In recent years, brigade combat teams (BCTs) have primarily conducted advise and assist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This type of operational environment has led to a drastic change of pace in the training provided at the Army's combat training centers (CTCs).
Prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a CTC rotation was likely to feature a decisive action training environment (DATE). Such an environment consisted of expeditionary combat operations, which began with joint forcible entry followed by echelons of units entering the combat zone in need of service and support from logistics units.
The advise and assist mission has its own set of logistics problems, and its intensity is different from an expeditionary mission's intensity. A transition back to DATE from an advise and assist focus requires units to essentially get back to their roots, dust off the doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s, and marry that doctrine with unified land operations.
Soldiers must understand the core functions and design of a decisive action mission and how units should fight. For the logistics community, this means establishing forward arming and refueling points, logistics resupply points, and forward logistics elements to supplement the capabilities of the forward support companies. The difficulty lies in the lack of training provided for such operations, which was caused by the Army's primary focus being advising and assisting other militaries.
This article discusses how developing and maintaining a logistics common operational picture (LCOP) among command teams within the brigade is critical for enabling a brigade support battalion (BSB) to sustain a BCT in a decisive action or expeditionary environment. The discussion includes the use of analog and digital tracking systems, the use and execution of a proper primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) communication plan, and the lessons learned from the first decisive action training rotation for the 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in more than a decade.
UNDERSTANDING UNIT CAPABILITIES
Predeployment operations in preparation for the 2nd BCT's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation included gaining a firm grasp on the capabilities of each forward support company and other BSB companies. Knowing what equipment each unit needs for the operation is critical in order to develop an LCOP.
The LCOP is derived from the common operational picture. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, defines a COP as "a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness."
In a November-December 2008 "Army Logistician" article, Chief Warrant Officer Timothy N. McCarter Sr. likewise defined the LCOP as "a single and identical accounting of the logistics capabilities, requirements, and shortfalls in an area of operations shared between the supporting and supported elements. The LCOP allows the supporting elements to determine unit capabilities, forecast logistics requirements, synchronize logistics movements, and publish information that improves situational awareness at multiple echelons of support."
In order for an LCOP to be developed, units must submit timely and accurate logistics status (LOGSTAT) updates. Without this critical information, the support operations officer (SPO) has no way to develop a plan to provide the resources and services that units will need in a combat environment. Although the responsibility of providing these statuses lies solely on the maneuver battalions, it is the responsibility of the BSB and, more directly, the SPO to provide the means to report such information.
COMMUNICATING LOGSTATS
During its JRTC rotation, the 2nd BCT used Joint Capabilities Release (JCR), which was the primary means of communication within the brigade's PACE plan. Because Soldiers lacked training and understanding of the Battle Command Sustainment Support System, the unit instead used JCR for LOGSTATs.
However, LOGSTATs were often not provided in a timely manner. If they were, it was difficult to determine the accuracy of the status because of inconsistent degrees of measure. For example, when asked for the status of their bulk fuel supply, some units would provide the number of gallons on hand in their fuel tankers. Others provided that information as well as an estimate of how many gallons were on hand in individual vehicles. This made it incredibly difficult to determine what the unit needed for resupply.
Unit logistics capabilities drive how an operation is planned, rehearsed, and executed. A maneuver unit cannot operate without fuel, sustenance, ammunition, and maintenance assets. Ensuring an operation is successful requires the understanding of what resources are available balanced against what resources will be needed.
This balance is impossible to achieve without an established LCOP. Achieving an LCOP is impossible without the accurate reporting of commodities from units through LOGSTATs.
BATTLE TRACKING
After a working PACE plan is established, units submit all reports based on the communications available. In the case of the 2nd BCT, the PACE plan consisted of JCR, radio, tactical satellites, and secure voice over internet protocol phones.
Primary battle tracking in the initial phases of joint forcible entry was conducted through JCR, hard copy maps, and whiteboards. This allowed the SPO and other BSB entities to take information immediately from the JCR and plot it on the battlefield map.
Having such information readily available and updated throughout the mission allows commanders to make complex decisions about resupply operations and commodity consumption. Tracking this information also gives the officers and noncommissioned officers who track these commodities historical data that enables improved forecasting and planning processes.
Executing rehearsals and drills is necessary for personnel to become trained and proficient at operating communication systems. A rehearsal provides a venue for key players to learn who the decision-makers are for each type of information, who needs to know what kind of information in order to accommodate requests from units, and where to go if further questions need answering.
The 526th BSB, 2nd BCT, conducted a thorough sustainment rehearsal and consistent two-minute drills prior to and throughout the JRTC rotation. The sustainment rehearsal allowed all battalion and company command teams to come together in a learning environment that allowed each command team to see where its unit fit into the puzzle. The teams learned how logistics would come into play in the operation, where they needed to focus their planning for resupplying their units, and who would make decisions about providing supplies.
The two-minute drills conducted inside the tactical operations center and SPO shop provided different scenarios for the officers and noncommissioned officers to react to. The drills allowed them to find hiccups in the system that could be improved before an emergency situation arose.
These drills and rehearsals are critical to ensuring that transitioning between analog and digital tracking, or simultaneously using both, is seamless. Conducting such rehearsals also helps units to understand where they need redundancy in their systems. They learn what information needs to be backed up and how that information plays into making critical decisions in the midst of a combat operation. Creating redundancy in the system protects the information and maintains knowledge management.
Within a BCT, it is the logisticians' responsibility to ensure the maneuver commanders have all of the logistics information they need to make informed decisions. However, it is also critically important that the maneuver units understand what information the logistics elements need in order to provide them with unwavering support.
Considering lessons learned from DATE rotations at CTCs, the major takeaway is that logisticians and warfighters need to have the same understanding of what logistics support is critical. Just as logisticians may not understand when and where a cavalry squadron should emplace a screen, maneuver commanders do not need to know the ins and outs of logistics tracking systems; they just need to know how to submit accurate LOGSTATs.
Everyone needs to thoroughly understand both the concept of support and the scheme of maneuver. Without this knowledge, support will fall short and leave the maneuver elements unable to complete their missions.
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Capt. Adam Crawford is the battalion S-4 of Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, U.S. Army North. He has a master's degree in supply chain management from the Florida Institute of Technology.
Capt. Anthony Finch is the brigade ammunition officer of the 526th BSB, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He has a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of North Georgia.
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This article was published in the September-October 2017 issue of Army Sustainment magazine.
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