A Statement on the
Posture of the United States Army 2002

by

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and
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Presented to

The Committees and Subcommittees
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
and the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS

The annual Army Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs.

Designed to reinforce the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army, posture and budget testimony before Congress, the Army Posture Statement serves a broad audience as a basic reference on the state of the Army.

This document is available on the Army Homepage at www.army.mil
It is produced by the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
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simulations do not provide a theater-level simulation system, compatible with current simulation suites that replicate a Major Theater of War scenario.

d. ARNG and USAR Force Support Package Units.

- Manpower. Shortfalls in FTS manning limit operations and training management. Sustaining DMO SQ impacted by limited school spaces for low density MOS. Some MOS require extensive training (11M, 19K, 13B, 13F, 31, and 63H) and sequential schools require a soldier’s absence from their civilian employment for extended periods.

- Equipment. Some FSP units have equipment that is incompatible with their active counterparts. This creates problems, especially with command and control, during training. Several FSP units will have to acquire needed force modernization equipment at the mobilization station.

- Training. Some Equipment Readiness Code-A equipment shortages inhibit effective training. Units will require additional training time after mobilization to achieve proficiency on collective tasks. Limited funds and/or limited days available for training generally cause soldiers to attend either Annual Training or DMO SQ schools. Distance to training areas and facilities further erodes available training time.

e. The results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

- Detailed validations are maintained by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Training Division.

- For ARNG divisions and eSBs, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System and Mobile Subscriber Equipment connectivity is the foremost compatibility issue. As MTOE changes and unit reorganizations continue, compatibility will improve.

- ARNG and USAR FSP unit equipment shortages resulting from reorganizations and MTOE changes affect compatibility the most. Nonstandard software systems in these units affect both the Standard Installation Division Personnel System and the Unit Level Logistics System. Corresponding systems between components are frequently very different. Most FSP units will not be fully compatible with AC units until after mobilization.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261 note), shown (A) by State for the Army National Guard and RSC/GOCOM for the U.S. Army Reserve, (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Over this past year, The Army made great progress toward realizing the goals of all three components of the Vision we articulated over two years ago—People, Readiness, Transformation.

Soldiers remain on point—as they have for over 226 years. Strong in will and unyielding in spirit, they are key to providing decisive victory as part of the joint team. These soldiers are supported by dedicated, professional Department of the Army civilians and wonderful families. Our greatest strength lies in our people—they are central to everything we do.

Readiness remains The Army’s top priority and the enduring focus in fulfilling our non-negotiable contract with the American people—to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Today’s Army has to be prepared to perform a wide range of worldwide missions and must always be ready to defend the United States and its territories; support national policies and objectives; and defeat adversaries who endanger the peace and stability of the United States and our allies. Recent events have clearly demonstrated our readiness as our current area of operations extends from Afghanistan to Washington, New York, and the rest of the United States. We are simultaneously engaged in fighting the war on terrorism, keeping the peace in the Balkans and the Sinai, deterring war in Korea and Southwest Asia, and supporting civil authorities both at home and abroad. There are over 25,000 mobilized Soldiers from the Guard and Reserve serving alongside their active duty counterparts to accomplish our missions.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 were more than just the first salvo in a new war; they validated the direction of our Vision and the need to accelerate Army Transformation. This is not business as usual. The Army must accomplish in less than ten years what traditionally has taken up to twenty years. To do this, we are reengineering the way we do business to return savings and manpower to our warfighting forces while centralizing and streamlining organizations in order to focus our efforts on Army core competencies. The Army continues to move out. We intend to achieve the Objective Force—this decade.

Our challenge is to win this war, prepare for the next war, and garner the resources to do both. The President’s Budget request supports realizing The Army Vision. This budget will allow our Soldiers to remain trained and ready, while providing the resources needed to transform The Army for it to remain a key instrument of national security policy well into the future. We have helped our people, maintained a trained and ready force, and begun preparing to fight the wars of the 21st Century, but we need to do more. We need to move faster, and with the continued support of Congress and the Administration, we will.

The Army-Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.

February 2002

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General, U.S. Army
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Secretary of the Army
POSTURE STATEMENT 2002

Throughout our Nation's history, The Army has demonstrated that it is America's decisive ground combat force with capabilities sufficiently diverse to cover the full spectrum of operations demanded by the Nation-anytime, anywhere. The essence of The Army remains unchanged—an ethos of service to the Nation, the readiness to fight and win decisively, and a willingness to accomplish any mission the American people ask of us.

Today, we are engaged in a global war on terrorism and defense of our homeland. Soldiers, On Point for the Nation, are protecting and promoting American interests around the globe. They are accomplishing these vital missions much as we have for over 226 years with little fanfare or attention. The Army is able to accomplish what is asked by relying on the strength of its Soldiers-active, National Guard, Army Reserve-and civilians, who honorably and proudly answer the calls to duty.

The Army has no illusions about the challenges it faces. It must help win the global war on terrorism and prepare for future wars and conflicts by effectively using the resources you provide us to transform. With the continued support of Congress and the Administration, our Soldiers will continue to do their part to decisively win the global war on terrorism, rapidly transform themselves to fight and win new and different kinds of conflicts, meet our obligations to allies and friends, and maintain our readiness for the unexpected and unpredictable challenges that may arise.

conducted in FY 2001 and all met deployability standards. Forces Command maintains the results of the CONUSA inspections, Training Assessment Models (TAMs), and holds the data for Reserve Component FSP unit inspections.

- Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by state for the ARNG and by Regional Support Command for the USAR units are available from G3, DCSOPS, FORSCOM.

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat and FSP unit, and the U.S. Army Reserve FSP units, of the active-duty combat and other units associated with that Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State for the Army National Guard and RSC/GOCOM for the U.S. Army Reserve:

a. This information is contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Appendix B and C. An electronic version can be viewed at www.forscom.army.mil/pubs/Pubs/2530/SEC1-7_1.HTM.

and to be accompanied, for each such National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve unit, by --

b. The assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of ANGCRRA. Detailed assessments of specific RC units are maintained at the two numbered Armies in the continental United States (CONUSA) and three CONUS-based corps.

c. Army National Guard divisions and eSB.

- Manpower. Several eSB have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior officers. Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) is a training challenge because Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) require extensive training, often at sequential schools. Within the eSB Full Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge. In the eSB FTS is approximately 55 percent of requirements. In divisions, recent force structure authorization increases are causing short-term fill percentages shortfalls.

- Equipment. Equipment on-hand versus equipment authorized continues to hamper eSB conversion. Shortages in chemical defense equipment and night vision devices limit the full range of training for eSB.

- Training. Adequate training resources in FY 01 enabled eSB to sustain platoon pre-mobilization training proficiency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the availability of adequate maneuver areas continue to challenge most units. Current
b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG, and USAR, including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:

- Summary tables and assessments are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Training Division.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State, for units of the Army National Guard and for each RSC/DRU for units of the U.S. Army Reserve, of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions. For purposes of this report, data for Operational Readiness Evaluations will be provided on eSB and FSP units of the ARNG and for FSP units of the USAR. Training Assessment Model data will be provided to meet this reporting requirement for all other units of the ARNG and USAR. Data on ARNG units will be reported by State and on USAR units by RSC/DRU.

- During FY01, ARNG state level Inspectors General conducted extensive inspections throughout the U.S. State level Inspectors General conducted approximately 639 inspections during the year, visiting 812 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of inspections conducted by Inspectors General are available upon request from the responsible state IG. Operational Readiness Evaluation Data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data is maintained at the state level and is available upon request from state level training readiness officials.

- The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) inspections for RSCs/DSUs. Eight such inspections were

**THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

The attacks of 11 September provide compelling evidence that the strategic environment remains dangerous and unpredictable. Although we may sense dangerous trends and potential threats, there is little certainty about how these threats may be postured against America or her interests. Uncertainty marks the global war on terrorism, and our Soldiers continue to be involved in smaller-scale contingencies and conflicts. Yet, the potential for large-scale conventional combat operations will continue to lurk just beneath the surface. Victory in battle will require versatile combat formations and agile Soldiers, who can deploy rapidly, undertake a multiplicity of missions, operate continuously over extended distances without large logistics bases, and maneuver with speed and precision to gain positional advantage. Our Soldiers must be capable of prosecuting prompt and sustained land operations across a spectrum of conflict resulting in decisive victory.

**THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK**

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) established a new strategic framework for the defense of the Nation that struck a balance between near-term readiness and our ability to transform ourselves in order to meet current and future conflicts. The report outlined a new operational concept that gives continued priority to homeland defense, promotes deterrence through forward presence, and asks that we have the ability to conduct both smaller-scale contingencies and large scale, high-intensity combat operations simultaneously.

Our Soldiers can defeat enemy armies, seize and control terrain, and control populations and resources with minimal collateral casualties and damage. They can operate across the spectrum of military operations, whether it is full-scale conventional conflict, fighting terrorists, or setting the conditions for humanitarian assistance. This multifaceted ground capability enables us to assure our allies and friends, dissuade future military competition, deter threats and coercion, and, when necessary, decisively defeat any adversary.

As The Army continues to work with other departments, agencies, and organizations, emerging requirements that are not fully defined in the 2001 QDR may require additional resourcing, whether technological, logistical, or force structure. Despite ten years of downsizing, The Army has accomplished all assigned missions to a high standard. In short, we are doing more with less, and the strain on the force is real. Our Soldiers continue to give us more in operational readiness than we have resourced.

While we fight and win the global war on terrorism, The Army must prepare itself to handle demanding missions in the future strategic environment. Over two years ago, The Army undertook transforming itself into a force that is more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations. We have gained insight from previous deployments, operations, and exercises, along with leading-edge work in Army Battle Labs, joint and Army warfighting
experiments, and wargames. With this insight, The Army embarked on initiatives to assure its dominance in a new contemporary operational environment by deterring and defeating adversaries who rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives against conventional forces. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent operations overseas validated The Army's Transformation. If anything, 11 September provided new urgency to our efforts. Thus, we are accelerating Transformation to give our commanders the most advanced capabilities they need to ensure that we have the best led, best equipped, and best trained Soldiers for the emerging global environment. And to mitigate risk as we transform to meet future requirements, we will prioritize among the imperatives of meeting existing threats, safeguarding our homeland, and winning the war against terrorism.

