Unlike the post World War II and Vietnam eras where significant force structure reductions were the direct result of decreased levels of hostilities, our Army today is experiencing considerable force reductions amid a continued high operational tempo related to a very dynamic strategic security environment. The difficulty of managing that reduction is exacerbated by fiscal realities that have caused the Army to fundamentally change how we man, equip, and train forces to meet current and emerging requirements. In the near term, the Army must continue to prioritize resources based on objectives outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), meet requirements in support of ongoing global missions, manage the overall readiness of the force, and develop a modernization strategy that improves capabilities and reduces risk in a fiscally constrained environment.
Balancing these competing demands to achieve the best posture for the Army is the focal point of the G-8. The challenge we face is twofold. On one hand the Army must deliver capabilities to Combatant Commanders that are responsive to their needs and in keeping with national strategic objectives. On the other hand, the Army's ability to build a modern and ready force that can meet global security requirements will be tempered by ongoing budget cuts and the ability of the Army's requirements and acquisition systems to adapt to increasing complexities. The G-8 operates at this intersection - strategy, requirements, resources, and acquisition - and adjudicates competing demands to achieve outcomes that enable the Army to accomplish its missions today and in the future.
Since a clear picture of the future remains elusive, the Army must continue to make the best equipping and resourcing decisions possible while balancing end strength, readiness, and modernization. The current fiscal environment has made the process even more challenging, as we anticipate a continued decline in Defense appropriations. Additionally, as we reduce end strength we must continue to meet global operational commitments while prioritizing resources to safeguard the readiness of our units and Soldiers. Personnel costs have risen tremendously and threaten to crowd out the budget. To alleviate that, necessary end strength reductions are programmed yet will take years to materialize. Readiness must be preserved to allow us to respond to existing threats and Combatant Commander requirements. That leaves a reduction to modernization as the most realistic avenue for reducing expenditures to meet near term budget caps. As a result, we will continue to accept greater risk in our long term modernization programs for the next several years. The challenge is manifest in the fact that our Research, Development, and Acquisition accounts declined 30 percent over the past several years while during the same period, the Army had ongoing commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and emerging concerns in Europe and elsewhere.
The Army's ongoing worldwide commitments and the complexity of the security environment create a high level of potential risk which dictates a more innovative approach to problem solving. In addition, the threats we face range from low-tech insurgents, hybrid non-state actors, conventional military, cyber attacks, and nuclear armed opponents, all of which defy a single approach to countering. Today, we simply cannot afford myopic and immature technologies that ignore current threats nor can we afford decade long development projects focused on a particular enemy at the expense of upgrading and modernizing currently fielded equipment. Deployed Soldiers standing in harm's way today cannot wait for the next technological advancement. We must preserve resources and capabilities to generate readiness, sustain our forces, and invest in the future within the context of a very dynamic strategic environment and a very uncertain and ambiguous fiscal future.
To guide our thinking in dealing with this challenge, we look to documents like the Army Operating Concept (AOC), DSG, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, and others to inform our investment and modernization strategy. For instance, in order to "win in a complex world" the AOC reminds us that the Army must effectively operate in the future Joint Operating Environment (JOE) - an intensely complex environment where enemies and adversaries employ traditional, unconventional and hybrid strategies to gain strategic and operational advantages. Our forces must effectively integrate the use of lethality, survivability, mobility and situational awareness to win and achieve overmatch against a range of threats. We must ensure that how we equip the current force preserves adequate capacity and readiness to be able to deploy in a JOE and defeat any adversary that may be encountered. In the near term, we can only accomplish this by delaying investment in the future force, focusing instead on short term, high return investments and selected developmental programs.
That deliberate trade-off means we must be even more diligent with how we spend our limited near term investment dollars. We will reconsider current requirements and fielding timelines to ensure procurement objectives reflect what Soldiers really need today. As such, we will focus our modernization efforts on incremental upgrades to existing proven platforms, and where possible, leverage commercial technologies. Concurrently, we will continue to innovate and use equipment in new ways - like we have done with manned and unmanned teaming. Our goal is to deliver capabilities faster in a low-risk and responsive manner. While our budgets are declining, we do not have the luxury of waiting on leap ahead programs that take years to mature. Current threats change rapidly and as an institution, the Army must also adapt swiftly to deliver more, faster. Our adversaries simply will not accommodate extended timelines or a multi-year development process.
As an example of our efforts, we are focusing on improvements to combat systems including the M1 Abrams, the M2 Bradley, Stryker, and Aviation fleets. Incremental upgrades to our ground combat vehicles will provide the force increased lethality, fuel efficiency, power, and more effective communication capabilities at echelon. Since budget constraints preclude the development of a new Armed Scout Helicopter on any near term timeline, the Army will re-organize and re-purpose existing equipment to meet reconnaissance capability requirements, while long term solutions continue in the Science and Technology (S&T) realm. Teaming the Apache with unmanned aircraft to fill the armed scout role is one example of an innovative solution. In lieu of initiating a program that will take years to develop and delay fulfilling a time sensitive operational need, the Army intends to "up-gun" the Stryker with a 30mm cannon to better match emerging threats in an expedited manner. Such incremental upgrades and innovative approaches are examples of how the Army will spend the bulk of its procurement and Research and Development efforts in the near term. In addition to these upgrades, near term procurement dollars will focus on purchasing high payoff developmental systems like the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Armored Mobile Protected Vehicle. Both are examples of next generation ground combat vehicles that will likely remain in service for the foreseeable future.
Though the Army cannot afford substantial development programs in the near term, we will continue to preserve investment in S&T that focuses on mid and long-term solutions for inherently military problems that do not have a comparable commercial application. Examples include next-generation armor and directed energy. This methodology acknowledges the mid and far term environment alluded to in the AOC but approaches the problem set from a cost informed perspective. As technology matures and resources become available, we will consider incorporating promising advancements into existing formations or if the technology warrants, transitioning into developmental programs. The key difference today, as opposed to previous major developmental efforts, is that the Army cannot afford risky and expensive programmatic decisions at the expense of modernizing proven, existing equipment that delivers incremental but effective improvements and overmatch for our Soldiers today. While we will be prudent with procurement efforts, preserving research funding is an affordable hedge against future risk.
In every inter-war period in our nation's history the military has undergone budget reductions as public sentiment favored spending peace dividends on other national priorities. Today, peace and security appear elusive with the emergence of threats in both cyber and space domains and the rise of state and non-state actors that pose a persistent challenge. Further, our forces remain deployed and globally engaged while simultaneously contending with significantly reduced resources. To meet the challenge, in the near term we will make modest investments with a focus on delivering the best and most affordable capability to our warfighters as rapidly as possible while hedging against future risk with long term S&T investments. This approach best matches resources to our defense strategy with the least amount of risk. Moving forward, the G-8 will embrace these challenges while striking the right balance between strategy, requirements, resources, and acquisition to deliver the world's most capable land warfighting force.
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