

# Army National Guard

WHITE PAPER

## *“Strategic Reserve to Operational Force”*



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### **Introduction**

“It’s what I signed up for.” In those few words, Staff Sergeant Steve Pepper, a Wisconsin National Guard MP who returned from Iraq in July 2004, described the new paradigm of the Army National Guard (ARNG) – mobilization is an expectation, not an exception. Gone is the Cold War mantra of “one weekend a month, two weeks a year” with little chance of mobilization during an ARNG career. Today’s ARNG is a total Army partner with Joint and expeditionary capabilities.

Not since World War II have so many Soldiers been activated for wars. Fighting the Global War on Terrorism has meant that ARNG Soldiers have been called upon more than ever to provide security to our nation. Today, the ARNG is conducting support and stability operations (SSO) in Iraq and Afghanistan while also keeping peace in the Balkans. Mobilization is now entrenched in ARNG operations.

America’s increased dependence on the ARNG has created significant personnel, political and budgetary implications. This new reality presents a considerable challenge to current resources. As a result, many organizational and structural changes will be needed to meet the nation’s new mission requirements. Some of these changes include predictable deployments, one-Army pay and personnel system, and a streamlined mobilization process. Restructuring the Army to modular units and developing a Force Generation Model will bring rigorous planning metrics to mobilizations. Other initiatives like ARNG force rebalancing and expanding reach back capabilities will produce a more cohesive, deployable and combat-ready ARNG force.

Paramount to ARNG’s future success is an Army-wide cultural change which fully supports the principal of recurring mobilization. This new culture must include families, employers and the Congress. ARNG Soldiers must be recruited, trained, equipped and retained with a “go-to-war” mindset. To accomplish this, the entire structure that supports the ARNG must be transformed as well.

### **Overview**

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed in a July 9, 2003, memo on Rebalancing Forces, that prudent use of the ARNG remains a cornerstone of the new paradigm:

“Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.”

While the ARNG constitutes an indispensable portion of the Army’s deployable land power and support, priority still goes to AC units to conduct expeditionary missions. The intent is to avoid involuntary mobilization and deployment of ARNG land force units within the first 30 days of an operation. The mission plan should give ARNG Soldiers ample notice before being mobilized. The 9 July 2003, memo from Secretary Rumsfeld states,

“Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid

response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every six years.”

The Army White Paper, “Serving a Nation at War” published in May 2004 notes,

“The National Guard will continue to provide strategic and operational depth and flexibility. . . .”

In a statement before the House Government Reform Committee in April 2004, Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, described the paradigm’s end state:

“My acid test ... is to ensure that the Guard and Reserve are assigned the right mission, have the right training, possess the right equipment, are positioned in and with the correct infrastructure, are physically, medically and operationally ready to accomplish the assigned tasks, are fully integrated within the Active Component and are there in the right numbers required to help fight and win any conflict.”

The path to a trained, resourced and indispensable ARNG crosses the readiness spectrum.

#### Mobilization:

- Change the mobilization process from “alert, mobilize, train, deploy” to “train, mobilize, deploy.”
- Streamline mobilization process to take full advantage of the JFHQ and State capabilities.
- Increase full-time support at the unit level.
- Provide deployment predictability through the six year ARNG Force Generation model.
- Use the full authority of mobilization statutes.
- Use the entire ARNG force for enduring mobilizations as part of a capabilities based force in a campaign quality Army.
- Create enduring mobilization sites that are fully resourced (dedicated staffs, required facilities and services).

#### Training:

- Instill in all Army Soldiers the warrior ethos, a process that starts with recruiting, is reinforced through a Soldier’s career, and permeates into civilian life after retirement.
- Organize, train, and equip ARNG units equal to their AC counterparts.
- Formalize AC-ARNG unit affiliation by assigning ARNG units an AC “partner” for training.
- Fund additional active duty for training and allow more flexibility in how units drill.
- Fully fund DMOSQ and professional development

### Readiness:

- Fully recognize and support the full range of 1-4-2-1 missions identified in the FY05-09 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) -- recognizing that Homeland Defense (the first "1") is the single most important mission.
- Develop an ARNG Force Generation Model that brings every unit to C-1 rating prior to availability to deploy.
- Transform ARNG units into modular forces that seamlessly integrate with Army formations.
- Determine how the ARNG will support the Army in performing its Homeland Defense (HLD) mission.
- Create Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students (TTHS) accounts in the Army Guard to remove non-deployable Soldiers from units.
- Provide relief from AC stop-loss if the Soldier transfers to an ARNG unit.