SOLDIERS SERVING TODAY

Globally, Soldiers offer tangible reassurance to our allies, build trust and confidence, promote regional stability, encourage democratic institutions, and deter conflict. Nothing speaks to the values of America more than Soldiers on the ground providing comfort, aid, and stability at home and abroad. The Army, as part of a joint military team, provides a wide range of options to our leaders and commanders. As we have seen, in today's world we cannot win without the human dimension on the battlefield. Whether it be gathering intelligence, challenging an adversary's ability to conceal and seek cover, or protecting innocent civilians, the American Soldier remains the ultimate precision weapon during combat operations, particularly when legitimate targets are interspersed among non-combatants. In the final analysis, it is the Soldier on the ground who demonstrates the resilience of American commitment and provides the needed flexibility to decisively defeat our adversaries.

Since October 2001, Army conventional and special operations forces, as part of the joint force, have participated in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the Afghanistan theater of operations. The range of their capabilities was extensive. These highly trained Soldiers worked with local forces to forge a powerful alliance. They designated targets for air strikes, secured airfields, and performed reconnaissance and security missions that facilitated the safe introduction of follow-on forces. Supporting the war effort, they provide security to joint forces, critical facilities, and supply lines, and they receive and prepare both combat and humanitarian supplies for air delivery to Afghanistan. Currently, more than 12,000 Soldiers are deployed from Egypt to Pakistan, from Kenya to Kazakhstan. And although hostilities in Afghanistan are shifting focus, requirements for ground forces are growing—they are assuring regional stability in Afghanistan, directing humanitarian assistance and relief operations, securing detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and deploying to the Philippines.

At home, The Army continues its long tradition of support to homeland security. Even before 11 September 2001, The Army had 10 trained and certified Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams ready to assist civil authorities and had trained 28,000 civilian first responders in 105 cities. Since

d. Post mobilization training for FSP units is principally common task testing, NBC defense, force protection, sustainment, command and control, weapons qualification, tactical communications training, and branch specific technical training. Virtually all units also require branch specific technical training to meet deployment standards.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve.

• The ARNG made significant progress in the use of Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) during the preceding fiscal year. The ARNG teamed with TRADOC Systems Manager Combined Arms Tactical Trainer in developing a Maneuver Gated Training Strategy that incorporates the use of Maneuver Simulators into training plans that produce increased unit proficiency. The ARNG is on the verge of fielding the Abrams Full-Crew interactive Simulator Trainer (A-FIST XXI). The A-FIST XXI will provide us with an appended precision gunnery trainer that allows soldiers to train on their assigned equipment at home station and virtually replicating the tough doctrinal Tank Table Standards of a live range. The ARNG JANUS Battle Staff Trainers are being updated to the Army's approved software solution and hardware procurement is being planned and executed that will support the One SAF Future Combat System fielding in a seamless manner. The ARNG took delivery of its first EST 2000 marksmanship training systems. These systems are used in support of units conducting the vital homeland defense and airport security missions assigned to the ARNG.

The ARNG developed a unique partnership with STRICOM in the development, verification, validation and accreditation of systems and system upgrades. Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP) civilian infrastructure Commanders receive assistance from graybeard mentors, TADSS Facilitators, and JANUS Tech Team Exercise Support in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations based training that augments the support provided by TS XXI soldiers and greatly enhanced unit proficiency and readiness

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State for Army National Guard units, and for each RSC/GOCOM for the U.S. Army Reserve units, and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with-

a. Explanations of the information shown in the table. Summary tables are classified. This information is maintained by maintained by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Training Division.
• Public Law 104-106, Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRA.

13. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, and the number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the U.S. Army Reserve shown for each RSC/DRU, who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRA.

• Public Law 104-106, Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRA.

14. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, and the number of members, and the percentage of total Selected Reserve unit membership, of the U.S. Army Reserve, shown for each RSC/DRU, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRA.

• Public Law 104-106, Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard, and of the U.S. Army Reserve, that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRA.

• Public Law 104-106, Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat and FSP unit, and U.S. Army Reserve FSP unit, and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State for Army National Guard units, and by the RSC/GOCOM for U.S. Army Reserve units, of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat and CFP units, and U.S. Army Reserve units, in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRA.

a. Estimated time for post mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Force Readiness Division.

b. Information on the type of training required by units during post mobilization is maintained by the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs).

c. Post mobilization training for enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) can be categorized as maneuver, attack, defend, protect the force, gunnery and NBC defense.

The attacks, we have mobilized over 25,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) Soldiers for federal service here and overseas. Nearly 11,000 Soldiers are on state-controlled duty securing airports, seaports, reservoirs, power plants, the Nation's capital region, and serving at "ground zero" in New York City alongside the United States (U.S.) Army Corps of Engineers. To increase protection for our citizens and reduce vulnerability, we accelerated the safe destruction of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agent and munitions while combating the proliferation of chemical weapons. And continuing a commitment to civil authorities, nearly 500 Soldiers worked Super Bowl XXXVI, and over 5,000 Soldiers are helping ensure the security of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah.

