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Military Review
January-February 2005

Lieutenant General Russell L. Honoré, U.S. Army, is Commander, First Continental U.S. Army. He received a B.S. from Southern University A&M College, an M.S. from Troy State University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Air War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS), Europe, Saudi Arabia, and Korea.

Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, U.S. Army, is Commander, 3d Battalion, 87th Division (Training Support). He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. from the University of Louisville, an M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies, CGSC, and is a graduate of the Army War College. He has held various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, Croatia, Bosnia, Egypt, and Kuwait.

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Theater Immersion Postmobilization Training in the First Army

We are in a war with no rear areas or front lines. We have to instill the Warrior Ethos into the mobilized soldiers we train. Every soldier must be able to function as an infantryman. Soldiers must have tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive training until their response is intuitive. When soldiers get off the bus at the [mobilization] station, they must feel they have arrived in Iraq or Afghanistan.

We have a non-negotiable contract with the American people to prepare [our] sons and daughters for war. We must use imagination and innovation to do this better than we ever have before. We cannot; we will not fail in this task.-- LTG Russell L. Honoré

Between 11 September 2001 and the summer of 2003, the First and Fifth Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) mobilized and deployed thousands of Reserve Component (RC) soldiers from the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve for the Global War on Terrorism. In the First Army's area of responsibility (AOR) alone, some 77,924 RC soldiers were trained and deployed from mobilization stations east of the Mississippi River. By the fall of 2004, this number grew to 191,491. Some soldiers and units were employed in the United States as part of Operation Noble Eagle; others deployed to combat zones as part of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. CONUSA mobilized additional ARNG and RC forces and deployed them to the Kosovo Force, the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Initially, most of these soldiers and units were combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) soldiers.

Dynamics changed during the summer of 2003. Entire ARNG-enhanced brigades were called up for duty in combat zones. In the First Army AOR, the 30th Brigade from North Carolina was the first such formation mobilized for employment in Iraq. The 30th Brigade began postmobilization training, with the 24th Infantry Division (ID) in oversight. The 2d Training Support Brigade (TSB) of the 78th Division, Training Support, heavily reinforced with trainers from the 78th and 87th Divisions, had the lead for training. The 30th Brigade executed postmobilization training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Drum, New York. This was a historic mission; it was the first time an entire ARNG-enhanced brigade mobilized and deployed to a war zone under the First Army's auspices. The effort was a success, but the First Army experienced challenges and learned significant lessons.

During the summer of 2004, the First Army mobilized multiple ARNG brigades in the form of Tennessee's 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and Mississippi's 155th Brigade Combat Team (BCT). To avoid competing with active units for training resources on active posts, both formations mobilized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The 278th RCT trained at Camp Shelby from June through September then executed a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at the National Training Center (NTC) in October. After completing the MRX, the 278th RCT returned briefly to Camp Shelby then deployed to theater in November. Similarly, the 155th BCT trained at Camp Shelby from July through October, executed an MRX at the NTC in November, and deployed to theater in December. Leading the First Army effort was a 24th ID command and control (C2) cell with the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division (heavily reinforced by elements of the 87th and 85th Divisions) as the lead trainer.

This approach created an economy of scale that saved resources, particularly training support brigade observer/controller-trainers (OC-Ts). Lessons learned during the 278th RCT's training applied to the 155th BCT's training. Both brigades mobilized at a single location. First Army introduced a new approach to postmobilization training-theater immersion -a training concept that is now the watchword for postmobilization training across the entire First Army AOR.

Reserve Component units called up for mobilization are of all shapes and sizes and perform myriad missions requiring varying training programs. For the most part, the combined forces land component commander (CFLCC) defines specific training requirements, but the list of CFLCC tasks is not all-inclusive. Unit commanders often arrive at mobilization stations with specific mission essential task lists (METL) they want particular emphasis or additional training on. In general, battalions or smaller units receive from 35 to 60 days of postmobilization training, but the precise number of training days varies based on the mission, destination, and latest arrival date in-theater.

