units must assist deploying units with moving assets from the fort.
UMOs are now capable of accessing TC-AIMS II from their unit areas, which should improve the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced and OEL reconciliation. However, ITOs may become disconnected from units if the process is not managed appropriately because units are no longer forced to interact with their servicing ITOs as frequently.
Because the ITOs are the linchpin between the unit and SDDC resources, a lack of interaction with the unit could become a significant problem. Movement and support meetings become even more essential, especially in the early phase of the deployment.
There is another way to bridge interaction gaps. SDDC is postured to support deployments through its Deployment Support Command. The Deployment Support Command is an Army Reserve organization aligned to SDDC. To support the SDDC Total Force Integration Strategy, Army Reserve deployment and distribution support teams are aligned with continental United States-based active component terminal brigades and battalions to advise and assist units during the deployment process. These teams are critical because ITO staffs are experiencing manning constraints. In essence, these teams are augmenting ITOs during the deployment preparation stage.
Appreciating the intricacies of the deployment process helps us to understand why a deployment readiness challenge should not be evaluated as a single phenomenon. As with any system, if any single component behaves differently or fails, it could have a cascading effect on the entire network. Such components could include current policies.
To address deployment readiness, we must take a comprehensive look at the whole DTS before we attempt to solve an isolated problem. For instance, although UMO training gaps exist, if automated information systems are not properly interfacing, would additional training address the real issue? No. In some cases, units are being blamed for data accuracy issues that are beyond their control.
However, it is important for organizations at every level to conduct "movement and support" engagements to ease many of the deployment readiness problems. This can only enhance the ultimate goal of force projection.
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Col. Dennis C. Major is the commander of the 841st Transportation Battalion, 597th Transportation Brigade, SDDC. He holds a bachelor's degree in business administration, an MBA, and a master of professional studies degree in homeland security. He is currently pursuing a doctorate of education in interdisciplinary leadership. He is a graduate of the Transportation Officer Basic Course, the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, and the Command and General Staff College.
Maj. Calvin E. Townsend Jr. is the deputy operations officer for the 841st Transportation Battalion, 597th Transportation, SDDC. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Fayetteville State University. He is a graduate of the Transportation Basic Officer Leader Course, the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, Airborne School, and the Air Assault Course.
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This article is a digital exclusive for Army Sustainment magazine.
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