But, fighting the global war on terrorism in no way diminishes the requirements placed on The Army for support to missions and operations around the world—indeed, it expands it. While The Army remains engaged at home, it is prudently taking action for follow-on operations around the world, to include mobilizing some 2,000 ARNG Soldiers to augment our missions in the European theater. In fact, The Army-active, ARNG, and USAR—has over 124,000 Soldiers and 38,000 civilians stationed in 110 countries. Additionally, on any given day last year some 27,000 Soldiers were deployed to 60 countries for operations and training missions. And it is easy to forget that our Soldiers have been on the ground conducting peacekeeping missions in the Balkans for six years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for eleven years, and in the Sinai for nineteen years. Our Soldiers have been in Korea and Europe for over 50 years, assuring their peace and stability while, at the same time, providing the Nation with a rapid deployment capability to areas near those theaters of operations, as needed.

THE ARMY VISION: PEOPLE, READINESS, AND TRANSFORMATION

On 12 October 1999, The Army articulated its Vision that defined how The Army would meet the Nation's requirements now and into the 21st Century. The Vision is comprised of three interdependent components—People, Readiness, and Transformation. It provides direction and structure for prioritizing resources to ensure The Army remains the most dominant and intimidating ground force in the world to deter those who would contemplate threatening the interests of America. Ultimately, it is about risk management, striking a balance between readiness today and preparedness for tomorrow. It is about having overmatching capabilities while simultaneously reducing our vulnerabilities in order to dominate those who would threaten our interests-now and in the future. It is about examining where we are now and where we need to be, and it is about achieving decisive victory—anywhere, anytime, against any opposition.

PEOPLE

People-Soldiers, civilians, retirees, veterans, and their families—are The Army. People are central to everything we do in The Army. Institutions do not transform; people do. Platforms and organizations do not defend our Nation; people do. Units do not train, they do...
not stay ready, they do not grow and develop leadership, they do not sacrifice, and they do not take risks on behalf of the Nation; people do. We must adequately man our force, provide for the well being of our Soldiers and their families, and develop leaders for the future so that The Army continues to be a professionally and personally rewarding experience. Soldiers will always be the centerpiece of our formations. They are our sons and daughters. We are committed to recruiting and retaining the best people and giving them the finest tools to do their job so that they remain the world’s best army.

**MANNING THE FORCE**

Current and future military operations depend on an Army with the flexibility to respond quickly in order to rapidly meet changing operational requirements. The Army has approached its manpower challenge in a variety of ways. In fiscal year (FY) 2000, we implemented a personnel strategy to man units at 100 percent. Starting with divisional combat units, the program expanded in FY2001 and FY2002 to include early deploying units. The Army is currently assessing its ability to fill remaining units by the end of FY2004. The ARNG and USAR now make up more than 50 percent of The Army’s force structure. Ongoing and expanded reserve integration initiatives—such as include Full Time Support—have increased reserve readiness and increased their ability to rapidly transition from a peacetime to a wartime posture.

A new advertising campaign in 2001—An Army of One—raised the awareness and interest levels of potential Soldiers. The Army achieved 100 percent of its goal for all components in recruiting and retention for the second year in a row. And to ensure that we recruit and retain sufficient quality personnel, we continue to examine innovative recruiting and retention programs.

**Well Being**

Army readiness is inextricably linked to the well being of our People. Our success depends on the whole team—Soldiers, civilians, retirees, and their families—all of whom serve the Nation. The term well being is not a synonym with “quality of life,” but rather an expansion of the concept that integrates and incorporates existing quality of life initiatives and programs. Well being takes a multifaceted approach. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to improve TRICARE in order to provide better medical care for Soldiers, families, and retirees and to continue to close the compensation gap between Soldiers and the civilian sector. Our Soldiers appreciate, more than you realize, your support this past year for pay increases of at least 5 percent and the 3.6 percent for the civilians who support them. Targeted pay increases for highly skilled enlisted Soldiers and mid-grade officers, the online electronic Army University education program, and upgraded single-soldier barracks and residential communities further support and aid in maintaining the well being of Soldiers willing to put their lives at risk for our national interests. In turn, the attention to a Soldier's well being helps The Army recruit and retain the best people. Our Soldiers ask little in return, but they judge their Nation's commitment to them by how well it takes care of them and their families. It is a commitment we must honor.

a. The number of ARNG soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG is 1,109, which includes all 54 states and territories. The breakdown by each state is maintained by NGB.

b. Those soldiers who have not completed the required IET within the first 24 months are discharged from the USAR under AR 135-178 Separation of Enlisted Personnel. Before discharge, every means available is used to ensure the soldier has had the opportunity to be trained. In some cases, the soldier was unable to attend the required scheduled training through no fault of the soldier. (e.g. temporary medical condition, death of an immediate family member, failure to complete high school and requiring an additional semester of summer school).

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

   • In FY01, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, and the number of US Army Reserve members shown by each RSC/HGCOM, who were

a. Screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment;

   • In FY01, 92,051 approximately ARNG underwent a retention physical. Of these personnel, 2,730 persons, or 3 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

   • In FY01, USAR screened 26,296 soldiers. Of these, 149 failed (0.6 percent) to meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

   • In FY01, ARNG 2,730 persons who were transferred from a deployable to a nondeployable.