The mobilization of brigade-size formations for combat in Iraq demanded a different approach. In wartime conditions, formations receive about 90 days of intense training from the individual level through brigade operations at the mobilization station. Postmobilization training covers a variety of CFLCC-mandated tasks ranging from individual to collective tasks and from stability- and supportfocused operations through conventional combat missions. Reserve Component brigade training concludes with an intense MRX at one of the command training centers.

Theater Immersion

Theater immersion rapidly builds combat-ready formations led by competent, confident leaders who see first, understand first, and act first; battleproofed soldiers inculcated with the warrior ethos man the formations. Theater immersion places-as rapidly as possible-leaders, soldiers, and units into an environment that approximates what they will encounter in combat. At the soldier level, training is tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive, and designed to illicit intuitive soldier responses. It thrusts formations into a theater analog soon after they arrive at their mobilization station and places stress on the organization from individual to brigade levels. Theater immersion is a combat training center-like experience that replicates conditions downrange while training individual- through brigade-level collective tasks.

See first.

Theater immersion's most important component is a deliberate, continuous study of the contemporary operational environment (COE) intheater, particularly a study of the threat. To facilitate this process and because of the evolving nature of the threat in Iraq, the First Army is refining Web-based collaborative information sites and quickly disseminating the latest intelligence and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to trainers. The intelligence officer of the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division with the First Army G2 studied daily intelligence reports from each brigade's targeted employment area, myriad unit after-action reports (AARs); Center for Army Lessons Learned products; and Department of the Army (DA), G3, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force products to replicate and update TTP in the training area. The intelligence officer interviewed soldiers and leaders of all ranks and positions, from riflemen to brigade and division commanders, in-country to obtain the most recent views of the COE. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S3 and the First Army G3 studied the latest TTP and operational patterns of coalition forces to determine the best methods to counter and defeat the threat. Having 20 of its own soldiers deployed to Iraq as coalition military-assistance training teams greatly helped in this process. The teams provided almost daily updates to help craft the training environment and, with 3d Brigade and First Army combat veterans, were employed as OC-Ts soon after returning from Iraq.

Understand first.

The training environment was grounded in an operational scenario updated with fragmentary orders and intelligence summaries and subscenarios for specific training events. Employing crawl-walk-run, eight-step, and multiechelon techniques, soldiers, leaders, and units progressed from individual to collective events and from vehicle and squad to battalion- and brigade-level operations. Collective events culminated at brigade level with a field training exercise (FTX) and peaked at battalion level with a 5-day Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP) that ended with a battalion live-fire coordination exercise (FCX). These events placed a premium on battle command and decisionmaking in a stability operations and support operations (SOSO) environment.

To approximate the environment in-country, the TSB commander and unit leaders executed two reconnaissance missions and predeployment site surveys to confirm training practices were appropriate to each brigade's sector. Key trainers, like the TSB executive officer and the command sergeant major (CSM) traveled to Jordan and Kuwait to ensure appropriate cultural awareness and reception, staging, and onward integration (RSOI) training.

Act first.

The most obvious manifestation of theater immersion is the physical design of training sites. The Army constructed two fully functioning forward operating bases (FOBs) for the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) and 155th Brigade, as well as four villages, a highway overpass, and roads lined with guardrails. The villages included mosques, offices for civil authorities, markets, walled residences, tunnel complexes, traffic circles, and low-hanging telephone and electric cables typical of Iraqi villages.

Joint Coalition Council facilities where soldiers interfaced with indigenous civil leaders replicated those in-theater. The Army transformed cantonment areas into three FOB analogs with entry control points (ECPs), guard towers, and wire. FOBs and towns were named after existing locations in-country, and road signs, police cars, and markets were created based on recent photos from Iraq. To save time and conserve costs, 3d Brigade, 87th Division, soldiers performed most of the construction work to build these sites. For example, the 2d Company, 305th Battalion TSB, built most of the two FOBs for defense training and battalion ARTEPs and FCXs.

Within weeks of arrival at the mobilization station, and after soldier readiness processing and dental and medical examinations, units began operations as tactical formations. Unit leaders planned, prepared, battle-tracked, and controlled their organizations while acclimating to the battle rhythm typical of units fighting in-theater. They had to accomplish some classroom instruction, but training maximized time in the field. Soldiers averaged over 40 days operating from FOBs and camps while under constant threat of attack by a resourceful enemy.