### Outreach:

- Launch Strategic Communications and public information campaigns to ensure families, employers, neighbors and Soldiers in all Components understand the new ARNG paradigm and its important role.
- Implement a stronger ESGR relationship throughout the ARNG community.
- Call attention to humanitarian operations and other non-GWOT missions outside the continental United States, which may not receive the same backing as mobilizations to fight terrorism or defend the homeland.

### Implications

The ramp-up and operational employment of more ARNG units (rather than selected units repeatedly) will reduce overall stress on the force and strengthen the capabilities, leadership and resiliency of the Army. Expeditionary missions will drive the need for better trained Soldiers and more capable leaders, requiring more intensive leader training and demanding promotion systems that advance the best and brightest. Lessons learned from mobilizations will permeate the ARNG, increasing preparedness of follow-on forces. Better trained, equipped and led units will improve homeland defense capabilities.

The traditional ARNG training baseline of 15 days of Annual Training and 48 Unit Training Assemblies will remain the baseline. Focused readiness will demand more preparation time as the unit approaches mobilization. Funding for the ARNG will increase as TTHS accounts mature and drill attendance, duty MOS qualification and retention rates improve.

The ARNG remains critically short of mission-essential equipment. Traditional ways to equip units will have to change. Home station facilities need upgrading for new equipment storage and training. Many older facilities are "land locked" in urban areas and cannot expand or meet current force protection requirements.

Review of compensation, incentives, and stabilization for ARNG Soldiers needs to continue. One example: increase Affiliation Bonuses to encourage prior service personnel to join the ARNG rather than the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Also, ARNG should enact a Stabilization Policy to avoid having a prior service Soldier mobilized for at least 12 months after transitioning from the AC to the ARNG. Increases to enlistment, re-enlistment, and extension bonuses, as well as the addition of an AC-to-ARNG transition bonus may also be required to ensure the ARNG is able to maintain the right all-volunteer force.

Employer support of this new culture is critical to its success; therefore, more will be needed in the way of employer incentives. Extension of TRICARE to Selective Reserve members deserves significant consideration. Not only would this improve medical readiness, it would also help civilian employers reduce personnel costs.

Recruiting practices and advertising messages must openly address the expectation of mobilization, possibly at a higher cost of doing business. Allowing ARNG recruiters earlier access to AC Soldiers would foster a continuum of service.


### **Force Generation Model**

At the heart of the new paradigm is a Force Generation Model that transitions the ARNG from tiered to focused readiness. Such a model will provide a predictable mobilization cycle which is crucial to the ARNG's ability to meet future needs. Currently, the ARNG planning metric is one mobilization in every six years. Focused operational readiness will do away with the "have/have not" division of tiered resourcing. Virtually all ARNG units will be programmed for a C-1 rating when deployed. The end result is a truly trained, ready and viable ARNG that can support an expeditionary Army and the global defense strategy.


Using the six-year cycle as an illustration, units will focus on individual/crew/squad training during the early phases, transition to collective training, and plan to deploy in year 6. Year 5 would include a Combat Training Center rotation or comparable event. Prior to year 6, units will be manned, equipped and trained to C-1 levels. While unpredictable world events may force the Army to mobilize units prior to year 6, this model will allow for greater planning than ever before.

"There will be no 'late deployers,' merely 'future deployers' who are at different stages of their rotation cycle," explains "Serving a Nation at War." In year 6, ARNG units (the "Available Force"), if mobilized, will be assigned combat missions, forward presence rotations, humanitarian assistance or homeland defense missions. Length of the activation can vary from several weeks to months, possibly under a steady state of Presidential Reserve Call-up authority.