12. The number of members, and the percentage total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, and for the U.S. Army reserve shown by each RSC/DRU, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
ANGCRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment and a narrative summarizing procedures to be followed in FY00 to account for members of the USAR who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment:

a. In FY01, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel was: 45,539. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

b. The USAR makes a substantial investment in training, time, equipment, and related expenses when persons enter military service. Separation before completion of an obligated period of service is wasteful because it results in loss of this investment and generates a requirement for increased accessions. Consequently, attrition is an issue of significant concern at all levels of responsibility within the USAR. Reasonable efforts are made to identify soldiers who exhibit a likelihood for early separation, and to improve their chances for retention through counseling, retraining, and rehabilitation prior to initiation of separation proceedings.

Non Prior Service (NPS) enlistees in USAR units will normally be ordered to IADT within 270 days of enlistment. NPS direct enlistees in the IRR must enter IADT within 180 days after date of enlistment. NPS enlistees may be authorized an additional period of delay from reporting as provided in AR 601-25, paragraph 3-4.

An enlisted soldier who cannot satisfactorily complete the MOS training for which selected will be required to accept training to qualify for an alternate MOS as determined by the USAR unit commander (AR 612-201).

The tracking of new soldiers who have not completed training is done by the use of the Training Pay category codes. All soldiers who are awaiting shipment to Basic training are listed as Pay Category 'P'. Those soldiers who have completed Basic training, returned to their USAR unit, and are now waiting to attend Advanced Individual Training are coded as Pay Category 'Q'. Those soldiers attending training are carried in Pay Category 'P' while they are at school.

Those soldiers who are not "deployable" for reasons other than lack of IET are listed on the personnel databases with a code indicating the reasons for their non-deployable status.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard and a narrative summarizing procedures to be followed in FY01 for discharging members of the USAR who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months of entering the USAR.

Leader Development

Civilian and military leaders are the linchpin of Transformation. The leaders and Soldiers who will implement the new warfighting doctrine must be adaptive and self-aware, capable of independent operations separated from friendly elements for days at a time, exercising initiative within their commander's intent to rapidly exploit opportunities as they present themselves on the battlefield. Leaders must be intuitive and capable of rapid tactical decision-making, and all Soldiers must master the information and weapons systems technologies in order to leverage their full potential. But new technologies and new kinds of warfare will demand a new kind of leader.

As part of our transformation process, the Army is taking a comprehensive look at the way we develop officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers through the Army Training and Leader Development Panels to review and assess issues and provide recommendations on how to produce the Army's future leaders. We have expanded these reviews to include Army civilians in anticipation of the need to replace the increasing number who will become retirement eligible after FY2003. The Army must have top-notch military and civilian people at all levels in order to meet the global, economic, and technological challenges of the future.

In June 2001, the Army published the most significant reshaping of Army warfighting doctrine since 1982. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, emphasizes the Army's ability to apply decisive force through network-centric capabilities and shows just how dramatically the Army must transform itself to fight both differently and more effectively. This doctrine will assist in the development of a new force-the Objective Force-that maximizes the technological advantages of equipment, leader development, and evolutionary warfighting concepts. The Objective Force will demand a generation of leaders who know how to think, not what to think.

READINESS

At its most fundamental level, war is a brutal contest of wills. Winning decisively means dominating the enemy. To be dominant, we must be not only organized, manned, and equipped, but also fully trained. Today, the Army is ready for its assigned missions, but sustained support from the Nation, Congress, and the Administration is required to ensure that we maintain our readiness. To do so requires that we pay attention to training, installations, force protection and readiness reporting.

Unit Training

Tough, demanding training which is supported by an infrastructure that allows us to train, sustain, and deploy is essential to readiness. History has taught us and we have learned that, in the end, armies fight the way they train. The Army is committed to fully executing our training strategy—the higher the quality of training, the better the leaders and warriors we produce. The result is an increased state of readiness to serve our Nation. To this end, we must fully modernize training ranges, combat training centers, and training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations to provide adequate and challenging training. The Army has funded the integration of virtual and constructive training capabilities to achieve realism and cost effectiveness.
As we move to greater network-centric warfare capability, our forces will operate with even greater dispersion, and maintaining sufficient maneuver areas for training these extended formations will become even more critical. Thus, The Army is implementing a sustainable program to manage the lifecycle of training and testing ranges by integrating operational needs, land management, explosives safety, and environmental stewardship. This program will ensure the continuing viability of training ranges by addressing the multiple aspects of encroachment: endangered species and critical habitats, unexploded ordnance and munitions, spectrum encroachment, airspace restrictions, air quality, noise, and urban growth. As we transform to a future force with new systems, organizational structures, and new doctrine to achieve full spectrum operational capability, our training enablers and infrastructure, along with realistic and relevant training venues, must be funded to match the timelines we have established to field a highly trained Soldier-one whose unit is poised to fight new and different kinds of conflicts while maintaining traditional warfighting skills.

