As the United States began to develop the architecture for the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, a number of technologies emerged to lead the way - the Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interceptor Subsystem, or ERIS, the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor, or HEDI, and the Terminal Imaging Radar, or TIR, to name but three. Each would play a role in the development of a layered defense concept and can be seen in the elements deployed today.
Thirty years ago, however, many options and technologies were in development and under consideration. One such project was the Braduskill Interceptor Concept, or BIC, and on June 28, 1985, the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command awarded four concept definition contracts for the BIC.
Originally known as the Boschma Interceptor Concept in honor of concept developer Lt. Col. James Boschma, the BIC dates back to 1984. It was subsequently renamed Braduskill to reflect the intercept method -- "bradus" -- the Greek word for slow -- combined with the English word "kill."
With forward basing the BIC was conceived as a midcourse interceptor. Operating with other ballistic missile defense, or BMD, technology efforts, the BIC interceptor was to "receive commit instructions and orientation data from a ballistic missile defense node.
After launch, on board sensors would guide the interceptor to locate and then fly alongside the target objects. During this time, the sensors would identify the warhead from the debris cloud. The BIC would then destroy the target with explosive warheads guided by infrared sensors or radar sensitive homing devices.
As the history noted, "the BIC approach to ballistic missile defense provides an inherently very attractive means of countering the ballistic missile threat by selecting a battle space that permits relatively long engagement times and relatively slow home-in target velocities -- both of these characteristics enhance a battle commander's ability to win the battle."
1985 was a pivotal year for the BIC. In February, Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, approved the BIC work package which authorized the program through fiscal year 1989 and included a proof of principle, or POP, test program.
Within a month, the command had established the BIC Task Force, headed by Boschma, and by Dec. 1, 1985 the seven-member BIC team was chartered as a project office.
While the task force addressed subsystem engineering, engineering and design, test management and sensor/data processing, the four concept development contractors (Sperry Systems, Lockheed Aerospace, Martin Marietta and LTV) worked to develop concepts for conducting the proof of principle test program.
Over the next two years, a variety of studies and assessments were initiated to develop the BIC experiment which would incorporate off-the-shelf technology to allow for an initial flight test 24-months after the contract was let.
Teledyne Brown Engineering conducted studies on the BIC booster, sensor viability and an application assessment. The Performance Review Institute, or PRI, addressed the nuclear environment. Sperry was awarded a contract for command, control and communications, or C3, and Delta developed a BIC simulation architecture study.
Meanwhile other government agencies contributed to the BIC discrimination radar assessment; the BIC discrimination experiment, lethality tests, concept application, neutral particle beams, C3/battle management studies and the development of test facilities.
If 1985 was key to the development of the project, 1986 saw the beginning of the end.
Initially budgeted for $12.1 million in fiscal year 1986, the funds were gradually transferred elsewhere. The Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment received $2 million. Another $2.5 million went to the Advanced Sensors Measurement Payload. With an additional $1.5 million declared as excess per the command's spending guidelines, by mid-year the BIC was at $5.8 million.
Ultimately on May 5, the BIC was further reduced to zero, to be funded by FY 1987 funds at a later date. In the midst of this turmoil, leadership of the project transferred from Boschma to Col. David Mahlik.
To operate within the new funding amounts, the test program was moved from the Kwajalein Missile Range to White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. In addition greater emphasis was placed on the BIC's potential discrimination contributions to the SDI architecture.
Concurrent with these efforts, Sparta was tasked to conduct an architecture assessment comparing the proposed BIC and the ERIS programs. While some argued that the BIC would be a complement to the ERIS providing additional data for a more effective discrimination effort, other experts saw the BIC as an impediment to the architecture subtracting valuable time from the potential ERIS intercept.
In Sparta's final assessment, they determined that the BIC was more of a hindrance rather than an asset and the system did not fit in the established architecture. Sparta recommended that any remaining funds be realigned.
In the end the funding restraints of FY87, funding for concepts and experimental programs was significantly reduced with entire programs canceled. In FY87, the BIC leadership was advised to provide lists of concepts and accomplishments that could be applied to other programs. The contracts were terminated in the solicitation source evaluation boards and the BIC ceases to appear in the histories.
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