Because time is limited at the mobilization station, immersing soldiers immediately into a replicated combat zone enables focused training 24 hours a day and retraining as needed. Instead of living in a normal garrison environment, soldiers were surrounded by concertina wire, ECPs, and guard towers to simulate the FOB environment. In a FOB, small-unit leaders trained theater-specific tasks, troop-leading procedures, and basic discipline.

To populate the simulated villages, the Army hired 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) including 80 Iraqi-Americans. Under control of the 3d Company of the 349th Logistics Support Battalion (LSB), the COBs, particularly the Iraqi-Americans, added a powerful dose of realism to each training event. Iraqi-Americans portrayed linguists, mayors, police chiefs, religious leaders, terrorists, news reporters, and Iraqi National Guard, Army, and Border Police. They spoke to soldiers only in their native tongue and wore clothing appropriate to their positions. These COBs were given simulated identities, rehearsed at COB academies, and routinely participated in training events. Soldiers encountering the COBs communicated through translators to negotiate, conduct bilateral meetings, gather intelligence, and react to civil disturbances.

A full-time opposing force (OPFOR) from the 3d Company of the 349th LSB, primarily mobilized reservists, rehearsed operations for weeks before the brigades arrived. Dressed and equipped like anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) and with OPFOR academy training and daily S2 updates on the latest threat TTP, the OPFOR designed and executed threat countertasks that immersed training leaders and warriors in the most realistic situations possible. IEDs such as booby traps, mines, projectiles, bombs, and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) were ubiquitous. Soldiers were constantly subjected to simulated sniper, rocket, and mortar attacks.

Instilling the Warrior Ethos

To achieve success against the AIF OPFOR, soldiers and leaders conducted detailed troop-leading procedures, issued doctrinally correct five-paragraph orders, conducted rehearsals, and performed rigorous precombat inspections and precombat checks. The Army treated every training event, including individual weapons qualification; military operations on urban terrain (MOUT); combat patrolling; and cordon and search, as a combat mission.

The Army organized training events in 19 modules, each focusing on 1 or more of 83 theaterspecific CFLCC training tasks. These modules led to new theater-specific METLs for each formation and echelon. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, validated in writing that individuals and units had trained to proficiency, and the commander of First Army approved resulting training plans. The Army created a densely packed training matrix to ensure soldiers could accomplish all required training tasks to standard. Trainers tracked soldiers by name as they progressed through CFLCC-mandated individual tasks. To accomplish this, the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division was heavily reinforced by trainers from the 1st, 4th, and 5th Brigades of the 87th Division and elements of the 4th Brigade, 85th Division. At its peak, the effort employed some 750 First Army personnel to train the 7,000 soldiers of the 278th ACR and 155th BCT. The ratio of OC-Ts to soldiers was ap proximately 1 to 13. TSB commanders responsible for various modules prepared detailed training plans, rehearsing, terrain-walking, and validating training events in detail and preparing risk-management worksheets.

TSB commanders also put their training creativity to the test in multiecheloned training events to validate individual and collective tasks. Speed and trust in absorbing the latest lessons learned and flexible, adaptive, responsive trainers were the watchwords for developing training plans. Theater-specific tasks like FOB defense, ECPs, combat patrols and ground assault convoys, raids, or cordon and search garnered significant attention in training for combat in Iraq. But First Army trainers built many other tasks into the training program, including METL-specific, branch, and specialty training. Gathering and updating the latest TTP for each task and developing appropriate threat countertasks were critical, and this is a continuing process that lies at the heart of theater immersion.

As conditions changed in-theater, trainers rapidly changed conditions on the training battlefield. This approach placed a premium on agile, creative TSB commanders and aggressive, streamlined acquisition of the latest lessons from the war zone.