**Installations**

Installations provide homes, family and training support, and power projection platforms for The Army. They are the bases where Soldiers live, train, and from which they launch on their missions. Worldwide, we have physical plants worth over $220 billion. For too many years, The Army has under funded long-term facilities maintenance in order to fully fund combat readiness and contingency operations; thus, we now have first-class Soldiers living and working in third-class facilities. Commanders currently rate two-thirds of their infrastructure condition so poor that it significantly impacts mission accomplishment and morale. The major investment in Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) in FY2002 will help improve only the most critical conditions in our crumbling infrastructure. Over the next five years, SRM shortfalls will continue to approximate $3 billion annually as a result of our aging facilities. Exacerbating this situation is the fact that The Army has more facility infrastructure than we need. The cost of operating and sustaining these facilities directly competes with funding our warfighting capability. The realignment or closure of excess facilities will free funds for installations and bring the recapitalization rate closer to the Department of Defense's goal of 67 years by 2010. The Army is divesting itself of mothballed facilities and examining privatization alternatives. For example, we are capitalizing on the success of the Residential Communities Initiatives by expanding the program to 24 projects to more efficiently and effectively manage installations. Encompassing over 63,000 family housing units, the program allows the private sector to remodel, build, and manage housing on Army bases in order to provide the quality housing our Soldiers and their families deserve. In FY2003, we will institute a centralized installation management organization that will improve our facilities and infrastructure through consistent funding and standards that promote the equitable delivery of base operation services and achieve efficiencies through corporate practices and regionalization.

- In FY01, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRAA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year, and the number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRAA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the U.S. Army Reserve and, of those officer, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year.

- In FY01, a total of 105 ROTC graduates were released early from their active duty obligation. Of these, were Distinguished Military Graduates and previously accounted for in question 4. The remaining ROTC graduates are serving the remainder of their obligation in the National Guard.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRAA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRAA:
   a. 178 USAR officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion. 153 were favorably considered.
   b. In the ARNG in FY01, the number of officers recommended for unit vacancy promotions, above the grade of first lieutenant, was 2020. An active duty officer concurred in 100 percent of those officer promotions.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRAA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

- In FY01, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under 1115 of
SECTION 521(B)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
   a. Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 21,322 or 58.3 percent
   b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers: 20,494 or 60 percent

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
   a. ARNG enlisted: 148,710 or 47.2 percent
   b. USAR enlisted: 57,051 or 35 percent

3. The numbers of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation. Of those officers
   a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRR:
      • In FY01, 25 officers were released to the selective reserve to complete their obligation.
   b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRR, together with the reason for each waiver:
      • In FY01, 1 waiver, for mental disorder, was granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation:
   a. In FY01, 4 ROTC DMG graduates were released before completing their active duty service obligation.

Of those officers
a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRR:
   • In FY01, 4 were released from AD and assigned to ARNG to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRR, together with the reason for each waiver:

Force Protection
The missions and training we assign Soldiers are not without risks, and Soldiers must be able to live, train, and work in safe, secure environments. We minimize risks by proactively protecting our force. For example, we reevaluated force protection security programs and adjusted over $800 million in FY2003 to further support controlled access to installations, in-transit security, counter-terrorism training improvements, information assurance, situational awareness, crisis response, and force protection command and control. An additional $1.8 billion is required for further force protection and security program requirements generated in the wake of the attacks on America.

Readiness Reporting
Measuring readiness requires accuracy, objectivity, and uniformity. The Army is transforming its current readiness reporting system to achieve greater responsiveness and clarity on unit and installation status. The Strategic Readiness System (SRS) will provide senior leaders with an accurate and complete near real time picture representative of the entire Army (operating forces, institutional forces, and infrastructure). The SRS will be a predictive management tool capable of linking costs to readiness so resources can be effectively applied to near- and far-term requirements. A prototype SRS is being evaluated at selected installations, and its development will continue to ensure compliance with congressionally directed readiness reporting.

TRANSFORMATION
Transformation is first and foremost about changing the way we fight in order to win our Nation’s wars decisively. The 21st Century strategic environment and the implications of emerging technologies necessitate Army Transformation. The global war on terrorism reinforces the need for a transformed Army that is more strategically responsive, deployable, lethal, agile, versatile, survivable, and sustainable than current forces.

Technology will enable our Soldiers to see the battlefield in ways not possible before. See First enables leaders and Soldiers to gain a greater situational awareness of themselves, their opponents, and the battle space on which they move and fight. Superior awareness enables us to Understand First, to assess and decide on solutions to the tactical and operational problems at hand faster than our opponents-to gain decision superiority over our opponents. Networked units are able to Act First, to seize and retain the initiative, moving out of contact with the enemy to attack his sources of strength or key vulnerabilities at a time and place of our choosing. The Army uses precision fires—whether delivered by joint platforms or Soldiers firing direct fire weapons—to defeat the enemy as rapidly and decisively as possible. Army units will be capable of transitioning seamlessly from stability operations to combat operations and back again, given the requirements of the contingency. And when we attack, we destroy the enemy and Finish Decisively.

The Army is taking a holistic approach to Transformation, implementing change across its doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems, as well as across all of its components. Transformation will result in a different Army, not just a modernized version of the current
Army. Combining the best characteristics of our current forces, The Army will possess the lethality and speed of the heavy force, the rapid deployment mentality and toughness of our light forces, and the unmatched precision and close combat capabilities of our special operations forces. Adopting a common warrior culture across the entire force. Transformation will field the best-trained, most combat effective, most lethal Soldier in the world.