## ARNG BCT Training, Equipping & Reset within Army Force Generation Model



## ARNG CS/CSS Training, Equipping & Reset within Army Force Generation Model




At a minimum, the Force Generation Model offers Soldiers, families and employers a predictable timeframe for extended active duty tours. In addition, the model reduces reliance on cross leveling and shares the war fighting burden across the force. But a number of challenges ensue:

- Success depends on a high degree of unit integrity. Soldier and key leader rotations must be kept to a minimum, especially during collective training. Prudent use of stop-loss/stop-move may be needed for AC and ARNG units. The limited area from which ARNG units can recruit may hamper vacancy backfill, making Active Component DMOSQ transfers more critical.
- Force Generation relies heavily on Soldier deployability and medical readiness enhanced by early screening programs.
- Additional funding will be required to exceed traditional Unit Training Assemblies and Annual Training constraints in certain years of the model.
- Increasing ARNG readiness will impact the Army's logistics and training base (school seats, ammunition, training areas, etc.).
- New equipment must arrive in a timely manner to ensure total package fielding and allow for NET/DET.

The ARNG provides Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), units must maintain a baseline level of personnel, equipment and collective training expertise through all phases of the Force Generation cycle. Planning metrics for the ARNG should target 25 percent of the force in an alert status, 25 percent on mobilized/deployed for training and approximately 50 percent available to Governors for MSCA missions while they continue individual/crew/squad level training. See the National Guard model below.

## Core Joint Capabilities



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## **Modularity**

“Modularity provides a combatant commander with a force that is interchangeable, expandable and responsive to changing requirements,” notes the January 2004 OSD report, “Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve.”

As part of the Army’s plan for increased flexibility in responding to an asymmetric threat, modular organizations are being created. The ARNG will reorganize into Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) – 10 Heavy, 23 Infantry and one Stryker BCT. Additionally, the ARNG will have a number of Support Units of Action (SUA) and form eight command and control headquarters called Units of Employment (UEX). UEX will have organic logistics support and be structured to command up to five BCTs and their support bases.

Tied to modularity is rebalancing the forces between the AC and ARNG. This process began in 2002 and may impact over 100,000 AC and ARNG Soldiers. Rebalancing efforts include divesting positions in field artillery, divisional air defense, and armor and engineering units. At the same time, rebalancing will add positions in civil affairs, psychological operations, chemical, special operations forces, intelligence and military police units.

This rebalancing effort will create additional high demand/low density units to reduce stress on the force. It will increase AC capabilities providing better support for the first 30 days of a rapid response operation. Force rebalancing also improves high-tech operations and experimentation. Finally, rebalancing will reduce the need to mobilize ARNG units early.

## **Mobilization/Demobilization**

An operational ARNG force must be quick to mobilize, properly trained for the mission, and returned to home station without delay. Prior to 9/11, operational deployments generally were viewed as one-time events. An “Industrial Age” mobilization/demobilization process was adequate. The process was linear and sequential -- emphasizing mass over time, and achieving wartime preparedness after mobilization.

Today the Army needs a more disciplined, strategic approach to mobilization, akin to the AC deployment process of “train-alert-deploy.” ARNG units must complete most administrative, medical, logistical and training requirements prior to mobilization. If possible, ARNG Soldiers should be provided at least 30 days alert notification for unprogrammed missions to address personal/family concerns and medical/dental readiness. The Force Generation Model will offer a long-term solution with phased utilization.

The current process for cross-leveling and replacing ARNG unit personnel is cumbersome and inefficient. A key element to better personnel fill is allowing the ARNG to manage the individual replacement process as part of a more streamlined administrative model. The Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) will have to be completely redesigned to provide an efficient process for managing personnel replacement.

Army training centers must be better prepared to support the ARNG. Currently, there are significant shortfalls in barracks space, officer and senior enlisted quarters, and dining and maintenance facilities.

The situation will worsen as additional WWII-era wooden structures are demolished and competition continues with AC units preparing for deployment. Without permanent transient facilities and “surge plans” at training and mobilization sites, the “train-mobilize-deploy” readiness model is challenged.

More credit must be given to pre-mobilization training conducted at home station and training sites. More urgency must be placed on medical assessments. The first general officer in the chain-of-command should be empowered to validate Soldier readiness.