The trainers included key individual tasks that cross-walked to collective tasks in tough, realistic, hands-on conditions to create intuitive soldier responses. They embedded IED threats in-theater in every training event possible from land navigation to battalion ARTEPs and in every form conceivable, from projectiles slung behind guardrails to boobytrapped buildings and highway overpasses. Soldiers repeatedly trained on multiple tasks. For example, a single simulated rocket attack trains soldiers how to react to indirect fire, casualty evacuation procedures, 9-line medical evacuation requests, damage assessment, crater analysis, counterbattery fire, and many other procedures.

Individual and collective training places emphasis on first-line supervisors and junior-level leaders. AARs focused on key leader skills and the warrior ethos to develop initiative and aggressiveness in formations. At the heart of this approach were comprehensive noncommissioned officer AARs led by TSB and brigade CSMs. As units progressed through training, gaining greater confidence, the responsibility for conducting AARs passed to unit leaders.

The Army devised and executed a robust live-fire program throughout the training matrix to ensure soldiers participated in live-fire events throughout training. Soldiers and units progressed through rigorous premarksmanship instruction to individual- and crewserved- weapons qualification. Reflexive-fire and close combat assault courses included urban scenarios, IEDs, and moving-target arrays followed by live-fire FOB defense against a moving VBIED and squad and platoon live-fire assault courses.

After crew-served-weapons qualification, gunners and assistant gunners qualified on weapons from vehicles such as HMMWVs, heavy expanded mobile tactical trucks, 5-ton trucks or howitzers (day and night), and on moving platforms engaging stationary and moving targets. Crews formed into combat patrols and ground-assault convoys for collective live-fire events in day-and-night conditions, again from moving and stationary vehicles versus moving and stationary targets. Combat vehicle crews executed Bradley and Tank Tables through Table XII. Paladin crews and platoons fired through Field Artillery Table XV. Mortar platoons executed mortar training and evaluation programs. A battalion/brigade FCX combined fires from motorized companies, howitzer platoons, mortar platoons, close air support, and Army aviation. By the time they completed training at Camp Shelby, the 278th RCT and 155th BCT had expended over 2.3 million rounds of ammunition and more than 14,500 soldiers were qualified to use individual and crew-served weapons.

The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, and Camp Shelby also used training devices to enhance soldier weapons proficiency. While tank and Bradley crews employed traditional systems like the Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer, the Army fielded new systems as well, notably the Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer, which soldiers used to good effect to practice and sustain convoy skills. Additional devices the Army found useful in training squads and crew-served weapons teams were the Engagement Skills Trainer- 2000 and the Virtual Battlefield Simulator-1. The Fire Arms, Laser Marksmanship, and Beamhits Training Systems were also superlative primary marksmanship instruction tools. As the 278th RCT and 155th BCT mobilizations drew to a close, the Army fielded mine simulators and training IEDs. These new devices will see plenty of action in future mobilizations.

Draconian Maintenance

Whether soldiers are breaking through Normandy hedgerows or operating from dispersed FOBs throughout Iraq, effective logistics, particularly maintenance, is a key determinant of a unit's ability to effectively perform its mission and survive. The paradigm shift from "normal" operating procedures practiced at armories and drill centers to the full exploitation of the Standard Army Maintenance Information System is a challenge. Rapidly immersing leaders, operators, and units in the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS-G), with emphasis on "blasting" to the Standard Army Supply and Maintenance Systems rather than the antiquated "disc-drop" system, is imperative.

A 2-day structured "ULLS-G Gunnery," with all operators and maintenance leaders in attendance and outside subject matter experts brought in for training, included the U.S. Army Forces Command G4 and a III Corps Command Maintenance Evaluation Team. ULLS-G Gunnery laid the foundation for effective maintenance management and Class IX flow throughout mobilization, into the MRX, and on to theater. Enforcing attendance, oversight, and accountability at brigade-level maintenance meetings was instrumental to unit success.

Trainers issued DA activity codes to units and enforced parts-ordering and tracking. Because time was of essence, trainers inspected and validated all unit equipment before deployment and training. Creating accountability and confidence in the maintenance and supply system was imperative. Training event OC-Ts habitually checked operators and equipment for proper licensing, dispatches, and preventive maintenance checks and services. Operators or equipment found wanting were frozen in place until unit commanders corrected the problem. All of this was reported in tactical AARs.