True Transformation takes advantage of new approaches to operational concepts and capabilities and blends old and new technologies and innovative organizations that efficiently anticipate new or emerging opportunities. Transformation will provide versatile forces that have a decisive margin of advantage over potential adversaries and fulfill the Nation's full spectrum requirements. Transformed ground forces will dominate maneuver on the battlefield to gain positional advantage over the enemy with overwhelming speed while enhancing the capabilities of the joint force. This approach will contribute to the early termination of the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

Transformation will exploit network-centric capabilities to enable rapidly deployable and sustainable Army forces to quickly and precisely strike fixed and mobile targets throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield.

Transformation consists of three interrelated elements—the Objective Force, the Interim Force, and the Legacy Force. We will develop concepts and technologies for the Objective Force while fielding an Interim Force to meet the near-term requirement to bridge the operational gap between our heavy and light forces. The third element of Transformation is the modernization and recapitalization of existing platforms within our current force—The Legacy Force—to provide these platforms with the enhanced capabilities delivered through the application of information technologies. Several important initiatives that should produce even greater advances in 2002 are the production, testing, and delivery of the Interim Force vehicle early this year, and the development of mature technologies to achieve Objective Force capabilities.

Digitization concepts tested and proved with the Legacy Force are being refined in the Interim Force and will be applied to the Objective Force. These efforts, along with planned training and testing and joint exercises such as the U.S. Joint Forces Command's "Millennium Challenge 2002" will enable the Army to stay ahead of current and future adversaries by providing the Nation and its Soldiers with unmatched advanced capabilities. To achieve additional momentum, we will carefully concentrate research and development and acquisition funding on our most critical systems and programs.

The Objective Force
The end result of Transformation is a new, more effective, and more efficient Army with a new fighting structure—the Objective Force. The Army will field the Objective Force this decade. It will provide our Nation with an increased range of options for crisis response, engagement, or sustained land force operations. Instead of the linear sequential operations of the past, the Objective Force will fight in a distributed and non-contiguous manner. Objective Force units will be highly responsive, deploy rapidly because of reduced

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**ADDENDUM**

Data required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994

**SECTION 517 (B)(2)(A)**
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>AC in RC *</th>
<th>Army Average **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
**Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 517(b)(2)(B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner (as the paragraph above).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>AC in RC ***</th>
<th>Army ****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
**** Below the zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
risks incurred from this resources shortfall could undermine The Army's ability to satisfy national security requirements. At the same time, the war on terrorism, the requirement to secure the homeland, and the need to maintain readiness for possible near-term contingencies have validated the need for a new kind of Army-a capabilities-based ground force that can fight and win battles across the full spectrum of military operations. We are accelerating Army Transformation to achieve these capabilities. The Army cannot predict what other changes the future will bring, but what will not change is the need for our Nation to have the best trained, best led and best equipped Soldiers on the ground, deployed rapidly at precisely the right time, the right place, and with the right support structure as part of a joint military team.

**SOLDIERS ON POINT FOR THE NATION**

**PERSUASIVE IN PEACE, INVINCIBLE IN WAR**

platform weight and smaller logistical footprints, and arrive early to a crisis to dissuade or deter conflict. These forces will be capable of vertical maneuver and defeating enemy anti-access strategies by descending upon multiple points of entry. With superior situational awareness, Objective Force Soldiers will identify and attack critical enemy capabilities and key vulnerabilities throughout the depth of the battle space. For optimum success, we will harmonize our Transformation efforts with similar efforts by other Services, business and industry, and our science and technology partners.

By focusing much of its spending in science and technology, The Army will create a new family of ground systems called the Future Combat Systems (FCS). This networked system-of-systems-a key to fielding the Objective Force-will allow leaders and Soldiers to harness the power of digitized information systems. And the FCS will allow commanders to bring a substantial, perhaps even exponential, increase in combat capabilities to the joint force without a large logistics footprint. Newer technologies will be inserted into the FCS as they become ready.

We owe our Soldiers the best tools and equipment so they are not put at risk by obsolete or aging combat support systems. The Comanche helicopter, the Objective Force Warrior system, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) initiatives are integral components of the network-centric operations of the Objective Force. They are the infrastructure that allows Soldiers to do what they do best-fight and win our Nation's wars. Comanche will provide an armed aerial reconnaissance capability critical for gathering intelligence for coordinated attacks against targets of opportunity. The Objective Force Warrior system will provide quantum improvements over our current soldier systems in weight, signature, information exchange capabilities, ballistics tolerance, and chemical, biological, and environmental protection for our individual Soldiers on the battlefield.

Terrestrial systems alone will not enable full spectrum dominance. Space is a vertical extension of the battlefield and a key enabler and force multiplier for land force operations. Objective Force commanders will access and integrate the full spectrum of C4ISR and Information Operations capabilities, to include national agencies, strategic and operational units, tactical organizations, and joint or multinational forces. In short, commanders will draw upon a wide array of capabilities that enable not just overwhelming force projection, but the ability to out-think our adversaries.