When ARNG units mobilize and deploy, they still need support from their home station. Currently, ARNG units are authorized a small rear detachment to stay behind and assist the families of deployed soldiers, maintain facilities, and conduct other administrative functions. Rear Detachment Authorizations consist of one Soldier per Company and two per Battalion.

Other changes needed:

- Shorten the mobilization process for highly-skilled civilian professionals to reduce total mobilization time and enhance volunteerism. Consider direct deployment.
- Give military credit for comparable civilian experience.
- Where practicable, ensure units demobilize at the same site from which they mobilized to ease the process.
- Improve notification of unit arrivals.

In order to get units to the theater quickly and efficiently, the ARNG is working to move to a Home Station Modified Direct Deployment (HSMDD) for some types of units. NGB, FORSCOM, and HQDA are currently conducting a pilot program with three units to determine the feasibility of this concept.

## **Employers**

Long-term success of an expeditionary ARNG will depend directly on employer support. The Army must launch an outreach program that:

- Focuses on small businesses that are more heavily impacted by mobilizations than large employers.
- Leverages the work of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.
- Repeatedly updates ARNG Soldiers and families on rights and responsibilities under the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act.
- Provide outreach to employers, to include Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act issues and monitoring mobilization of citizen-Soldiers in key civilian positions.

In March 2004, Department of Defense mandated that Services implement a Civilian Employment Information program for members of the Ready Reserve. Armed with such information, DoD can more

effectively mobilize ARNG, distribute information to employers and identify members with needed civilian-acquired skills.

## **Personnel**

More flexibility is needed in personnel management, specifically, a single AC-ARNG system that allows Soldiers a seamless flow between full and part-time status. Transitioning to a new Force Stabilization manning system for AC combat units is a good first step. The ARNG must build on the strengths of this system and follow its basic tenets: improved unit readiness, cohesion and predictability. In the Active Army, once in a Force Stabilized unit, Soldiers serve the entire operational lifecycle. Likewise, the ARNG must design programs and policies that sustain unit cohesion but allow Soldiers to grow professionally in military and civilian careers.

To best achieve personnel readiness across the Army, we must:

- Grow readiness from within through phased mobilization.
- Exploit the potential of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), to include authorization to mobilize most recently trained Soldiers.
- Aggressively seek volunteers. Offer incentives for serving beyond 24 months in support of major operations.
- Examine enlistment contract language to ensure it acknowledges the possibility that the Soldier may sign up for six years, but may serve eight years due to stop loss/stabilization.
- Improve health and dental readiness of Soldiers by creating a viable and centralized medical database, establishing a self-assessment program within the five-year periodic physical window, publishing medical deployment guidelines, and updating health readiness on Unit Status Reports.
- Re-examine the Military Service Obligation (MSO). Consider elimination of the IRR as a recruiting or transfer option, especially for high demand MOS's. Alternatively, reduce the MSO if an AC Soldier transitions to the Selective Reserve.
- Rejuvenate Family Readiness program with more funding and an increase in full-time support. Exploit the Joint Force Headquarters – State family program for total Army family support.

Many skills useful to the military are difficult to acquire through traditional accession policies. By direct entry, the ARNG can acquire additional manpower without affecting end strength. This will allow ARNG to realize cost savings in certain specialty skills and increase opportunities for using retirees. Furthermore, direct entry will open new avenues to the ARNG by developing community partnerships with industry and academia.

## **Summary**

Manning the force will be the ARNG's greatest challenge. To succeed, the ARNG must place greater emphasis on recruiting and retaining quality Soldiers for an operational force and attracting smart, adaptive Soldiers that have internalized the Warrior ethos. Providing the proper incentives to Soldiers, their families, and their employers is a prerequisite for achieving this new cultural paradigm.

Just how much the Nation will support an expeditionary ARNG remains unknown. While our military strategy demands it, the unique status of citizen-Soldiers will challenge it. Providing the Army a fully modernized, ready, part-time force capable of maintaining a steady deployment posture has its costs. Investment must center on readiness, infrastructure, and interoperability.

Maintaining integrated total force capabilities is key to accomplishing the nation's defense policy goals. If the U.S. is to successfully assure allies, dissuade military competition, deter threats and decisively defeat adversaries; transformation to this new paradigm is necessary.

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