Command maintenance, evaluation, and training teams and internal trainers, such as the TSB S4 and logisticians with recent theater experience, focused on logistics management and unit administrative and logistical operation center (ALOC) procedures. They stressed recent ALOC TTPs and CSS situational awareness, provided one-on-one assistance, and distributed relevant logistics information, such as the "Mobilizing Unit Leader's Maintenance Management Smart Book and Baseline SOP" and "ALOC Smartbooks" from recent Combined Arms Support Command publications. Because some units received relatively brief postmobilization training, immediately on a unit's arrival trainers stressed a sense of logistical urgency and recent doctrine and TTPs. Establishing a baseline of logistic fundamentals greatly improved unit sustainment.

Battle Command

For ARNG leaders and staffs, steeped in legacy battle command techniques designed for high-intensity operations, counterinsurgency operations and SOSO presented a significant paradigm shift. Commanders' critical information requirements and the military decisionmaking process were no longer easy to apply to the operational environment. ARNG leaders and staffs had to learn a whole new lexicon with supporting tasks and TTPs and apply them to theater immersion so unit leaders could see first, understand first, and act first.

Pattern analysis and sanitation, water, energy, academics, trash-medical, and security charts replaced watchwords like doctrinal and situational templates. Effects-based targeting, information operations, and force-protection working groups moved to positions of prominence in unit planning. ARNG trainers embraced new digital equipment and employed it throughout the formations, and soldiers learned new battle rhythms similar to those encountered in-theater.

A robust Battle Command Training Plan (BCTP) included the Leader Training Program at the NTC; cultural awareness training in Jordan; pre-deployment site surveys; staff and leader IED training; a BCTP command post exercise (CPX); a signal exercise; and company, battalion, and brigade CPXs. Both brigades participated in CPX-based MRXs with each of their go-to-war divisional headquarters.

The 1st (Simulations) Brigade, 87th Division, was the primary trainer for the capstone CPX conducted at Camp Shelby based on the Brigade/Battalion Simulation System. Equipped with a digital division tactical operations center, 1st Brigade, 87th Division, became a simulated higher headquarters and provided digital links for all key Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) devices across brigades. Battalion ARTEPs exercised battalion and brigade C2 with the brigades issuing orders and tracking each battalion.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, knowing the enemy is critical to battlefield success; in battling the AIF, this principle is amplified. Simply put, actionable intelligence drives operations. To build unit proficiency, the First Army developed a rigorous 11-day training plan, which incorporated knowledge of the enemy, to build intelligence products and analysis of the enemy to develop predictive analysis for future operations.

A 2-day knowledge-based training plan gave brigades necessary knowledge to understand the enemy and how he organizes. Soldiers studied insurgency operations, AIF organizations operating in Iraq, enemy weapons systems, IEDs, equipment, and tactics. Soldiers cannot absorb this knowledge in 2 days; the use of the classified computer network is critical to continued study of AIF tactics.

The second element in the training plan was analysis. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) defines success or failure for intelligence organizations. A 9-day training plan included the All-Source Analysis System (Light), urban IPB, link-pattern analysis, collection management, and targeting and analytical techniques. During the first 6 days, soldiers mixed classroom instruction with practical exercises. A 3-day intelligence exercise integrated all subjects taught during the first 6 days of training. The exercise and other brigade staff training, such as brigade and battalion CPXs and battalion ARTEPs, allowed brigades to develop intelligence battle rhythms and become familiar with useful intelligence products. Realistic, detailed threat scenarios reinforced the analytical procedures learned previously. Intelligence training was aggressive and mentally taxing.

Because of the Army's dependence on Army Tactical Command and Control Systems, battle command requires competent signal units. Theater immersion means experiencing theater-like conditions in all collective signal-specific training events. Signal elements set up voice and data communication backbones in FOBs, base camps, and remote sites; moved them; then set them up again. Signal training posed several challenges. A TSB does not possess divisional or area signal asset trainers or tactical network engineers. A garrison support unit does not possess signal-asset maintainers. Contracting support for technical and maintenance expertise; tasking a signal battalion for tactical network support; and creating a signal specific OC-T team from across the 87th Division solved this problem.