Transporting and sustaining the Objective Force will require capabilities that are cost effective, that adhere to rapid deployment timelines, and that have a smaller logistical footprint over longer distances without jeopardizing readiness. Materiel readiness will be maintained at reduced costs by increasing inventory visibility, eliminating artificial ownership barriers, and integrating automated systems.

**The Interim Force**

The Interim Force is a transition force that bridges the near-term capability gap between our heavy and light forces. It will combine the best characteristics of the current Army forces-
heavy, light, and special operations forces. Organized into Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), it will leverage today’s technology with selected capabilities of the Legacy Force to serve as a link to the Objective Force. Most importantly, the Interim Force—a combat ready force—will allow exploration of new operational concepts relevant to the Objective Force. The Army will field at least six of these new, more responsive brigade combat teams. These units comprise an Interim Force that will strengthen deterrence and expand options for the field commanders. Over the past two years, we have organized two brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, and additional IBCTs are programmed for Alaska, Louisiana, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania. Leaders and Soldiers of the IBCTs at Fort Lewis, along with an Army coordination cell, have been working closely with all supporting agencies to develop wide-ranging iterative solutions to doctrine, training, logistics, organizations, material, and soldier systems required to field the Interim Force. The first IBCT has completed brigade and battalion level headquarters training with the Army’s Battle Command Training Program and company level maneuver live fire training across the spectrum of conflict. The IBCT is training extensively for restrictive and urban terrain, and the force has used special operations training techniques and procedures for the development of night and urban fighting techniques. Training of the Interim Force is proving that the practice of combining heavy, light, and special operations cultures results in a more adaptable and capable leader or Soldier. The Army has learned from experimentation that technology such as digitization allows the integration of intelligence data with tactical and operational information and gives our leaders and Soldiers the ability to seize and retain the initiative, build momentum quickly, and win decisively. The Army is accelerating the development and fielding of the Interim Force and studying the viability of fielding an additional interim capability in the European area.

**The Legacy Force**

As The Army transforms, the Legacy Force—our current force—will remain ready to provide the Nation with the warfighting capability needed to keep America strong and free. Through selective modernization and recapitalization, the Legacy Force allows The Army to meet today’s challenges and provides the time and flexibility to get Transformation right. Effectively managing risk without sacrificing readiness, The Army is focusing resources on systems and units that are essential to both sustaining near-term readiness and fielding the Objective Force while taking prudent risk with the remainder of the force. Recapitalization rebuilds or selectively upgrades existing weapons systems and tactical vehicles, while modernization develops and procures new systems with improved warfighting capabilities. The Army has identified 17 systems its Prioritized Recapitalization Program and fully funded them in selected units. Among these systems are the AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopters; the M1 Abrams tank; the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle; and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile defense upgrade. Modernization provides the linkage to facilitate the fielding of the Interim and Objective Forces. The Crusader self-propelled howitzer will provide combat overmatch to our commanders until at least 2032 and serve as a technology carrier to the Objective Force. Recent restructuring initiatives have reduced Crusader’s strategic lift requirements by 50 percent. Technology improvements have increased its range by 33 percent, increased the sustained rate of fire by a factor of 10, and utilizing robotics, reduced crew requirements by 33 percent. Modernized M1A2SEP tanks and M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicles are capable of the same situational awareness as the Interim Force, thus enabling Soldiers and leaders to learn network-centric warfare on existing chassis. The advantage these information technologies provide our current force further enhance its warfighting capability. Army Aviation modernization efforts will reduce our helicopter inventory by 25 percent and retain only three types of helicopters in service, and the savings in training and logistics will be used to support the recapitalization of our remaining fleet. As part of its Legacy Force strategy, The Army terminated an additional 18 systems and restructured 12 in this budget cycle.

**Revitalizing The Army**

Transformation applies to what we do, as well as how we do it. We are working with the business community to accelerate change across the entire Army, promote cooperation, share information, gain greater control over resource management, and adopt better business practices by eliminating functions or activities that no longer provide value. This initiative seeks to focus constrained resources on achieving excellence in areas that contribute directly to warfighting. Transformation of our business practices cannot wait, and we have started at the highest levels.

The Army is restructuring the Army Secretariat and Army Staff to create a more unified headquarters for the conduct of enhanced policy, planning, and resource management activities. The goal is to transform the headquarters into a streamlined, integrated staff more responsive to rapidly changing operational and institutional missions and to push more resources out to the field units. This will streamline the flow of information and speed decision-making. The unified headquarters will seek greater integration of the reserve components into key staff positions to better accommodate issues and concerns. To minimize turbulence in the workforce, we will reinvest manpower savings in other Army priorities. Realignment initiatives already underway will help us meet the congressionally mandated 15 percent reduction in headquarters staffs. With congressional support, The Army will apply these methodologies to the entire force.

**A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE**

The Army, like the American people, remains committed to preserving freedom. As we have for over 226 years, we will continue to win our Nation’s wars. Contrary to the expectations some, the post-Cold War period has not seen a reduction in the demands placed on Soldiers on the ground. In fact, in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union, the international security environment has underscored the importance of ongoing commitments and highlighted new requirements for The Army. These increased demands have intensified the competition for resources and reduced needed investments in people, systems, platforms, and research and development. Unless redressed,
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