Under the 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S6's oversight, training began before units arrived at the mobilization station. Contractors arrived at unit home stations and provided initial operator proficiency assessments, operator training, and equipment assessment and maintenance. Contractors provided assessments to the TSB S6 and helped refine training plans. Once at Camp Shelby, the signal company participated in CPXs and polished unit-collective tasks. The signal company participated in all digital CPXs, and Camp Shelby provided additional digital C2 training during battalion ARTEPs.

Both brigades transformed from heavy, mechanized formations to agile, motorized organizations with HMMWVs and a mechanized infantry task THEA HEA HEATER TER IMMERSION MMERSION 8 January -February 2005 MILITARY REVIEW force. The Army fielded new equipment in these formations, such as ATCCS devices like Blue Force Tracker, Maneuver Control System-Light, and the All-Source Analysis and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, which many Active Component units have yet to receive. New tools of war such as M4 carbines (soldier favorites in the Rapid Fielding Initiative); the Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; and the PROPHET intelligence system facilitated unit training.

Transformation does not apply only to digital systems and new pieces of equipment. Soldiers transform as well. In the case of members of mobilizing brigades, many soldiers were cross-leveled to flesh out changing formations. Combat soldiers like tankers and scouts gained an additional military occupation specialty (MOS) as infantrymen; CS and CSS personnel attended a 20-day 91W course to meet the Army's latest MOS standards. Phased mobilization allowed the Army to call up selected personnel in advance of unit mobilizations and assign them to MOS qualification-producing institutions. These soldiers arrived at the mobilization station at approximately the same time as their parent units.

The MRX was the culminating event in the First Army training program. The brigades debarked from planes and trains and flowed into Fort Irwin in simulated RSOI operations-as if they were moving trough the aerial and sea ports of debarkation in Kuwait en route to Camps Arifjan and Buehring. As they would have to do in Kuwait, the brigades battletracked the build of combat power, force-protected, and planned and prepared for a long, contested move into the Mojave Desert. At the NTC, brigades conducted combat road marches into the AOR and occupied FOBs, faced myriad force-protection, SOSO, and combat tasks prevalent in-theater-all under constant attack from the AIF. Training included robust live-fire MOUT and live-fire and live-counterfire missions by Paladins from the FOBs. Because free elections in-theater are crucial in the strategy for victory in Iraq, election-support missions at the NTC were the units' graduation exercise.

Immersion: An Evolving Concept

First Army did not rest with the success of the 278th RCT and 155th BCT's missions. Trainers from across the First Army descended on Camp Shelby and lessons, techniques, and methods spread rapidly to mobilization stations across the eastern United States. Trainers improved theater-immersion initiatives at each mobilization station and tailored them for combat, CS, and CSS formations. Many trainers also brought their own innovative methods to Camp Shelby. Today, the Army is building FOBs at every major mobilization station, and many theaterimmersion tools pioneered in the 278th RCT and 155th BCT mobilizations are omnipresent.

The most significant lesson learned in the 278th ACR and 155th BCT effort was the need for more sophisticated and rigorous training in battalion and brigade battle command; in particular, effects-based targeting and information operations. Here time is the enemy, as are the multitude of training and transformation requirements that compete for leader time and attention. To mitigate the problem, the Phased Mobilization Concept was expanded to provide more time for leaders, headquarters, and CSS elements to mobilize in advance of the main bodies, which would allow them to complete individual and some collective training requirements before their units mobilized and to better prepare them to guide their organizations. This approach created more time to focus on critical battle command training events, including multiple brigade-level command post exercises as well as a brigade FTX with multiple maneuver battalions in the field.

Finally, it was determined that an OC-T team, created along lines analogous to the NTC Bronco Team, was necessary to coach, teach, and mentor brigade and battalion leaders and staffs throughout postmobilization training. In the future, these initiatives will be put to the test with the mobilization of the 48th Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 2d Brigade, 28th Division, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, as well as other mobilizing units across the First Army AOR.

Also available online at:
http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/english/JanFeb05/Bhon.pdf